Achieving and Maintaining Food Security in the PRC: The Impact on Foreign Policy by Rittenhouse, Paul D
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
12-6-2016
Achieving and Maintaining Food Security in the
PRC: The Impact on Foreign Policy
Paul D. Rittenhouse
pdrittenhouse@hotmail.com
DOI: 10.25148/etd.FIDC001736
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Chinese Studies Commons, Food Security Commons,
International Relations Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rittenhouse, Paul D., "Achieving and Maintaining Food Security in the PRC: The Impact on Foreign Policy" (2016). FIU Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. 3260.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/3260
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
 
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING FOOD SECURITY IN THE PRC: THE  
 
IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
 
requirements for the degree  
of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 in  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 by  
Paul D. Rittenhouse  
2017 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
To: Dean John F. Stack Jr. 
      Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 
 
 
This dissertation, written by Paul D. Rittenhouse, and entitled Achieving and Maintaining 
Food Security in the PRC: The Impact on Foreign Policy, having been approved in re-
spect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. 
 
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Thomas Breslin 
 
_______________________________________ 
Zeng Jin 
 
_______________________________________ 
Gail Hollander 
 
_______________________________________ 
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
 
 
 
Date of Defense: December 6, 2016 
 
The dissertation of Paul D. Rittenhouse is approved. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Dean John F. Stack Jr. 
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
Andrés G. Gil 
Vice President for Research and Economic Development 
and Dean of the University Graduate School 
 
 
Florida International University, 2017 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Many people contributed to the completion of this dissertation.  Throughout my course 
work each of my professors made direct or indirect contributions.  My Committee mem-
bers made direct contributions in time, knowledge, and advice.  Most of all I would like 
to acknowledge Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi.  Dr. Mesbahi provided critical insight 
into establishing the analytical framework for the study that facilitated its organization, 
research, and writing.  
iv 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING FOOD SECURITY IN THE PRC: THE  
IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY 
By 
Paul D. Rittenhouse 
Florida International University, 2017 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how the People’s Republic of China 
has used domestic and foreign policy to achieve and maintain food security.  This is a 
formidable task for the PRC given that it has 20% of the world’s population and only 7% 
of its arable land.  It has been made more formidable by domestic policy errors and its 
changing position within the international system. 
The PRC has evolved from a Marxist revisionist state to one that mixes state capi-
talism and free enterprise and has become a combination of revisionist and status quo. 
Such changes lend themselves to process-tracing as a methodology in order to reveal the 
rationale behind the change and the resulting impact on food security.  To capture this 
evolution, a food paradigm is constructed for various eras that reflect domestic influences 
on food security.  To this is added the international aspect; the choice of what countries it 
would or could trade with, as needed.  Together the domestic and international are com-
bined to obtain a complete view of the food paradigm and resulting food security situa-
tion for each era. 
In pursuing food security this dissertation will focus on rice, wheat, soybeans, and 
maize, the prime grains for human consumption and animal feed in the PRC. These 
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grains provide much of the caloric intake of the population as well as being the prime re-
serve products.  The results show that these products have been used as a tool of foreign 
policy to reward or punish other states by adjusting their imports and exports to send po-
litical messages as seen fit.  The PRC has always maintained a diversified import supply 
base, but as imports have continued to grow, the supply base is expanding.  Expansion is 
not through land-grabbing but by contract growing by local farmers in less developed 
countries and leasing land in developed countries, both on previously uncultivated lands.  
Simultaneously, there are efforts to improve grain production in African countries, 
among others.  Increasing output there will increase total world supply, an indirect bene-
fit to the PRC food security and to its image abroad. 
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Chapter I -  INTRODUCTION 
 
Food is an indispensable need for all creatures.  In the modern world, states take 
on the responsibility having food available for its population.  This can be accomplished 
wholly by the state or through a market system or a combination thereof.  When a state 
creates the conditions for a consistent food supply it is said to be food secure.  Conditions 
refer to the domestic policies and trade-offs that affect the growing of crops and raising 
of livestock plus whatever additional foodstuffs must be imported.    
Food is an asset that can be sold or purchased.  Normally, states engage in trade 
when they have surplus food to sell and when they are in a deficit position they purchase 
food from other states.  Whenever food moves from one country to another international 
relations are involved.  Foreign policies, the means a state employs in pursuing its inter-
ests, in this case food security, will be crafted to assure food security for those in a deficit 
position as well as those in a surplus position.  The PRC always had a degree of flexibil-
ity regarding what countries they purchased food from, and what countries they sold or 
gave it to.  That flexibility permitted trade to be a tool to influence, signal, reward, or 
punish the states they chose, or did not choose, to engage in trade.  Those decisions could 
be made for food security reasons or for unrelated reasons.  So long as a choice existed, 
the tool carried meaning. 
Food security has been an issue in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its 
founding in 1949.  Food security is an issue the PRC would prefer to solve domestically.  
When unable to do so, it had to be achieved through engagement with the rest of the 
world, therefore affecting foreign policy.  This dissertation will address the interplay of 
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foreign policy and the pursuit of food security to answer the question of how and why 
foreign policy decisions were made that furthered PRC interests in terms of food security, 
and its position within the international system.   
 
What is Food Security? 
Human food security is simply having enough to eat, with the proper nutritional 
and caloric content, to support the population at any stage of life and occupation.  It is a 
basic physiological need, like clothing and shelter, according to Maslow1.  The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) definition is more expansive:  “Food security exists 
when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food  preferences for an active and 
healthy life” (FAO : 2010).    Whether the food is grown, purchased, or arrives via wel-
fare is immaterial as long as it is provided.  Often, this becomes an issue of distribution 
(Sen: 7-8).  Distribution refers to three separate issues:  The need to move food to areas 
of shortfall which is an economic development issue.  It can be an affordability issue 
caused by higher food prices or reduction in the income of the consumer.  Or, it can be 
the availability of welfare food, either temporary to offset harvest shortages or perma-
nent.2 
                                                 
1 Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs begins with basic physiological needs (including food) and ascends 
to safety and security, belonging and social satisfaction, self-esteem, and self-actualization. 
 
2 Of these two definitions, the FAO definition of food security becomes aspirational when “food prefer-
ences” become a requirement to be met in order to achieve food security.  Sen’s concerns over distribution 
and entitlements should serve as a reminder that food security will always be an issue with parts of society 
either on a periodic or permanent basis, a case where food preferences are not an issue and where having 
enough to eat with proper nutritional and caloric content is the essence of food security. 
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How would the condition of a state’s food security be measured?  One measure is 
the Global Hunger Index which measures the percentage of undernourished, underweight 
children under five years, and children dying before the age of five.  In this index, which 
excludes the industrialized countries, the PRC has a score of 5.1 ranking it 43rd in the 
world and above the world average of 14.7 (the lower the score the better).  Overall, the 
PRC score is considered moderate.  For comparison purposes, Russia has a score of 4 
which is better.  The PRC Global Hunger Index score has improved by 50% since 1990 
(Global Hunger Index: 2012).   
Another way to measure food security would be total output.  Even with a short-
age of arable land the PRC is the largest grain producing country in the world due to 
quite high total output per hectare (ha.).  When population is considered, however, the per 
capita grain production tells a different story.   
Food balance sheets (FBS), compiled by the FAO, are another way to measure 
food security.  The object of the FBS is to arrive at the per capita caloric intake available 
for a country.  It includes net domestic production of all categories of food (grains, vege-
tables, fruits, dairy, and animal), contributions or withdrawals from stocks, imports and 
exports, uses for seed, animal feed, industry, and processing loss, to arrive at the total cal-
ories (of protein, fat, and energy) available for human consumption.3  The FBS method of 
measuring food security is the most complete and comprehensive.  However, it fails to 
account for distribution issues that appear, indirectly, in the Global Hunger Index.  By 
                                                 
3 Using grain as an example, the net production of wheat would take the harvested grain and subtract the 
amount needed for seed for the following season, wastage, processing losses, uses other than food, and ani-
mal feed.  
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definition, the FBS takes into account total output which is a crude measure of food secu-
rity, yet is also the basis for it. 
In pursuing food security this dissertation will focus on rice, wheat, soybeans, and 
maize, the primary grains for human consumption and animal feed in the PRC.  These 
grains provide much of the caloric intake of the population as well as being the prime re-
serve products.  There are other factors involved in achieving food security including wa-
ter availability and quality, and elements of climate change.  These issues are extremely 
important but are beyond the focus of this dissertation.  However, as with crops other 
than grains, they will be included should they shed light on the primary topic.  
 
Food Security and the PRC 
The history of China has been one in which the availability of food has always 
been of paramount concern for the population and the leadership.  A subsistence-based 
agriculture needed good growing conditions to assure the basic means of survival. The 
imperial leadership needed a surplus to extract from each harvest to support the govern-
ment’s needs, what urban population there was, and to supply the grain reserves that 
served as insurance against a bad harvest (Li 2007).  Without a good harvest, segments of 
the population faced food insecurity; back-to-back bad harvests could lead to disaster. 
The rapid growth in the Chinese population in the last half of the 20th century sent 
the total to well over a billion.  Now, approximately 20% of the world population lives in 
the PRC, a country with approximately 7% of the world’s arable land.  Historically, 
China has been able to meet the growing demand for food through expansion of agricul-
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tural activities to unused land.  In the current era of modernization, agriculture faces in-
tense competition for arable land.  Improved and larger housing, roads, industrial estates, 
dietary changes related to increasing wealth, and even golf courses all remove land from 
agricultural pursuits.  In the case of dietary changes, increased meat consumption results 
in increased demand for feed grains, and decreased demand for grain for human con-
sumption.  This issue is compounded by environmental concerns including overall pollu-
tion, decreasing water quality, climate change, and increasing desertification.   Hence, in-
tensive agriculture practices have had to replace extensive practices to increase the food 
supply.  
While China faces these problems, the world does also.  There is concern in the 
world regarding the projected population increase to about 8.3 billion in 2030 from about 
7 billion today (Human Development Report, 2011: 165).4  How will all of these people 
be fed?  Many people have raised this question, Paul Ehrlich and Lester Brown being two 
of the most published on the subject.5  Couple the total population growth projections and 
increasing life expectancy, and the pressure on the food supply will grow.   
In the years since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) pursued a number of agriculture policies to meet the ideals of a communist state, 
before stepping away from those ideals to meet the growing demand for food as well as 
economic development.  First, there was land redistribution then collectivization to meet 
communist ideals.  Poor performance in agriculture under collectivization led to famine, 
                                                 
4 IFPRI suggests that a population of 9 billion will consume at the rate of 12 billion should consumption 
trends follow those of the industrialized world. (Global Hunger Index:2012, 4) 
 
5 Brown’s 1995 book, Who Will Feed China? is said to have had a profound impact on the PRC govern-
ment despite the advances made in the previous 25 years. (Crook: 63) 
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and the need to sacrifice ideals to improve output. This was accomplished through de-col-
lectivization, freer markets, regional self-sufficiency, farm subsidies, and the limited use 
of comparative advantage domestically and internationally.  Once free of the transitional 
politics of agriculture, government efforts have been focused on maintaining control of 
the PRC’s food supply to the greatest possible extent.  Control relates to both price stabil-
ity and assured supply.  Domestically, regional self-sufficiency directives are an attempt 
to minimize regional price differentials.  The attempt to maintain agricultural land has led 
to a minimum acceptable amount for agricultural activities, according to the State Coun-
cil.  The national “red line” of 120 million ha. of arable land should not be violated due to 
concerns over grain security.6  Trade in agricultural products, once an action of last re-
sort, is accepted as necessary.  However, to maintain as much control as possible, acquir-
ing land in foreign countries to grow crops for consumption in the PRC is being pursued 
(Zhang, 2011: 2).7   
All of these policy shifts have been implemented against the backdrop of the PRC 
attempting to realize its perception of its “rightful” place in the community of states, that 
of a Great Power.  As with domestic agricultural policy adjustments, foreign policy 
changes have also been occurring.  These have ranged from ideologically based “leaning” 
to the Soviet model then adding Chinese characteristics to that model, forsaking the inter-
national system and attempting to create and lead the developing world.  Then, the PRC 
                                                 
6 Xinhua, August 14, 2008.  Accessed 8/12/13. 
 
7 International “land grabs” have been reported extensively, yet inconclusively by many newspapers, 
NGO’s, and international organizations such as the World Bank, FAO, IFAD etc.  This will be covered in 
Chapter VI.    
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reversed itself by seeking protection within the balance of power framework through rap-
prochement with the U.S. and a pragmatic engagement with the world to assist in the 
modernization of the PRC (MacFarquhar: 1987; MacFarquhar, 1991). 
 
Food Security Solutions 
 
In the long term, a state with a food security issue has three choices of how to 
solve the problem.  First, it may pursue a domestic solution, increasing domestic supply.  
Second, it can look to trade to obtain its food security.  There is also a third, but very 
long-term method; it can take steps to reduce its rate of population growth, so that the 
long range potential of agricultural capabilities and population are consistent.  In this sec-
tion we will discuss domestic and trade as solutions to achieve food security.  Trade, the 
“low politics” of international relations, requires that we understand the PRC’s guiding 
principles in dealing with the outside world.  Once we have determined that, later in the 
chapter we can look at how food can be used as a tool of foreign policy. 
“In the short run with given food supplies, the challenge is buffer stocks, open 
trade, and transfers to match food availability with individual food needs” (Tweeten: 
1999, 482).  The PRC tended to rely less on trade and more on buffer stocks and control-
ling demand to assure food security.  Farmers were allowed to keep 250 kg. of grain per 
adult, with less for  children and the elderly, to sustain them until the next year’s harvest.  
Urbanites had their consumption controlled via rationing, starting in 1953 (Rada: 1983, 
521) for grain, pork, and oil (Chinn: 1980, 744-8).  Food stocks are maintained by the 
government and continue to be state secrets.  Rada references a writer who claimed re-
serves reached 80 million tons in 1975, but he believes that was only a target amount and 
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in any case was such an extremely large quantity by any measure that it would have been  
impractical to collect or store (Rada: 1983, 529).  These are traditional methods to com-
pensate for poor weather conditions and in some cases to affect the cost of grain. 
Longer term, for a country that suffers from food insecurity, the fundamental rea-
son must be that population is too high for the existing productive capacity of its arable 
land.  Domestic solutions to food security may be limited by natural endowments, soil 
quality, climate, and water availability being the principal ones.  With those constraints 
there are methods to alter the structure of agriculture, the production, distribution, and 
consumption patterns of a given state.   
With respect to production, financial incentives for farmers to produce more are 
the quickest ways to improve output.  Financial incentives can be through higher crop 
prices, either direct or via subsidies, through lower taxes, or for subsidized inputs.  Alter-
ing the legal structure of land ownership was another way to increase output.  Giving land 
ownership to the farmer provides incentives to grow more as the farmer will be able to 
receive the benefit of all of the increased output.  The application of science also increase 
output.  Better seeds, the use of chemical fertilizers and irrigation are proven to increase 
output. 
Improved distribution networks of grain can also improve output in two ways.  
First, they allow for the use of comparative advantage, growing crops in the areas they 
grow best rather than having to produce a non-optimal mix of crops in order to have some 
of all types.  Second, it allows grain to be moved more quickly and efficiently to areas 
that find themselves in a short-erm shortage position.  Finally, there can be changes in 
consumption patterns.  Financial disincentives can be used to drive the prices of some 
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products higher so that consumers will opt for less expensive ones that can be grown in 
greater quantities.   
An indirect way to provide food security is to develop non-agricultural products 
that can be exported to earn foreign exchange (FX) that can be used to purchase food 
from abroad.  This is a common practice for countries without the natural endowments or 
an insufficient arable land / man ratio to be self-reliant in food.  In the coming chapters 
we will see how the PRC used all of these techniques in order to increase grain output, as 
well as disincentives that did not work well. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Since 1949, the PRC has gone from a Marxist state to a nearly capitalist one; from 
a revisionist state to nearly a status quo one; from a poor and undeveloped state to the 
second highest national GDP in the world; from a taker of norms to a maker of norms in 
international government organizations (IGO); from a state that relied on human strength 
for economic and military accomplishment to one that uses advanced technology and has 
nuclear weapons.  This study will involve PRC domestic policies, economic develop-
ment, international politics, foreign policy, and international trade.  The best way to ap-
proach wide range of disciplines is through process tracing.  Process tracing is applicable 
as this story requires a thick descriptive examination that ebbs and flows over time and is 
based on qualitative information.  (Collier: 2011, 823-830; Bennett and George 1997).  
Process tracing has also proved to be appropriate for analytic eclecticism according to Al-
ice Ba; “The process of tracing…particular ideas over time revealed the importance of 
process…and pattern of ideational-material interactions…” (Sil & Katzenstein: 2010, 
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199).  Yet, “It does not make sense to pursue an eclectic approach as a research goal. Ra-
ther eclecticism is the unintended result of research that seeks to explain specific events 
as well as possible” (Schimmelfennig quoted Ba: 2010, 15).   
Once process tracing leads the need to seek to explain what has happened, the tra-
ditional approaches of realism or liberalism might be employed to identify causation.  
Should a specific paradigm, theory, or discipline become the sole frame of reference for a 
study, the foundational assumptions of the chosen paradigm may preclude complete un-
derstanding (Sil & Katzenstein: 2010, 10; Sil: 2000, 1-21).  To explain, understand, and 
gain insight, “analytic eclecticism” is an appropriate approach, especially given the mag-
nitude of changes that have occurred since 1949. Sil and Katzenstein offer pragmatism as 
the method of inquiry within analytic eclecticism for several reasons.  Applying pragma-
tism to analytic eclecticism, and the study of international relations, first “implies that 
competing perspectives need to be reformulated in order to facilitate novel efforts to con-
stitute and solve a problem.”  Second, it bypasses paradigmatic rigidity “in favor of open-
ended efforts to frame, and address socially important problems facing actors in a social 
world.”  Third, it “emphasizes creativity in adapting and recombining elements of theo-
retical knowledge produced by separate research communities.”  Fourth, it “eschews rigid 
boundaries and hierarchies in the production of knowledge, encouraging reflection and 
deliberation…” (Sil & Katzenstein: 2010,47).        
Sil and Katzenstein regard realism, liberalism, and constructivism to be the lead-
ing paradigms of international relations and are worthy of inclusion within analytic eclec-
ticism. Marxism also will be noted due to its influence in the early decades of the PRC.  
11 
 
Given the dramatic changes that have occurred during the PRC era, all four may offer in-
sights into that evolution and will assist in evaluation.  Such an approach will assist in 
evaluation of the food security issue over time, just as the PRC leadership has evolved in 
its thinking over the same time frame, to address a question that involves multi-dimen-
sional tradeoffs that have practical implications and ultimately can be best explained and 
understood outside of single paradigm limitations. 
 
Marxism 
The PRC was formed through a successful revolution that brought the victorious 
Communist Party to power.  Marxism addresses human security only through class ten-
sions, the proletariat and peasantry against the bourgeois, and not until that dynamic is 
superseded by ownership of the means of production by the proletariat and peasantry will 
that tension be addressed (Pettman: 2005, 10).  Marxism was supposed to improve the 
quality of life for the peasantry and the laboring classes. 
The failure of communization, and the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the need to 
recover from them introduced the first attempts to soften the impacts of Marxist commu-
nal organization.8  From this point on, there would be a constant debate on the extent of 
state involvement in the economy.  Put another way, where should the PRC be in relation 
to the communism / socialism / capitalist continuum.  The debate continues today but is 
focused only on the socialist / capitalist end of the spectrum. 
                                                 
8 This was the time that Deng Xiaoping used the phrase “it does not matter whether the cat is black or white 
as long as it catches mice,” a metaphor  for ideology not mattering so long as the results were positive. 
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The Marxist fixation on class tensions left little room for any discussion of for-
eign policy.  The successful conclusion of Marxist theory would have worldwide govern-
ment by and for the proletariat without national distinction, thereby obviating the need for 
foreign policy.  Lenin supplied a foreign policy aspect to Marx when he created the Com-
intern as a vehicle to “promote class war everywhere outside Russia, to convert imperial-
ist war into civil war, and to further the cause of world revolution” (Hopper: 1941, 737).  
While this was essentially a Russian / USSR foreign policy, it provided a prescription of 
action for future communist governments.  The PRC continued this tradition during 
Mao’s reign, particularly in Southeast Asia.   
 
Realism 
Classical realism holds that units (states) are differentiated, rational, and therefore 
interested in acquiring power in order to protect their interests, of which the primary one 
is survival of the state. To assure survival, the acquisition of power is an unending task, 
made necessary by an anarchic world full of surprises. How much power is needed to sur-
vive is an unanswered question, knowable only once states engage in conflict.   There-
fore, realists seek relative gains in all material capabilities.  In that way they are always 
gaining on those with more power or lengthening their lead in power.  Hans Morgenthau, 
a leading realist, includes human nature in his realism and applies morality to his realism.  
Human nature, the fundamental traits shared by humans, is at the root of man’s objective 
laws and will be challenged only by those willing to risk failure.  Morality enters as a 
principle that must be acceptable to both man and the state.  The morality of one state is 
not necessarily more moral than that of another (Morgenthau: 1978, 12-3).  With respect 
13 
 
to trade-- a key aspect in this dissertation-- classical realism maintains that trade exists 
because the state permits it, and in an anarchic world, only the state alone can provide for 
its best interests.  Shambaugh calls realists in the PRC “’China Firsters’, caring little 
about the interests of other countries or constituencies in world affairs” and maintains 
that they are the dominant school of PRC international relations thinking (Shambaugh: 
2013, 31). 
Neorealism or structural realism posits that the international system is controlled 
by major powers, each with the overriding goal of survival in an anarchic world.  Sur-
vival requires power.  But contrary to classical realism, the amount of power required is 
only that sufficient for survival, not a never-ending acquisition of it.  When one state or a 
group of aligned states become too powerful, neorealism maintains that the other major 
powers will align to balance the perceived power of the other(s), thus keeping the interna-
tional system in balance and away from war (Waltz : 2006, 116-23).  The problem with 
neorealism is that it operates only at the international level considering great powers and 
dismisses domestic and leadership considerations of states.  Waltz explicitly says that ne-
orealism is a systemic theory that precludes reduction in the level of analysis to the unit 
or individual levels, and therefore foreign policy as well (Waltz : 2006, 121-3).    
Neoclassical realism offers the best approach within realism as a whole.  While 
accepting the neorealist structure of Waltz, neoclassical realism explicitly accepts the 
idea that domestic policies have a bearing on the foreign policies of states.  “It explicitly 
incorporates both external and internal variables….adherents argue that the scope and 
ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the inter-
national system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities….however, 
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that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, be-
cause systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit 
level.” (Rose: 1998, 146)  Lobell et al maintain that states “conduct foreign policy based 
upon their assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions, but always subject to 
domestic constraints….threat assessment, strategic adjustment, and policy implementa-
tion are inherently difficult and may entail considerable bargaining within a state’s lead-
ership and with other stakeholders within society”  (Lobell, Ripsman, &Taliaferro: 2009, 
25-6).  Further, under both Mao and Deng Xiaoping, the unit level was driven by their 
position or the prestige of the leader, a further reduction in level of analysis. 
Neoclassical realism provides us with a systemic view of world politics while in-
corporating foreign policy, which will add the reductionist aspect Waltzian neorealism 
discounts, to better understand the interactions between systemic, regional, interstate, and 
domestic issues in play continuously and at times of changes in the PRC food policy.  Af-
ter all, PRC foreign policy is predicated on its domestic policies and situation.  Former 
PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made the statement, “diplomacy is an extension of 
internal affairs” (quoted in Gurtov: 2010, 14). 
Given China’s “century of humiliation,” (1840-1949) it would seem that neoclas-
sical realism would be the proper lens through which to evaluate the PRC’s foreign pol-
icy and food security.  However, given the increasing involvement of the PRC in the or-
ganizations that encompass an incomplete (and always incomplete) form of world gov-
ernment, realism should be questioned as the only appropriate lens.  Liberalism may pro-
vide additional insights unavailable to a strictly realist point of view. 
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Liberalism 
Liberalism, especially in regards to trade, will play an important part in this study.  
The “bottom-up” approach of liberalism runs counter to realism.  It looks at the individ-
ual as a relevant actor and at how individuals coalesce into groups and make collective 
decisions.  It incorporates this into views of economics and world politics (Keohane, 
2002).   
Liberalism is characterized by its belief in markets and in trade and that trade re-
duces the probability of conflict.  Regarding to trade, liberalism sees it as mutually bene-
ficial and directed from the bottom up to take advantage of market opportunities.  Liber-
als see absolute gains from trade as being beneficial; this contrasts with the realist view 
that successful trade results in achieving relative gains.  The PRC treatment of trade has 
spanned both the realist and liberal paradigms and neoliberal institutionalism within the 
framework of liberalism, as evidenced by its membership in the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  By joining 
these IGOs, it must abide by the rules and norms of the organization.  Theory holds that 
states that join international organizations are able to achieve more as the behavior of 
states moves closer and closer to the expectations of the organization (Karns & Mingst: 
2010, 42)9.  Regime Theory also holds that regime members are less likely to use coer-
cion against another member (Russett & Oneal: 2001, 193-6), and that trading states are 
less likely to engage in conflict (Russett & Oneal: 2001, 145-8).    
                                                 
9 A realist institutionalist would maintain that the PRC joins these international organizations in order to 
change the organization from the inside and remake it into an organization corresponding to the way the 
PRC sees the world.   
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Another element of liberalism is the decreasing efficacy of military power to set-
tle disputes.  This is manifested in the globalized world where power projection is more 
difficult due to distance and the trade regime that currently exists, which, though still 
with problems (especially in times of real or perceived crisis), uses the market to allocate 
scarce resources (Keohane & Nye: 2001, 23-5,  Rosecrance: 1986, 16).  Perhaps the 
world is approaching a point where economic competition will supersede dispute resolu-
tion by force. 
As coercive power is becoming less efficacious the use of soft power is increas-
ing.  Nye refers to co-optive power as getting others to want what you want.  It can be ac-
complished through the use of soft power resources: culture, ideology (ideas and prac-
tices worth emulating), and international institutions (Nye: 1990, 167).  The PRC has a 
strong interest in soft power and pursues it through its development model: non-interfer-
ence in domestic affairs of other states, and promotion of Chinese culture (Cho & Jeong: 
2008, 456).10  Soft power is and will be important in the discussions on food security and 
foreign policies of the PRC, especially within the developing world.  The PRC, consistent 
with its desire to lead the developing world, has invested resources and people in Africa 
to improve agriculture there.  This can payoff for the PRC by increasing the gross availa-
bility of food in the world (most likely) or by becoming an export market for African 
food products. It also provides the PRC with additional allies, especially in UN voting.  It 
                                                 
10 Cho and Jeong acknowledge Nye’s work on soft power as a catalyst in the PRC’s thoughts and pursuits 
of the subject.  They point out that China scholars eventually decided Nye’s version of soft power was an 
American version and that the PRC needed to develop soft power tailored to the needs and abilities of the 
PRC.  
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is worth mentioning here that while soft power can be a tool for getting others to want 
what you want, if not done well it can demonstrate that your way is not to be followed.   
Liberalism is important in understanding the way that the PRC has come to inter-
act with the rest of the world in regards to trade, interdependence, soft power, and how it 
operates within the context of IGOs where food is an issue of importance.  Liberalism of-
fers a way of looking at today’s world from an economic power base as opposed to a mil-
itary based power.  
 
Constructivism 
Constructivism, with its focus on identity, ideas, and agency, appears to be the 
paradigm that will help close the gap between paradigms and to offer understanding of 
the many changes that the PRC has implemented.     
The PRC has the long history of imperial China on which to draw for its iden-
tity.11  However, to differentiate itself from the past, Mao denigrated previous aspects 
such as the Confucian hierarchical society in order to move the PRC into an egalitarian 
future.  At the same time, in identifying initially with the Soviets, Mao, as Deng did later, 
added the aspect of “Chinese characteristics” to communism and a market-based econ-
omy, respectively.  Not only did this separate the PRC from standard understandings of 
those terms, it served to add the exceptionalism or uniqueness of the Chinese past to the 
                                                 
11 The foreign policy of Imperial China provides an excellent example of constructivism.  The superiority 
of the Chinese state (identity) was acknowledged by tributary states that in turn received trading privileges.  
In following the procedures laid down by China (norms) the system continued and served to maintain a 
peaceful relationship (interests).  Further, tributary states tended to apply the same system to other states, 
furthering the established normative behavior.  See Chapter II for more detailed information on the tribu-
tary system. 
18 
 
PRC present.  The changes that have occurred in the PRC are the result of ideas and the 
effect of agents modifying the structure or patterns of behavior that were in place at the 
time.  None had a greater impact than Mao as an agent, but the structure that his agency 
created was weak.  He took action based on his desires and beliefs but could not trans-
cend the imperial structure and culture created over the previous 2000 years.  The unin-
tended consequence of Mao’s choices was the modification of his egalitarian and revolu-
tionary goals.  The intended goals of Deng, to re-introduce material incentives to produc-
tion, were successful, yet potentially brought with them the unintended consequence of 
desire for political liberalization.  As the PRC has engaged with the world, accepting the 
norms of IGOs has modified its behavior.  Simultaneously, it has attempted to modify in-
ternational behavior in seeking to modify IGO norms. 
Constructivism will be used to work with the ideas and identities associated with 
the PRC and its leadership.  One could say that the PRC continues to be in a stage of con-
structing its identity.  As mentioned above, it has taken on several since 1949.  Implicit in 
that is the change of interests that accompanies the change in identity.  Personal identi-
ties, “tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are” (Hopf: 1998 175).  
Identities are formed intersubjectively, an interaction between the self and the other.  
States have identities also, intersubjectively determined that give other states an indica-
tion of behavior predictability, a need to prevent chaos (Hopf: 1998, 174).  When identi-
ties are not determined intersubjectively, a state’s internal perception may be inconsistent 
with the perception of other states, and chaos or misunderstanding and its consequences 
may occur. 
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Wang uses textbooks to depict the CCP version of national identity. The national 
identity narrative of the PRC, depicted in textbooks, was first one of the triumph of the 
revolution and class struggle.  This continued until the 1989 Tiananmen incident which 
served as the catalyst for revision. The revision of textbooks was completed by 1991 and 
stressed victimization of China by the West and had a strong dose of nationalism.12  
Wang sees the change in the presentation of national identity as also giving the CCP a 
reason for being following Tiananmen (Wang: 2008, 790).    
Increased nationalism serves to cause overreaction to real or perceived provoca-
tions limiting the PRC’s flexibility on the domestic and international fronts.  But it is also 
consistent with the PRC position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states 
(and therefore the internal affairs of the PRC).   
Interests are derived from identity.  States pursue their own interests in order to 
maintain state-society arrangements, which serve to constrain their foreign policies.  To 
do so, state survival, autonomy over resource allocation, economic well-being, and col-
lective self-esteem are the overriding interests of the state (Wendt, 2003: 235-7).  Issues 
faced by the PRC (and many other countries) are the trade-offs that must be addressed 
within domestic resource allocation to be successful in meeting the other interests con-
sistent with identity.  Wendt may be correct that satisfying those interests constrains for-
eign policy.  However, the natural endowments of the state may also serve to enhance 
foreign policy options as well as to constrain them.     
                                                 
12 Wang cites Callahan saying that the National China Library maintained that no new “national humilia-
tion” books were published between 1947 and 1990 (Wang : 789). 
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The litany of changes within the PRC since its inception is extensive.  At the in-
ternational system level, it has aligned with both superpowers and has twice followed in-
dependent foreign policies.  At the state level, its economic approach has moved from 
egalitarian to materialist; at the individual level, from the charismatic leadership to a bu-
reaucratic one.  The PRC actually has a dual problem in its identity.  Not only does it 
have to construct / confirm a national identity, it must also maintain the identity and inter-
ests of the CCP.  To maintain power, the ideology-driven CCP is the institution that has 
moved towards materialism to improve the economy and the living conditions of the citi-
zens.  That movement is incomplete given the high Gini coefficient, rule by man not law 
(especially with regards to private property), and a political system facing small but in-
creasing demands for additional popular input.   
The emphasis on ideas, identity, interests, and agency and the state-society rela-
tionship that constructivism emphasizes will add an important element to this study.  It 
provides a means to dig into the thoughts of actors at the unit level and the resulting 
thoughts and actions that apply to the unit operating in the international system.  This will 
be important in any study of China given its relative reclusiveness starting in the Ming 
Dynasty and its attempt to reestablish itself as a Great Power. 
 
 
Constructing a Food Paradigm 
To understand the dynamics of the PRC food supply, a food paradigm will be 
constructed.  The food paradigm will be the attributes and policies of the country that the 
government employs, or influences, to achieve (or fails to achieve) food security for its 
21 
 
citizens.  It is a function of natural endowments and the result of the state-society rela-
tionship, food production and distribution capabilities or economic development, and 
population size.  At any point in time, the existing food paradigm can be evaluated to de-
termine the efficacy of its ability to deliver food security, the outcome of the strategies 
and tactics used to meet the objective of food security.  Operating under policies of au-
tarky and self-reliance, the food paradigm would be strictly a domestic issue.  Under con-
ditions of self-sufficiency, trade with the rest of the world would make up for domestic 
production shortfalls in the food paradigm.13  
Each of the elements of the food paradigm is inter-related where a change in one 
can have either a positive or negative impact on the other(s).  The origins of the food par-
adigm, excluding natural endowments, can be found in domestic politics and economic 
                                                 
13 Self-reliance and self-sufficiency present definitional problems.  Using FAO definitions, self-sufficient 
“implies meeting food needs, as far as possible, from domestic sources and minimizing dependence on 
trade.”  Self-reliant “takes into account the possibility of international trade…implies maintaining some 
level of domestic production plus generating the capacity to import from world markets as needed” (FAO, 
2000).   These two terms tend to be used interchangeably.   When Ministry of Agriculture states that the 
PRC is 95% self-sufficient in grain and imports will make up the shortfall, there is a dependence on im-
ports.  Implicit in the PRC comment is that they will have sufficient resources to pay for the imported grain, 
most likely from the earnings of other exports.  This meets the need for imports in both FAO definitions.  
According to the FAO, the term “self-reliant” should have been used.  
 The Chinese term for self-reliance is zili gengsheng meaning “regeneration by one’s own efforts” 
(Kerr : 2007,6).  In the initial decades of the PRC, self-reliance was the development modality.  The rebirth 
of the Chinese nation and the birth of the PRC were to be achieved internally.  Foreign elements were elim-
inated in some areas and used as little as possible in others, thus ending the foreign domination of the previ-
ous 100 years.  Development could occur anyway just as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was success-
ful against the Japanese and the Nationalists by being self-reliant, so could the PRC as a whole.  Wu de-
fines the PRC as “a country committed to a policy of self-reliant development [that] will not engage in the 
type of transactions that would undermine its goal of national independence or violate its own unique de-
velopmental vision” where that vision is a “militarily strong, economically self-sufficient, and politically 
autonomous China” (Wu : 1981, 452).   
Self-reliance and self-sufficiency are not only applied to the PRC as a whole but also to regions 
within the country.  This resulted in a low level of regional specialization and division of labor and there-
fore the absence of comparative advantage.  Following the departure of the Soviets, economic development 
policy was based on import substitution and self-reliance. Trade was considered a residual activity to be 
engaged in so long as imports and exports were balanced (Wu : 1981, 458). 
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development, both of which are based on ideology that sets constraints on domestic poli-
tics and economic development methods.  The elements of the food paradigm are the re-
sult of or influenced by the state ideology and the economic development model selected 
to achieve modernization.     
 
Natural Endowments 
The most basic aspect of the food paradigm is whether a state is sufficiently en-
dowed with the natural resources (arable land, soil quality, and climate) to support its 
population.  Arable land is not a static situation; it can be increased through irrigation or 
the introduction of crops that can grow in less arable lands as well as other ecological ad-
justments such as re-forestation.  Increases are medium-term enhancements for agricul-
tural output and add only marginally to the stock of arable land.  Irrigation is limited by 
availability of untapped water sources and may require significant investment, i.e. dams.  
Arable land can also be diminished by alternative uses.  This can occur quickly regardless 
of rules in effect to prevent it.  Alternative uses represent a greater threat to food security 
than does the benefit of increasing arable land, especially in the short term.  Within the 
food paradigm, changes in arable land will be dealt with in economic development and 
domestic politics. 
 
Domestic Politics 
In the PRC, domestic politics reflect the political discussions that occur at the 
highest levels of government.  The outcome of such discussions demonstrates which fac-
tion enjoys the power to implement its programs.  It is at this level that decisions are 
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made and the speed at which they are implemented determined.  Splits within the leader-
ship have generally been over the speed and extent of changes.  Liu Shaoqi thought col-
lectivization proceeded too quickly while Mao thought it was too slow.  When Mao’s 
policies failed, as during the GLF, power switched to Liu, Deng, and Chen Yun until 
Mao was able to regain the upper hand.  Similarly in later years, Deng wanted to acceler-
ate the pace of reforms but was held back by leftists who objected to the extent of re-
forms in the domestic economy or by those who objected to the speed of reforms.  De-
spite political recriminations for those who differed with Mao over the economy and 
Deng over CCP control (in stopping the 1989 protests), major changes have occurred in 
ideology through domestic politics that have not been successfully replicated elsewhere. 
The transition from state-centered redistributive economies to a market-based dis-
tributive system has had differing results in different areas, Russia, Eastern Europe, and 
the PRC.  The means have differed but only in the PRC was there economic change with-
out a change of regime.  Tsou maintains that regime type and the state-society relation-
ship are “…separate dimensions of a political system.  While the regime type remains the 
same, state-society relations can undergo important changes....This is one reason why 
those who use this concept (1) do not see any possibility for radical change without a rev-
olution and (2) cannot adequately explain changes in state-society relations that have 
been initiated or at least supported by those in power.” (Cited in Cui: 2000, 197).  In the 
PRC, there has been no revolution and state-society relations have changed, but remain 
weighted towards the state. 
Sun maintains that the success that the PRC has had in transforming its economy 
while maintaining the regime has come about for several reasons.   
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“…Chinese reform has been the subject of ceaseless ideological debates…the 
debate over the legitimacy of the market economy, the debate over the stock 
market system…, and the debate over privatization…This ideological back-
ground constitutes an extra cost of reform. To minimize this cost, the reform-
ists have adopted two strategies. The first is to incorporate new reform plans 
or new elements of the market into the preexisting ideology. An example 
would be the concept of ‘socialist market economy’.  The second strategy is 
to ‘put aside the debate,’ which in practice means being able to do something, 
but not able to talk about it” (Sun: 2008, 108).   
 
This explains the start and stop progress in reforms as reformers wait for conservatives to 
catch up or for reforms to prove their effectiveness.  It also explains the language of 
change and the use of the term “with Chinese characteristics” rather than the mixing of 
ideological terms. 
Regardless of the overall orientation of domestic politics, there are always differ-
ences of opinion on how best to address specific issues.  Even if they are ideologically 
consistent, there will be disagreements to be resolved on policy implementation.  For ex-
ample, agreement on the need to invest in industrial modernization in the PRC may be the 
agreed-to policy.  Yet, the allocation of funds among heavy industry, light industry, and 
agriculture was contested among differing points of view (Lardy:1995, 180-4). 
 
 
 
25 
 
State-Society Relationship 
The state-society relationship refers to the distribution of power between the state 
and society (Kang and Han: 2008, 50).14  The actual measurement of power would come 
from the relationship of public goods provided either by the state or by society (Kang and 
Han: 2008, 38).  In a totalitarian state all public goods would be provided by the state.  
Prior to the onset of reforms in the PRC, the public good of housing was provided by the 
state; the danwei provided housing through the workplace for urban residents and through 
the commune for rural residents.  When the state was the only legal buyer of crops in the 
PRC, the state provided the public good of allocating food to its citizens.  In contrast, a 
market-driven state would rely on society for most public goods. 
There has been radical change in the structure of the economy as well as the op-
tions available to the population, for example, in terms of choice of work and in the free-
dom to travel.  These “freedoms” were granted by the state in order to affect moderniza-
tion and improve opportunities for lives to improve.  Society has acquired a larger degree 
of power (or choice) versus the state.  But the state continues to have the ability to re-im-
pose itself on society, but probably not to the degree of pre-reform times.   
Civil society is the realm of the social, economic, and moral order that lies outside 
of state control. In the PRC, civil society is not what would be expected in a democracy.  
                                                 
14 The state-society relationship is included as a key variable in both domestic politics and the food para-
digm.  At the domestic political level, it represents for all aspects of state’s relations to society.  Within the 
food paradigm, it represents only those aspects concerned with food security.  For example, at the domestic 
political level, the state-society relationship might include a state-sponsored medical care scheme that 
would not have a bearing on the levels of food security nor the food paradigm.  A plan to maintain a certain 
amount of land for agriculture, created at the domestic political level, would have an impact on food secu-
rity and therefore would be considered part of the food paradigm. 
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One might take the position that there is no civil society in the PRC unless it is granted by 
the government, which in effect maintains state control.  Miller maintains the PRC has a 
corporatist model of civil society that “emphasizes communication and cooperation be-
tween state and society instead of a social field independent of the state. In addition, cor-
poratism emphasizes a monopoly of functional organizations instead of free competition 
among social organizations. Such functional organizations can negotiate with the state for 
their members' sake on the one hand, and on the other hand they must make a commit-
ment to enforce public policies among their members” (Miller cited in Kang and Han: 
2008, 50). 
As opposed to the corporatist model, or the totalitarian model where the state has 
complete control of the power in the state-society relationship, Kang and Han offer a 
model of graduated controls for the PRC, predicated on the perception of threats to the 
state.  “…the government implements different control strategies with respect to different 
social organizations according to their different challenging capabilities and the character 
of public goods they provide.”  Politically antagonistic organizations would be banned as 
they have publicly challenged the government. Trade unions and community organiza-
tions that have the potential to challenge the government would be converted to quasi-
governmental organs to increase control. Religious organizations with a strong possibility 
of challenging the state would be limited in their growth. Business and commercial asso-
ciations and official Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) are capable of only a weak 
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challenge and provide public goods; they are encouraged and supported by the govern-
ment.  Grassroots NGOs and informal organizations with no capability to challenge are 
simply ignored (Kang and Han, 2008, 49).15 
The PRC offers additional state-society relationship challenges.  What the central 
government says and does may differ from the actions of provincial and / or local author-
ities.  In the commercial realm, the central government may agree to intellectual property 
protection at the international level but there is no enforcement at the local level.  In the 
area of agriculture, maintaining arable land may be accepted at the national level but con-
verting farm land to a housing complex may offer locals a profit opportunity they cannot 
resist.  The center / periphery issue within the PRC is one that has plagued China for a 
long time despite the power of the state. 
The state-society relationship in the PRC has changed significantly in some areas 
and only marginally in others.  For purposes of the food paradigm, the change to a more 
market-based economy has given the farmers the choice of crops to grow and the popula-
tion more choice in the foods they consume, as opposed to what the rationing system pro-
vided.  This, as we will see, has altered consumption habits and created a knock-on effect 
that has impacted the food paradigm. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The graduated control model also provides the government an instrument of policy.  For example, control 
of trade unions can be used to reduce the call for worker safety at times or be used as an instrument to en-
force safety issues or increase wage levels. 
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Population 
The population aspect of the food paradigm is closely aligned to the state-society 
relationship and demonstrates the continuing power of the state.  Population growth can 
be subject to national policies to influence or compel human reproduction, internal migra-
tion, immigration, and emigration that affect the total population.  The demographic tran-
sition, the change from a high fertility / high mortality condition to one of low fertility 
and low mortality is generally attributed to industrialization, urbanization and individual-
ism (Johnson-Hanks: 2008, 302) and more recently to government social programs.  De-
spite conditions that were not conducive to demographic transition, discussions on popu-
lation control began in the 1950s, at a time when a growing population was considered a 
sign of national power.   
Control of internal migration was recognition of the inability of the state to feed 
an urban population greater than what existed at the time.  That said, such constraints 
may have prevented the development of extensive urban slums, not an uncommon occur-
rence in the developing world. 
 
Economic Development 
The structure of agriculture is influenced by the structure of the economy and vice 
versa.  A state with 80% of the population involved in agriculture, barely above subsist-
ence level, is an underdeveloped economy.  Modern economies today tend to have less 
than 5% of the population involved in agriculture with the majority involved in secondary 
and tertiary pursuits.   
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Grain production and economic development were a symbiotic relationship.  Eco-
nomic development was in need of increased agricultural production for the raw materials 
of light industry, a stepping stone to heavier industry.  Additional food would need to be 
provided for an urbanized workforce, required for modernization and industrialization.  
Additional knowledge and skills would be needed to operate an economically developing 
economy and in a developed economy.  The supply of labor for this undertaking would 
have to come from the rural population, those who grew the food.  What FX was needed 
to facilitate development would have to come from agricultural exports. 
For international political reasons the PRC selected the Soviet model of develop-
ment, probably a poor, but politically correct choice.  Self-reliance, the second option, did 
not fare well either.  It was not until nearly 30 years later that a development model, mod-
elled after successful development policies of its neighbors, did the PRC find a route to 
what had been sought in 1950.   
Overall, the reforms beginning in 1979 have loosened state control over parts of 
the economy.  Allocation of state funds towards public goods, particularly in transporta-
tion, has improved economic efficiency.  Together these changes have increased the pro-
duction and distribution capabilities of the PRC.  Explicit in economic development is the 
need and desire to become involved in international trade.  The PRC could no longer af-
ford to be both self-reliant and to develop economically.  Food production and distribu-
tion are elements of the national economy that have benefitted from these changes. 
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Summary of the Food Paradigm 
The food paradigm tells us the results of the thinking about the food supply and 
the policies implemented to reflect that thinking and supply the population of the PRC 
with domestically produced food.  Changes in total population are slow and the natural 
endowments are very slow.  Changes in the production and distribution capabilities can 
change more rapidly.  That rate of change depends to some extent on the state-society re-
lationship which itself can change rapidly but most likely is adversely impacted if it 
changes too often or without sufficient forethought.  All elements of the food paradigm 
are directly related to the domestic politics, including ideology, of the PRC.  The interac-
tions between the elements of the food paradigm are shown below in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 
Domestic Elements and Interactions of the Food Paradigm 
Economic 
Development 
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The International System 
 
The food paradigm is the domestic effort to achieve food security.  If that is not 
possible, a state will be forced to step outside of its boundaries in pursuit of food and that 
brings a food-deficit state into the international system.  The international system is the 
arrangement of states based on material capabilities and the way in which they ally them-
selves for mutual protection in an anarchic world.  Alliances replace the need for each 
state to rely on self-help for survival and instead create a larger entity with greater mate-
rial capabilities, a joint effort for survival.  During the Cold War, a bi-polar situation, alli-
ances were built around the USSR and the US in order to balance relative power.  Even 
though the PRC deserted the USSR, that did not automatically put it into the US bloc as it 
pursued its own foreign policy.  The collapse of the USSR resulted in a uni-polar world 
that continues to exist today.  
Of course, the entire world was not included in this bi-polar standoff.  The Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) presented an alternative to the Cold War for many states, es-
pecially in the developing world.  The PRC was active in this movement even when a So-
viet-bloc state. 
The Cold War limited contact among states in an opposing bloc.  There was lim-
ited economic contact, contact among citizens, and at times between diplomats from each 
bloc.  When a state had the need to trade, it tended look within its bloc first prior to con-
sidering a state from the other.  As will be seen, the PRC engaged in ongoing trade with 
Western European countries both of the West Bloc as well as those of the Soviet Bloc.  
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Trade was not only influenced by the Cold War but also by the mutual histories of 
potential partners.  The PRC established trade relations with Japan for grain and other 
items from early on.  Within seven years after Japan was driven from China following 
eight years of occupation, the two began trading again.  Though citizens had suffered un-
der the Japanese, the government needed items that Japan had to offer.  Yet, trade with 
North Vietnam was small and irregular due to historical differences and the fact that the 
Vietnamese sided with the Soviets following the Sino-Soviet split. 
 
Foreign Policy 
 
Foreign policy--the strategies and tactics used to meet the self-interested national 
objectives of the state--has its origins in both the domestic arena and the within the inter-
national political system. The principal question here is how are the national interests of 
the state determined?  This section will address views of PRC foreign policy including 
the formal and informal, the roles of culture and geography, foreign policy formulation, 
and the foreign policy of food.  It will conclude with the risks that international trade may 
present, both to the buyer and the seller. 
 
Views on PRC Foreign Policy   
The PRC gives primacy to domestic policy.  “For the People's Republic of China, 
foreign policy definitely stands in second place as compared with domestic political and 
economic concerns” (Feurwerker: 1972, 9).  As cited earlier, in 1990, then Foreign Min-
ister Qian Qichen maintained “diplomacy is an extension of internal affairs.”  This is 
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quite similar to Sutter’s comment that China makes its foreign policy from the inside-out  
while the US, in contrast, makes its from the outside-in (in Dosch: 2010, 62).    
Wang Qingxin views PRC foreign policy as having four cultural roots from the 
Chinese past: an emphasis on moral conduct, pragmatism, aversion to the use of force, 
and a preference for defensive rather than offensive conflict.  Moral conduct encom-
passes establishing and maintaining a good society based on harmonious human relations 
and social harmony.  It is a top-down-driven ideal emanating from the highest levels of 
government to the lowest levels of society.  The government serves as an example that 
the rest of society should follow.  Pragmatism refers to moderation as opposed to extrem-
ism and the willingness to compromise to maintain harmony among men; flexibility is a 
key.  Aversion to the use of force places conflict as a secondary issue of government; 
force should not be necessary if the government is virtuous.  The preference of defense 
over offense in conflicts follows the prior point in that defensive war creates social condi-
tions that favor the defender and that a defensive struggle has a tactical advantage over 
the aggressor (Wang: 2000, 145-52).    
A common thread that appears within Chinese informal political ideology is, 
“…[a] complex of cultural values, preferences, prejudices, predispositions, habits, and 
unstated but widely shared propositions about reality that condition the way in which po-
litical actors behave” (Levine: 1997, 34).  Since the first Opium War, the informal ideol-
ogy has been:  1) The Chinese are a great people and a great nation;  2) the Chinese na-
tion deserves a much better fate than that experienced in the modern world; 3) China 
should receive compensatory treatment for past injustices; 4) as a great nation, China nat-
urally occupies a central position in world affairs and must be treated as a great power; 5) 
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China’s national sovereignty must be respected and that precludes foreign criticism of 
China’s internal politics; and 6) China’s special virtue is not based on expediency but on 
immutable principles that express universal values such as justice and equity” (Levine: 
1997, 43-4). 
As opposed to the informal ideology, the formal ideology of the PRC is rooted in 
Marxism-Leninism. It is “unquestionably the dominant ideology in shaping and inform-
ing views, preferences, expectations, and assumptions of the Chinese Communists…[it] 
consists of a fairly small number of interrelated central propositions that constitute an or-
thodoxy that is defined…by defense of the central doctrines against the heresy of large or 
small deviations as it is confronted with major competing ideologies” (Levine: 1997, 33-
4).   
The precedence of the informal over the formal ideology “in foreign policy de-
rives from the fact that the attitudes it encompasses unite otherwise contending Chinese 
political elites, including those who subscribe to opposing formal ideologies.  Thus it 
tends to be consensual rather than decisive.” (And changes more slowly.) “Informal ide-
ology is part of a generic Chinese nationalism rooted in a sense of Chinese national iden-
tity that developed historically over a very long period, and the current characteristics in 
the course of the past century and a half” (Levine: 1997, 43). 
Together, the cultural norms of an ancient society, the informal ideology of the 
“century of humiliation”, and the formal ideology of Marxism-Leninism provide three el-
ements that influence the thinking of the PRC with regards to foreign policy.  It would be 
difficult to argue against the most important element being that of pragmatism and flexi-
bility.  The dramatic changes that have occurred in foreign and domestic policy since 
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1949 require both.  One cannot help but think that using the modifier “with Chinese char-
acteristics” is the flexible way to bridge some of the divides between the formal ideology 
and what has become reality.16      
The physical security of the PRC is of course a constant priority, as it is for all 
states.  The means to security can vary, and must take into account the domestic issues as 
PRC foreign policy flows from inside-out.  Lu maintains that security and economic de-
velopment have been policy constants though with differing emphases and different times 
(Lu: 1997, 155-6).  China has learned that to be a comprehensive power it must be a mul-
tidimensional one.  Strength in a single area, say industrial power, does not make a com-
prehensive power (Shambaugh; 2013, 5-6).   
Nathan and Scobell see the security of the PRC in terms of outwardly expanding 
rings of concern starting with domestic concerns over demography and maintaining or-
der.  The second ring includes countries adjacent to the PRC (22 in total).  The third con-
sists of the regional groupings with interconnected foreign policy interests and with them 
brings the PRC into contact with US, Russian, and EU interests (45 countries and 6 re-
gional systems).  The fourth ring encompasses the rest of the world including areas with 
significant natural resources.  (Nathan and Scobell; 2012, 3-7).  Here again we see the 
priority of security being based on domestic stability before it expands outwards.  Once 
expanding outwards, the concern is first for the adjacent countries, those whose proximity 
                                                 
16 For a discussion on “Chinese characteristics” and IR theory in the PRC, see Song and Chan, “Interna-
tional Relations Theory in China”, in Hu, Chan, & Zha (eds), China’s International Relations in the 21st 
Century. 
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can impact the PRC domestically, and ultimately, due to the need to import natural re-
sources from around the world, we see the potential impact on domestic development, 
growth, and stability issues. 
A long-standing foreign policy principle is Five Principles of Peaceful Coexist-
ence, a major foreign policy initiative from the mid 1950’s.  It entailed: 1) Mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-interference in 
internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.  This served 
two different purposes at two different times.  First, it was an attempt to reach out to the 
non-communist countries of Asia.  “At that time, the principles were intended to 
strengthen relations with neutral countries such as India and Burma and to mollify South-
east Asian governments who were fighting Communist insurgencies and worried about 
fifth-column potential of Chinese minorities within their borders.”  Second, following the 
Cold War, it came to mean “an alternative to the American conception of a new world or-
der in which international regimes and institutions would limit the rights of other sover-
eign states to pursue policies at variance with American interests and values.” (Nathan 
and Scobell :2012, 28).17    
 
 
 
                                                 
17 In the author’s opinion, the Five Principles can be spun to justify most PRC actions regardless of actions, 
hostile or not.   
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Foreign Policy Formulation 
The establishment of PRC foreign policy, like many aspects of PRC life, has var-
ied with the persona and prestige of the man in charge at the time.  However, there is a 
decision-making structure in place consisting of a formal and informal structure. 
The paramount leader has the ultimate decision-making authority in foreign pol-
icy decisions.18  The paramount leader is assisted by the informal “nuclear” group, one or 
two persons hand-picked by the leader.  This group has the ultimate decision-making 
power regardless of Politburo decisions.  The Standing Committee of the Politburo is the 
highest official foreign policy decision-making institution, though full Politburo approval 
is needed for major foreign policy decisions.  Standing Committee decisions are based on 
consensus but in reality end up being unanimous.  Those with a highest rank or authority 
always had greater say in any matter.  The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
(FALSG) serves as a “decision-making consultative” group that will put forth policy op-
tions and proposals for the Standing Committee.  It includes not only decision-makers but 
also top departmental personnel.  It is considered to be very influential.  This group now 
has five subgroups consisting of government, party, military, economic and trade, and 
propaganda, in part reflecting the widening scope of foreign affairs in an interdependent 
world (Lu; 1997, 8-13) (Shambaugh: 2013, 63).  Additionally, the National Security 
                                                 
18 The term paramount leader refers to the titles of Chairman of the CCP and General Secretary of the CCP.  
Mao was Chairman. After his death, that title was abolished and the title of General Secretary of the CCP 
replaced it (Nathan and Scobell ; 2012, 41). 
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Leading Small Group (NSLSG) was established in 2000 with a mandate that includes in-
ternal as well as external security.  Membership in the NSLSG and FALSG is similar 
(Shambaugh: 2013, 64).   
The above presents a picture of a vertical organization where a relatively few peo-
ple are involved in formulating and approving foreign policies.  Under Mao, policies di-
rectives came only from Mao or Zhou En-Lai, and Zhou took personal responsibility to 
carry them out.  While Mao may have consulted and needed to consult with other leaders 
in the early 1950’s, by the mid- 1960’s “…Mao at the pinnacle of political power would 
make all major decisions by himself.  The Politburo Standing Committee was but a rub-
ber stamp” (Lu: 1997, 86). 
Deng’s return to power in 1978 provided him with the same decision-making 
powers that Mao had enjoyed.  And he exercised them, overruling others to initiate the 
Tiananmen crackdown.  But for the most part he relied on consultation with others (Na-
than and Scobell: 2012, 43).  To accomplish this, the organization and strength of the bu-
reaucracy needed to be augmented, institutionalized to avoid the disruption of Maoist 
policies and to meet the needs of opening PRC doors to the outside world.  This required 
enhanced understanding of the non-PRC world as well as policy options that required ex-
pertise in various disciplines as opposed to correct political interpretations. 
Hudson suggests that regime type, interest in foreign policy, and situation type 
(crisis or not) indicate the extent of individual leaders to direct foreign policy (Hudson: 
2007, 38).  In the cases of Mao and Deng, the regime type clearly would allow them to 
make foreign policy unitarily.  Mao did and was able to bring the rest of the Standing 
Committee with him.  Deng had relatively less power and preferred to be consultative but 
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had sufficient power to get his way.  Both were more concerned with domestic issues yet 
played balance-of-power politics.  Mao tended to manufacture crises (Quemoy and Matsu 
and skirmishes with the Soviets) while Deng invaded Vietnam.  But Deng primarily en-
gaged the international community to support his reforms. 
Shambaugh maintains that foreign policy decisions are made only by senior lead-
ership and ministries.  Intelligence organizations, localities and state-owned corporations 
involved in international commerce, and society would serve only as groups attempting 
to influence decision makers (Shambaugh 2013, 62-3).  One would think that food secu-
rity issues would be policy decisions, or a series of decisions that would be agreed to and 
monitored by senior leadership, yet were formulated at ministry levels with input from 
influencing groups.  Only in the case of a foreign policy message being sent via trade in 
agricultural goods would decisions be reserved to the pinnacle of power.     
 
Foreign Policy of Food   
We now need to examine how food, specifically grain, can be used as a tool of 
foreign policy.  First of all, grain is not a natural resource, it is an annual product that de-
fies political control.19  Control is a function of weather, individual decisions by farmers 
(depending on their freedom to decide) around the world, and the distribution system that 
is used to transport it.  Despite thoughts that food could be a resource, similar to oil as a 
coercive power, it cannot as the major grain exporters are liberal democracies that do not 
control grain production (other than by influence) and distribution, which is carried out 
                                                 
19 Political control can be exercised by governments by dictating what crops are to be planted.  They can 
also influence those decisions with incentives.  Governments, as of yet, are unable to control weather.  
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by the private sector.20  Further, most countries produce grain and there will always be 
those that can export (Paarlberg: 1978: 4-5).  The grain trade fluctuates with output and in 
most cases the grain market is too thin to use it as a source of power (Nau: 1978, 778). 
Grain may not be the source of power as oil is, but it can be a diplomatic tool.  
Nau holds that grain can be used in diplomacy to influence the structure of international 
food systems including production, distribution, consumption, and private vs. public 
transactions.  Grain transactions may also be used for non-food reasons such as the accu-
mulation of FX, to manipulate domestic prices, or to further other (and not necessarily 
connected) objectives (Nau: 1978, 777).  Wallensteen is more direct and maintains “the 
structural possibility of turning an economic asset into a political instrument” requires 
four conditions to exist simultaneously; scarcity, supply concentration, demand disper-
sion, and action independence, the capability to take action defined by the supplying state 
itself.  By no means does this suggest that when such conditions exist that grain will be 
used as a political weapon, only that they must exist to be used as such (Wallensteen: 
1976, 277-9).21 
The denial of food has been a weapon of warfare for thousands of years.  Follow-
ing WWII, the avoidance of starvation has become an international norm that the nations 
                                                 
20 During the Nixon administration, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz suggested that the US could use its 
agricultural strength in much the same way that OPEC had used oil.   
21 Wallensteen and Paarlberg, writing in the 1970s, have differing points of view on US dominance of the 
grain trade.  As mentioned above, Paarlberg holds that there are a number of grain exporters in the world 
and Nau backs that up by calling the international grain market thin.  Wallensteen maintains that the domi-
nant position the US holds needs to be tempered as it approaches the ability to use grain as a political 
weapon.  Since that time, as will be seen, other countries, Brazil in particular, have increased their share of 
the world grain market.  However, the US remains the largest exporter of grains and most likely, given 
weather conditions, the only country to addrress shortages in a meaningful way.   
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of the world have the capacity to accomplish.  “There has been and remains a prevailing 
consensus that famine situations are extraordinary and that they should be met by extraor-
dinary means. To fail to do would be gross immorality according to world-wide stand-
ards” (Hopkins and Puchala: 1978, 601-2).  Famine relief may have become a moral in-
ternational norm, but the denial of food in war-torn areas continues as a means of con-
ducting warfare despite any moral considerations. 
If we ignore Wallensteen’s criteria for conditions that could make grain a political 
weapon and view them independently, we can see how grain can be used as a tool of for-
eign policy to influence, reward, or punish another state.  In the case of scarcity, the US 
and the USSR have had several situations where grain purchases from the US had an im-
pact.  In 1963 there was a crop failure in the USSR and Kennedy tried to sell grain to the 
USSR to advance the prospects of détente.  He was hindered in that effort by domestic 
objections and requirements to ship half of the intended purchase on US-flagged ships 
and the purchases were half what was intended.  Eight years later, also in pursuit of dé-
tente, Nixon attempted to sell grain to the USSR.  This met with demands for renewal of 
export controls but also from farmers who wanted sales to continue; it was profitable for 
them (Paarlberg: 1978, 8-9).  The US tried to influence the Soviets in their time of scar-
city but were unable to take full advantage due to domestic concerns.  Interestingly, this 
is also an example of Wallensteen’s action independence, or the failure of it, a fear that 
he expresses due to US dominance of the international grain market. 
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In 1973 the US embargoed soybean shipments to Japan to avoid domestic infla-
tion.22  Japan was in need of new suppliers and found Brazil a willing supply partner.  By 
1976 Brazil’s share of world soybean exports rose to 30% from 5% (Paarlberg: 1978, 16).  
Again, we see the impact of the domestic situation on international trade.  Control of do-
mestic inflation resulted in, effectively, a new supplier in a commodity previously domi-
nated by the US.  Japan punished the US and demonstrated that new suppliers could be 
created. 
In 1960 the US reduced the sugar quota for Cuba.  The US was the major buyer, 
almost a case of monopsony.  This was a punishment of the Cuban revolution of the pre-
vious year and there was nothing Cuba could do about it (Wallensteen: 1976, 279-80).  
Buyers can exert influence, and it can hurt when the target has no action independence. 
Finally, the intended consequence of actions may not have the desired result.  In-
dia was a buyer of US wheat, and the US wanted it to make structural changes in its crop 
production in order to increase output.  The Indians dragged their feet on reforms and the 
US retaliated by waiting until the last minute to renew the annual quantities available to 
India.  This irritated senior leaders of India who reacted by speaking out against US for-
eign policies, and as there was heated debate in India on the reforms, it made them more 
difficult to enact (Paarlberg: 1978, 12-3).  In this case, playing “hardball” in attempts to 
influence led to a failure of the intended result.   
With grains, there are a limited number of suppliers that have the annual ability to 
export in large quantities.  With wheat, this is normally the US, Canada, and Australia, 
                                                 
22 The US harvest was smaller than anticipated which led to an increase in prices.  Exports to Japan would 
have further reduced the domestic supply that in turn would increase domestic prices and inflation  
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the latter two having less ability than the US.  A smart buyer would reward its primary 
supplier with annual purchases and maintain multiple suppliers by purchasing some from 
each annually.  Purchasing some amount from each will keep each supplier happy.  The 
buyer can punish the supplier by reducing planned purchases.   
When there are few buyers, the tables are reversed and the supplier will need to 
maintain good relations the buyers.  The buyers can punish by refusing to buy, reducing 
normal volumes, or demanding discounts.  The smart supplier will do its best to make 
sure that each of the buyers buys some volume from it so that it develops a reputation as a 
dependable supplier. 
In agriculture there are two other major considerations.  Annual output depends 
mostly on the weather and anticipated transactions-- either buyers or sellers may have the 
upper hand in negotiating transactions in any year or series of years.  Therefore, transac-
tions at market prices tend to be the best way for each to proceed with the relationship.  
Yet, there is still room for either side to make concessions should there be an opportunity 
to influence, reward, or punish as appropriate.  The second major consideration is the do-
mestic farmer.  All states prefer to be in control of their own food supply.  Keeping the 
farmer profitable, with as few subsidies as possible, is a primary concern and one that is 
always a consideration in domestic policy as well as in international politics. 
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International Trade and Its Political Risks23 
The international trade in grain has been a fixture of life for thousands of years.  
However, in the modern world the amount of grain traded internationally is a small frac-
tion of the total production.  There are several reasons that the trade in grain is relatively 
small.  Grain is an inexpensive and bulky commodity that spoils and that is expensive, 
relative to the cost of the grain, to transport.  Various types of grain grow in every area in 
the world and in all countries but the smallest city-states.  The local grain preference type 
tends to be a function of what grows in that area and reduces demand for non-traditional 
out-of-area grains.   
The denial of food has always been a weapon of war.  Siege warfare has been 
used from Masada to WWII.  The UK decided to rely on food imports to free agricultural 
labor and make them available for the Industrial Revolution.  In both WWI and WWII, 
the Germans attempted to blockade the UK and have an insufficient food supply drive 
them from the battlefield or make a separate peace.  Simultaneously, the Nazis attacked 
the USSR to obtain a source of grain, Ukraine.  Destruction of the crops that supply sol-
diers as well as the local populations was used in the 20th century and in the millennia 
past.  
                                                 
23 The comments on trade apply to other commodities and products as well as grain. 
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A state that must rely on food imports to supplement domestic production runs the 
risk of becoming dependent on other states for basic human needs.  There are many defi-
nitions and variations of dependency.24  For this dissertation the definitions of scholars 
Keohane and Nye will be used. 
Keohane and Nye offer two approaches to interdependence.  First, the traditional 
realist approach in which military power takes precedence to assure a state’s survival.25  
Second, a liberal approach. Complex interdependence, they maintain, is more representa-
tive of the interconnected world that exists today.  The traditional realist approach uses a 
series of terms to reflect increasing levels of complexity in trade-related activities.  First 
is interconnectedness.  This is simply the normal apolitical trade that occurs between con-
senting states and does not have costly ramifications to either party.  Second is depend-
ence.  A state becomes dependent on another state when it is “determined or significantly 
affected by external forces.”  In such a case the cause of the dependency may be inade-
quate domestic endowments, and the remedy may come from foreign sources.  Such a sit-
uation is common given the unequal dispersion of natural resources around the globe.  
Third is interdependence or mutual dependence, a situation where there “are reciprocal 
costly effects of transactions” between the trading states.  Both the costs and the gains 
                                                 
24For a discussion of the use of the terms depend, dependency, and interdependence, see Baldwin “Interde-
pendence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis” in International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn, 
1980), pp. 471-506.  He examines the common usage and the usage used within the field of international 
relations and its sub-field of political economy of these terms over time, beginning with Machiavelli. He 
finds a wide variation in the usage of the terms (and even contradictory usage) over time.  
 
25 It is difficult to not include economics in this approach.  As economics is the allocation of scarce re-
sources, it seems impossible to have sufficient power to survive without paying attention to state income 
and its allocation in order to build a sustainable state that is not subject to internal decay as well as a mili-
tary that is not dependent on external sources of military advancement. 
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from these transactions are not necessarily the same for each state.  (Keohane and Nye: 
1989, 9-10). 
Whenever interdependence becomes uneven, the condition of asymmetry can oc-
cur.  In such a situation, one side will increase its influence or leverage over the other.  It 
can be a source of power that can make the disadvantaged side do what it would not oth-
erwise do.  The power aspect of interdependence is split into two dimensions by Keohane 
and Nye, sensitivity and vulnerability.   
McMillan distills Keohane and Nye’s sensitivity interdependence to “the extent to 
which one country is affected by the actions of another” and vulnerability interdepend-
ence to “the extent to which a country can insulate itself from the costly effects of events 
that occur elsewhere” (McMillan: 1997, 34).  Both include costs and time for adjustments 
to mitigate a situation.  Solutions to issues of sensitivity can be addressed through more 
or less normal means such as alternative sources of supply, using existing reserves, pay-
ing more than before, and creating domestic sources of supply.  In the case of vulnerabil-
ity, the extent of the cost and time will be greater to remedy the situation.  Vulnerability, 
and especially asymmetric interdependence, also carries with it a strategic aspect which 
in turn increases the potential for violent conflict as demonstrated by the Japanese attack 
in 1941 following economic embargos by the US.  In response to the Middle East oil em-
bargos of the early 1970’s, the US threatened violence in the event of further such activi-
ties. 
The liberal view that Keohane and Nye present they call complex interdepend-
ence.  It contains three characteristics: 1) There are now multiple channels of connections 
among states.  These occur with interactions of persons, businesses, and institutions 
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among nations, as well as governments across the globe.  Each group has its own priori-
ties that influence government behaviors and lessen the efficacy of military options 
within foreign policy.  2) There is an absence of hierarchy among issues.  State survival is 
no longer only military security.  What happens internationally has domestic implica-
tions, and both need to be considered when devising solutions.  IGOs, (e.g., WTO, IMF, 
WB) may pursue the needs of member states that conflict with the needs of other groups 
of states or the needs of certain member states.  Foreign policies must address not only 
national interests but special interest groups that transcend international boundaries.  This 
is especially true in liberal democracies.  3)  In the developed world the use of military 
force has diminished.  These states do not fear an attack that would threaten their sur-
vival.  Nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent during the Cold War but did not stop proxy 
wars, yet the US and USSR did not permit those conflicts to slide out of control.  Sur-
vival has expanded to include economic and ecological issues, including those that would 
damage the victor as well as the vanquished in war (Keohane and Nye: 1989, 24-9). 
In times of peace when trade can provide foodstuffs not readily available from do-
mestic production, then comparative advantage in trade can be an international source to 
fulfill domestic needs, a situation of interconnectedness, or apolitical trade.  Yet, should 
the international situation change, inadequate food supplies could quickly become an 
asymmetric vulnerability.  Therefore the question must be asked as to whether food is a 
strategic good in times of war and peace?   
There are several definitions of a strategic good ranging from scholarly to practi-
cal.  Baldwin maintains that it is “anything that is needed to pursue a given strategy and 
that is relatively inefficient to produce at home” (Baldwin: 1985, 214-5).  During the 
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Cold War, Thomas Schelling stated “The most peace-like of civilian goods will be ‘stra-
tegic imports’ to the Russians, if the Russians plan to consume some of them and find 
them difficult to produce. For in that case any saving that accrues to the Russian economy 
through the gains from trade is a saving in resources that can be applied to military or 
other use” (quoted in Forland: 1991, 197).  Eisenhower claimed that “if our opponent 
needs something badly, then that something is strategic” (quoted in Reuveny & Kang: 
1998, 586).  Baldwin’s definition rests on comparative advantage while the other two rest 
on denial of anything to one’s enemy.   
Ripsman and Blanchard define strategic goods as “materials that are essential for 
national survival or defense.”  Relying on other states for strategic goods constitutes vul-
nerability interdependence (Ripsman and Blanchard: 2000, 60).  They then address strate-
gic goods by means of testing “the level of a state’s vulnerability to a disruption of trade 
relations with an adversary and the adversary’s potential supporters in the event of war by 
considering whether it would be able to access sufficient quantities of the goods that are 
essential for the pursuit of national objectives if the links were terminated” (Ripsman and 
Blanchard: 2000, 58).  This definition suggests that domestic sources of all, or nearly all, 
food needs should be available at all times.   
When discussing complex interdependence during the Cold War, Keohane and 
Nye noted that “force is not often an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as 
economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important” (Keohane and Nye: 
1989, 27-8).  In international politics, the traditional referent object of security has been 
the survival of the state.  Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an expansion of 
the referent objects of security to include threats unrelated (potentially) to military 
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threats.  Buzan et al, introduced the concept of non-traditional security through several 
books beginning in 1991.26  Their proposed sectors for non-traditional security include 
the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors.  They maintain that 
within the non-traditional categories are issues that if not addressed can pose an existen-
tial threat to the referent object.  An existential threat requires securitization.  “In theory, 
any public issue can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized (the state 
does not deal with it…and it is not…an issue of public debate…) through politicized 
(…the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource alloca-
tions…) to securitized (…an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justify-
ing actions outside of the normal bounds of political procedure)” (Buzan et al: 1998, 23-
4).   
For securitization to occur, it requires a speech act by an actor declaring a referent 
object existentially threatened, a securitizing move.  For such a move to become securit-
ized, it needs the audience to arrive at the same conclusion.  If that does not occur, secu-
ritization does not happen and the issue remains simply politicized.  Securitization calls 
for actions that require “breaking the rules”, actions that may occur through consent or 
coercion (Buzan et al: 1989, 21-31).  In the chapters that follow, we will see securitiza-
tion attempts succeed and fail.27  
                                                 
26 Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear, 1991; Buzan, Waever, O., deWilde, J., Security: A New Framework 
for Analysis, 1998. 
 
27 Maintaining the position of the CCP is always an objective in PRC domestic and foreign policy.  A secu-
ritization attempt would be expected to be one where CCP survival is the referent object.  Another way to 
look at this is the securitization of aspects of Chinese society that form a threat to the nation and therefore 
indirectly to the CCP, the current ruling dynasty.  Another question that arises, who is the securitizing actor 
and who is the audience?  Referent objects may come from the state or functional areas within.  In the case 
of the PRC, the securitizing actor will most likely be the President, Premier, or a member of the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo.  The audience will most likely be the functional actors that will be responsible 
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From the realist perspective, it is possible to see Buzan’s non-political, political, 
and securitization characterizations fitting with Keohane and Nye’s definitions of inter-
connectedness, dependency, and sensitivity and vulnerability, respectively.  Similarly, 
from the liberal point of view there is also a fit with complex interdependence with non-
traditional security.  Keohane and Nye imply an increasing variety of threats where mili-
tary force is not applicable to solve contemporary problems, while Buzan et al extend ex-
istential threats beyond state survival by force to non-traditional threats to survival of the 
referent object and that could ultimately end up being the state.   
Buzan locates food problems in the environmental sector.  As might be expected, 
this sector is complicated and concerned with a variety of issues:  disruption of ecosys-
tems, energy problems, population problems, food problems, economic problems, and 
civil strife resulting the aforementioned issues.   Food problems include production issues 
affected by ecological degradation, consumption problems related to population and mi-
gration, and distribution problems that are impacted by poverty, economic development, 
and periodic shortages caused by normal weather issues (Buzan et al: 1989, 74-7).  To 
this we must add the impact of issues of ideology and politics. 
Buzan’s securitization approach suggests that an existential threat and Ripsman 
and Blanchard’s definition of a strategic good are essentially the same.  However, 
Buzan’s approach allows for anticipation of an existential threat via politicization prior to 
securitization.  Politicization falls in the area of sensitivity interdependence, recognition 
that a potential issue exits and that addressing it early can relieve the state of more costly 
                                                 
for mitigating the threat.  There will be no participation from society as a whole is an authoritarian or totali-
tarian state where there is no public policy debate.    
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measures involved with securitization or vulnerability.  Ripsman and Blanchard also as-
sume that strategic goods can be identified when a state is subject to sensitivity vulnera-
bility (Ripsman and Blanchard: 2000, 65), but it lacks the foresight that Buzan incorpo-
rates.  Identification of strategic goods and mitigation of the potential threat can require 
decades of planning and implementation.   
Over time, the basic paradigm of the PRC with regards to food security has 
shifted from one of autarky to self-reliance and to one of self-sufficiency at the 95% level 
(Tuan and Ke, 1999:17)… a paradigm shift, and one that necessitates international en-
gagement and therefore foreign policy to achieve food security.   
When we combine the food paradigm with the international system and foreign 
policy, we get the relationship below in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
Elements and Interactions of the Food Paradigm 
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Organization 
 
This dissertation will be organized chronologically so as to provide the relevant 
background and evolution of Chinese / PRC thoughts and learnings on food security.  
The time to 1949 will focus on the traditional methods and organization of providing 
foods as well as the failure of that system, a major factor in the rise of the CCP.  The 
post-1949 era will be broken down into periods based on the leadership, Mao, Deng and 
then the third and fourth generations.  Each period will follow three threads: 1) The 
evolving PRC food security situation; 2) the domestic and international political situa-
tions at the time; and 3) the interactions between the foregoing that disclose food secu-
rity’s effect on foreign policy and foreign policy’s effect on food security. 
Chapter II – The Legacy of Food Security and Foreign Policy in China 
This section will serve as background for the chapters that follow.  It will discuss 
the traditional means of food security and the conduct of foreign policy in imperial 
China. 
Chapter III – Mao Zedong and Political Food 
This chapter will explore the foreign policy changes resulting from the domestic 
food paradigm successes and failures and their impact during the tumultuous times of 
Mao’s rule.  This is a period of agricultural output increases resulting from land redistri-
bution followed by a drastic failure brought on by collectivization and ill-conceived de-
velopment plans.  Similarly, the PRC position in world politics experienced wild swings 
in alignment with the East, West, and non-aligned.   Changing alliances, famine, and the 
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prestige of Mao made this period of food security and insecurity one that has shaped 
views on food security ever since.  
Chapter IV – Deng Xiaoping and Pragmatic Food 
The Deng era runs from approximately 1978 to 1993.28  As Mao’s era was driven 
by domestic political considerations against the background of the Cold War, Deng’s era 
was driven by domestic development concerns and achieving the goals of the Four Mod-
ernizations, which included agriculture.29  The pragmatic approach recognized the inade-
quacy of the previous food paradigm and added material incentives to increase output; it 
was the first change of many in the structure of PRC agriculture.  Pragmatism appeared in 
the conduct of PRC foreign policy.  The PRC engaged the West in order to learn from the 
more advanced industrialized countries not only as buyers of technology but as students 
of what China had missed out on over the of the previous hundred years.  This period also 
brought with it the recognition that population increases were no longer drivers of 
strength but rather a potential vulnerability, that recognition in turn leading to the imposi-
tion of the one-child policy.   
Chapter V – Food and the Leadership of the Third Generation 
The paradigm of food security started as one of self-reliance but transformed into 
one of self-sufficiency, reflecting the success of high-labor-content crops for export.30 
                                                 
28 Deng’s second return from political exile occurred in 1977 while Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, 
was still in power.  Deng assumed power in 1978 having forced Hua from office.  From his return on, he 
was one of if not the most influential leader in the PRC.  
 
29The Four Modernizations included agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. 
30 Self-sufficiency can have two meanings for our purposes.  First, it can be reflective of the domestic 
source of food products, 95% self-sufficiency in grain would mean that 5% was imported.  This is the 
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This chapter will deal with the efforts currently underway to assure food security.  Do-
mestically, there has been a reversion to provincial autarky, self-sufficiency, or self-reli-
ance by central government declaration plus an attempt to stabilize the alternative uses of 
agricultural lands.  Internationally, the PRC joined the WTO, a move that was expected 
to hurt PRC agriculture due to lower protective tariffs, and new efforts have been made to 
secure grain outside of the bounds of normal trade. 
Chapter VI – Land Grabs - Making Land Mobile?  
The term “land grab” refers to the acquisition of farm lands in a second country to 
raise crops for consumption in the first.31  Crops grown do not enter the domestic or inter-
national markets but go directly to the investing country.  What makes this a questionable 
policy is that most of the land acquisition has been in countries suffering from food inse-
curity. 
The 2008 spike in food prices, especially rice, sent a chill through the rice-de-
pendent world.  The rolling panic which started in India spread throughout Asia and 
eventually to Africa, South America, and Europe.  It was nearly coincidental with this 
panic that news reports began to spread about states purchasing or leasing land in other 
states to provide grain for home countries.  Purchasers were said to include sovereign 
wealth funds and state-owned companies as well as private enterprises.  The PRC was 
                                                 
meaning employed by the PRC.  Second, self-sufficiency can also refer to whether the state is self-suffi-
cient when taking into account its domestic production plus its exports minus its imports.  In this case, a 
state would be self-sufficient if it had sufficient funds to pay for imports. 
 
31 Within the PRC, “land grabs” refers to illegal or adequately compensated acquisition of land, generally 
farm land, used by local elites for alternative uses. 
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one of the states reported to be purchasing land in other states to supply themselves (von 
Braun & Meinzen-Dick).  This chapter will examine the food security issues. 
Chapter VII - Conclusion 
This chapter will serve two purposes.  First, it will offer an answer to the question 
of whether food security issues have influenced foreign policy, the objective of the dis-
sertation.  Second, it will speculate as to whether the PRC trusts trade in grain as a long-
term solution to a worrying problem and potential vulnerability.  To date, the PRC has 
become a constant trading country in grain for import and horticulture for export. 
Whether or not a sensitivity turns into a vulnerability will depend on population and in-
come levels, the demand, and the supply.  The supply is where the vulnerability manifests 
itself.32  Maintaining the “red line” of agricultural land helps but fails to address the qual-
ity of the land for either agricultural or alternative uses.  Foreign land acquisition has an 
uncertain future as an exclusive food source.  Current domestic policies discourage com-
parative advantage domestically.  Pollution and its effects will hang over the PRC for 
years to come.   
 
 
  
                                                 
32 This assumes that population growth controls remain in effect until the actual population begins to de-
crease. 
56 
 
Chapter II - The LEGACY of FOOD SECURITY and the FOREIGN POLICY of 
CHINA 
 
This chapter will present the traditional Chinese food paradigm and conduct of 
foreign policy.  It serves as an historical frame of reference that sheds light on aspects of 
food security and foreign policy that influence PRC attitudes and policies today.  The 
food paradigm will focus on the state-society relationship, production and distribution ca-
pabilities, and population.  We will see food security issues of the past, along with an ex-
ample from the late 19th century that will reappear in subsequent chapters dealing with 
the rule of the PRC.  The foreign policy section will address the “tribute system,” an im-
perial method of maintaining peace with its neighbors and policies employed when peace 
could not be maintained.   
 
The Chinese Food Paradigm in History 
 
In this section we shall examine the Food Paradigm that existed up through the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).  The system that existed contained many aspects of what cur-
rent governments do to assure a consistent food supply for the population.  However, a 
major difference is the advancement in technology, especially as it relates to transporta-
tion. 
 
Traditional State-Society Relations  
The hierarchy of society and the state-society relationship in Chinese history have 
long been key aspects of the food paradigm.  Its origins can be found in the writings of 
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Confucius and Mencius and echoed by most rulers throughout imperial times.  The au-
thoritative hierarchy of society starts with the ruler and goes in order to his ministers, 
then to the provincial officials, followed by the local gentry, and finally to the common 
people (Shih: 1988, 605-7).  Away from government, the same authoritative hierarchical 
construct exists within the family unit, or lineage, headed by the senior male in an ex-
tended family household.  A social hierarchy also existed generally relating to occupa-
tion.  Government officials were at the top followed by peasants, artisans, and merchants.  
The senior position of the peasant indicates his importance in a subsistence-based agricul-
tural society.  Confucius had nine points of directions for the ruler to attend.  Three of 
these are important to the subject at hand:  1) Identifying himself with the interests and 
welfare of the whole body of public officers – the creation of loyalty; 2) showing himself 
as a father to the common people – exertion for the good of the state; and 3) encouraging 
the introduction of useful arts – for sustaining revenue and wealth for the state (Lin,Y.: 
1966, 119-20).33  The prosperity of the common people keeps them content that in turn 
fuels the coffers of the state through tax payments, which are managed by the public offi-
cials with the same objectives as the ruler.  
In a subsistence-level agrarian society dependent upon tax revenue in grain from 
the vast majority of the population, the ruler best able to sustain his rule assures a con-
stant supply of food.  The importance of a stable food supply remained a constant 
                                                 
33 Other six of Confucius directions are: Cultivating his personal conduct; honoring worthy men; cherish-
ing affection for, and doing his duty toward, his kindred; Showing respect to high ministers of state; show-
ing tenderness to strangers from far countries; and, taking interest in the welfare of the princes of the Em-
pire. 
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throughout imperial times.  This objective is demonstrated in the following quote: “…the 
legendary origins of the Chinese state emphasize the control over nature achieved by the 
ancient sage emperors” (Li: 2007, 2).  Control over nature meant control over flood and 
famine through water control projects and grain storage to protect against shortages and 
provide seed for the coming planting.  This was a demonstration of moral legitimacy by 
an emperor.  Ancient writings demonstrate this responsibility:  From the Book of Lord 
Shang, writing about the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE):  “…the way to organize a state 
well is, even though the granaries are filled, not to be negligent in agriculture…” (De-
Bary: 1999, 194).  From the Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE) “…in ancient times, people 
had to have [a reserve of] nine years’ food supply.  A state was not considered a state if it 
did not have a reserve of at least three years’ food.” (DeBary: 1999, 603).  In the 18th cen-
tury Qing Dynasty: “Indeed the state’s success in creating massive stores of grain to miti-
gate seasonal fluctuations in grain availability and to counteract scarcities in years of 
poor harvest, positively increased popular expectations that it could intervene to protect 
the subsistence requirements of the population” (Wong: 1997, 224). 
 
Ever-Normal Granaries  
The ever-normal granary system and the emphasis on water control were the two 
principle avenues to assure a supply of food.  The grain storage system originated with 
Mencius or before (Li: 2007, 3).  It was not successful each time it was tested but on the 
whole functioned as an accepted element of the state-society relationship. That relation-
ship was based on society taking responsibility for grain output within a market setting. 
The state provided three functions related to control of the cost and availability of grain:  
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First, it entered the market at seasonal times of shortage or abundance to maintain price 
levels.  Second, it maintained an inventory of grain to be used in case of a poor harvest.  
Third, it provided a “safety net” for the poor through charity granaries.   
Ever-normal granaries were to be located in each county of each province and 
were stocked by purchases from local growing areas.  They were supplemented by com-
munity granaries and charity granaries.  Community granaries were stocked with private 
contributions and made seasonal sales for consumption and / or seed to local farmers.  
The charity granary was also financed by local contributions for reduced price grain and 
loans.  Local contributions were from local elites as well as merchants and resellers.  
Charity granaries also served to keep the inventory “fresh” with discounted sales but also 
capped the sales at 30% of the beginning inventory.  In times of shortage the 30% ceiling 
could be breached.  The spread and efficacy of the community and charity granaries fluc-
tuated over time.  In times of shortage, tribute grain could also be transferred to suffering 
areas.34 The grains that were stocked varied by region with wheat, millet, and sorghum 
the primary grains in the north plus tribute grain in the form of rice.  The Yangtze River 
is generally considered the dividing line between north and south.  Southern areas stored 
predominantly rice, though after 1760 an equivalent amount of silver was stored, and lit-
tle grain, in order to purchase needed foodstuffs (Li: 2007, 194).  The granary system 
reached its apex during the 18th century under Qing rule.    
For most of imperial times, grain circulation was managed by the market: mer-
chants and re-sellers in the private sector.  Granaries, operated under the auspices of the 
                                                 
34 The area around Beijing is not a major agriculture producing area.  Beginning in the Sui Dynasty, as the 
Beijing population grew, grain, as taxes, was shipped north to provision Beijing and the surrounding area. 
60 
 
emperor, generally bought and sold grain seasonally in order to keep prices stable.  
Stocking was generally from local production but was sometimes moved out of area to 
balance prices or as relief shipments to shortage areas.  Merchants played a role here, 
buying and selling grain within and outside of local markets.  Merchants ranked at the 
bottom of the Confucian hierarchy but were depended upon by the state to act morally in 
times of shortage and to forsake profit for the general welfare of society.  As the mer-
chant was in business to make a profit, his motivation could differ from that of the state’s 
desire to maintain the general welfare.  When there was an imbalance between supply 
and demand, there was always an opportunity to move grain to an area where the price 
was higher.  One might expect that the low status of the merchant class within the social 
hierarchy was a reflection of such occurrences or the fear of such. 
In the 18th century, the state gained more control over community granaries and 
was able to use reserves to equalize prices and supply locally and across the empire.  This 
was accomplished by monthly reports of grain prices, weather, and harvest reports from 
all prefectures to the central authorities who could then reallocate grain reactively or pro-
actively as they saw fit (Wong: 1997, 113). In addition to providing information, the sys-
tem still relied upon the state to convince local elites to “play roles defined for them by 
the state in accordance with Confucian moral sensibilities” (Wong: 1997, 119).  Wong 
summarizes the system as a demonstration of “…the state’s capacity to construct a mas-
sive and sophisticated structure to influence the material welfare across diverse lo-
cals…it…sustained for many decades as a complex system of grain mobilization, storage, 
transfer, and distribution” (Wong: 1997, 117).  An important aspect of state involvement 
was utilization of power to coerce movement of grain out of the local growing area.  
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Movements out of area carried with it the fear of shortages and of price increases in the 
originating area. 
Yet, at the apex of the granary system questions were raised by the state concern-
ing the cost of storage, whether the system impacted the rising cost of grain, whether 
market forces might work best, whether the system was assisting the target population or 
whether reduced grain costs simply benefited those who could afford the grain or who 
were involved in deception.  The morality of the system’s intent was colliding with the 
cost of running the system (Li: 2007, 166-7).35  
  It was not until the 1920s and 1930s that China earned the name “Land of Fam-
ine” (Lee: 2011, 134, Li: 2007, 307).  However, this is not meant to imply that famine 
was uncommon prior to the 20th century, Chinese history is littered with famine.  “No 
other civilization has had such a continuous tradition of thinking about famine, and no 
other nation’s modern history has been so influenced by hunger and famine” (Li: 2007,2). 
 
Water Control 
Controlling water was the second moral function of the emperor.  Rain was 
needed for a good harvest and control of rivers was needed to prevent flooding that could 
be as disastrous as the absence of rainfall for the food supply.  Water control encom-
passed the construction and maintenance of levees and dikes, irrigation projects, and 
dredging should waterways become over-silted.  Maintenance of the water control sys-
tems was a key to the long-term effectiveness in achieving and maintaining food security.  
                                                 
35 This is similar to the discussions around PL 480 in the US, some 300 years later, concerning the cost and 
efficacy of grain storage by the government. 
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The adequacy of maintenance varied over time and could be a factor in the fall of an em-
peror or dynasty. 
China’s rivers generally run from west to east, and, as would be expected, they 
were the most efficient means of transportation.  This was especially true of low value 
bulk items such as grains.  The major north-south waterway was the Grand Canal which 
ran 1700 km. from Hangzhou to the Beijing area.  It was constructed during the Sui Dyn-
asty to facilitate the movement of tribute grain to the Beijing area.  The shipment of trib-
ute grain to Beijing moved permanently from the Grand Canal to a sea route in 1840.  
However, the canal continues in operation today.        
Perkins uses historical documents to ascertain the extent of water control projects.  
His conclusion is that the bulk of water control projects occurred between the 10th and 
13th centuries and were concentrated in the east.  He finds this logical as that was the lo-
cation of most of the population and explains the expansion of rice production in that area 
(Perkins: 1969, 62-3).  As will be seen, this development is also unfortunate in that cur-
rently the center of population is also the best agricultural land.36 
 
Production and Distribution 
China’s climate is quite varied, ranging from extremes of tropical in the extreme 
south to frigid in the extreme north bordering Siberia.   What grain crops were planted 
tended not to be an issue as climate and soil dictated that.  The introduction of crops from 
                                                 
36 Prior to the advent and use of chemical fertilizers, manure was the prime fertilizer for crops.  A concen-
tration of people and farm animals was therefore required for farming to be successful.  The concentration 
of people in the best farming areas is a result of necessary farming practices of the past. 
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the Western Hemisphere began in the 16th century.  These included maize, potatoes, and 
peanuts that provided additional sources of calories from land considered marginal for 
traditional crops.  Cotton, a cash crop, was introduced in the 17th century (Li, 2007, 90).  
The map below shows the prime growing areas for various crops. 
 
Plate 2.1                 Agricultural Map of the Peoples Republic of China 
 
Source: www.kas.ku.edu/archivedsite/chinese_food/food_images/china_agricultural_86.jpg 
 
In the 18th century, there were production choices to be made: whether to plant 
grain or cash crops, mainly cotton, oil seeds, and tea.  While there were no directives on 
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what a farmer should plant and even with the ever-normal granary system to protect 
against grain shortages, too much planting of cash crops in a local area could raise the 
specter of food shortages in the future.  
There was an element of change occurring: the commercialization of agriculture 
and the monetization of rural China.  An accelerant of this was the change of the land tax 
to one paid in cash rather than one paid in grain.  Such payments necessitated the need to 
sell crops for cash, even for the farmer who consumed all he harvested, therefore increas-
ing commercialization.  The planting of cash crops increased.  Crop specialization in-
creased and with that long-distance trade had to increase to distribute food supplies suffi-
ciently.  Along with the commercialization / monetization of agriculture came the in-
creased commodification of land.  (These changes started with the increase in population 
which will be addressed below.)  By about 1840, all tea, half of raw silk, and a quarter of 
raw cotton were commercially distributed.  Rice lagged behind at only 10%, (Rowe: 
2002: 512-16) possibly a recognition by the farmer and the community of the fears of a 
food shortage.   
In the 18th century, there was significant long-distance trade between grain sur-
plus and grain deficient regions.  This trade generally followed river routes along the ma-
jor rivers and via seaborne trade from Manchuria to eastern coastal cities and imports 
from Southeast Asia to southern coastal cities (Myers and Wang: 2002, 612).  Areas 
along the river and canal-borne trade were where the commercialization of China grew 
quickest.   
As mentioned above and regardless of the degree of commercialization of agricul-
ture, in times of shortage or price instability, grain from the harvest or the ever-normal 
65 
 
system could be moved from the local area to where it was expected to be consumed.  
Even in normal times, there was a continual fear of food insecurity among the local popu-
lations.  The perceived or actual over-planting of cash crops or shipments out of the local 
area would raise the fear of shortages and / or higher grain prices.  The distribution issue 
related to trade in a subsistence-based agricultural economy concerned local versus long-
distance trade.  Fears could manifest themselves in the blockage of grain shipments out of 
the local areas.  The same or related issues will continue to appear as we move further 
into the 21st century.  
  
Population 
While the PRC is concerned about feeding its population, this has not been a 
problem throughout Chinese history.  This first major increase in population occurred 
during the period of the high Qing when the population doubled from 225 million to 450 
million between 1750 and 1850 (Lin, J.: 1995, 273).  Prior to that time there had been a 
number of positive changes to Chinese agriculture.  In the 11th century, the introduction 
of Champa rice from Indochina allowed for double cropping (two crops per growing sea-
son) and even triple in some cases (Lin, J: 1995, 269; Freeman: 197,146).  Champa rice 
was also rather drought resistant and allowed for the expansion of rice growing areas to 
non-traditional rice growing areas.  There were also technological advancements such as 
iron-tipped ploughs and seed drills (Lin,J., 1995).  Extensive agricultural increases could 
also occur as peasants moved into adjoining lands previously unexploited. 
Increasing population did have an effect on agriculture; it had to keep up to feed 
the increase.  It did so in part in 1860 when Manchuria, the traditional Qing homeland, 
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was opened to Han immigration for the purpose of increasing agricultural activities.  Pop-
ulation increases bring additional labor that can lead to higher outputs.  However, 
Boserup suggests that this applies to the south where incremental labor increases rice out-
put but not to the north where yields remain constant (Li: 2007, 75).  Hsu maintains that 
output kept up with population growth due to a switch to more labor-intensive crops such 
as corn and sweet potatoes (Hsu: 1982, 25).  These are predominantly northern crops, 
which suggests corn and potatoes increased the caloric output of the land.  The efficiency 
of agriculture did suffer.  In the 1930’s, US rice production per capita exceeded that of 
China by a factor of ten (Hsu: 1982, 27). 
There were still negative aspects of population growth.  Population was growing 
faster than cultivated acreage.  The cultivated land-man ratio dropped gradually from four 
mu per person in about 1590 to about 2.70 in the latter half of the 19th century.37  Elvin 
sees the increase in population during the Qing as having an adverse effect on agriculture.  
Extensive practices resulted in decreasing marginal productivity of new, but less produc-
tive, lands.   The increase also developed into a high-level equilibrium trap, a situation 
where each incremental unit of labor results in decreasing output per unit.  The only way 
to escape such a trap is to convert from traditional practices to modern practices (Elvin: 
1973, 311-15).  According to Lin: “The pattern of Chinese agriculture that was practiced 
up to modern times essentially was established by the Song Dynasty (960-1279)” (Lin, J.: 
1995, 279). 
                                                 
37 A mu is a standard Chinese land measure equal to 1/6 of an acre.  
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Elvin extends his argument in favor of a high-level population trap beyond agri-
culture to the economy as a whole.  He maintains that population growth and an essen-
tially stagnate economy brought about conditions where the use of technology could not 
provide a sufficient return on investment.  Manpower was inexpensive and there was no 
need to replace it.  Therefore, steamships and railways could not replace the efficient 
river-borne junk traffic.  Nor could railways incorporate rural areas’ traditional means of 
overland transport.  The only way to cure such a situation was to increase market size, 
one that incorporated foreign demand and therefore drove employment and the need for 
labor-saving technology (Elvin: 1973, 312-18).38 
The increase in population had other positive and negative effects.  Handicraft 
production became a monetary earner for rural households, especially with spinning cot-
ton, a natural outgrowth of cotton production.  Urbanization increased rapidly.  With re-
spect to food, the additional mouths became easier to feed in more concentrated areas 
than in rural areas, and more people became available for an industrialization drive if one 
materialized.  Unfortunately, the commodification of land and the need to pay taxes in 
cash resulted in a higher level of land concentration and “landlordism” and tenant farm-
ing, an aspect of Chinese society that would serve to increase rural poverty and serve as 
one rationale for revolution.   
                                                 
38 Lin, in addressing the question of why China did not industrialize prior to Europe, given its relative head 
start and population size, attributes it to two reasons.  First, pre-modern technological advancement comes 
via observation and tinkering while modern technological advancement comes through application of the 
scientific method.  Population size increased the opportunity for pre-modern advancement.  Second, the im-
perial education system focused on memorization of extensive Confucian texts and their application to 
passing imperial exams to prepare themselves for government service.  Thus, the best and the brightest had 
no time to devote to activities required to further accumulation of human capital nor did the promotion sys-
tem within the bureaucracy encourage such activities (Lin: 1995, 284-6).  
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An Example of Issues Facing the Food Paradigm 
The following example illustrates many of the issues discussed above, including 
economic development of transportation, the transfer of grain out of the local area, plant-
ing of cash crops rather than grain, natural barriers, and eventually a scarcity of FX.  All 
of this can be illustrated by the rice trade between Guangxi and Guangdong in South 
China in the second half of the 19th century.  Along with these limitations come historical 
issues with the grain trade as well as those that will face the PRC government.   
Southern China was isolated from points center of the country by the Nanling 
Mountains, through which there were only two passes; neither was conducive to the 
transport of grain in any quantity.  The Southern province of Guangdong was reliant on 
its neighboring province to the west, Guangxi, for its rice. The dependency was due to the 
conversion of land to silk production and general commercialization in Guangdong. In 
the 18th century, 8% of Guangxi rice production was reserved for Guangdong and the ar-
rangement worked well.  Guangxi had excellent river transportation to Guangdong and 
the granaries functioned as they did further north.  However, this long-distance trade was 
a source of worry to Guangxi residents and the arrangement fell apart. This led to Guang-
dong relying on rice from SE Asia for its staple food.  This worked well until a railroad 
was built through a Nanling pass which brought with it a new set of problems.  The peo-
ple of Guangdong preferred imported rice but were forced, because of import duties, to 
consume domestic rice.  The rationale was to reduce imports to preserve FX and to be 
self-sufficient in grain. However, just because there is a railroad pass through the moun-
tains did not mean that rice could be supplied from the north.  Rail cars, locomotives, and 
efficient management were also required, and they were in short supply.  Ultimately, 
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lower quality northern rice needed to be shipped by sea in order to have sufficient quanti-
ties available (Lee: 2011, 16-31).  Such issues would become important in the 20th cen-
tury and beyond under dynastic, Nationalist, and PRC governments.   
 
Summary of the Traditional Food Paradigm 
The state-society relationship regarding food was a shared responsibility among 
the farmer, the merchant and the state.  The farmer was always in charge of the selection 
of crops to be planted; the merchant distributed grain both within and outside of local 
growing areas.  The state controlled the ever-normal granaries which were used to control 
prices, provide emergency relief in times of shortage and to supply the poor.  The respec-
tive roles of the merchant and the state were not permanent and would vary over time.  
With respect to water control, the state carried out that function through the contribution 
of corvee labor supplied by the population.  Water control by the state was an effort to 
create the conditions in which grain production and distribution would flourish. 
Within a subsistence-based agriculture economy the fear of insufficient food was 
always in the mind of the peasant.  The system could not guarantee a consistent food sup-
ply.  The food supply was always subject to domestic turmoil, corruption, a lack of effec-
tive communication to warn of shortages as well as to move grains to affected areas, and 
of course the vagaries of the weather.  Yet, the system did recognize the mutual needs of 
the rulers and the ruled.  The state could not exist without the tax receipts from the popu-
lation and the peasant would be worse off without the safety net provided by the state and 
the water control projects it initiated and maintained. 
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A subsistence economy implies one where there is not much wealth.  There was 
wealth but it was concentrated within a small section of society, excluding the nobility 
and its officials.  The implementation of tax payments in cash rather than grain exacer-
bated the concentration of wealth in favor of the landowning class.  While this was an at-
tempt to monetize the rural economy thereby breaking the hold of the mono-culture sub-
sistence farming (Rowe: 2002, 512), it had a negative effect on the peasant, especially 
those at the margin.  Monetization forced more and more peasants into tenant farming 
and closer to the margins of society.  Meanwhile, landowners increased their control of 
the land and their wealth. 
As might be expected, views of the food paradigm shifted with class.  For the less 
well-off, “…grains are not something to play with or waste, any child who does not finish 
the grains in his or her bowl is told that his or her future mate will be one with a pock-
marked face” (Chang, K.: 1978, 10).  For the elite, food was a virtue that could be ob-
served or ignored at will.  At the government level, morality appears as a function of 
granaries and water control.  In the following statement, morality (in terms of consump-
tion) is used to save the dynasty:  “Overindulgence in food and drink is a sin of such pro-
portions that dynasties could fall on its account” (Chang, K.: 1977, 10).     
 
Traditional Foreign Policy 
 
Traditional Chinese foreign policy has been influenced by geography, a dominant 
culture, and Confucian hierarchy.  The culture and Confucian hierarchy are developments 
of the Chinese civilization and have operated within a large but limited geography for 
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most of Chinese history.  Together, these three influences have led to the “tribute sys-
tem,” the accepted way that China has managed its foreign policy throughout its Imperial 
times.  This section takes a quick look at China’s geography and then explores how China 
has conducted its foreign relations with neighboring states and tribes to maintain its dom-
inant position and peace in the past up to the mid-19th century when a declining Qing 
Dynasty ran afoul of British trade interests. 
 
Geography 
The geography of China was beneficial for the development of the Chinese state.  
The eastern border is the East and South China Seas, both of which provide a barrier to 
foreign invasion.   Historically it was a formidable barrier but developments in Europe 
eventually made that coastal barrier a long and poorly defended series of entry points.  
Except for southeastern China and its border with Vietnam, the southern border is moun-
tainous and jungle-covered, which again presents a formidable line of defense.  Western 
China is again defended by mountain ranges west of Sichuan with deserts and mountains 
farther west.  It was only during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasties that China 
moved beyond the desert barrier to the mountain barriers of Tibet and Xinjiang.39   
The north was a different story.  It was inhabited by nomadic tribes with whom 
nearly all dynasties fought border wars and did not always win.  The terrain was treeless 
                                                 
39 The Tang Dynasty (618-906 CE) expanded to include part of what is now Xinjiang but did not hold it.  
The Yuan Dynasty (1271-1365) included Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet but these were Mongol areas incor-
porated with China proper and ruled by the same Khan. 
72 
 
grasslands which facilitated mounted cavalry that Chinese forces could neither easily de-
fend nor defeat.  Early attempts to keep marauders out led to the building of defensive 
walls starting in the 7th century BCE and continued in fits and starts through the Ming 
Dynasty.  This was an expensive and ineffective defensive strategy.   Both the Yuan 
(1261-1365) and Qing Dynasties were established by northern invaders. 
The core area of China, lost only during the Southern Song Dynasty (1217-1279 
CE), provided material resources that allowed China to prosper and develop economi-
cally.   Brantly Womack suggests that the “solid center” of China in Asia, as opposed to 
the “liquid center” of the Mediterranean Sea, gave China an advantage that the develop-
ing states of the West did not have.  This allowed the Chinese always to be close to their 
center of power (Womack : 2012, 39).  There was no need to travel as what they needed 
they had at hand.  Others needed to come to them. 
 
Tribute System 
China was usually the dominating power in its region, following consolidation, 
from the Qin Dynasty onwards. Its dominance came from its material strength, its culture, 
and the position of its ruling emperor.  Its material strength was a function of size, 
wealth, industry, and military might.  More lasting and influential over the longer term 
was China’s cultural dominance.  Chinese writing style, the Chinese calendar, similarities 
in food and dress, Confucian and Buddhist beliefs, and similarities in governmental or-
ganization spread to neighboring states (Spence: 1991, 118).  These influences were 
strongest in Korea, Vietnam (Wang, Y.K.: 2012, 148), and Japan (Zang and Buzan: 2012, 
18). 
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The hierarchical nature of Confucianism is manifested at its apex by the emperor, 
the “Son of Heaven” and the ruler of all under heaven (tianxia).  The morality and virtue 
of the emperor set himself and China apart from other states and tribes.  As the emperor 
was the universal ruler on earth, it followed that any state having dealings with China 
could not be treated as equal (Feuerwerker: 1973, 44).40  Those polities not accepting 
Chinese culture and ideology were considered barbarians. 
The combination of material, culture, and ideology made China, from the earliest 
imperial times, the leading civilization in East Asia.  It created a long-lasting Sino-centric 
region of the world.  From this dominant position, the question we need to address is how 
this dominance was manifested in China’s foreign policies. 
The term “tribute system” was coined by Fairbank and Teng in their 1941 article 
concerning Qing foreign policy.  The tributary system was: “(1)…a natural outgrowth of 
the cultural pre-eminence of the early Chinese, (2) that it came to be used by the rulers of 
China for political ends of self-defense, (3) that in practice it had a very fundamental and 
important commercial basis, and (4) that it served as the medium for Chinese interna-
tional relations and diplomacy” (Fairbank and Teng: 1941, 137). 
The basic operation of the system demanded that an envoy of a state or polity re-
quest an audience with the Emperor.41  Upon approval, the supplicant would appear bear-
ing tribute gifts of local products and bow to the Emperor in accordance with rituals that 
                                                 
40 “The tianxia referred to was limited to the areas surrounding the Chinese empire, which roughly corre-
spond to what we call today Northeast and Southeast Asia and parts of Central Asia” (Zhang : 2009, 554). 
41 The Chinese Emperor could also initiate contact with a potential tributary.  However, the net result was 
the same. 
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acknowledged his superiority.  The Emperor would reciprocate with gifts to the suppli-
cant, oftentimes in excess of what was received.  In return for the tribute, the foreign pol-
ity would receive trading privileges with China that would be carried on between mer-
chants of China and representatives of the tributary state.  From the point of view of the 
Chinese, participation in the tributary system was an acknowledgement that the non-Chi-
nese polity accepted the superiority of Chinese culture and that the Emperor was the ruler 
of all under heaven (Fairbank and Teng : 1941, 137-8).  The barbarians or Sinicized 
states received trading rights for a period of time and only in the places designated by 
China. 
Included within the tributary system was an established hierarchy.  The most Sini-
cized states, Korea and Vietnam, were at the top of the tributary pecking order as they 
were more Sinicized than Japan.  Japan ranked higher than other tributaries for the same 
reason.  These rankings also served to establish rankings between and among states when 
dealing with each other absent China (Kang: 2010, 57).  Kang divides trade with China 
into four categories: Tribute, the ceremonial part in which the lower-ranking state pre-
sented gifts and acknowledged the superiority of China; official trade, that conducted by 
officials from China and the tributary state, immediately after the acceptance of tribute; 
private trade, that which occurred between individuals under the rules established by the 
tribute system; and finally, illegal trade, that which involved smuggling and piracy.  Pri-
vate trade accounted for the bulk of all trade (Kang : 2010, 109). 
Continuous trade would require an ongoing series of tribute missions.  Korea sent 
nearly three missions per year between 1637 and 1874 (Feuerwerker: 1973, 46).  In 1587, 
Ming records indicate that there had been trade missions from 123 polities during that 
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dynasty.  However, many were one-off events relating to the discovery voyages of Cheng 
Ho.  Neighboring states tended to have missions every three to five years. (Fairbank and 
Teng: 1941, 151-4).     
By and large, the tribute system was a land-based system that ignored sea-borne 
trade.  Sea-borne trade in early Imperial times was immaterial.  The Ming had forbidden 
sea-borne trade in 1424.  Thus, tributary trade was the only legal foreign trade.  While 
never completely stopped, junk trade out of Southeast China began to flourish again dur-
ing the Qing Dynasty.  The inability to control the junk trade led some formerly tribute 
states to abandon paying tribute as they were able to engage in China trade with Chinese 
merchants operating far from the center of power (Chan, H.K. :1968, 414) (Fairbank and 
Teng: 1941, 202). 
While Fairbank and Teng addressed the Qing Dynasty and the evolution of the 
tribute system from the Ming, it must be realized that this practice has its origin back in 
the Bronze Age (Fairbank and Teng: 1941, 137).  Why did it last so long and was it the 
basis for Chinese foreign policy over that time frame?  Cultural preeminence is one as-
pect, a non-material one.  China had the material goods that others did not; the preemi-
nence of its agriculture and industry provided that.  Be it grain, silk, or metal arrowheads, 
these were not items that the surrounding nomads and aboriginals had, nor did they have 
the ability to produce.  As long as the Chinese had superior material resources, they were 
able to dictate the norms and rules of the tributary system (Wang, Y.K: 2012, 139).  Be-
cause of China’s central location and the workings of the tributary system, its foreign re-
lations were predominantly bilateral rather than multilateral.   
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China was not all powerful within its region for all of its history.  Internal power 
struggles, dynastic change, and poor governance, among other reasons, could weaken an 
emperor or dynasty.  At such times, external states or tribes could present an existential 
threat to the existing rulers.  Tibetans, the Xiongnu, Jurchens, and Mongols provided 
threats and dominated China from time to time.  In times of weakness, China paid tribute 
to the leading power of its region.  “[It] was at times a form of ‘payoff’ to keep weaker 
Chinese regimes in power” (Swaine: 2010, 2).  
At times, China was conquered by outside forces.  The Yuan Dynasty was formed 
by Mongols and the Qing by Jurchens, both successful invaders from the north.  From the 
start of the Yuan Dynasty to the fall of the Qing, China was only ruled by Han Chinese 
for 276 of 651 years.  Yet, the cultural domination of the Chinese civilization continued 
as foreign conquerors gradually adopted the traditional Chinese culture and ways of gov-
erning.  
 
Mutual Benefits 
The hierarchical nature of Confucian thinking and China’s ability to dictate the 
rules provided China an enviable position during periods of domination.  For the Em-
peror, the tribute system legitimated his rule as the Son of Heaven for China while forc-
ing a tributary to acknowledge the superiority of the Chinese Emperor to the tributary 
emperor.  There could be no equality between Emperors as Confucianism, through the 
tribute system, precluded equality.  The tributary state was treated as a vassal state (Fair-
bank and Teng: 1941, 140; Feuerwerker: 1973, 44).  There was little material benefit to 
the Chinese Emperor from trade.  It was mostly carried out by merchants, a low ranking 
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occupation in the Confucian hierarchy, though through various taxes imposed at various 
times, some revenue could flow to the state. 
The tribute system served as a method for the Chinese to control its neighbors 
through trade provided that the neighbor acknowledged the superiority of the Emperor 
and the civilization, a combination of material and non-material resources.  “By allowing 
foreigners to pay tribute, it was hoped, they would be transformed into civilized peoples 
and pose no threat. This cultural transformation served as a defense mechanism to protect 
China from foreign attacks” (Wang, Y.K: 2012, 148).   
A foreign state was of no interest to China unless there was a relationship between 
the ruler of that entity and the Chinese Emperor.  Whether or not there was a relationship 
depended on distance from the Chinese capital, whether or not they shared a common 
border, and whether that country was important to the defense of China (Wang, G.:1998, 
301).  Similarly, whether or not a tributary state was considered a vassal was most likely 
a function of its distance from China as well as the state of material capabilities of both at 
any time.  Gao Mingshi has suggested that China considered vassal states from three 
viewpoints indicating importance to China: an inner vassal area, an outer vassal area, and 
a temporary non-vassal area (Zhang, F.: 1968, 554-5).  Ban Gu illustrates this premise: 
“…the Emperor does not govern the barbarian peoples, their tribute shall not be refused, 
but they shall not be subjected to governance outside of the Middle Kingdom” (Zhou: 
2010, 153). 
For China, the tribute system was to provide legitimacy and security.  Legitima-
tion of a Sino-oriented world through the legitimation of the Emperor comes from the of-
ferings of tribute and from the highly ritualized submission of the tribute to the Emperor 
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and his acceptance of it.  Security is addressed through Sinization of the tribute states and 
avoiding strategic over-reach beyond the inner vassal area.  Yet, China was sufficiently 
conscious of the outer vassal area to prevent another state from governing an outer area.  
Here we have the origins of a tribute-based foreign policy but still incomplete foreign 
policy. 
As mentioned above, the main benefits received by the tributary were the trading 
privileges which enabled them to obtain goods from the more advanced Chinese.   If a 
tributary state was under attack from another state, they could call on the Chinese to help 
repel the invaders (Wang Y.K: 2102, 148).  The Ming came to the aid of Korea twice in 
the late 16th century to repel Japanese invasions (Huang, R.: 2004, 564-74). 
Under asymmetric conditions between China and its periphery, Womack suggests 
that the tributary state would acquire an additional benefit.  China would recognize the 
autonomy of the tributary while the tributary gave deference to the material capabilities 
of China.  This was a necessity as granting autonomy without deference would not work 
for China and granting deference without recognition would not work for the tributary 
(Womack, B. : 2009, 101-2).  Granting autonomy refers to self-management of the inter-
nal affairs of the tributary by the tributary.  When China would come to the defense of a 
tributary under attack from another state, it served to maintain / strengthen that tributary 
relationship with that state and simultaneously signal to other tributaries China’s position 
of “ruler of all under heaven.”  
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China’s Foreign Policy and Conflict 
The tribute system was used to obtain recognition and security for China, in ef-
fect, an inexpensive purchase of security.  However, not all states were tributaries and 
some fluctuated back and forth, the northern borders were never secure, and the material 
and non-material superiority of the Chinese state fluctuated over time.  In addition to the 
tribute system, other instruments of policy could also be employed, those of pain and of 
pleasure. 
China’s national interest also required military means to protect existing tributar-
ies and to punish those reluctant to join the system or those who sought to leave it.  Most 
importantly, it was needed to secure the northern borders.  Failure to do so presented an 
existential threat.  At various times during the imperial period, armies of multiple hun-
dreds of thousands of soldiers were raised to counter the threats from the north.  The use 
of military force was common.  China was involved in 3790 recorded wars between 1100 
BCE and the fall of the Qing in 1911 (Breslin: 2001, 1).  China was able to enlist tributar-
ies to fight common enemies as they did with Korea against the Jurchens in Manchuria 
during the Ming Dynasty (Clark, D.N. : 1998, 289)  They also used a divide-and-conquer 
strategy in the north against the Mongols who were plagued with internal tribalism 
(Chan, H.L.: 2004, 226-7).  An alternative strategy was to encourage the barbarians to 
fight the barbarians to assure they did not attack China.  
Scholars, starting with Fairbank and Teng, have viewed the tribute system as one 
that was defensive in nature.  The expansion of China from its Qin era size to its size in 
1911 suggests that there was an expansionary tendency to go along with a defensive trib-
80 
 
ute system.  This is true even when excluding the additional territories added when for-
eign dynasties, the Yuan and Qing, were forced out.  This can partly be explained by mi-
gration into unoccupied areas, migration that diluted the existing populations, tributaries 
being voluntarily absorbed to China, or by conquest.   Expansion into the southwest of 
today’s China was a reaction to the local governance in the aboriginal regions of Yunnan 
and Kweichow (present day Guizhou).  Constant internal disputes, oppression of locals 
by their chiefs, and attacks on Hans led to an invasion to restore order which resulted in 
administrative inclusion into China.  Migration to Taiwan by individuals and then their 
families effectively colonized the island to the distress of the original inhabitants.  Rebel-
lion by aboriginals and Han eventually led to armed suppression and further expansion by 
China in Taiwan. Expansion into the northwest was facilitated by incompatible Mongol 
tribes that the Qing warred against so long as it was in their interest to do so.  Final con-
trol took about 35 years.  (Zelin: 2002, 227-8)   
Whenever a large army was raised, either to meet a threat, conquer additional ter-
ritory, or to function as a standing army, the costs could be exorbitant and were financed 
by higher taxes.  This was an invitation to domestic instability.  A way to eliminate or re-
duce the cost of inflicting pain was to use pleasure, an alternative method of influencing 
the course of foreign affairs.   Traditional sources of pleasure included bribes, lavish en-
tertainment, brides to neighboring states to establish or prolong good state-to-state rela-
tions, and sex.  (Breslin: 2002, Chapter 1).  Of course, both sides of any conflict are sub-
ject to the pleasure aspect of diplomacy and, as with pain, the lasting impact is always 
questionable. 
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Chapter III - MAO ZEDONG and POLITICAL FOOD 
 
This chapter will address the food and foreign policy relationship during the rule 
of Mao from 1949 through the short period of rule by Hua Guofeng in 1978.42  This pe-
riod is anything but consistent in both domestic and international relations.  Yet, there are 
overriding objectives in both cases that originated with Mao and extended through his 
successors, some to the current times.     
The first section will examine the food paradigm that existed during this period.  
It is a time of rapid change in the ability to feed the population and ranges between suc-
cess and failure.  Second, the international political system will be examined.  This is the 
time of the Cold War, the cold and sometimes hot war for hegemonic supremacy between 
the Soviet Union and the US as well as their allies.  As a participant in the Cold War, the 
PRC had its own interests and foreign policy to satisfy those interests.  Within the foreign 
policy existing at the time, the existence of food security or insecurity in the PRC will be 
examined.  In times of food security, food could be used to finance economic develop-
ment or be exported.  The choices of export destinations by an authoritarian or totalitarian 
government are highly likely to be political decisions, an extension of foreign policy.  
Similarly, in times of food insecurity, obtaining adequate food supplies from other states 
are likely to be limited by the existing foreign policy.  In either case, one might expect 
that domestic changes related to the food paradigm at the time might trigger a change in 
foreign policy or those changes in the PRC’s relationship to the international system 
might result in re-thinking the food paradigm.  
                                                 
42As Mao appointed or anointed Hua as his successor, he will be considered as part of Mao’s rule.  Hua, 
who ordered the arrest of the Gang of Four, was a transitional ruler between Mao and Deng. 
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The Food Paradigm During Mao’s Time 
 
The construction of the food paradigm under Mao is a reflection of the organiza-
tion of the state as a whole.  The adoption of the Soviet model of the economy and soci-
ety and its adaptation to the PRC’s circumstances dominated this time period.  Domestic 
politics, those of the CCP, were at the fore of decisions.  Government control and the 
communist philosophy required the state-society relationship to shift to greater state con-
trol and to penetrate deeply into private lives.  The economic development that was con-
sidered a key to CCP survival failed yet the CCP survived.  On the other hand, while Mao 
lived many years and was in control most of the time, he set the stage for the dismember-
ment of many of the policies he implemented.  
 
Domestic Politics      
In 1949, the PRC was a poor, war-ravaged country.  The Nationalist government 
and the communist revolutionaries had been fighting off and on prior to the Japanese in-
vasion of 1937.  Following WWII, they re-engaged for a final showdown that the CCP 
won.  They inherited a backward devastated land, a population with a low rate of literacy 
and one that was 80% rural eking out a subsistence living.  The citizens, and especially 
the rural population, were about to endure more than many could endure. 
From the outset, the PRC placed significant emphasis on several factors.  First 
was the consolidation of the revolution.  This took two forms: Breaking the hold or influ-
ence of the rural elite was accomplished through land redistribution and improving the 
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lives of the population as a whole through modernization and economic development 
(Teiwes, 1995, 51).  Second was the need to make good on the CCP claim to rule all of 
China (Fairbank: 1995, 22).  Therefore, they needed to reclaim territories lost to coloniza-
tion (Hong Kong and Macau), those lost to short-lived independence movements (Tibet 
and Xinjiang), those lost to the Soviets at the end of WWII (Manchuria and Dalian), and 
of course Taiwan to conclude the revolution. 
The domestic politics of the PRC during the reign of Mao were dominated by 
Mao, ideology, and the conversion to communism.  The conversion of the economy and 
society would have profound effects on all aspects of life in the new country.  The senior 
leadership, primarily Mao and the Politburo Standing Committee, were generally in 
agreement on the policies to be initiated and followed.  When disagreements occurred, 
they tended to be in the speed with which programs were implemented.  There was con-
cern that rapid implementation might lead to mistakes that would damage the credibility 
of the CCP.  Yet, Mao was in charge. His leadership in fighting the Japanese and defeat-
ing the Nationalists solidified his position (Teiwes 1995, 60).  When Mao suffered per-
sonal setbacks from failed policies, he was always able to make a comeback and pursue 
his ideals for what China should become.  What the PRC has become is in many ways the 
antithesis of Mao’s vision. 
The magnitude and extent of domestic political change from 1949 through Hua’s 
time as Chairman of the CCP was extreme.  It featured land redistribution, and was aimed 
at the rural gentry.  The “100 Flowers” rectification campaign was directed at intellectu-
als.  Collectivization and the GLF were directed at the rural population to wipe out re-
maining vestiges of capitalism. Both contributed to famine. Finally, the Great Proletariat 
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Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 (GPCR) was directed at the urban population and lead-
ership that had advocated material incentives to increase agricultural output during and 
after the GLF.  Purges of top leaders and seemingly constant rectification campaigns di-
rected at those viewed as deviating from Mao’s line were an ongoing reality.  These will 
be dealt with below, primarily in the discussion of the state-society relationship and the 
production and distribution capabilities of the PRC during this time.     
 
State-society Relationship 
“One great difference between China before and after 1949 would be the material 
means such as radio, other communications, and police firepower could be combined 
with ideological sanctions in the Soviet totalitarian form.  This combination would now 
let the CCP state penetrate Chinese society as never before” (Fairbank 1995, 47).  At the 
time, the two most intrusive changes in the state-society relationship were the hukou sys-
tem and collectivization of agriculture.   
 
The Hukou System of Control 
The first change in the state-society was the initiation of the hukou system, a sys-
tem that required registration of the entire population.  Registration provided the state the 
means to control unwanted internal migration.  The hukou system is an extension of the 
traditional baojia system in place since ancient times, a registration system that linked a 
person’s residence to that of the family, along with elements of the Soviet internal pass-
port. Ultimately, the hukou system linked a person’s registration to his place of work, the 
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danwei for urban residents, and to the lowest collective unit for the rural population 
(Cheng and Selden, 1994; 645).   
Citizens were categorized by whether they were agricultural or non-agricultural 
workers and whether they were local or non-local (Chan and Buckingham 2008; 587-9).  
Changing one’s registration category was controlled. The rationale for such population 
control came from two sources.  First, it prevented the rural population from migrating to 
the cities in search of work.  This kept unneeded workers at home when there was unem-
ployment in the cities.  In the event that additional urban labor was needed, private ar-
rangements were eventually replaced by government recruitment.  It also provided an op-
portunity for the government to entice (then compel) urban residents to return to rural ar-
eas when there was unemployment coupled with a good harvest.  Second, it kept the ur-
ban governments from having to provide food, housing, schooling, and healthcare for 
more people than were needed, benefits unavailable in rural areas. 
Initially, enforcement came through having the proper papers permitting one to 
work in a place or be in a place.  Ultimate enforcement came with the imposition of ra-
tioning.  By 1955, grain and most foodstuffs plus cloth and cotton were rationed.  Rations 
could only be obtained in the place of one’s official registration.  Rationing was only ap-
plicable to urban residents, or government employees working in rural areas.  The rural 
population had to feed themselves.  Government assistance would only help rural resi-
dents in the event of severe food shortages (Cheng and Selden: 1994, 656-8).  The ration 
received per urban household was a function of the age mix of the household residents 
and the occupation of the working members, the more physical the work the greater the 
ration.  A household with a large number of workers could actually receive an allotment 
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greater than they could consume.  The purchase of non-staple items such as furniture and 
consumer durables required local government approval (Chinn: 1980, 747). 
All this resulted in extreme bifurcation of society, “a spatial hierarchy of urban 
places and prioritizing the city over the countryside…” (Cheng and Selden: 1994, 645).  
Urban residents had housing, education, retirement, and healthcare provided by or subsi-
dized by the government.  Agricultural workers had to live off of their harvests (that 
which was not required to be sold to the government) and provide for their own housing.  
Supplemental foodstuffs could be purchased at local markets but only during times when 
those markets were permitted to exist.  Education and medical care were spotty at best.  
Following collectivization, food, education and medical care were provided by the collec-
tive.   
 
Collectivization 
The hukou system kept the rural peasants from migrating to the urban areas and 
the collectivization process allowed for deeper penetration of the state into the hinterlands 
than ever before.  The progression to collectivization of agriculture was supposed to be a 
step-by-step process covering three phases; land reform, mutual aid teams, and semi-so-
cialist co-operatives.  Participation in each phase, following land reform, was to be volun-
tary.  After all, many poor peasants had just received their land and would not be willing 
to give it up so soon (Walker: 1966, 9).   
Land reform had been under way during the civil war in CCP dominated areas 
prior to formation of the PRC.  It was expanded to the rest of the country and completed 
by 1952.  The land reform had two purposes.  First, it was a means of putting land into 
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the hands of the poor peasants, those who were landless and served as agricultural labor 
for landlords or rich peasants.  With their own land and their ability to reap the benefits of 
their own labor, the recipients of the land were assumed to produce more grain than oth-
erwise would have occurred.  Second, it was a way of defusing the power of the landlord 
class, a natural opponent of the CCP (Walker: 1966, 3-4).  By 1952, 300 million peasants 
had received 50 million ha. of land (Wang and Davis: 2000, 21)  
Mutual-aid teams (MAT) were the first step in the collectivization process.  They 
were the voluntary grouping of five to seven households that would pool their resources 
of land, labor, and whatever machinery or animals they had during busy times of planting 
and harvesting.  All in all, this was a natural method of addressing the nature of farming.  
By the end of 1954, there were 10 million MATs comprising 58% of peasant households. 
Elementary Agriculture Producer’s Co-operatives (EAPC) consisted of about 30 
households and 13-20 ha. of land.  Membership was voluntary, land and resources were 
pooled, and profits were divided based on land, labor, and tools contributed. Land and 
tools were still privately owned and private plots were allowed.  By mid-1955 there were 
630,000 EAPCs comprising 17 million households. 
Advanced Agriculture Producer’s Co-operatives (AAPC) consisted of four to 
eight EAPCs.  It is at this point that the state-society relationship started to change.  
Households were required to give up title to their land and other capital goods.  Income 
was based on labor contributed, private plots were allowed, and households were able to 
keep hand tools to work the private plots.  Members lost their ability to decide what to 
produce and where to sell.  Management was centralized.  By late 1957, there were about 
735,000 AAPCs encompassing about 119 million households. 
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The final step was the creation of communes, an amalgamation of AAPCs into 
24,000 communes comprising about 5,000 households apiece and 4,000 ha. of land.  
Membership included 99% of all rural households.  No private plots were permitted.  
Ownership of all assets belonged to the commune.  No non-commune work was permit-
ted.  Income was a function of labor contributed.  The commune became a branch of the 
government, the place where all decisions were made with respect to commune opera-
tions (Wang and Davis: 2000, 22-5).  A key reason for the creation of the commune was 
the ability to mobilize larger work forces to work on rural projects such as water projects 
including canals and dams (Lin: 1990, 1233-4). 
Simultaneously with the march towards communization, the state was increasing 
the amount of grain it took from the farmer.  During the period of land reform, 10% of 
production was procured by the government at a government-established price.  That 
price increased 25% from 1950 to 1953.  The government had to compete with the still-
existing private market for grain.  Coincident with the arrival of MATs, the quota was 
raised to 25% and in 1957 it reached 75%.  Between 1953 and 1957, the government pro-
curement price increased only 10% (Lardy: 1983, 30).  With communization, all produc-
tion belonged to the commune (state).  The commune served the same purpose as the ur-
ban rationing system regarding food: it controlled demand. 
Each step of the way the state-society relationship was altered with the state tak-
ing a larger and larger role in the production and distribution of public goods.  However, 
it could not be maintained.  The rapid transition to the commune presented problems with 
management of such large undertakings.  There were issues between poor and middle-in-
come peasants concerning the value of their contributions.  Over-enthusiastic cadres were 
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often opposed to peasants opting out and used coercion to maintain membership.43  Fi-
nally, managing an organization of 5,000 households would present problems for even 
the most astute manager; cadres were frequently in management positions due to political 
considerations rather than management abilities (Walker: 1966, 10-12).  
The dramatic fall in grain production from 1959 through 1961, the period of the 
GLF, led to loosening of control in rural organization.  As early as 1959, private markets 
were re-opened in rural areas.  Private plots in communes were re-introduced in 1960, 
and the commune itself permitted devolution of decision-making to the production bri-
gade level, 20-30 households (Lin: 1990, 1234).  In 1961, decision-making moved further 
down the commune organization structure to the production team.  In effect, the commu-
nization era was over as communes began to operate as MATs / EAPCs while still main-
taining their governmental function.  It was not until the reform period of Deng that the 
commune ceased to exist. 
 
Economic Development 
The economic development of the PRC was a top priority of Mao and the CCP 
leadership.  Improving the lives of the citizenry was the primary method of securing the 
                                                 
43 Justin Lin Yifu looks at the failure of communes from a higher level.  He maintains that it was the elimi-
nation of the right to withdraw from communes in 1958 that led to a reduction in output.  This right let effi-
cient farmers withdraw and avoid the issue of free-riders within the commune system.  Yet the success of 
the commune rested upon efficient labor input.  Without that right to withdraw, the commune would not 
disintegrate but neither would it flourish, “ in a one-off game, staying idle [or reducing one’s labor input] is 
the rational option” (Lin: 2102, 95). 
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revolution, and economic development was one of the means.  It also served to demon-
strate to the world that China was again going to be a leading state in the world.  As Mao 
had chosen to “lean” towards the Soviets, it follows that using the Soviet model of eco-
nomic development was natural.  Was the Soviet model one to be emulated by the PRC?  
At the times of their respective revolutions, the Russian population was 70% urban while 
the PRC was 80% rural (Lieberthal: 1995, 300).  The agricultural output of Russia was 
480 kg. per capita per year in 1928--the start of Soviet collectivization--while China’s 
was only 220 kg. in 1952, barely at subsistence levels (Keuh: 2006, 708).  The absence of 
grain to export to earn FX to pay for modernization was a significant problem for the 
CCP.  
While the PRC had aligned itself with the USSR for ideological reasons, there 
were other reasons also.  Soviet industrialization in the 1930’s was the most rapid for any 
country to date (Goldman: 1980, 55).  Soviet agriculture, from 1928, showed impressive 
gains in output (Wilber: 1969, 91-2).  The Soviet model of economic development was to 
concentrate on the development of heavy industry - iron, steel and the like.  Both the 
USSR and PRC adhered to a policy of “selective development” of heavy industry under 
conditions of austerity (Tang: 1967, 1118).  Light industry and agriculture would receive 
much less investment and would support the development priority.  The Soviets allocated 
42% of investment capital towards the development of heavy industry.  The PRC allo-
cated 48%. (Lieberthal: 1995, 303).  Perhaps this was a function of Mao’s ego: an attempt 
to demonstrate to the Soviets that the CCP could achieve “developed” status faster and 
better than its benefactor.  In addition to resources being directed to heavy industry, they 
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were also directed to the development of scientific and technical skills, and the applica-
tion of up-to-date technology for priority sectors.  Agriculture was to be exploited for the 
benefit of heavy industry.  Domestic trade, services, residential housing and maintenance 
suffered from relative neglect. Capital to finance such investment would come primarily 
from domestic sources as opposed to trade and aid (Prybyla: 1970, 113-5).44  
In order for the policies to be successful, agriculture needed to supply excess 
foodstuffs (that not needed for consumption by the producers) to feed the urban workers, 
to provide inputs for light industry (for example, cotton and tobacco), and to be used for 
trade in exchange for industrial inputs or technology.  The maximum that can be ex-
tracted from the peasants serves to limit, or is the bottleneck, to meeting industrialization 
goals (Tang: 1967, 1124-28).  The situation created by heavy-industry-first policies of 
PRC economic development, at the expense of agriculture, served to undermine the ulti-
mate goal.   
The emphasis on heavy industry ran counter to previous statements by Mao.  In 
his 1943 report On Coalition Government, Mao stated:  “It is the peasants who constitute 
the main market for China’s industry.  Only they can supply foodstuffs and raw materials 
in great abundance and absorb manufactured goods in great quantities” (quoted in Lardy: 
1983, 15).  When he put the investment emphasis on heavy industry, he continued to 
maintain that agriculture was a market for industrial output.  Yet, his only real attempt to 
stimulate agriculture was though social changes and bureaucratic means (Lardy: 1983, 
15-6).  This situation was exacerbated by the “scissors effect”, keeping the prices paid for 
                                                 
44 The application of technology was combined with the heavy use of unemployed or underemployed labor 
to take advantage of the availability of labor while judiciously using scarce capital. 
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grain low and the prices for all other items high.  This eliminated the peasant as a pur-
chaser of light industrial products (consumer goods) and limited the potential for light in-
dustry to contribute to the economic development of the country.  
As would be expected, the path to economic development and the role of agricul-
ture were much debated at the senior levels of the CCP.  Liu Shaoqi maintained that col-
lectivization should only occur once sufficient mechanized equipment existed to offer the 
farmer an incentive to join collectives (Chao: 1970, 16-7).  Mechanization would permit 
more efficient use of large-scale farming and ease the labor burden on individual farmers, 
an incentive to voluntarily join the collective.  One must also assume that such a policy 
would provide excess labor for industrialization.  Chen Yun, who was responsible for the 
economy, was in favor of a more balanced approach to development with more invest-
ment in light industry and agriculture.45  Chen’s view also included a thoughtful and ra-
tional transition that emphasized the need to avoid rash advances (Vogel: 2005, 12-3).  
Nor did Chen think that collectivization would improve overall agriculture output; collec-
tives were not superior to individual farms.  However, he supported collectivization as it 
would be easier to procure grain from collectives as opposed to individual farms (Chao: 
1970, 33).  In 1955, Mao’s opinions carried the most weight, and the speed of collectivi-
zation was increased without additional mechanization and without adjusting investment 
between sectors of the economy.  After all, the factor endowment that the PRC had in 
abundance was agricultural labor so who needed mechanization?  Further, voluntary 
movement to the collectives was better than Chen expected. 
                                                 
45 This approach is similar to Bukharin’s recommendations in the USSR.  Chen spent several years in Mos-
cow studying the Soviet economy. 
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Collectivization, the governing of the collectives by cadres and the projects imple-
mented by the cadres, taken together, produced the disaster of the GLF.  Oftentimes dis-
asters have many causes; the GLF is not an exception.  First, the culture of reporting re-
sults of the harvests was not one of what was actually produced but rather which report-
ing entity could surpass the target by the most.  This was bravado or fear of reprisals for 
not meeting objectives.  Reporting more than the actual served to justify the CCP and its 
leadership and the decisions they had made.  Unfortunately, when those false claims were 
accepted as true they led to improper follow-on decisions.  Second, the projects that the 
collectives were able to undertake given their large memberships took the members from 
their primary tasks of growing crops.  Insufficient attention led to reduced output, espe-
cially at crucial times in the planting - harvesting cycle.  Third, directives from Beijing to 
improve output did the opposite.  Close planting, deep plowing, increasing multiple crop-
ping (more than one crop per year on the same piece of ground), and inappropriate pair-
ing of crops in multiple cropping caused decreases in output.  Mao was an advocate of 
close planting and deep plowing while the planners in Beijing altered cropping patterns 
without sufficient knowledge of what farmers had learned over thousands of years of ex-
perience.  Fourth, the CCP operated a planned economy and planning extended down to 
the collectives.  Collectives were basically to be self-sufficient and to provide most, if not 
all, of its food needs, regardless of the growing conditions.  “Local economic units soon 
began to promote their own self-sufficiency without regard to the needs of other localities 
and the flow of goods between localities.  In a sense, China reverted to its traditional lo-
calism” (Prybyla: 1970, 283).  Finally, rural markets continued to exist in the PRC until 
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communization.  Mao was concerned that capitalism was gaining momentum in rural ar-
eas and needed to be stomped out.  The elimination of local markets and the private plots 
that supplied them removed an alternative source of grain supply and income for individ-
uals that existed until that time. 
The GLF was a disaster.  The resulting famine claimed between 15 and 60 million 
lives.46  Mao’s prestige within the ranks of the CCP was diminished at the highest and the 
lower levels.  The Soviets withdrew their technical assistance without warning to empha-
size their displeasure at the path the CCP was taking.  This action was a major blow to 
PRC economic development and to Soviet – PRC relations, one that would lead to a shift 
in the international political system, and one that was not repaired for decades.  Mao rec-
ognized that mass mobilizations do not work for economic development but retained his 
faith in mass mobilizations for political ends (Lieberthal: 1995, 319-21).   
Recovery from the disaster came through several channels. Collectivization was 
maintained but there were changes in management, economic liberalization, and the real-
location of resources among economic sectors.  Planting and compensation decisions 
were delegated downwards to the production brigade level in 1960 and then to the pro-
duction team level in 1961, essentially the level that existed during the MAT period 
(Chao: 1970, 64).47  Private plots totaling about 5-7% of commune land were reinstated. 
Prices paid for grain after fulfillment of taxes were increased 27% (Lardy: 1995, 388).  
                                                 
46 For a discussion of the number of deaths and births forgone plus relief efforts, see Lardy in Cambridge 
History of China, pp. 372-8. 
 
47 In 1962, the production team was reaffirmed as the official institution of the rural sector.  Individual 
households had been farming allocated commune land independently, though they had to provide a percent-
age of the harvest to the production team.  Mao was adamantly opposed to the household system (Chao: 
1970, 65). 
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Rural markets were reopened for all agricultural commodities except grain, cottonseed, 
and oil seeds (Prybyla: 1970, 352). 
The structural changes were simple in principle; agriculture became the priority 
followed by light industry and then heavy industry.  Heavy industry still received the 
largest share of investment capital, but investment in agriculture and light industry did 
grow at faster rates.  Improvement in agricultural output would feed the people and pro-
vide inputs to light industry whose profits could be used to fund the sector that needed it 
most.  Plus improvement would provide for exports to earn FX that could be used to pur-
chase technology and raw materials in short supply or unavailable in the PRC.  Agricul-
ture first would be the mantra of the CCP for decades.  To prioritize agriculture, Chen 
wanted to resort to comparative advantage and plant specific crops in areas with high and 
stable yields.  Self-reliance was not a smart economic policy (Lardy: 1995, 391).  In such 
areas, the emphasis would be on improving the productivity of the existing land through 
the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides, improved seed, the develop-
ment if transportation capabilities (railways, roads), and improved mechanization 
(Prybyla: 1970, 359-66).   
At this point, with the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, aid, and credits, that self-
reliance became necessary.  There was insufficient FX to import much and no interest by 
non-communist countries to assist the PRC.  This was reality, yet the need to import was 
there; self-reliance was not autarky.  “The doctrine of self-reliance hinges on the post-
ponement of the revolution of rising expectations; it is part and parcel of a broader phi-
losophy of austerity... [However] failure to make use of foreign technological and scien-
tific advances, to benefit from some measure of derived development will tend to bring 
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about much wasted effort, a rediscovery of things long since known elsewhere, an artifi-
cial restriction of developmental inputs.”  Domestically, self-reliance was confidence in 
the people to continue the task of development.  Internationally, it was avoiding depend-
ence that might occur with too much foreign assistance (Prybyla: 1970, 399-400).  
The agriculture-first policy continued under Mao’s watch.  GLF food shortages 
were made up by imports beginning in 1962 and have continued since.  Agricultural out-
put did not reach pre-GLF levels until 1965.  Mass political mobilizations continued; the 
GPCR being the post-GLF high point.  The GPCR was directed at the urban population 
and had little impact on food output.  Perhaps Mao feared a repeat of the food shortages 
of the GLF.  However, the GPCR did negatively impact the efficiency of the rail network 
and the movement of food to the cities. The 1960’s were also the time of the “green revo-
lution,” a period of new strains of seed that greatly improved the output of both rice and 
wheat. The use of green revolution seeds and the focus of the GPCR on urban areas lim-
ited any negative impact on food output during the GPCR.   
Lardy neatly sums up the output of agriculture during the Mao period by dividing 
it into periods of direct planning and indirect planning.48  Direct planning, or production 
planning, was “characterized by the imposition of detailed sown area and output targets 
and specific cropping patterns by higher-level authorities on production units” (Lardy: 
1983,19).  To meet production targets incentives were not employed; command from 
above was considered sufficient.  Little attention was paid to efficient allocation of re-
sources and farmer income.  Inefficiency was rampant, and output and income declined.  
                                                 
48 One could also refer to direct planning as further encroachment by the government on the state-society 
relationship while indirect planning refers to the society, via a market system, providing more public goods.   
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Direct planning was attempted first in 1956, utilized in 1958-60 during the GLF and from 
1966 to 1977.  Other than during the initial years of the PRC, direct planning was used 
when Mao was in complete charge. 
Indirect planning “…relies essentially on state manipulation of credit, procure-
ment contracts, taxes, and prices.  State procurement prices are the major policy instru-
ment used to influence the growth and composition of farm output…” (Lardy: 1983, 18-
9).   The use of incentives gave farmers the options as to what crops to plant, which en-
couraged the use of comparative advantage, when to use credit, and whether to sell their 
after-tax output to the local market or to the government.  Farmers acted to maximize 
their income, which maximized output.  The indirect method was used prior to 1956, 
when there was no other choice, and during the recovery from the GLF to 1965.  Once 
there was a choice, indirect planning was used only when Mao was in a period of relative 
weakness. 
 “Overall, Mao left China largely self-sufficient and possessed of the sixth biggest 
economy in the world” (Terrill: 1993,446-7).  Yet, the PRC’s ranking was the result of its 
large population. On a per capita income basis it was 190 USD in 1978, approximately 
10% of the world average. 
 
Population 
Population, especially as it relates to population control, would seem to be an as-
pect of the state-society relationship.  Controls on internal migration are one aspect but 
control of human reproduction by the state is the ultimate intrusion by the state into soci-
ety.  However, population has its own place in the food paradigm as the total population 
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of the PRC is roughly a quarter of the world total, dramatically affects food security, and 
has been the subject debate within the CCP since its early days. 
In 1949, Mao was confident that the PRC could clothe, feed, house, educate, and 
employ the population.  This was consistent with the CCP’s pro-natalist policies during 
WWII and with the Soviet post-war policies; both driven by the high loss of life caused 
by the war.  However, in 1952, attitudes began to change.  The elite wanted access to 
birth control.  There was a move to comprehensive planning which included the rural-ur-
ban split, and there was increased anxiety concerning the ability to feed the entire popula-
tion.  In 1953, Deng came out in favor of birth control.  In 1955, birth control was pro-
moted on a purely economic basis.  Without some control, people’s livelihoods, the wel-
fare of the country, and that of following generations would be adversely impacted.  
While these policies were generally aimed at urban areas, Chen Yun advocated a two-
child policy for both urban and rural households. 
With the Twelve Year Agriculture Plan population control--euphemistically 
called birth planning--came into being.  This included delaying marriage and spacing the 
births of children.  Speaking of the need for population control, Mao maintained “…if we 
wait until the population reaches 800 million to carry it out, it will be too late. [We must] 
achieve planned births step by step” (quoted in White: 2006, 39). 
The disaster of the GLF must have raised anxiety levels concerning the ability to 
feed the people. Concern for the agricultural output was joined by concern for the number 
of mouths to feed.  In 1962, birth planning was expanded to densely populated rural areas 
(suburbs) which included the two-child maximum and later marriage.  Zhou Enlai was 
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prominent in promoting these policies.  During the GPCR, interest in birth planning var-
ied inversely to grain production results.  Senior leadership retained an ongoing concern 
about the ability to supply sufficient food for the population.  After the initial years of the 
GPCR, birth planning flourished.  However, birth planning does nothing to satisfy the im-
mediate need for food.  The radicalization of the time led to promoting self-sufficiency as 
opposed to comparative advantage and a return to direct planning for agriculture. This in-
cluded reversing the reforms (private plots and rural markets) that had been introduced to 
aid in the recovery from the GLF, lessened the immediate output of food.  This was par-
tially offset by a reduction in industrial crop production in favor of grain. 
In 1975, the limit on births was put at three for rural households and remained at 
two for urban households (White: 2006, 19-61). 
 
Analysis of the Food Paradigm During Mao’s Reign 
 
The food paradigm, from a domestic point of view, was a roller coaster of success and 
failure.49 The key question is whether or not there was food security or insecurity in the 
                                                 
49 There is a general problem with agricultural production and trade numbers as well as financial numbers 
for the PRC during the period of 1949 through 1987.  In general, PRC numbers suffer from incompleteness, 
inaccuracy (both based on methods of calculation as well as obfuscation), changes in category definitions, 
not reported, and restatements of figures, all of which make it difficult to generate a series of production, 
trade, or financial figures that is consistent over time.  In some cases, a series of figures will be generated 
by an institute or scholar to the point in time the work was published with no subsequent continuation using 
the same sources or methods.  The source of all numbers will accompany each presentation of figures and 
the sources identified, as would be expected.  However, there will be years when no figures are available or 
the sequence of figures is not or appears not to be consistent.   
With regards to agriculture production numbers, those from 1958 through 1960 are quite suspect.  
Generally they are not reported, otherwise they are attempts retroactively to approximate them.  Those from 
1949 to 1957 either come from the PRC government or are approximated by scholars. (A number of schol-
ars have used a variety of sources to approximate obvious reporting issues.)  Production numbers are also 
suspect for the period of the GPCR when they were not always reported due to the chaos at the time.  The 
FAO has published Food Balance Sheets for the PRC since 1961.  However, many of its numbers are a 
three-year average rather than annual numbers.  In some cases, annual figures can be obtained. 
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PRC.  As shown in Table 3.1, through 1958, based on domestic production only, grain 
consumption per capita was increasing, in spite of population growth.  However, the PRC 
was food insecure as measured by average daily calorie consumption; the FAO maintains 
that the minimum calories intake per day should be 220050.  The establishment of com-
munes and the GLF crushed output and created famine.  Per capita calorie intake de-
creased almost 30% from 1958 to 1961 and per capita grain consumption fell by 27%.  
                                                 
Trade numbers by weight, when available, seem to be consistent.  They do suffer from omissions 
and periods of no reporting.  During the time of state control of all exports and imports, tonnage numbers 
are generally available from Ministry of Foreign Relations and Trade.  Permission for private international 
trade was granted in 1983 and from that point agricultural shipments are based on value and collected and 
published by Customs.  From 1987 on, there are good figures for tonnage shipments both to and from spe-
cific countries.  Prior to that point, source and destination of shipments are not always available. 
Financial numbers suffer the same issues regarding availability.  They are complicated by barter 
transactions and the pricing of products during the intra-Soviet bloc trade.   
50 National statistics for caloric intake should represent the age distribution of the population as well as the 
activity levels the population is required to perform in employment.  The figures used here and in Table 3.1 
do not necessarily reflect that.  The recommended caloric intake per day was 2200 at the time; later it was 
increased to 2300 per day. 
Table 3.1
Indicators of Food Security / Insecurity
Year 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
% change in total grain output (1) 17.1% 23.8% 1.2% 2.5% 1.8% 8.2% 4.9% 1.0% 2.6%
% change in population 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 1.4% 3.3% 3.1% 2.2% 2.9% 2.1%
K/cal consumption per capita per day (2)  1,742 1,856 2,083 2,048 2,041 2,232 2,326 2,217 2,248
Year 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
% change it total grain output -15.0% -15.3% 2.8% 8.1% 6.3% 10.6% 3.7% 9.7% 1.9% -4.1%
% change in population 1.8% -1.5% 2.9% 1.3% 1.4% 0.1% 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 2.9%
K/cal consumption per capita per day (3) 1,920 1,378 1,415 1,526 1,594 1,666 1,797 1,865 1,817 1,758
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
% change it total grain output 1.0% 13.7% 4.2% -4.0% 10.4% 3.8% 3.6% 0.4% -1.0% 7.8%
% change in population 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 2.2% 2.0% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4%
K/cal consumption per capita per day (3) 1,731 1,840 1,845 1,828 1,897 1,893 1,909 1,875 1,914 2,062
Sources
1) Grain production 1949-1951 (Chen: 1967, 338-9).  Production 1952-1978, PRC State Statistical Bureau, various years
2)From (Piazza: 1986, 83-4)) through 1960.  
3) Source:  FAO Statistics Division - Food Balance Sheets 1961 on
Shaded areas indicate years in which population growth exceeded grain output increases.
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Consumption of domestic grain production per capita did not achieve the 1958 levels un-
til 1977.  Rural per capita consumption of grains lagged urban consumption by up to 
nearly 50 kg per year in 1952.  By the end of Mao’s era, the gap had closed to less than 
15 kg. per year (Wang and Davis: 2000, 144).  Grain is not unique; rural consumption 
lagged urban for nearly all categories. Not only did the PRC food insecurity continue, it 
also reached existential concerns for the CCP.  
Recovery from the GLF was hampered by the decreasing arable land per capita.  
Obviously a significant cause of this decrease was due to population increases but also 
because of GLF policies and arable land being removed from production by economic 
development.  Food insecurity would have been worse without the application of science.  
The conversion to the use of chemical fertilizers and hybrid rice and wheat seeds pro-
vided for yield increases that offset the loss of arable land.  Domestic chemical fertilizer 
output increased 600-fold and imported chemical fertilizer increased 63-fold between 
1950 and 1978, albeit from a very low base.  Higher yielding “dwarf” rice hybrid seeds 
were introduced in the PRC in the mid 1950’s.51  
Why did grain output decline and remain low from 1958 until the end of Mao’s 
reign?  Lardy’s periods of direct and indirect planning provide a view of material incen-
tives, and government top-down planning impacted output.  In Table 3.2, where the 
shaded areas represent times of direct planning, we can see production react to material 
                                                 
51 Dwarf rice is shorter which keeps the plant from falling over and produces more kernels per plant.  
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incentives.52  The average annual price increase for grains and the government procure-
ment percentage of the output provide the key information.53  From 1949 through 1952, 
the output per capita increased 69 kg per year.  This was a period marking the end of the 
civil war, land redistribution, and one year of government mandated price increase, all 
under indirect planning.  From 1952 through 1957--a period of continuing price in-
creases, the imposition of mandatory government procurement and an aborted attempt at 
communization--during this time per capita production increased by 18 kg per year. 
Other than the year of attempted communization, it was a time of indirect planning.  
From 1957 through 1960, the period of the GLF, communization occurred, price in-
creases were reduced, government procurement increased, and direct planning was in full 
swing.  The result was a reduction of 60 kg per capita per year of grain output.   
The recovery period from 1961 through 1965 marked a return to indirect plan-
ning, price increases and reduced government procurement.  The result was an increase in 
grain output per capita of 48 kg per year.  From 1965 through 1976 in the time of the 
GPCR, there was a return to direct planning.  However, it was much less radical than the 
GLF in rural areas.  Grain price increase continued but at a lower rate while government 
also continued but at a reduced rate.  After an initial fall in grain output during the most 
                                                 
52 The total grain production shown in this table includes rice, wheat, coarse grains (including maize), soy-
beans, and potatoes that are converted to grain equivalents.    This reflect the need for seed for the follow-
ing year’s crop that will come from the current crop, uses for animal feed, processing and waste or spoil-
age.  What you see for output on a per capita basis is not what you get to eat. 
 
53 The typical farmer would keep approximately two thirds of his output for personal consumption.  As the 
government procurement percentage approaches one third of the output, there is nothing left to sell in the 
private market, if the private market is operating.  Should there be additional grain left to purchase follow-
ing household consumption and required sales to the government, the government would still purchase 
whatever the farmer was willing to sell.  At times purchase price was the same as the required sale price or 
higher. 
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chaotic years of the GPCR, production recovered with increases in grain output of 24 kg 
per capita per year. 
 
  
Under direct planning, the net result was a reduction in grain production per cap-
ita by 36 kg per year (-60+24).  Under indirect planning there was an increase of 135 kg 
Table 3.2
                Indirect or Direct Planning Impact on Grain Output 
Average Government Total Grain Arable 
Annual  Grain Procurement Population Production Land
Year Price Increase % of total Output (millions) Kg / capita / year Ha./capita
1949  541.7 205 0.1807
1950  552.0 236 0.1818
1951  563.0 286 0.1841
Land Reform Completed 1952  574.8 284 0.1877
1953  582.6 287 0.1863
10 Million MATs 1954 3.10% 27% 601.7 283 0.1817
630K EAPCs 1955 614.7 299 0.1792
1956 628.3 307 0.1780
735K AAPCs 1957  646.5 302 0.1730
99% of rural HHs in communes 1958 659.9 303 0.1633
1959 2.40% 34.90% 672.0 253 na
1960 662.1 217 na
In effect - return to MATs 1961 681.3 217 0.1518
Grain imports begin 1962 690.5 232 0.1493
1963 6.40% 25.50% 700.3 243 0.1469
1964 712.1 264 0.1442
1965 726.8 268 0.1410
GPCR starts and runs through 1976 1966 744.6 287 0.1370
1967 765.1 285 0.1327
1968 787.6 265 0.1283
 1969 810.7 260 0.1240
1970 833.4 288 0.1201
1971 1.80% 21.70% 855.6 292 0.1165
1972 877.3 274 0.1130
1973 898.2 295 0.1099
1974 917.7 300 0.1082
1975 935.7 305 0.1045
1976 951.9 300 0.1026
1977 966.4 293 0.1009
1978 979.7 311 0.0992
Sources:  Production 1949-1951 (Chen: 1967, 338-9).  Production 1952-1978, PRC State Statistical Bureau,
      Various years
Population:  1949-1960…..1961-1978 FAO Statistics
Arable Land:  1949-1958 (Chen: 1967,284-5) (defined as cultivated land). 
1961-2012: FAO Staistics Division
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per capita (69+18+48).54  Therefore, it is safe to say that output reacted positively to the 
increases in prices for grain, a material gain.  
Similarly, a reduction in forced government procurement provides a greater op-
portunity to sell excess production in the open or less restrictive local markets where 
prices are higher.  These three factors provide a strong incentive for the farmer to produce 
more.  When the opposite occurs, the choice of what to plant is not in the hands of farm-
ers and prices are government established and government is the sole buyer, production 
falls.55  As previously mentioned, free markets for some grain products did not exist.  In 
such cases, the government created a multi-tiered pricing system.  Once a farmer met the 
required sales to the government, additional sales could be made to the government at a 
higher price.  In this way, though there was a single buyer, the farmer still had an incen-
tive to produce more.  With the onset of the GPCR, the government procurement actually 
fell rather than increase as it had done in previous direct planning times.  This was due to 
the imports of grain that began in 1961. That grain went to the coastal cities relieving the 
pressure on the rail system as well as easing the strain on the rural population caused by 
government extraction.  Reduced forced procurement, even though price increases were 
reduced, did lead to higher outputs, though at a lower rate than could have been achieved.   
Direct planning periods have led to a reduction in arable land even though the 
highest level of collectivization was, in part, to provide manpower to increase the output 
                                                 
54 The years 1977 and 1978 are excluded as they are transition years. 
 
55 It should be noted that there is a lag time between policy changes and changes in output.  Hence, one sees 
the highest output, at the time, during the first year of the GLF and the lowest output a year after the return 
to indirect planning. 
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of the land with water collection for irrigation when needed and to control flooding.  But 
water collection activities also turned farmland into ponds.   The GLF-caused famine led 
to an absolute decrease in population in 1960.  Yet the next mass campaign, the GPCR, 
led to an annual population growth of 2% to 2.9% per annum over the first eight years, an 
increase of 23% over the average population growth rate when compared to the first nine 
years of the PRC.  
Continuous population growth influences the arable land per capita available to 
grow food but also the amount of food production per capita.  The ability to increase out-
put in light of the rising population comes from multiple cropping and the use of chemi-
cal fertilizers and hybrid seeds.  Direct and indirect economic planning has a more imme-
diate impact on output.  In times of indirect planning, when the farmer chooses what to 
plant and a market exists to value output, the higher the annual price increases for grain 
the higher the output as measured in total grain production per capita.   
A key question in the area of economic development is whether the PRC was able 
to leverage its agricultural economy to export and generate FX that would allow technol-
ogy imports (Mellor and Johnston: 1961, 588).  As can be seen in Table 3.3, this was ac-
complished during the first ten years.  The situation was reversed when extensive grain 
imports were required to offset the production shortfalls of the GLF and continued, re-
ducing the agriculture balance of trade thereafter.  It should be noted that agriculture ex-
ports are all inclusive of agricultural products, not just grain.  Included are silks, tung oil, 
hides, and tea, among others.  Implicit in these agricultural trade surpluses, the PRC was 
self-reliant in agricultural production whenever the balance was positive even though 
there were imports.  When negative, self-sufficiency is implied.  
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Table 3.3   
  
Agriculture Balance of Trade 
(millions USD)56   
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
96 127 235 495 474 639 736 581 689 753 
          
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
488 -292 -184 -189 -70 132 422 355 286 804 
 
Was this the best that could be accomplished?  Huang et al maintain that agricul-
ture’s potential was not realized.  Top-down institutional planning and the emphasis on 
self-sufficiency did not allow comparative advantage in what products were produced 
where, therefore negating any opportunity to trade with the world products where a cost 
or quality advantage was present (or could be developed).  The top-down planning also 
established how much of what product was to be exported based on an annual plan, not 
what was available and financially viable to export.   
Finally, the currency was overvalued.57 Huang et al go further and suggest than 
none of the agriculture objectives supporting economic development was achieved. 
While output increased, consumption was insufficient to meet the UN minimum require-
ment of 2300 calories per day. It failed to provide labor to the non-agricultural sector due 
to the hukou system.  It failed to provide raw materials for light industry as evidenced by 
                                                 
56 Source: Kirby, R.H.,  “Agricultural Trade of the People’s Republic of China 1935-69”, Foreign Agricul-
tural, Economic Report, Economic Research Service, Washington, DC, Aug., 1972. 
 
57 For a discussion on the currency values during the Mao period, see Lardy (“Chinese Foreign 
Trade,” The China Quarterly, No. 131. 692-3).                       
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the need to ration clothing.  And it failed to increase incomes, or was not allowed to 
(Huang, Otzuka, and Rozelle: 2008, 469).   
The net result of Mao’s rule regarding food security is mixed.  Domestic rice pro-
duction increased by about 50% and wheat production more than doubled.  Yet the popu-
lation increased by 80%.  Increases in yields allowed per capita consumption of grain to 
remain approximately constant from 1957 to 1977, excluding the GLF disaster.  Yet, this 
is a time of gross government mismanagement.  The large number of deaths due to star-
vation during the GLF, attributable to direct planning, excessive extraction to keep the 
wheels of heavy industry turning, false reporting of production, adding non-agriculture 
tasks to rural workers, forced communization, and the creation of Potemkin farms to fool 
touring officials as to the failure of the GLF delayed remedial action.  Society became 
justifiably suspect of the state’s abilities to provide public goods at the level the state de-
sired. 
Despite the initial increases in food production, the PRC was experiencing food 
insecurity.  As shown in Table 3.2, the population was growing quickly, the arable land 
per capita was declining, and economic and political issues complicated production.  The 
most striking indicator of food insecurity was the low level of caloric intake per capita 
per day.  Estimated for the initial years of the PRC, the post-1958 average daily caloric 
intake of energy did not exceed the initial year’s estimates until 1978 and were still below 
the FAO recommended level of 2200 per day in 1971 (Perisse: 1981, Table 1)58, a 
                                                 
58 National statistics for caloric intake should represent the age distribution of the population as well as the 
activity levels the population is required to perform in employment.  Perisse’s statistics represent a compo-
site of developing countries. Smil, using China demographic statistics, found that the China need for caloric 
intake was 2210 calories per day in 1983 (Smil: 1986, 29).    
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chronic deficit in food consumption.  The only way to address this issue, at least in the 
short term, was to import grain.  Importing brings the international politics into the equa-
tion. 
 
International Politics and Food Security 
Foreign policy is formed by both domestic politics and international politics.  This 
section will examine the international system and the phases of PRC foreign policy dur-
ing Mao’s reign.  The international system is the world of states into which the PRC was 
born in 1949.  It encompasses the relations among states ranging from diplomacy to trade 
to conflict to migration as well as the transmission of ideas (Buzan: 1993, 331).  For each 
foreign policy period, “high politics,”-- relating to national security--will be addressed 
first as they will influence the “low politics,” relating to trade and investment (Cooper: 
1972, 18).  In the realm of food security, these two areas of international politics will 
overlap; national security depends not only on maintaining political independence but 
also on the ability to provide food supplies for the population.  In the case of the PRC, the 
inability of the CCP-directed economy to provide food for the population presents an ex-
istential threat to the CCP (Buzan: 1998, 100-4).  Therefore, attention must be paid to 
trade relations as trade was essential for the PRC in its economic development, food se-
curity, the choice of trading partners, and PRC’s position in the international system.  The 
result will be the influence of foreign policy on food security and the influence of food 
security on foreign policy.   
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The International System 
The Cold War, from the creation of the PRC to the unraveling of the USSR, dom-
inated the entire period of Mao’s rule and most of Deng’s.  The Cold War pitted the US 
vs. the USSR, each with its own allies, in a struggle for hegemonic superiority.  The nu-
clear capabilities of the two superpowers deterred each other as well as the core allies of 
both.59  As a result, direct conflict between the USSR and US was avoided.  Nuclear de-
terrence, however, did not stop either superpower from engaging in conflict via proxies 
or directly with a state on the periphery of the other’s bloc.  The US fought against USSR 
and PRC-backed forces in Vietnam and Korea, while the USSR’s invasion of Afghani-
stan resulted in US arms support for Afghanis.  Additionally, both superpowers backed 
opposing sides in African, Asian, and South American conflicts (Tow: 1997, 117).  
The PRC played a major role in the ebb and flow of the Cold War.  It fought the 
US in Korea as a member of the Soviet bloc.  It fought border skirmishes against the So-
viets while following an independent foreign policy.  It backed the sides opposing either 
the US or USSR in Africa and Asia, and it finally leaned towards the US to balance So-
viet power.60  The PRC also depended upon the Soviets for economic development dur-
ing its first decade of existence and later, after the death of Mao, successfully relied on 
the developed world for economic development. 
                                                 
59 Core allies of the US included NATO countries plus Japan, Taiwan, Korea after 1950, and the neighbor-
ing states of the US.  The USSR core allies included the Warsaw Pact countries plus other bordering states. 
 
60
 Nakajima suggests that Mao leaned towards the Soviets for the following reasons:  1) The risk of China 
moving towards US may have provoked strong reaction from Stalin.  Tensions between US & USSR were 
strong and USSR bordered China.  Russia was strong and China weak.  2)  Mao may have felt that it was 
necessary to solidify his position within the CCP.  3)  Yalta had produced a treaty with the Nationalists in 
which the Soviets had recovered Tsarist rights in Manchuria, including railroads and the naval base at Pt. 
Arthur (Dalian) which might remain under Soviet control.  5)  Stalin had met with Kao Kang (the CCP 
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The PRC did not blindly follow either the Soviets or the US.  Either one posed a 
grave threat to the PRC; operating together they posed an existential threat.  Preventing a 
US – USSR alliance against the PRC and preventing encirclement by either or both was 
of great importance.  Hence, from a position of relative weakness, Mao tended to play 
one off against the other or as in imperial times, find defense through the barbarians 
fighting each other (Kissinger: 2012, 101-4).    Mao dealt with more than just the super-
powers.  He also pursued an independent foreign policy; by attempting to take a leader-
ship role in the non-aligned movement among countries emerging from colonialism in 
Asia and Africa. 
In the following sections, the foreign policies of the PRC during the times of Mao 
will be examined in greater detail.  PRC scholar Wang Jisi identifies three eras of PRC 
foreign policy that encompass Mao’s rule: 1) “Two Camps”; 2) “opposing imperialism, 
revisionism, and reactionaries of all countries”; and 3) “Three Worlds”, this only being 
made public late in Mao’s life.  I would prefer to call the second era the “Opposition” era 
for the sake of brevity.  But I would also include the “Third World” era.  The PRC made 
efforts to become a leader of the developing world as early as 1955 at the Bandung Con-
ference.  This effort suffered ups and downs over time but has been a consistent PRC pol-
icy since at least 1955 to the present.  It was influenced by the eras Wang identifies and 
by international politics in general, yet leadership of the developing world still continues 
as a goal.  It also provides the PRC with a readily available platform from which to criti-
                                                 
leader in Manchuria) & signed a separate trade agreement that worried Mao (Nakajima: 1955, 264-5).  Kao 
was eventually purged by Mao. 
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cize either superpower or developed countries should the situation call for PRC opposi-
tion to either their actions or inactions, especially when relating to economic imbalance in 
the world.  These are not discrete periods of time as foreign policies overlap and have pe-
riods of time during which they are stressed and others when they are conveniently over-
looked.  For example, rapprochement with the US, starting in 1971, was not the starting 
point for engagement with others in the Western bloc. The PRC was engaged economi-
cally with states in Western Europe and with Japan within several years of the forming of 
the PRC. 
In examining these different foreign policies, we shall first look at the “high poli-
tics”-- those relating to national security and then look at “low politics”--those relating to 
trade, especially the grain trade and food security. 
 
Two Camps Policy Foreign Policy and Food Security 1949-1958 
 
Robinson suggests several themes in PRC, or Maoist, foreign policy.  Based on 
the mandate to rule and a relatively compliant populace, the dominant themes were na-
tional unity, socialist revolution, export of communist revolution, pro-Soviet and anti-
American rhetoric and actions, and restoration of Chinese primacy in Asia.  Yet the prime 
driver of foreign policy was domestic politics. Mao’s dominating personality and his 
need for constant political campaigns were one domestic influence as was the weight of 
the past. Additionally, what was learned during and after the formation of the CCP, and 
ideology were influential (Robinson: 1997, 556).  Notably absent is economic develop-
ment which Robinson maintains was superseded by politics.  Lurking in the background 
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was the need for state survival (Kirby: 1997, 19) and, according to Whiting, reactive ra-
ther than well-planned foreign policy (in Tow: 1995, 124). 
This period is a combination of Two Camps and Third World policies.  From the 
Two Camps point of view, cooperation with the Soviets was the predominant foreign pol-
icy alignment.  The East Bloc was the predominant trading partner.  The Korean War, os-
tensibly agreed to by North Korea and the Soviets, presented the PRC with a potentially 
existential issue as UN sanctioned troops (primarily American) approached the PRC bor-
der.  The PRC entered the war which quickly resulted in a stalemate along the original 
and soon-to-be permanent border between North and South.  Nakajima maintains that ex-
posing the PRC to a hostile neighboring state, the US or a US-backed South Korea, and 
Soviet assistance during the war in the form of the sales of obsolete arms to the PRC cre-
ated the first issues between the Soviets and the PRC (Nakajima: 1995, 270-82).  Still, the 
Soviets continued to support the PRC with trade credits, though less than smaller coun-
tries in Eastern Europe received, turn-key plants and equipment, and technical assistance.  
Yet, the drift apart continued following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and his “cult 
of personality” which Mao viewed as a criticism of himself, Soviet disagreements over 
the PRC’s domestic political campaigns and development plans, and the GLF also con-
tributed (Nakajima: 1995, 284-7).  Withdrawal of Soviet advisors in the midst of their 
work increased the split and led to the self-reliant development strategy of the PRC.  The 
final nail in the coffin of the Sino-Soviet alignment was the signing of the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty between the US and USSR, a move interpreted by the PRC as being aimed at 
the PRC and leading to the PRC publically declaring that the USSR nuclear protection 
was no longer valid (Yahuda: 1968, 93). 
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Just as it was in the interest of the PRC to keep a hostile state (Korea) away from 
its border, the same applied in the south where Zhou Enlai attempted to secure the PRC’s 
southern border via neutralization.61  Zhou considered the anti-colonial war against the 
French in Indo-China a risk to PRC economic development and security as the US had 
intimated that they would come to the aid of anti-Vietminh forces in Vietnam if neces-
sary.  This risked replacing French forces with American forces at the PRC border; a risk 
that the PRC could not afford and had reacted to militarily when presented with the same 
issue in Korea.  Neutralization would come with a French pull-out and the states of Vi-
etnam, Laos, and Cambodia being declared as neutral in the great power struggle of the 
time.  No foreign troops would be permitted in any of the three countries nor would any 
foreign bases, a key concern of the PRC in insulating itself from a US threat.  Such an 
agreement came to pass from the Geneva Conference which ended in the withdrawal of 
France from the newly independent states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.  This neu-
tralization in effect provided the PRC with buffer states on its southern border which 
would allow time, estimated by Zhou as fifteen years, for the PRC to develop into an in-
dustrialized state from an agricultural one (Shao: 1986, 483-505).  For what Zhou called 
the “zone of peace” to function well, keeping US bases from bordering states, required 
the addition of India and Burma that came in 1954 and 1960, respectively, following 
agreements on contested borders (but not all contested borders with India)  (Shao:1979, 
327 and 336) .    
                                                 
61 This is reminiscent of the tribute system in that it was a bordering region, relatively close to the capital, 
and consisting of states that could come under the influence of the PRC, not as vassal states but eventually 
ones that come under PRC regional hegemony.  Similarly, it was defensive in nature.     
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The Third World aspect of policy, an attempt to become the leader of the newly 
independent countries and the developing world, primarily Asian and African, was 
kicked off at the Bandung Conference in 1955.  While Zhou’s efforts appear to have been 
made with all integrity, he was not the final arbiter for the PRC: Mao was.  Zhou’s ap-
proach was eventually over-ridden by Mao who reverted to arming militants abroad, as 
he had done previously with the Vietminh.  The PRC was to support local communist 
groups against the existing governments in Malaya, Indonesia, and Thailand among oth-
ers.  Soon the PRC had border skirmishes/wars with India in 1959 and 1962 (Hinton: 
1997, 360-2).  An attempt to convene a second Bandung Conference in 1965 fell apart as 
the PRC refused India’s request to include the USSR as it was not an African or Asian 
state.  While the second Bandung Conference failed, the desire to lead the developing 
world remains in the interest of the PRC to this day. 
How did food enter into the foreign policy of the PRC during the Two Camps pe-
riod?  There are two distinct time frames within this period:  First, the period of increased 
grain output. Second is the period of the GLF famine.  During the first period, from 1950 
through 1958, grain output per capita increased nearly 50% while the population in-
creased more than 21%.  By 1956, caloric intake per day had met FAO guidelines.  The 
increases in grain output led not only to meeting the FAO guidelines but also permitted 
grain exports in addition to other agricultural products. 
The PRC needed to trade.  Grains, industrial crops, and other primary products 
were used to pay for technology needed for economic development.  “Export is for the 
sake of import, which, in turn, is for the socialist industrialization of our country” (Yeh 
Chi-chuang quoted in Hsiao: 1977, 10).  Grain exports to the West provided FX or barter-
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based trade while grain exports to the East Bloc yielded barter trade.  Yet, trade is not 
solely for economic development funds; “foreign trade is also a weapon of international 
political struggle” (from a PRC textbook quoted in Hsiao: 1977, 9).  Imports and exports 
could be used to gain influence in other countries and in special situations to circumvent 
trade restrictions.  To accomplish economic development and wage an international polit-
ical struggle, the PRC needed to control the production, distribution, and consumption of 
grains at home.  It took full control of imports and exports of grains by 1952 when all in-
ternational foodstuffs transactions came to be managed and executed through National 
Cereals, Oil and Foodstuffs Import and Export division of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.  
This gave the government full control (excepting smuggling) over what was bought or 
sold, the source or destination, and the cost or price (Crook et al: 1999, 46).  This organi-
zation increased the state-society balance in favor of the state and allowed the state to 
manage the political nature of international trade as well as control of FX earnings.  As 
was shown in Table 3.3, the PRC balance of agricultural trade from 1950 through 1958 
grew by nearly 700% indicating a level of success in using agriculture to generate FX 
earnings that could be used to import technology.   
The international political system affected the composition of PRC trading part-
ners.  Prior to the onset of WWII, trade was concentrated with what Dernberger calls the 
West, the total comprising 94% China’s exports, in dollars, in 1930.62  The USSR ac-
counted for only 3.4%.  The ascendency and political orientation of the PRC necessitated 
a change in trading partners.  The Soviet Bloc accounted for 20% of trade in 1950.  This 
                                                 
62 This includes Western Europe, North America, and Japan plus the colonial areas of those countries in 
Asia and present day Thailand. 
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rose to 75% in 1956, a major change in just six years (Dernberger; 1969, 135).  In agri-
culture trade, prior to WWII, China was an importer of grains from the US, Argentina, 
and Australia, and rice from Thailand, Burma, and Indochina.  Exports went primarily to 
Hong Kong / Macao, the UK, and Japan (Kirby:1972, 13,18).63 
The decision to “lean” towards the Soviets brought with it a Cold War defense 
provided under the umbrella of Soviet nuclear capabilities as well as acquiescence  to So-
viet foreign policies within the international system.  This represented the best interests of 
the PRC in terms of ideology.  Marxist ideology, land redistribution specifically, and the 
termination of civil war led to an increase in agricultural production and food security by 
1956.  Aligning with the Soviets was a foreign policy decision to side with an ideological 
like-minded state by committed communists.  There can be little doubt that land redistri-
bution would have occurred in any case as it was a CCP policy in areas they controlled 
during the civil war.  Therefore, the increase in agricultural production was ideologically 
driven rather than the result of foreign policy.  Foreign policy decisions related to Korean 
War participation served to reduce potential trading partners during the US embargo for 
all goods but as has been seen, many US allies continued to trade in foodstuffs and non-
strategic goods with the PRC.  Trade with the West Bloc provided FX badly needed by 
the PRC to support its economic development. 
                                                 
63
 An examination of trade agreements from the early years of the PRC shows trade of agricultural prod-
ucts and other primary products with the USSR and the East bloc, as well as with Western Europe for cer-
tain machinery, metal, chemicals, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, etc., items and technologies unavailable in the 
PRC.  PRC trade with less developed countries than itself tended to be the reverse; PRC industrial goods 
were traded for those countries’ agricultural products (Dernberger:1959, 163-206). 
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Within the Soviet bloc there was an emphasis on balanced trade between individ-
ual countries on a barter basis.  If there was settlement in cash, it was in roubles that were 
most often useless outside of the East bloc.  Barter trade and the East-Bloc trade arrange-
ments made it difficult to accumulate hard currency and inhibited the development of tri-
angular or multi-lateral trade, a situation where comparative advantage comes into play.  
The Soviets provided credits and used barter trade for Chinese products including rice 
and soybeans while supplying the PRC with technological goods, manufacturing plants, 
and technical training.  The composition of trade, grain for technology, was not balanced 
trade.  The issuance of credits to the PRC served to balance trade on the books but only 
by increasing the amount of debt owed to the Soviets.  This will become an issue in the 
latter half of the Two Camps foreign policy. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the prime grain trade with the East Bloc was with 
the Soviet Union and several other East Bloc countries.  Prior to 1954, all grain exports 
were rice.  Beginning in 1954, soybeans were added to the export mix, maize 
    was added in 1958, though 
very little.  There were no 
grain imports by the PRC 
from any East Bloc coun-
tries during this time pe-
riod.  It is interesting to 
note that Yugoslavia be-
came an importer of PRC 
soybeans in 1956, 1957, and again in 1959.  Tito had broken with Stalin in 1948 and was 
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pursuing independent economic and political policies based on nationalism.  Mao de-
nounced Tito “to assure a suspicious Stalin and realist Stalin that Mao entertained no Ti-
toist ambitions of his own as a national communist” (Yahuda: 1997, 276).   Under 
Khrushchev, in 1955 Tito was welcomed back into the Soviet Bloc and was supported by 
Mao also.  However, this accommodation was not to last long as Tito objected to the use 
of force in dealing with the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956, leading the PRC to 
break with Tito as Mao supported the intervention in Hungary (Whiting: 1959, 105-6).  
Though the shipments of soybeans are not a large quantity, the timing leads to the idea 
that trade resulted from political reconciliation and is concluded for the opposite reasons.  
Given that the break in relations came in 1956, it appears that the trade agreement cov-
ered several years and the PRC did not renege on its commitment even after political is-
sues arose, a behavior that would be repeated in the future.  Intra-East Bloc politics could 
lead to notable changes in amity and enmity within the Bloc; another example will be 
seen during the GLF. 
In summary, PRC trade within the East Bloc had three aspects that were a result 
of foreign policy decisions.  First, there were the technological needs of the PRC if it was 
to develop economically.  The PRC could only turn to the USSR for these items due to its 
foreign policy decision to align itself with them.  Second, there is the issue of payment to 
the Soviets for its assistance.  Agricultural products, primarily grain, were most of what it 
had to trade.  This was not an issue during this time frame but the steady accumulation of 
debts to the Soviets increased the costs of moving away from the Soviets politically.  Fi-
nally, while not using trade as a weapon, it was used as a signaling device to indicate ap-
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proval or disapproval to the Soviets or other East Bloc states of their ideological and po-
litical behaviors.  In effect, these served as warnings of more difficult times to come in 
the Sino-Soviet relationship.  
Exports to the West, shown in Figure 3.2, offered the PRC the opportunity to earn 
FX, an asset that could be used to purchase needs or repay debts anywhere.  Despite the 
US trade embargo trade conducted with West Bloc European countries was primarily for 
soybeans, beginning in 1951, with marginal amounts of rice and maize near the end of 
the period.  Japan was by far the leading importer of PRC grain. 
 
In January 1950, the 
UK became the earliest 
Western state to recognize 
the PRC.  Concerns over 
the sum of British business 
investment in China and the 
hopes of getting along with 
the CCP led to the recogni-
tion (New York Times: 1/8/1950, 127).64  Diplomatic relations were not a guarantee of 
trade just as trade was not subject to having diplomatic relations, especially in agricul-
tural trade. 
                                                 
64 The UK and PRC relations were at the charge d’affaires level only, not the ambassadorial level.  From 
the UK point of view, this constituted diplomatic recognition.  The PRC point of view was that it was not 
diplomatic recognition. 
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PRC trade with Japan is a curious issue.  First, PRC – Japan relations continued to 
be affected by the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 and the occupation of China from 1937 
through the end of WWII.65  Second, approximately six weeks following the end of the 
US occupation of Japan, Japanese businessmen approached the PRC seeking a restoration 
of trade.  Despite the PRC’s hard feelings towards Japan, this agreement occurred about a 
year before the cessation of hostilities of the Korean War where the two main belligerents 
were the US and PRC.  This war also accelerated the post-war economic development of 
Japan as Japan served as a staging area for US troops involved in Korea and fighting the 
PRC (Schaller: 2004, 146-170).  The trade agreement commenced in 1952 and was inter-
rupted in 1959 and 1960 before resuming.  The initial trades were barter arrangements 
between the PRC government and private Japanese companies with the PRC supplying 
primary goods in exchange for primarily industrial goods (New York Times: 6/3/1952, 3).  
The trade hiatus resulted from Japan – PRC - Taiwan arguments concerning the relative 
statuses of PRC and Taiwanese trade officials in Japan, a forerunner of similar issues be-
tween the PRC and other states regarding Taiwan.  
The PRC also reached out to the US during the Korean War for trade.  Minister of 
Trade Yeh Chi-chuang called for ending the US-imposed trade embargo as the PRC 
needed to trade with the West to facilitate economic development and that trade opportu-
nities between the US and PRC were good (New York Times: 10/2/52, 3).   This overture 
was not accepted by the US due to the existing war between the two but even if it had, 
                                                 
65 Another possible point of contention is the Treaty of Versailles in that the German concession in Shan-
dong was awarded to Japan rather than being returned to China. 
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grain products surely would not have been traded as the US was the major agricultural 
producer in the world and the PRC grain output was on the rise through 1958.66 
The fact that agricultural trade did exist between the PRC and members of the 
West Bloc demonstrates that foreign policies can also be overcome by need, in this case 
FX.  The attempt to establish trade relations with the US, most likely a publicity stunt, 
was rebuffed; an indication that at least at this time the foreign policy of the US was less 
shakable than the PRC’s. 
Agriculture trade with South East Asia was a return to or a continuation with tra-
ditional trading partners.  It served political purposes as well.  Zhou’s “Zone of Peace” on 
the southern and southwestern borders served to keep foreign forces away from PRC bor-
ders.  Further away from bordering states, the spirit of Bandung and the foreign policy 
desire to lead the newly or soon-to-be independent states of Asia and Africa led to trade 
and in some cases economic assistance.67  The PRC sought to gain influence in these ar-
eas through exchanges of high-level official visits between the PRC and other countries, 
through participation in trade fairs, trade and payment agreements, and buy-now pay-later 
schemes.  These activities were meant to demonstrate the superiority of the PRC eco-
nomic system, promote closer political relations, and ultimately to lure south and South 
East Asian states away from the West and towards the communist camp (Shao: 1959, 2).  
For both areas, trade in grain was part of that effort.  
                                                 
66 A reason for trade with the US or other West Bloc countries would be due to a lack of physical distribu-
tion capabilities within the PRC and the cost of internal transport.   
 
67 This paid off in 1971 when support from newly independent countries in Africa and Asia provided much 
of the vote that placed the PRC in the UN. 
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Barter trade, rice for rubber, occurred with Ceylon, Malaysia, and Indonesia.  
Ceylon ignored the UN embargo and began shipping rubber to the PRC in 1952.  Malay-
sia and Indonesia began trading following the lifting of the embargo in 1956.  The rice-
for-rubber trade with Ceylon in the post-Korean War years removed Burma as a prime 
supplier to rice-insufficient Ceylon, leaving Burma with a glut of rice (Wong: 1975, 492).  
It was at that point that the PRC stepped in and purchased rice from Burma (Shao, C.L: 
1959, 10), a friendly gesture to a neighbor.  The PRC continued purchasing Burmese rice 
and eventually ended up, in 1962, using Burmese rice to pay for Ceylonese rubber 
(Wong: 1975, 494).68  Shipments of rice to a few African countries began during this 
time period with shipments extending through times of PRC famine. 
India was an early trading partner of the PRC, which shipped rice and sorghum to 
India during a food shortage there (Shao, C.L., 1959, 7).  But India was also a rival for 
developing world leadership and a state bordering the PRC with unresolved border dis-
putes that would result in armed conflict.69  Pakistan, which leaned to the West, was also 
a food trading partner with the PRC.  Exports of rice to Pakistan commenced in 1956.  
The first exports of rice to Africa started in 1958. 
                                                 
68 Shao C.L. maintains that the PRC trade in SE Asia was also an attempt to woo those states away from 
capitalist suppliers.  The USSR led a similar effort in India and Burma.  The Burmese had became disen-
chanted with the PRC as PRC re-sold rice imports from Burma to traditional Burmese markets in addition 
to Ceylon, at lower prices (Shao: 1959, 11). 
 
69 In 1962 the Soviets appeared to be neutral in this border dispute, rather than siding with their fellow com-
munist state, so the conflict, in addition to addressing border issues, became a PRC desire to diminish the 
prestige of Nehru in the eyes of the developing world and “humiliate Mr. Khrushchev in the eyes of Com-
munists by showing that his friendship for India could not prevent China from attacking her” (The China 
Quarterly: 1963, No.13, 260).   
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Trade with Hong Kong deserves special mention.  In this period, reported trade 
with Hong Kong was not as important as it was to become.  Financially, trade offered an 
opportunity to earn FX, both through trade as well as remittances.  Politically, it offered a 
way to obscure the source of PRC exports and imports, therefore allowing embargoes to 
be by-passed.  For example, Hong Kong was supposed to be the source of rice shipments 
to the Philippines and South Vietnam beginning in the 1950’s (Shao, C.L:1959,4-5).  Sin-
gapore would also serve a similar function later.70  Exports to “other” areas are shown in 
Figure 3.3, below. 
 
Grain was not im-
ported as a general rule.  In 
addition to rice imports 
from Burma, small amounts 
of rice and maize were im-
ported from Cambodia.  Ar-
gentina sold wheat to the 
PRC in 1954, a one-off transaction.  In 1958 China purchased 128,000 tons of wheat, the 
vast majority coming from Canada and bits from Australia and France.  While these 
transactions might be viewed as a harbinger of things to come, major and sustained im-
ports of grain did not occur until 1961.   
                                                 
70 In addition to Hong Kong, trade with former British colonies could also provide FX as they tended to use 
or have access to pounds sterling. 
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In summary, this period sets the stage for future action and reaction. Ideology, the 
Cold War, and tradition entered into the PRC foreign policy and food security.  For our 
purposes, the achievement of food security was derived from ideology; Marxist land re-
distribution increased grain output and brought domestic food production to FAO-recom-
mended levels, in aggregate.  This allowed for exports of rice, soybeans and other agri-
culture-based exports to facilitate industrial development.   
The Cold War limited the PRC to obtaining technology from the Soviets and East 
Bloc with few options from the West.  This increased PRC dependency on and created 
debts to the Soviets; a situation that would be addressed in the near future.  For this pe-
riod, exports of grain and agricultural products helped pay for Soviet assistance in eco-
nomic development. PRC rice and soybean exports to Western Europe and Japan permit-
ted the PRC to obtain non-strategic goods from the West as well as FX.  
Neither ideology nor the Cold War prevented the PRC from using grain imports 
and exports to re-establish traditional trading links with South East Asian neighbors.  Nor 
did it stop the PRC from pursuing its desire to lead the developing world, a desire that 
used limited grain shipments as a tool of influence in the international political struggle.   
   
Foreign Policy and Food Insecurity 1958-1963 
 
The latter stage of the Two Camps foreign policy is a transition period to the Op-
position foreign policy when the Soviets along with the US would be opposed by the 
PRC.  It is the time of increasing tension between the PRC and USSR, an intra-Bloc dis-
pute.   The disputes were personal between Khrushchev and Mao, especially over Stalin’s 
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legacy.  They were historical regarding the overall relationship between the two coun-
tries, both pre- and post-PRC triumph in the civil war, and they were doctrinal over com-
munism.  The PRC thought of the USSR as being a revisionist communist state while the 
PRC strove to implement communization better and quicker that the Russians had (Chen: 
2009, 58).  Mao went against the advice of Khrushchev and the Russians and ended up 
with an economic disaster and famine.71 
The PRC entered the communist bloc as a partner junior to the USSR, which had 
both historical and institutional seniority and Stalin’s personal seniority as the longest-
serving national leader within the Bloc.  Upon Stalin’s death, Mao became the senior na-
tional leader within the Bloc (Wittfogel: 1962, 679-81).  Mao’s disdain of Khrushchev 
led him to think of himself as the leader of world communism (Chen: 2009, 56).  Wittfo-
gel goes on to attribute the GLF to the USSR’s scant financial support of the PRC’s eco-
nomic development when in 1954 they provided the final loan, after which the PRC 
would have to earn its own way through trade and for assistance on a pay-as-you-go 
method.  These changes in support necessitated rapid communization to enable the state 
to extract more from the agriculture sector to finance the industrial sector.  Rapid com-
munization of agriculture had been a failure in the USSR, which advised against the PRC 
pursuing such a policy.  Khrushchev’s public criticism of the PRC communization plan 
(to Americans, no less) cited the failures of the initial USSR communization efforts and 
made PRC-Soviet matters worse (Wittfogel: 1962, 687-8).   
                                                 
71 Khrushchev had warned Mao about the need to use material incentives to maintain or increase agricul-
tural output (Wittfogel: 1962, 690). 
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Chen has a different point of view and suggests that the GLF had its origins in the 
Cold War.  Once the USSR stated that it would surpass the US in steel production, Mao 
looked at Great Britain, the second-ranking capitalist country, as a target to surpass in 
steel production more quickly than the Soviets would pass the US.  Simultaneously, ver-
sus the Soviets and Khrushchev, Mao needed “to demonstrate the superiority of socialism 
in the People's Republic, to prove the genuineness of Chinese communism in contrast to 
Soviet revisionism, and to return China to equal status with the other great powers” 
(Chen: 2009, 57-8).72  Moving even with the number two capitalist country in steel pro-
duction by demonstrating its superior form of communism necessitated the participation 
of all citizens.  Communization of agriculture was the means. 
These two explanations of the origins of policies that created the GLF were inter-
national in scope; competition with the Soviets for leadership of world communism in 
one case and the Cold War in the other.  In both cases, Mao found rapid communization 
as the proper response and caused the PRC to look inward to surpass the Soviets and 
upon its failure then to look outward to recover.  Outward did not mean the Soviets or the 
East Bloc. Relief from food insecurity caused by the GLF would come primarily from the 
West.  
                                                 
72 If Mao’s collectivization plan had worked and demonstrated the superiority of PRC communism as op-
posed to Soviet communism, could the PRC have replaced the USSR as the leader of the East Bloc and 
then by definition the prime defender of the East against the West?  This is unlikely for material reasons.  
The Soviets were technologically superior to the PRC in most areas of industry, including substantial leads 
in military arms and delivery systems.  The PRC would not present an existential threat to the US.  Further, 
if the PRC was able to exercise significant influence / control over a degraded USSR, it is still unlikely that 
the Soviets would enter into war against the West that would threaten Soviet’ existence.  However, in a 
non-material sense, success would likely earn Mao the ideological prestige throughout the East Bloc that he 
coveted. 
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  1958 represents the transition from an increasingly food secure PRC to one of 
food insecurity resulting in the GLF famine.73  This led to daily caloric intake falling 24% 
on average between 1959 and 1962 and 32% in 1960 alone from the high point in 1956.  
In the previous period, the grain trade was used for economic development and for influ-
ence.  In this period, grain exports served to reduce debts and to buy the PRC’s way out 
of being a junior partner of the Soviets in the communist world.   
The domestic structural problems related to international trade as well as interna-
tional political issues that turned the trade in grains on its head.  The domestic structural 
issue was a result of the direct planning process.  In putting together the annual economic 
plan, grain exports were identified as a percentage of the output planned.  Commitments 
for export would then be with foreign customers solely based on the plan prior to what 
was actually produced.  Therefore, when the crop fell short of expectations, even disre-
garding overstated harvests, there was always a possibility of excessive exporting of a 
crop leading to domestic shortages.  There were inventories of grain from which to draw 
in cases of output shortages, as in the imperial period with the ever-normal granaries.  
Should there be consecutive years of overstated harvests, excessive exports, and resulting 
overstatement of inventories, disaster could occur…and did.74    
                                                 
73 Estimates from famine deaths are estimated between 15 and 60 million.  The higher estimates generally 
include births that did not occur as a result of the famine.  
74 A common excuse for poor outputs during the GLF was the weather; droughts and floods caused the dra-
matic fall in grain output.  However, as the fall in output occurred in all growing areas nationwide, one 
must conclude that drought struck the entire country.  This is highly unlikely. 
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Chen states that Mao deliberately chose agricultural exports as the way to acceler-
ate repayment of Soviet loans (Chen: 2009, 74).75  Using agriculture was an obvious 
choice as total agriculture-based products exceeded 65% of all exports.76  After all, a 
chief economic planner, Bo Yibo, after revising downwards initial output estimates, pro-
jected total grain output to rise to 375 mmt in 1958 and 400 mmt in 1959, a substantial 
increase over the 185 mmt in 1957 (Chen: 2009, 62) as well as a greater amount to ex-
tract from the peasantry.  Additionally, the GLF famine caused the output of other pri-
mary and industrial products to decrease also, further precluding those types of products 
as a means of repayment.  Soviet advisors were not withdrawn until 1960; therefore the 
Soviets were aware of the food shortages in the PRC and offered to postpone payments 
(Chen: 2009, 74).  This Soviet offer was not accepted by the PRC.  Neither was a vague 
US offer by Kennedy (we will consider, if they ask).                                              
1958 was a crucial year.  Inflated production figures misled trade officials leading 
to commitments to export grains from the previous and following years that did not exist 
in actuality.  Soviet disgust with PRC domestic policies, among other intra-East Bloc 
concerns, led to a pullout of Soviet technicians installing new plants and training the 
workforce.  The desire to rid the PRC of debts to the Soviets led to an acceleration of 
grain shipments to the USSR.  The PRC shipped a total of 4.78 mmt of rice (milled 
equivalent) and 990,000 mt of soybeans to the USSR in 1959 and 1960.  To all countries, 
                                                 
75 An option would have been to default, but that would have damaged PRC prestige internationally.  It was 
also in the interest of the PRC not to default as it had given loans to other developing countries; defaulting 
on debts to the Soviets would have given debtors of the PRC an excuse to default on loans from the PRC. 
 
76 Total agricultural products includes tea, tobacco, and textiles (including footwear) here.  These other 
non-grain but land, using products impacts the amount of food grains grown.  65% is the lower boundary of 
Eckstein’s estimates of the PRC’s export composition (Eckstein:1966, 114-5).   
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the PRC exported more than 6.1 mmt of rice and 2.3 mmt of soybeans in those two years 
(Kirby: 1972, 65).  In these two years, many Chinese starved.  The relative increase in 
grain exports, at this crucial time, can be seen graphically below. 
The decision to increase grain shipments to the USSR during the famine, or not to 
delay them, was most likely an act of bravado on Mao’s part or that of the leadership.  At 
best, it was a false statement that the PRC knew what it was doing socially and economi-
cally, most likely a true statement that it could get along without the Soviets, and at 
worst, a statement based on pride or ambition.  We have already seen that Mao thought of 
himself as the world leader of communism.  Whether he was or not, Khrushchev was still 
the leader of the USSR, the first country to adopt communism, one with 40 years of com-
munist experience, a superpower, and the country most closely associated with com-
munism.  What Mao thought is most likely what the rest of the world, outside of the PRC, 
would not agree with. The GLF did present Mao with an opportunity to lead the comunist 
world if he could succeed in communizing faster with better results than the Soviets.77  
                                                 
77 Could Mao have been the leader of international communism?  Womack suggests that if leadership is 
“the ability to coordinate compliance, then the surplus of attention enjoyed by regional or global power 
poses an interesting dilemma….if …international power is the ability to get another state to do something 
that it would not otherwise do, and that international leadership is the habitual exercise of international 
power, then the dilemma is that the use of rewards and sanctions reduces the capacity for sustainable lead-
ership.”  The solutions to that dilemma are:  1) lead in directions that others would wish to follow.  Com-
mon goals and mutual benefit do not impose compliance or cost, so rewards and sanctions are unnecessary.  
2)  institutionalization of international norms and procedures…leader can disappear behind protocol and 
precedent and leadership becomes sustainable as the system itself.  (Womack: 2010, 104).  Based on Wom-
ack’s discussion of leadership, Mao could not have succeeded in achieving his goal.  Few states were will-
ing to follow him and none allied itself for an extended period of time.  His allies within the East Bloc de-
pended on which country was having issues with the USSR and had been pushed away by Moscow.  An-
other intra-Bloc issue could easily change that relationship, for example, the PRC’s short alignments with 
Yugoslavia and Albania.  Further, institutionalization of norms within the East-Bloc would be an anathema 
to Mao and his constant revolutions. 
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The GLF was unsuccessful and diminished the prestige of Mao within the CCP as well as 
within the East Bloc.78 
The tonnage shipped to the USSR and the rest of the world seems like a large 
amount but on a per capita basis with a population of 670 million or so, it was a drop in 
the bucket.  In any case, if widely known at the time, it might have destroyed a weakened 
state-society relationship.79  Similarly, the imports that followed were also a drop in the 
bucket.  What is different is that those imports went to the urban population located along 
the east coast, readily accessible by ship, thereby leaving more grain (less extraction) for 
the rural population and decreasing the pressure on an inefficient domestic transportation 
system.  
To relieve the emergency food insecurity situation, the PRC began imports of 
wheat from the West Bloc and Argentina.  This was not new; France, Argentina, Canada, 
and Australia had shipped small amounts previously, but this time the PRC imported on 
average 3.8 mmt per year from the West and Argentina through the end of Mao’s rule.80  
Imports of grain have continued since then, indicative of ongoing food insecurity or the 
inability to be self-reliant.  The sudden and dramatic change in grain imports is shown be-
low.  The US continued to be avoided for relief grain shipments, a continuation of Cold 
                                                 
78 Mao should have paid more attention to Khrushchev’s criticisms of rapid communization and looked at 
other East-Bloc agricultural success.  An article in early 1962 on communist food crises stated that only Po-
land and Yugoslavia had “anything like a good record in food production and they have achieved it by 
abandoning the collective farm system and turning land back to the peasants” (Harsh: 1962, 1).   
 
79 Trains transporting grain to the USSR in 1961were attacked by starving peasants (Becker: 1996,155).  
 
80 The USSR shipped 300,000 mt of wheat to the PRC in 1961-62 to assist in famine relief.  The USSR was 
a net grain exporter until 1963. 
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War international politics.  The purchase of grain was not a foreign policy change be-
tween the PRC and the West as it involved non-strategic goods, from the point of view of 
the West, but it was a step outside of the norm with regards to quantity.  Imports in-
creased food security in urban areas and indirectly in rural ones.  As purchases continued, 
the specter of food dependency would increase.  The dramatic shift between exports and 
imports of grain, for all of Mao’s rule, is shown in figure 3.4, below. 
Yet this is not the full story.  Albania had objected to Khrushchev’s denunciation 
of Stalin as had Mao and started Albania down the path to doctrinal differences with the 
Soviets.  Khrushchev retaliated by cutting trade, including grain shipments, creating a 
food shortage in Albania.  In the midst of the famine of the GLF, Mao came to the rescue 
of the Albanians by diverting grain purchased from Canada and France to relieve Alba-
nia’s problem.81 The Christian Science Monitor (hereafter CSM) reported that 20,000 mt 
of wheat purchased from France in 1960 was diverted to Albania (Sheldon: 1961, 1). 
Fifty-eight tons of Canadian wheat were diverted from the PRC to Albania (Eckstein: 
1966, 165), most likely in 1961 or 1962.  Australian officials raised concerns that wheat 
shipments to the PRC were being used to repay Soviet loans (Norman: 1961, 12). We 
have seen that the amounts of grain that the PRC imported did not amount to much on a 
per capita basis nor did the exports to the USSR during the GLF.  Diversion of grain pur-  
                                                 
81 These shipments do not appear in PRC shipments or Albania receipts.     
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chases to Albania further demonstrates that Mao was more interested in the intra-East 
Bloc political system and his ability to influence it than the welfare of his citizens. 
Cuba had joined the East-Bloc in 1959.  The PRC welcomed them by commenc-
ing rice-for-sugar trade in 1961 at the height of food insecurity.  It must be suspected that 
this was an attempt by Mao to gain influence with Castro or reduce Soviet influence.  Ex-
ports of rice, soybeans, and maize all decreased after 1960; the largest decrease was to 
the USSR. Hong Kong had a significant increase as it was a source of FX.82     
The domestic aspects of the recovery from the GLF were discussed earlier.  They 
must be mentioned again as the cure for some of what ailed the PRC was a retreat from 
the high point of communization by the partial restoration of rural markets, private plots 
                                                 
82 Another source of FX was the sale of PRC gold and silver reserves. 
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within communes, increased grain prices, and reduced extraction.  Mao’s domestic pres-
tige was damaged and he retreated from overt CCP management temporarily.  This did 
not mark the high point of Mao’s domestic influence as he was to return and bring forth 
the GPCR to punish those who led the retreat from communization’s high point.  There 
should be no doubt that Mao realized that Khrushchev’s criticisms of the GLF were cor-
rect, yet by 1964 Khrushchev had been ousted and Mao was not the leader of world com-
munism but he was actively planning the GPCR.   
The PRC foreign policy directed at the Asian nations and developing world was a 
continuation of pre-PRC trade, as well as part of Zhou’s efforts to solidify the southern 
and southwestern borders as well as to create a zone of influence.  This included steps to 
limit Soviet penetration in some cases and the US in others.  Influence included purchas-
ing and selling grain to the region and in quantities that did not impact overall food secu-
rity but served to assist border areas, as shown in Figure 3.5.  The area of most im-
portance was the acquisition of rubber during the embargo with Ceylon and then bringing 
the source closer to home after the embargo with rice-for-rubber trade with Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  Rice exports to these states fell off during the recovery phase from the GLF 
then fluctuated among the three, depending on the political situation. 
The PRC had begun shipments of grain to a few African countries prior to the 
GLF, part of the spirit of Bandung.  The amounts were inconsequential in total.  Some 
countries continued to receive shipments during and immediately after the GLF.  In total, 
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the foreign policy of the PRC towards Asia and Africa had a minimal impact, in the total 
scope of the disaster, on overall food security.83 
To summarize the 
1958-1963 period, food in-
security again became a 
problem for the PRC, thus 
limiting the trade options 
necessary to feed the popu-
lation and continue eco-
nomic development.  Mao’s 
personal goal, to lead the communist world, coupled with the means, communization, are 
the principal causes of food insecurity.  The extent was further exacerbated by Mao 
through accelerated repayments of debts to the USSR as well as intra-Bloc political moti-
vations that transferred imported grain to Albania, a foe of Khrushchev.  Grain was used 
as a weapon of intra-East Bloc political struggle but its effects were felt internally by its 
own citizens.  Relief came from the West, the enemy, and Latin America.84  Depending 
on the West may not have been pleasant for Mao but other than Argentina, most wheat 
growing areas are in the West. 
 
                                                 
83 Though not related to overall food security, the PRC did purchase coffee and cocoa from Africa to en-
courage two-way trade and balance FX.  They also bought a significant amount of tobacco from Tanzania 
following a failure to sell the crop and sold a significant amount of sugar to Sudan at a discounted price due 
a lack of Sudanese FX (Snow: 1997, 288). 
 
84 The Soviets also contributed wheat in 1961-2. 
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Opposition Foreign Policy and Food Security: 1963-1972 
 
 This is the period of opposition: opposition to Soviet revisionism and imperialism 
resulting from the clash over Soviet aid, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Soviet’s 
peaceful coexistence with the US.85  There was also opposition to US imperialism and the 
US in general. In an interview in 1966, Zhou stated that the PRC would not provoke a 
war with the US but would react to US aggression anywhere in the world and that the 
PRC was prepared for war and should one break out there would be no boundaries 
(China Quarterly: July, 1966, 218-9).  Yet, this is also the period in which the initial sof-
tening of the US position towards the PRC begins.  Other than the off-and-on discussions 
among diplomats in Warsaw, the elimination of passport restrictions for US scholars trav-
eling to the PRC and other communist countries was a first step in the reduction of the 
isolation of the PRC policy while maintaining the containment aspect of US policy 
(China Quarterly: April, 1966, 218).  Subsequent steps in the same direction would in-
clude abstaining, rather than vetoing, the PRC admission to the UN and the relaxation of 
US trade restrictions, both in 1971.  PRC efforts in the same direction included inviting 
the US table tennis team to visit the PRC and the invitation to Nixon to visit the PRC.   
Harding sees the relationship between the PRC and a diverse number of develop-
ing states as client states serving four principal interests for the PRC:  1) some were far-
away outposts that provided the PRC a presence in a geographic area, such as Albania for 
Eastern Europe or Tanzania in East Africa; 2) protectorates where the PRC guaranteed 
                                                 
85 It is interesting to note that the PRC call for peaceful coexistence among nations did not apply between 
the US and USSR, the leaders of the Two Camps.   
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security, North Korea; 3) allies in Asia, such as Burma, that were counterweights to re-
gional rivals such as India; and, 4) insurgencies, where the PRC provided material and 
political support, most often those that could pressure the Soviets or the US (Harding: 
1997, 384-7), or Taiwan. 
The support for the international communist movement is evident in various ar-
eas.  Mao had differed from the USSR in the pursuit of revolutionary interests; he was 
now free to pursue them (Zagoria: 1962, 172).  In SE Asia, the “zone of peace” became a 
zone of PRC-supported insurgencies (“Ten Years of Chinese Communist Foreign Pol-
icy”: 1968, 1-4).  Communist parties were supported in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, In-
dia, and Malaysia.  Revolt in some countries was encouraged.86  In Africa, Burundi ex-
pelled PRC diplomats for payments to rebels in the Congo and for implication in the as-
sassination of an ex-Burundi leader.  Kenya seized 75 tons of PRC arms destined for 
Uganda.  Dahomey (now Benin) and the Central African Republic broke diplomatic rela-
tions over support for domestic communist revolutionaries, and a coup in Ghana resulted 
in the PRC embassy staff being reduced to 18 from 200 plus (China Quarterly, various 
issues 1965-66).  These activities certainly violated the Peaceful Coexistence doctrine of 
respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. 
More subtle activities were employed within the Soviet bloc to emphasize disap-
proval of Soviet activities.  Aid to Albania continued.  The USSR invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia earned stern rebukes from the PRC as well as fears that the Brezhnev Doctrine (the 
                                                 
86 The communist party in Indonesia, in combination with President Sukarno, attempted to overthrow the 
anti-PRC army generals of Indonesia in 1965.  The attempt failed and led to the overthrow of Sukarno and 
a long period of animosity between Indonesia and the PRC. 
 
137 
 
right of a communist country to intervene in a communist country tending towards capi-
talism) might also be applied against the PRC.   At the same time, the border issues be-
tween the PRC and the USSR were increasing and would soon turn into multiple skir-
mishes in the Heilongjiang border area as well as the Xinjiang border area in the west. 
The GPCR commenced in 1966 bringing with it an increase in domestic influ-
ences on foreign policy.  The radicalism of the time, including the takeover of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, the recall of all ambassadors but the ambassador to Egypt, the 
burning of the UK embassy in Beijing, border skirmishes with India, fomenting riots in 
Hong Kong, and quarrels with 32 different countries (China Quarterly: October, 1967, 
221-3).  The GPCR demonstrated that international relations were not only reactive to US 
and USSR foreign policies but also to their own domestic politics. 
From the high point of grain production in 1958 and the high point in export ton-
nage in 1960, production did not reach 1958 levels again until 1964-5 and exports until 
1966.  A major difference was the continuous importation of wheat in excess of the ton-
nage exported.  From 1962 through 1978, imports of wheat ranged between 1.15 and 4.4 
times the tonnage of grain exported.  By 1978, per capita consumption of grain was about 
the same as 1957.  
This period includes part of the GPCR which commenced in 1966 and ended in 
1976 and was aimed at the urban population.  The target was urban but there was carryo-
ver into the rural areas. Grain production remained essentially flat on a per capita basis 
despite a 27.8% increase in population and a 25.1% decrease arable land, a positive 
achievement during a turbulent time.   
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If the PRC continued to import grain in such quantities, how could it achieve a 
positive balance of payments in agriculture?  One reason is the dramatic increase in the 
level of fruit and vegetable exports that more than quadrupled between 1961 and 1973.  
The value of net fruit and vegetable trade exceeded net grain trade from 1967 through 
1973 (FAO Statistics).  The export of labor-intensive fruit and vegetables was a good use 
of comparative advantage. 
Grain imports came almost exclusively from the West after 1966.  The PRC was 
not only a “taker” in the global grain trade; it could also be a “chooser.”  Canada and 
Australia were wheat suppliers to the PRC from 1958.  Canada established diplomatic re-
lations with the PRC in 1970 while Australia hesitated until 1972 due to its traditional re-
lations with Taiwan.  In 1971, the PRC declared: “China would continue to consider Can-
ada first as a source of wheat as imports needs arose” (CSM: 7/9/1971, 2).  Three days 
later, the PRC told Australia they would be given equal consideration upon establishing 
diplomatic relations (Burns: 7/12/1971,1).  That did not occur until late 1972.  In 1970, 
Australia shipped about 2.2 million tons of wheat to the PRC.  From 1971 through 1973, 
it shipped about 400 thousand tons.  The traditional Australian two-track policy of anti-
PRC high politics and the continuing trade of “low politics” had ceased to work.   
During the Opposition period, politics caused decreased rice imports from Burma 
as the PRC export of revolution practices upset Burma.  Cambodia was a minor supplier 
to the PRC but the complications in relations were brought on by the Vietnam War and 
the overthrow of Sihanouk.  Small amounts of maize were purchased from Cambodia, 
Zambia, and South Africa in the early 1960’s but most maize imports were from Argen-
tina. 
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Grain exports went primarily to the West.  Of that portion, about half was to Ja-
pan, the largest customer for PRC soybeans.  Exports to Hong Kong continued to in-
crease and were generally bound for third countries. 
Exports to other than 
the West tended to ebb and 
flow with politics as shown in 
Figure 3.6.  The rice trade 
with Indonesia ceased from 
1965 through 1971 due to 
PRC meddling in the internal 
affairs of Indonesia.  Trade 
with Ceylon (soon to be re-named Sri Lanka) began a gradual decline after 1971 follow-
ing a resumption of the rubber – rice trade with Indonesia.  Trade with the Middle East 
and North Africa (hereafter MENA), Jordan and Lebanon in the 1963-4 time period in-
creased in 1970 with the addition of four more MENA countries.87  Increased shipments 
to the MENA appear to support Harding’s contention that foreign policy wanted to estab-
lish influence regionally for influence and to create problems for the superpowers.  Ten-
sions in that region were rising between Israel and Arab countries and the US and USSR 
                                                 
87 As opposed to trade with Africa for rice, exports to MENA countries tended to be for time frames or four 
to six years.  Trade with African countries tended to be for one to two years and for minor quantities.  Ex-
ceptions to this are Tanzania, Mali, and Benin, which took larger quantities on a more regular basis.  From 
the early 1960’s through the Three Worlds period there was a steady stream of African leaders, as well as 
the leaders of other recently independent countries, visiting Beijing in search of aid and trade. Most every 
issue of The China Quarterly carries a list of those supplicants. 
Figure 3.6
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were intimately involved on opposite sides.  The CSM  reported that the PRC had di-
verted wheat purchased from Australia to Egypt at the conclusion of its 1967 war with Is-
rael.  No quantity was given but it did emphasize the PRC’s need for the wheat for its 
own consumption and that the wheat had been purchased with scarce FX (Cooley: 1970, 
6).  From 1963 to 1969, Cuba was the leading, and sometimes only, East bloc importer of 
PRC rice. The end of Cuban rice – sugar trade came via a trade dispute over committed 
quantities as well as the PRC paying down debts to the USSR with re-exports of Cuban 
sugar. Through the conclusion of Mao’s rule, grain trade with East bloc countries ceased, 
a political decision resulting from the increasingly acrimonious relationship between the 
USSR and PRC. 
In sum, the Opposition time was one of agriculture stability on a per capita output 
basis, a continued need for imported grain, and the political decision to involve the PRC 
in the internal affairs of many other countries, so long as it politically helped the PRC or 
damaged the Soviets or the US, and with luck, both.  However, in an opposite vein, it was 
the time of approaching rapprochement with the US, and in terms of food security, an-
other arrow in the quiver to fight food insecurity.  
  
Three Worlds Foreign Policy and Food Security: 1972-1978 
 
Wang’s next theme in PRC foreign policy is Three Worlds that ran from the early 
1970’s through the early 1980’s.  It was elucidated in a UN speech by Deng in 1974.  
Three Worlds maintained that political independence could only be maintained by control 
of any country’s own resources.  Without economic independence, political independence 
is incomplete and insecure.  To be successful, the developing world needed to become 
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self-reliant by depending on the abilities of its own people, move up the value chain from 
unprocessed primary products by adding additional value, and use foreign aid to assist in 
such endeavors so long as it did not reduce sovereignty (The China Quarterly: 1974, 642-
4).  Of course, this is how the PRC developed and it stood ready to assist those who re-
quested assistance.   
The early part of this period was one of change for the PRC.  It gained admission 
to the UN and the Security Council in late 1971 and used that forum to rail against the 
two superpowers and their hegemonic intents.  Nearly simultaneously, rapprochement 
with the US occurred, starting with the lifting of the trade embargo against the PRC by 
the US and culminating in Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.88   Lifting the trade embargo 
provided the PRC with a new trading partner, the US, and also access to the premier agri-
cultural nation in the world.  Perhaps most important was the altering of the balance of 
power.  While the PRC leaned to the Soviets in 1949, with rapprochement they leaned 
towards the US.  This leaning, never a treaty, increased the PRC security by eliminating 
the possibility of a two-front war, no threat from the US, a clarification of Japan’s de-
fense status in the Pacific (part of US plans and not independent), and a one-China policy 
so long as it occurred peacefully.  The cost was the cessation of diplomatic relations initi-
                                                 
88 Formal diplomatic recognition would not occur until 1979. 
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ated by North Vietnam and Albania (Pollack: 1997, 426).  The PRC had become a bal-
ancer in the international system (Shambaugh: 1997, 198-9)89.  These international activi-
ties took place during the GPCR, albeit after the most contentious times, which passed in 
1969.   
The Three Worlds theme was most evident in the PRC’s anti-Soviet anti-super-
power rhetoric concerning its involvement in Africa, a third world area that the PRC 
identified with.  This was especially true in Angola where the Soviets and the Cubans de-
ployed troops and the Chinese supplied arms.  In an interview with the Sunday Times 
(London), Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien stated:  ‘”Some of our friends are suspicious of 
our words about Russia but some agree with us now that Russia has shown its hand in 
Africa’…. If the Russians try to expand anywhere in the world China will inevitably get 
involved, but in Africa on the whole all we can do at present is give political support and 
to expose the Russian sinister motives and crimes. The Russians may take advantage of 
                                                 
89 The neorealism of Waltz states: “Balance-of-power politics prevail whenever two, and only two, require-
ments are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive” (Waltz: 
2004, 121).  Anarchy, the absence of authority above the level of the state, is an assumption among realists.  
Therefore the need for the PRC to balance with the US against the USSR has to be for survival, the result 
of an accumulation of issues with the Soviets including hostile encounters, the failure of the PRC to de-
velop economically, and the internal issues related to succession and the Lin Biao affair.  The offensive-
realism of Mearsheimer suggests that the balancing be either offshore balancing or buck-passing in order to 
maximize the state’s never ending acquisition of power.  Buck-passing would infer that the PRC would 
pass its defense to the US to deter war but if war occurred the PRC would not be involved (Mearsheimer: 
2004, 157-9).  This would allow time to develop economically while avoiding the destruction from war.  
Offshore balancing would bring the PRC defense against the USSR but in the event of war, they would be 
involved.  The balance of power rationale for the PRC was offshore balancing and could not have been 
buck-passing.  The PRC would be involved in any conflict given its long border with the USSR and given 
the recent history of China, defense could not be outsourced without severe damage to the ruling perceived 
capabilities of the CCP. 
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some African nations but I must make it clear that we cannot help them much in a big 
way’” (quoted in Hook, Yahuda, and Wilson: 1977, 460-1).90   
In the area of food trade, several ominous signs began to appear as shown in  
figure 3.7.  From 1972 through 1978, imports of maize increased to 4.5 million tons 
while exports were only 600 thousand tons.   From 1950 to 1972, the PRC maize trade 
was about break even, 1.25 to 1 million tons in favor of imports.  Similarly, net exports of 
rice fell from 640 thousand tons in 1975 to less than half that from 1976 through 1978.  
Finally, soybean imports exceeded soybean exports in 1974 and 1977, a dramatic reversal 
and possibly a trend.  The PRC had run an agriculture products trade surplus since 1966, 
excluding 1974, through 1976 and was facing a string of deficits beginning in 1977.  
Within PRC agriculture trade, import sources for wheat, maize, and soybeans were exclu-
sively from the West and Latin America.  Again, the source was less a political decision 
than the fact of where these crops were grown in sufficient quantity to supply the PRC.  
On the export side, Hong Kong’s share of exports grew steadily during this period. Other-
wise, the West, Japan, SE Asia, South Asia, and Africa were the destinations for a combi-
nation of rice, soybeans, and maize that in total were decreasing and decreasing grain as a 
weapon of international struggle. 
                                                 
90 Note the similarities in this statement in reference to the USSR and Zhou’s comments referring to the US 
on page 72, the PRC would react to either superpower any place in the world. 
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What accounts for the 
increase in imports and de-
crease in exports?  The grow-
ing population and decreas-
ing ha. of arable land is an 
obvious reason.  This was 
offset by increased yields.  
Still, since 1949 the popula-
tion had grown by 80% while 
arable land had decreased by 45%, an unsustainable trend. 
There were two areas of concern.  First, the program of self-reliance in the area of 
agricultural production increasingly needed imports to offset the growing population, a 
situation that might become a dependency on foreign sources of supply for grains.  In 
times of heightened international tensions, grain could become a strategic good.  Second, 
industrialization had been retarded by the Sino-Soviet split and would have to catch up at 
some time.  Having light or heavy industrial products to export provides FX to use for 
grain imports but industry and agriculture compete for land and increasing industrializa-
tion exacerbates the arable land problem.  The re-start of industrialization was just around 
the corner under Deng XiaoPing. 
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Conclusion 
 
During Mao’s tenure, food security ranged between a success and failure in terms 
of domestic policies.  In the case of failure, it was exacerbated for international political 
reasons with the Soviets and probably by Mao’s ego.  Relief came from the capitalists of 
the West.  At best, the results were mixed, provided one did not lose life during land re-
distribution or the GLF. 
The food supply in total (and grain in particular) was a strategic good throughout, 
for several reasons:  First, as seen in Chapter II, food insecurity, or the fear of it, had a 
part of every generation for a very long time.  Second, at the conclusion of WWII in 1945 
and the revolution in 1949, food security was an issue.  Mao’s solution was land redistri-
bution to the peasants from the “landlord” class; a solution that worked in terms of grain 
production.  Third, in addition to fueling human activity, agricultural production was 
needed to produce an excess that could be extracted to feed the urban population, to ex-
port to earn FX, to provide raw materials for industry and to repay loans and credits to the 
Soviets, the ideological ally of the PRC.  Grain production was the bottleneck that needed 
to be overcome to finance industrialization.  By applying Ripsman and Blanchard’s defi-
nition of a strategic good to the subject at hand; “[grain is] essential for national survival 
and defense [and modernization],” we have the challenge Mao and the CCP faced, espe-
cially following collectivization.   
As would be expected for a strategic good, Mao pursued domestic solutions to as-
sure food security with two main domestic policy initiatives.  One was positive and the 
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other negative.  Land redistribution was positive.  Though brutal, it transferred land own-
ership from the rural elite to the peasants and led to a substantial increase in grain output.  
The peasant was able to reap what he had sown, an incentive that worked in improving 
food security. Between 1950 and 1958, output increased to the point where per capita 
availability of k/cal reached 2200 per day.  Grain exports were able to increase gradually 
during this time, also.   
Agriculture was able to earn FX directly or to acquire needed foreign materials 
through barter.  Barter was common with Japan and exports to Western Europe were for 
FX.  Trade with these countries was more advantageous than trade within the East Bloc 
where barter was the preferred method of settling accounts.  The value assigned to traded 
commodities in the East Bloc could be suspect.  It cannot be said that trade with Western 
Europe and Japan was politically incorrect.  This was a time when communist parties in 
both areas were considered viable political alternatives.  Receiving goods from another 
communist country might help local communist parties.  Grain was also available to ship 
to India to assist during a period of shortage but also to gain influence with a newly inde-
pendent state and one that would eventually contest the PRC for leadership in the non-
aligned movement.  Rice was barter for rubber with Ceylon when the PRC was under a 
strategic goods embargo during the Korean War.   
In sum, land redistribution demonstrated that food security concerns could be met 
by domestic policies adjustments.  The PRC did not suffer from interdependent sensitiv-
ity as it was able to react quickly to the situation it inherited on its own.  Grain was a stra-
tegic good, not only for feeding the population but for fulfilling the tasks that agriculture, 
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in general, needed to, to advance the country economically and to maintain the domi-
nance of the CCP. 
The negative aspect was mandatory collectivization that followed right behind in 
1958.  The result was GLF famine killing tens of millions.  Collectivization and its rever-
sal to the MAT level, were the principal domestic policy issues related to grain produc-
tion after 1958.  Famine relief was required and the need was exacerbated by Mao’s de-
sire to remove any means of Soviet financial pressure on the PRC, as he repaid loans by 
exporting grain in mid-famine.  Emergency relief was needed and was purchased from 
the West, not the US, but its grain growing allies, Australia, Canada, France and Latin 
American grain producer, Argentina.  While this may have hurt CCP pride, it was an ab-
solute necessity if it was to remain in power as its legitimacy was under question.91  The 
PRC has been an importer of grain ever since 1961. 
Despite the shortage of grain, Mao remained political.  In addition to repaying 
debts to the Soviets with scarce grain, he also tried to score political points against the 
Soviets by transferring grain intended to reduce famine conditions to Albania.  Albania 
was involved in a dispute with the Soviets that Mao could use to antagonize Moscow. 
The reversal of collectivization did not bring a sudden return to prior levels on a 
per capita basis.  Grain production per capita in 1958, 303 kg per year, was not exceeded 
until 1978.  It was also in 1978 that available k/cal per day reached the levels of 1954.  
The PRC became dependent on the rest of the world for grain from 1960 through the end 
                                                 
91 The Soviets were also a potential emergency supplier.  However, the Sino-Soviet split precluded that op-
tion.  Even if Mao had asked the Soviets for wheat, they were not in a position to be much help.  The PRC 
imported more wheat than the Soviets exported to its normal customers from 1961 through 1963 and the 
Soviets were a net importer of wheat in 1964 and 1965.   
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of Mao’s reign.  The PRC was in a situation where it could not insulate itself from the 
need for grain imports from grain rich countries, a situation of vulnerability interdepend-
ence.  As seen previously, the amount of imports was not that great as a percentage of to-
tal output.  However, the imports went to cities on the coast and the CCP needed to as-
sure sufficient grain supplies to avoid urban demonstrations that could lead to de-legiti-
mizing the CCP.   
The major post-WWII shift in the international system occurred with PRC – US 
rapprochement in 1972.  The PRC, now an enemy of the Soviets, faced a potential two-
front conflict with the US and USSR.  Creating diplomatic relations with the US, that in-
cluded recognition by the US of a one China policy, reduced that threat and in fact cre-
ated a tacit defense arrangement against the USSR.     
Rapprochement with the US opened the door to the leading agricultural country in 
the world.  This had two positive benefits for PRC food security.  First, it removed the 
possibility of the US forcing Europe and Canada to stop shipping grain to the PRC for in-
ternational political reasons.  Second, it increased the number of potential trading partners 
for grain as did the amount available.  Being interdependent on a greater number of states 
reduces the risk of dependency on one.  In the debate over the English Corn Laws, Ma-
caulay reasoned that dispersion by geography and by country lessens the possibility of 
dependence occurring due to politics and weather (Hirschman: 1969, 8-9).  With that 
came the ability to influence grain producing states by adjusting the quantities purchased.  
As we have seen and will see, this is a useful tool for the PRC.92 
                                                 
92 With each additional grain supplying country that the PRC engaged, a dependency was created between 
the farmers of the supplying country and the PRC.  What would be interconnectedness from a PRC point of 
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The PRC remained a grain importer.  However, while they remained a taker they 
also became a chooser of the supplying country.  Rapprochement improved this situation.  
It gave them an increased degree of influence among supplying countries as its purchases 
could be directed towards those states it wished to influence, reward or punish.  The one 
country that the PRC avoided punishing was the US; it was both a breadbasket and a de-
fender.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
view, for total wheat purchases, became a dependency for the farmer that counted on the farm lobby, his 
agent, to convince the government to acquire and maintain the PRC as a customer. 
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Chapter IV - DENG XIAOPING and PRAGMATIC FOOD 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on Deng Xiaoping as leader of the PRC, who was for all 
practical purposes, Mao’s successor.  It marks a period of reform from the intensely polit-
ical times of Mao to one where expertise superseded political conformity and the efforts 
of the CCP were directed at improving the lives of its citizens through economic develop-
ment.  For the CCP, it marked the transition to an authoritarian state from a totalitarian 
one (Teiwes: 2002, 63). 
The senior leadership of the PRC had not seen much of the world other than the 
USSR.93 Deng did travel following his second return to governing and learned how far 
the PRC had fallen behind the West and the Japanese.  “The more we see, the more we 
realize how backward we are…the basic point is: we must acknowledge that we are back-
ward, that many of our ways of doing things are inappropriate, and we need to change” 
(Deng quoted in Vogel: 2011, 218). 
For Deng to reform the ways of doing things required an ideological shift by the 
CCP away from communism to a more market-driven economy.  Implementation of the 
shift would be a long process, but once it started to take hold the reforms and opening to 
the outside world could proceed.  The rural sector suffered from excess agricultural labor 
and stagnant output and needed reform to assure food security. Opening the economy to 
outside influences would speed-up economic development and replace the technology 
                                                 
93 Both Deng and Zhou Enlai had worked in France after WWI.   
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and know-how that had failed to keep pace with the developed world.  Opening would re-
quire a foreign policy that supported the domestic agenda and provide an international 
climate that would facilitate achieving the modernization goals. 
Deng’s impact would be greatest on the domestic front as he dismantled many of 
Mao’s policies and sought to reduce the egalitarian nature of PRC society (Ash: 1988, 
533) beginning with agriculture.  On the international front, Deng inherited Mao’s rap-
prochement with the US and used it effectively to facilitate development.  His foreign 
policies, like his domestic policies, were aimed at improving the PRC’s position on the 
world stage and that did not preclude reconciliation with the USSR.  
This chapter will address the issues of: 1) how Deng’s reforms addressed food se-
curity and relieved the pressure on agriculture to finance modernization; 2) the role that 
foreign policy played in Deng’s reforms; and 3) how food security influenced PRC for-
eign policies and how foreign policies influence food security.  
 
The Food Paradigm under Deng  
 
This section will address the domestic efforts to improve food security through in-
creasing the supply and decreasing the demand for food.  This was the second time since 
the founding of the PRC that demand, rather than just supply, became a method of ad-
dressing food security.  Domestic politics provided the opportunities for the PRC to pur-
sue development strategies that were contrary to those of Mao.  Implementation of those 
strategies drove domestic food production higher and that in turn freed excess agricultural 
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labor to be available for rural industry and to populate the export-led economic develop-
ment strategy in coastal areas.  Deng was able to solve the challenge that Mao faced dec-
ades earlier. 
 
Domestic Politics 
Mao’s chosen successor was Hua Guofeng, who had taken over as Premier fol-
lowing the death of Zhou Enlai, and became Chairman of the CCP and Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) following Mao’s death.  Hua’s downfall had much 
to do with the “two whatevers,” whatever Mao did or said was to be followed by the 
CCP.94  He was outmaneuvered by Deng and forced into early retirement in 1981.   
Deng had been purged twice during the GPCR for a total of seven years but he 
had never been stripped of his party membership.  He returned from his second exile in 
1977 as a vice-premier taking responsibility for science, technology and education, activ-
ities which drove the country forward (Vogel: 2011, 149).  Chen Yun, a possible succes-
sor to Hua, was instrumental in securing the return of Deng to the government following 
Mao’s death.  Deng had been active in the post-1949 CCP, longer than any of the other 
potential candidates for Hua’s position, and was a former military commander from revo-
lutionary times, an attribute that gave him great credibility among the older party elite.  
                                                 
94 The “two whatevers” were used to delay Deng’s second rehabilitation.  Mao had dismissed Deng and 
whatever Mao did or said must be followed according to Hua who had risen to the top of the CCP during 
the GPCR.  He was outmaneuvered by Deng and the older cadres, such as Chen Yun.  They wanted to “ex-
orcise the Cultural Revolution from the system” (Lieberthal: 1995, 135).    
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Further, Deng never affirmed the GPCR, and by not doing so had the credibility to re-
store order and move the country forward (Vogel: 2011, 149).  Both Deng and Chen 
would play important roles in remaking post-Mao PRC (Teiwes: 2002, 70-1).95  
How did the decision-making at the senior levels of the CCP evolve under Deng’s 
leadership?  Shirk looks at the institutionalization of the political process under Deng and 
finds that he did improve the institutions of political leadership via term limits for the 
highest government and party posts, mandatory retirement age, and competition in elec-
tions for Central Committee members, among others.  Yet, he did not go particularly far.  
His own authority flowed from his position as pre-eminent leader until 1994 when his 
health deteriorated too much to continue, not from his designated positions which were 
vice-premier until 1980, Politburo Standing Committee member until 1987, and CMC 
Chairman until 1989.  She also notes “…Deng promoted institutionalization only so far 
as it did not limit his own authority” (Shirk: 2002, 301).   
Teiwes echoes Shirk in stating that even though Deng maintained a more consul-
tative style than Mao, his words were to be obeyed.  He quotes political scientist Yan 
Jiaqi: “Whatever Deng Xiaoping says must be carried out, unless it is not feasible” (Tei-
wes: 2002, 61).  The qualification of feasibility is a striking difference from Mao. 
The other and perhaps most important difference from Mao was that Deng’s pri-
mary motivations were to improve the lives of the citizens of the PRC and to maintain 
                                                 
95 For a detailed discussion on the domestic PRC politics see The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to 
Jiang, J. Unger (ed).  This discusses a variety of approaches in examining the nature of PRC politics by top 
China scholars. 
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control of the PRC by the CCP.96  Deng would use the power of his pre-eminence to in-
stitute economic reforms, to dismiss Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both of whom were 
Deng protégées and General Secretaries of the CCP, to restore order in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, and in post-Tiananmen times restart the PRC engagement with the world 
starting in 1992. 
Deng was an important leader of the PRC as he was responsible for a fundamental 
change in domestic politics, the ideological shift from Mao’s time.  This shift allowed for 
the rural reforms and the “opening” to the outside world.  In this section we will examine 
the ideological shift.  The rural reforms and the implementation of the one-child policy 
will be addressed in the state-society section and the opening in the economic develop-
ment section.  Each of these changes had a bearing on the food security of the PRC, di-
rectly or indirectly. 
 
Ideological Shift 
The ideological shift that was required for Deng’s reforms had domestic and inter-
national aspects.  On the domestic side, it meant abandoning the communist egalitarian 
approach in favor of decentralization of the economy and the use of material incentives to 
drive production in agriculture and industry.  Internationally, it meant abandoning Mao’s 
                                                 
96 Recall that improving the lives of the citizenry was a priority of Mao at the beginning of the PRC.  Mao’s 
method was ideologically based and assumed that development could occur under collectivization and self-
reliance. Deng’s method would be de-collectivization, material incentives, and opening to the world. 
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self-reliance approach to development in favor of specialization, joining in the interna-
tional division of labor, and accepting increasing interdependence with the rest of the 
world (Wu: 1981, 469).   
Domestic politics of the time recognized the need for change in the priorities of 
the PRC as they related to economic development, the role of the CCP, and dealing with 
the legacy of Mao.  Deng first used the Zhou Enlai slogan of the “four modernizations,” 
modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense to 
guide his efforts (Lieberthal: 1995, 130-1).  By 1978, he had obtained wide agreement 
among his growing number of supporters regarding domestic politics and economic de-
velopment.  Politically, cadres persecuted unjustly during the GPCR were to be rehabili-
tated, class struggle and mass movements would no longer be used for policy implemen-
tation, and the rigidities of Mao Zedong Thought were to be tempered.  Economically, 
development was key.  Restoration of institutions necessary to run the economy was ur-
gent; agricultural development was needed which meant the closure of the communes; in-
centives were needed to improve output in all economic sectors; and an opening to the 
outside world rather than self-reliance was needed to facilitate development (Lieberthal: 
1995, 129).  
Opening to the outside world explicitly required opening to trade which required 
overturning the traditional Marxist-Leninist and Maoist aversion to trade.  The Leninist 
view was that the world was divided into two groups, the rich and the poor nations of the 
world.  Trade between the rich and poor would result in the exploitation of the poor by 
the rich.  Maoist aversion sprung from Lenin in that trade would result in either the PRC 
being exploited or the exploiter, a Manichean dilemma.  Rethinking trade led the PRC to 
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Ricardo’s comparative advantage which is based on the Labor Theory of Value that Marx 
also used and therefore increased its acceptability, ideologically.  While acceptable, there 
were still debates over whether both sides of a trade would benefit.  The eventual ra-
tionale became that poor states could also benefit from trade even while they were being 
exploited by the rich state, so international trade was acceptable.  However, the method 
of evaluating whether trade was fair became the trade balance between one state and an-
other where trade equality would require equal imports and exports (Ma: 1986, 291-305).  
The PRC attempted to maintain this bi-lateral equality as will be seen in several instances 
to be mentioned.  
While Deng may have had overall agreement from those who supported his pro-
grams, the extent of the changes and the speed of implementation were always a subject 
for debate.  He lacked an overall plan (Lieberthal: 1995, 126), and the waters were un-
charted, leading Deng to approach reform by “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”  
As a result, the process of economic reform was a start-and-stop, advance-and-retreat 
process.  Apart from the political aspects, fundamental economic necessities were part of 
the back and forth.  Chen Yun was in charge of the economy but limited himself to mac-
roeconomic issues, not micro issues, meaning incentives.  Chen knew reforms were 
needed but was also politically conservative.  His conservative instincts were manifested 
in macroeconomic issues such as avoiding foreign debt, maintaining sufficient FX, and 
not spending more than the state collected in taxes.  He acted as the financial brake when 
his conservative financial instincts were threatened. 
Politics was also a constraint.  Of Deng’s four requirements for modernization, 
there was a strong bias towards the political: 1) A firm and consistent political message; 
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2) political stability and unity; 3) hard work with a pioneering spirit; and 4) a contingent 
of officials with “unswerving socialist orientation” and “professional knowledge and 
competence” (Vogel: 2011, 360).  Similarly, when he was running into conservative op-
position in 1979, he issued his Four Cardinal Principles stressing the need to be “in con-
formity with: 1) Marxist-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought; 2) the socialist road; 3) contin-
uation of the people’s democratic dictatorship; and 4) absolute political domination by 
the CCP” (Lieberthal: 1995, 135).97  The legacy of Mao remained strong so that it was 
necessary to placate the conservatives to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP.  The most 
important of the Cardinal Principles was the final one, domination by the CCP, one that 
all of the senior leadership would agree to all the time.  The others would become less 
and less relative as the reforms were successful and were expanded. 
 
State – Society Relationship  
The state-society relationship changes during Deng’s time were mixed.  Politi-
cally, reforms brought a reduction in politics as “reformers sought to permit a non-politi-
cal sphere of activity for individuals, drop class labels, use in-egalitarian distribution sys-
tems and conspicuous consumption as incentives for more work and creativity, rekindle 
interest in knowledge and technical skills…” (Lieberthal: 1995, 297).   Economically, 
                                                 
97 One favorite saying of Deng’s was to “seek truth from facts.”  This is actually a quote from Mao but one 
that Deng could use to satisfy conservatives yet simultaneously use to discredit non-fact based decisions of 
Mao. 
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there was a chipping away of the state power through increased personal choice, espe-
cially among farmers.  Yet, personal choice was usurped to the greatest extent via the 
one-child policy.   
 
Rural Reforms 
The ideological shift away from a rigid communist-based society came from a re-
alization by the ruling elite that the policies of Mao had hindered the overall development 
of the PRC and that fundamental change would be necessary begin the journey to mod-
ernization.  The first move in that direction was rural reform, the single most important 
reform as it relates to food security.  Rural reform meant escaping the commune system.   
Restructuring of the rural areas consisted of two separate policy changes:  first, 
decentralization of farming operations and second, the reform of the state purchasing and 
marketing system that eventually led to the use of market pricing of agricultural products.   
The communes had produced behaviors that were detrimental to agricultural out-
put.  Free–riders were able to reduce participation while enjoying the benefits of others’ 
labor, and the commune itself could lead to mismanagement of the commune and/or the 
abuse of power by management, the lowest level of government in the PRC.  To elimi-
nate these practices, two policies were implemented in 1979 to provide material incen-
tives to boost output and efficiency.  The first was to change compensation within the 
commune to each according to his work performed from each according to his need, an 
attempt to end the free-rider problem.  Second, the production team was upheld as the ac-
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counting unit and the arbiter of production (what and how much is to be planted) includ-
ing labor contracts within each group.98  The amount of land allocated to private plots 
was also increased.  However, this policy change did not include and actually forbad allo-
cation of land to specific households.  Both of these policies were enacted to combat 
egalitarianism, a fundamental element of traditional communism.  The principal objection 
to these measures was the inability of the smaller production teams to carry out large-
scale projects, mainly water control projects that the commune would have been able to 
conduct with control over a much larger workforce.  Objections by commune manage-
ment manifested themselves through ignoring or only partially implementing the changes 
at the local level (Ash: 1988, 530-3). 
The next step in the dissolution of the communes occurred in September of 1980 
when contractual agreements between households and the communes were created: the 
household responsibility system (HRS).  This was not a nationwide change but one tar-
geted only at poor areas disillusioned with the communes.  However, it was readily ac-
cepted by many as indicated by its adoption by 30% of the productions teams nationwide 
within three months and 90% within 15 months.  This program did allocate land to spe-
cific households.  Households had to meet quotas (turned over to the commune) and pay 
taxes after which they were free to dispose of any surplus.99  As would be expected, thire-
                                                 
98 Recall that making the production team the accounting level within the commune was initially put in mo-
tion to relieve the GLF famine. 
 
99 The commune had to meet a quota set by the government which was allocated to production teams and 
ultimately to households.  
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turn to essentially private farming caused ideological issues and difficulties in implemen-
tation in some areas.  In 1984, commune land was redistributed for private farming, and 
the land leasehold was extended to 15 years from its initial three years to encourage pri-
vate investment in farming to increase agricultural output.100  Previously, the three-year 
contract encouraged maximization of the short-term output at the expense of sustainable 
outputs.  (Ash: 1988, 534-7). 
Communes were not eliminated by fiat.  It was a step-by-step process that began 
in 1979.  A key aspect was the separation of government from economic administration.  
This was done initially in Sichuan with the re-establishment of township government to 
replace commune governance.  This ended the ability of the commune to interfere in the 
economic aspects of production, and eliminated the economic borders of the commune.101  
Between 1982 and 1984, the number of communes fell to 249 from 54,352 while the 
number of townships grew to 91,171 from basically zero (Ash: 1988, 539).  The peasants 
had the opportunity to chip away at the power of the state in the state-society relationship 
and they took it.  The commune simply melted away. 
The end of the commune also held out the opportunity for increased output in an-
other way.  Many communes had developed into self-reliant organizations producing all 
                                                 
100 Kueh equates the reforms to the 1949-52 land reforms both in terms of output and institutions (Kueh: 
2006, 717).  
 
101 The economic border of the commune is a reflection of what Donnithorne refers to as the “cellular econ-
omy” of the PRC, the emphasis on self-reliant communes or regions.  In effect, this makes the country into 
a group of provinces and the provinces into a group of counties and the counties into a group of communes 
or townships, each responsible for all of its needs.  Such practices reduce agricultural output through grow-
ing inappropriate crops for a specific area and are also reflective of the inability to transport crops through-
out the country, reducing comparative advantage opportunities. 
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of their needs.  Without that constraint, the agricultural sector was free to develop into a 
situation of comparative advantage in crop production.  However, an enabler for this was 
the development of a better transportation infrastructure to permit the timely and efficient 
transfer of grains from point of origin to point of need, an issue of economic development 
and time.102 
 
Material Incentives of Rural Reforms     
Deng’s initial agricultural reforms began in 1978.  Up to this time, what to plant 
and how much to produce (in sown acreage) was determined by the state, what Sicular 
refers to as mandatory plans.103  Upon harvest, the farmer had to sell a mandatory quota 
of his output to the government at a government set price.  This was referred to as “uni-
fied procurement,” reflecting all purchases by state entities.  After fulfillment of the 
quota, what was not kept for consumption could be sold to the government at prices es-
tablished by the government but at above quota prices, an incentive for the farmer to in-
crease output.  For grain, the local grain bureau, a state agency, was the only buyer of 
grain.  No individual or organization, other than the grain bureau, was allowed to engage 
in grain transactions or long-distance transport of grain (Sicular: 1995, 1022).  This sys-
tem of production and procurement provided little incentive for increasing agricultural 
production and little opportunity to increase the quality of life in rural areas; that required 
additional material incentives.   
                                                 
102 On Deng’s return after his first exile from power he tackled the rail problems that were plaguing effi-
ciency at a major rail hub, the result of factional disputes during the GPCR (Vogel: 2011, 109). 
 
103 This is different terminology for what Lardy called direct planning in Chapter II. 
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Material incentives in agriculture consisted of three components: 1) giving the 
farmer the choice of what to plant (in 1978); 2) using prices to stimulate or retard produc-
tion of different crops; 3) moving away from a single government-run distribution chan-
nel towards freer and eventually free markets.  These steps were gradual just as all of the 
reforms in the post-Mao were as can be seen in Table 4.1. 
For grain and cotton, the implementation of the incentives was slower than for 
other agriculture products.  Grain production was essential to feed the population and cot-
ton was a major input into the textile business, an area where Deng would concentrate 
light industry for domestic consumption and export.  Only in 1985 were mandatory quo-
tas eliminated for these products though the level of mandatory quotas had been decreas-
ing (Sicular: 1988, 678).  Other agriculture products had been freed from mandatory quo-
tas beginning early in the reform period.  Rather than mandatory quotas, production tar-
gets were to be used for planning purposes by the state.  This necessitated the use of price 
incentives to assure an adequate supply. 
Pricing was the direct material incentive for farmers to increase output.  In 1979, 
prices for grains were raised 30% for quota sales and 50% for above-quota sales. Quota 
prices for rice, wheat and maize remained constant through 1984 while soybean increased 
another 50% in 1981 before declining 15% for two years starting in 1984.  Above-quota 
prices increased for wheat, maize, and soybeans in 1978 and in 1979 for rice, wheat, 
maize, and soybeans and then remained constant through 1984.  In 1981, the premium for 
above quota soybeans was eliminated.  In 1984, grain output per capita reached an all-
time high (Sicular: 1988, 680-6).  
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  The third component of reforms provided additional market channels, other than 
the government, for grains and therefore the possibility of even higher prices than the 
above-quota price.104  Since 1977, the private market, other than the periodic local mar-
kets that had been re-introduced to help alleviate food shortages during the GLF, had 
been available to growers of minor crops: fruits, vegetables, and meat.  In 1982 it was ex-
panded to grains.  Following fulfillment of quota sales to government entities, trade in 
grains locally and long distance by individuals, commercial entities, and collectives was 
authorized.  Sales to state commercial entities were at negotiated prices.  The farmer then 
had an opportunity to sell quantities above the quota to the government at the above-
quota price, a negotiated price, or at the market rate (Sicular: 1995, 1022).  Generally, but 
not always, each price was better than the previous for the farmer, yet each carried addi-
tional risk.  In effect, this created a market price for at least a portion of production.  The 
amount of production available to the market, other than through increased output, came 
from reductions in the grain quota and tax by 20% between 1978 and 1982 and from a re-
duction in the number of planned procurement commodities by the state (Sicular: 1988, 
688). 
The elimination of mandatory quotas for grain led farmers to plant additional cash 
crops.  The sown area for grain crops fell 3.5% while the sown area for cash crops in-
creased by 13.1% from 1984 to 1985, evidence that the farmer reacted to the cumulative 
changes in material incentives.  In 1985, total agricultural output grew 4.1%, but the level 
of grain and cotton production fell 7.6%, prompting the government--concerned about 
                                                 
104 Without additional channels of distribution, the government enjoyed monopoly or monopsony pricing.  
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grain self-reliance and subsidy costs--to re-impose mandatory production targets to en-
sure contract fulfillment (Sicular: 1995, 1023, Lin: 1992, 34).105  By 1991 state control 
again began to loosen.106  Grain bureaus became self-supporting grain trading companies 
with pricing authority.  Grain ration shops were contracted out with responsibility for 
profit and loss.  Flat grain output levels at the end of Deng’s rule set the stage for infla-
tion in foodstuff, an issue for Jiang Zemin.  The back and forth on grain production re-
strictions are indicative of “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”   
In total, the HRS, planting choices, price increases, and increasing the possible 
marketing channels were improving agricultural output.  By the end of 1984, grain output 
had increased to 407 mmt from 306 mmt in 1978.  Of the gain in output, nearly 47% was 
attributable to the HRS and 32% was attributable to the use of fertilizer (Lin: 1992, 
45).107  Science and incentives increased output. 
 
The One-Child Policy 
  The concern over poor agricultural output was addressed via the HRS and incen-
tives.  The other half of the food security equation, the extent of the population that agri-
culture had to support, was addressed simultaneously.  Concerns over population growth 
                                                 
105 Increasing grain purchases at above quota prices and negotiated prices were not offset by price increases 
in grain ration shops selling to the public.  This resulted in subsidies for farmers and consumers reaching 
24% of the state revenues (Sicular: 1995, 1023).   
 
106 The back and forth on grain production and distribution restrictions are indicative of the start-and-stop, 
advance-and-retreat of reform implementation as the PRC “crossed the river by feeling the stones”. 
 
107 Fertilizer was made available to farmers at reduced prices and as an incentive for early fulfillment of the 
quota. 
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tended to follow years of poor harvests.  During the GPCR, harvests tended to be rela-
tively consistent as measured by per capita grain output despite the population increase 
from 1968 through 1970, an average of 2.89% per year, higher than any other three con-
secutive years the PRC’s history, and implying a doubling of population in about 24 
years.108   
The implementation of the one-child policy in September 1980 represented a 
long-term policy to cut the growth rate of the population and to ultimately reduce the de-
mand for food. Demographic Transition Theory “Stripped to essentials it states that soci-
eties that experience modernization progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility 
and high mortality  to a post-modern one in which both are low” (Kirk: 1966, 361).109  It 
refuted Malthusian concerns of the population growing beyond the food supply.110  Cau-
sality for the transformation comes from many sources including medical, economic, and 
ideational, among others.  For our purposes, the following are most important: 1) agricul-
ture moves beyond the subsistence level, freeing the peasantry to pursue more productive 
economic activities; 2) improved healthcare results in increased life expectancy and de-
creased infant mortality, reducing the need for a high birth rate to assure infant survival to 
care for elder parents in the future; and 3) urbanization occurs increasing the cost of rais-
                                                 
108 The chaos of the GPCR encouraged people to avoid becoming a target and led to people staying at home 
as a means of protection.  Too much staying at home was the cause of the spike in population growth.  
 
109 “The demographic transition theory was formulated by the Office of Population Research in 
Princeton   as a culmination of or abstraction from previous work on The Future Population of Eu-
rope and the Soviet Union, which was published in 1944 on behalf of the League of Nations” (Kirk: 
1996, 363). 
 
110 Malthus maintained the population expanded geometrically and food production only arithmetically and 
would lead to insufficient food per capita. 
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ing children provided a financial incentive to cut the birth rate.  This is a multi-genera-
tional transition.  The agriculture reforms started the movement away from subsistence 
and, as will be seen, non-agriculture employment began to increase.  However, with the 
largest population in the world and a fear of being unable to feed it, a deeply rooted pref-
erence for male offspring and large families, especially in rural areas, and internal con-
trols on migration, could the PRC wait for a demographic transition and meet Deng’s de-
velopment goals?  The answer was no and the one-child policy became law; an intrusion 
of the state into society to the highest degree as well as one that would have impact for 
generations to come.  
The one-child policy was a successful securitization.  It had been a politicized dis-
cussion among the CCP leaders for decades.  The referent object was the size of the pop-
ulation itself and the resources it would take to feed, clothe, educate, and care for--from 
cradle to grave--a population growing from such a large base.  Deng was the securitizing 
actor and the Standing Committee was the audience.  The functional actors were those 
who had the responsibility for implementing and maintaining the program.     
Yet, old customs are hard to overcome.  Land distribution was based on house-
hold size and then on commune work points, the latter favoring males and the number of 
males in a household.  The re-allocation of land rewarded larger families and those with 
the most males, therefore reinforcing the tradition of large families and a preference for 
males.  The relative impact of the larger family on income also served as a deterrent to 
the one-child policy, especially in rural areas. To offset this issue, one-child families were 
to receive private plot land for a family of four, a practice that was not consistently fol-
lowed.  Encouragements to have only one-child included the high cost of maintaining and 
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educating children, an urban issue that ran counter to the rural experience (White: 2006, 
115-7). 
The economy was stimulated by material incentives; enforcement of the one-child 
policy was the opposite.  It could be brutal with forced abortions and sterilizations or 
through fines and female infanticide, non-registration of females or of second children.  
Non-registration would effectively make these children non-persons, from a government 
point of view, for life. 
 
Summary 
During the period of Deng’s leadership, there were two examples of extreme 
changes going in opposite directions in the PRC state-society relationship as it relates to 
food security.  First there was the de-collectivization of agriculture, a step-by-step with-
drawal by the state from the agricultural activities of the peasant via the all-powerful 
commune system.  This was enthusiastically embraced by the peasants so quickly that it 
precluded a return to the commune.  The material incentives and the removal of overbear-
ing oversight led to an increase in the supply of food, but not always in grain production.  
Kueh maintains that price increases alone were insufficient, for “…the large response 
needed to increase output above increased peasant consumption it had to be directly 
translated into income benefits for the individual peasant families, and this could only be 
accomplished by decollectivization” (Kueh: 2006, 717).   The state-society relationship 
as it applies to the public good, food, shifted away from the state towards society. 
Second, the one-child policy relied on a combination of disincentives as the state 
intruded into human reproduction using minor incentives but mainly coercion to achieve 
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its goal of reducing the rate of population growth and future demand for food, a necessity 
according to Deng if the living standards of all of the PRC were to increase.111  By the 
time the one-child policy was modified to allow two children, the population pyramid of 
the PRC was distorted by gender and by an insufficient younger population to support an 
aging one.  In effect, the state decided that uncontrolled birth rates were not a public good 
and therefore inserted itself into human reproduction making the one-child policy a pub-
lic good that the state would control. 
 
Economic Development 
The impacts of economic reforms by Deng were far reaching and eventually 
transformed the PRC economy from an agricultural one to an increasingly industrialized 
one and one that recognized the importance of light industry as well as heavy industry.  
This section will focus on the development of township and village enterprises (TVE), 
and the introduction of special economic zones (SEZ) that impacted the coastal areas and 
brought foreign funds and expertise to the PRC in exchange for inexpensive labor and ex-
cess agricultural labor.  This section will also look at an aspect of trade that did not 
change: how export and import quantities of grain are determined and executed. 
 
Town and Village Enterprises (TVE) 
Historically, Chinese peasants had engaged in sideline occupations during the 
slack times of the year for farming.  These occupations generally involved adding value 
                                                 
111 There were a number of exceptions to the one-child policy, including the number of children minorities 
could legally have and a decreasing level of enforcement in rural areas over time. 
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to agricultural products that were sold to urban areas or at local markets.  They were an 
important source of rural income.  In the 1950’s, mandatory state procurement of agricul-
tural output removed the supply source for many of these sideline occupations.  Com-
munes had been the institution that the CCP had used to promote rural industry with 
mixed results. However, as the communes transformed themselves into townships, they 
provided a base for the resumption of a vigorous rural economy through TVEs.  The Sys-
tem Reform Commission of 1984 encouraged the rural processing of agricultural prod-
ucts where economically feasible and once that was accepted it opened the door for any 
other activity for which there was a market (Naughton: 2007, 274).   Whether as a com-
mune or a township, the TVEs were collectively owned and therefore politically accepta-
ble to conservatives. 
TVEs were not subject to the labor laws and restrictions imposed on state owned 
enterprises (SOE), and were quite successful competing with or acting as sub-contractors 
to SOEs.  TVEs were instrumental in employing surplus agricultural labor, reaching 123 
million in 1993 (Cai et al: 2008, 171), which in turn served to reduce unwanted rural to 
urban migration.  The TVEs tended to flourish in areas bordering the major industrial 
centers rather than being spread more evenly about the country (Naughton: 2007, 279). 
 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
SEZs were introduced in 1978 by Deng, the “opening” in Deng’s policy of reform 
and opening.112  The rationale for the establishment of such zones was based on several 
                                                 
112 The original term for these zones was simply “special zones.”  Chen Yun had “economic” added to the 
name in order to prevent or dissuade these zones from becoming zones that would include political reform 
(Vogel: 2011, 413). 
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reasons.  First, the economic development of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
South Korea, and Singapore), had shown that an export oriented economic development 
policy could be very successful.  Second, foreign investment in these zones would trans-
fer technologies and management expertise to the PRC, priorities for Deng’s economic 
development plan.  Third, the PRC’s primary factor endowment was labor, both in quan-
tity and low wages by international standards.  Fourth, the use of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) reduced the amount of internal capital needed to develop the zones.  Fifth, 
these zones served as locations to experiment with economic policies.113  The first were 
in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou.  The locations of these zones were chosen in 
order to attract investment from overseas Chinese investors from Southeast Asia, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan.  The growth in the number of SEZs can be tied to the reform process.  
The expansions of SEZs in 1984 and 1992 were indicative of waves of liberalization 
(Naughton: 2007, 406). 
The SEZs had four prominent impacts on the PRC.  First, their establishment cre-
ated unprecedented interdependence between the PRC and the rest of the world.  It was 
initially seen as a one-way street with the PRC gaining from what the West had and with-
out the imposition of western ideas the PRC did not want.  The West’s reaction to 
Tiananmen interrupted creeping interdependence but that shortly afterwards led to a gen-
eral acceptance of the mutual benefits of trade (Robinson: 1994, 190-1).114   Second, the 
                                                 
 
113 Initially, SEZs were cordoned off from the rest of the PRC.  The Shenzhen SEZ was fenced off and au-
thorization papers were needed for any PRC citizen to enter. 
 
114 Of course the West engaged in trade not only for economic benefits but also with the hopes that in-
creased trade, wealth, and exposure to western ideas democracy would transform the PRC government into 
a more pluralistic one. 
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domestic impact of the SEZ was to continue the bifurcation of PRC society.  In addition 
to the existing urban-rural bifurcation, the concentration of the SEZs in eastern coastal ar-
eas precluded inland areas from participating in SEZ successes, at least for several dec-
ades.  This was a further example of non-egalitarian development.  Third, the coming in-
crease in the export earnings of SEZs provided the PRC with a new major source of FX, 
thereby reducing the burden on agriculture to provide exports to earn FX to finance de-
velopment.  Finally, as with TVEs, SEZs utilized excess agricultural migrant labor to fill 
production positions, though not to the extent of the TVEs.  This increased incomes in ru-
ral areas via remittances. 
While the SEZs first went into use in 1978, they were experimental and required 
not only PRC approval but foreign interest.  They grew slowly until the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident and then remained relatively constant.  In the post-Tiananmen period the devel-
oped world and the PRC turned their respective backs on each other.  In 1992, Deng 
toured the SEZs in the south and made the comment that the PRC was open for business.  
This initiated a rush of foreign investors to come to the PRC to take advantage of its labor 
force or to penetrate the PRC market.  It signaled once again that the PRC was dependent 
on the outside world for its rapid development, something that could not be achieved 
without outside investment, technology, and skill transfers.  Deng introduced the SEZ 
concept, but it was in the post-Tiananmen times under Deng / Jiang and then Jiang that 
they flourished. 
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Summary of the Food Paradigm under Deng 
 
Deng’s agricultural reform of the PRC economy and the opening of the economy 
to the world served to unleash the innate abilities of the population to make better lives 
for themselves, a reversal of Mao’s ideological and political operational method.  Two 
policy changes, agriculture reform and the one-child policy, sought to remove the fear of 
food insecurity in the short term through supply and the long term through demand re-
spectively.  For the period of Deng’s rule, the policy changes worked.  The population 
was allowed to make more decisions as to what was best for themselves, but only within 
limits that continued to be imposed by the CCP.  Those limits included the continuation 
of the hukou system and the imposition of the one-child policy. 
The agricultural reforms implemented beginning in 1978 had an immediate im-
pact on grain output as seen in Table 4.1.  The increase in output was only temporarily 
impacted in 1985 with the re-instatement of mandatory quotas. This was due to the reduc-
tion in sown acreage for grain crops resulting from farmer choices to plant cash crops.  
From 1986 on the per capita grain production averaged 363 kg per capita, well above the 
311 kg amount in 1978.  Total annual grain output rose from 304 million tons to 445 mil-
lion tons between 1978 and 1994. 
From the food security point of view, Deng’s rule resulted in a significant im-
provement in food security with an approximate 26% increase in K/cal per capita grain 
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availability and 16% in grain production.115  By 1982, per capita availability had ex-
ceeded 2300 calories per day and continued to grow (Table 4.2).  The PRC continued to 
be interdependent on world agricultural trade but there was no vulnerability issue. 
 
 
                                                 
115 Note the definition of grain availability from the previous chapter. 
Table 4.1 Material Incentives and the Impact on Grain Output
Total Grain Total Grain Arable 
Production Production Land
Year Millions of tons Kg./capiata/ year Ha./capita
1978-82, 20% reduction in quotas and agriculture taxes 1978 304.8 311.1 0.099
Compensation method changed, choice of what to plant, 1979 332.1 334.5 0.098
quota and above quota prices raised 30% and 50%
Dissolution of communes begins
HRS impemented 1980 320.6 318.6 0.096
1981 325.0 318.6 0.096
After quota fulfillment, non-government distribution 1982 354.5 342.7 0.094
   channels available at negotiated or market prices
1983 387.3 369.1 0.106
Land leasehold extended to 15 years 1984 407.3 382.4 0.105
Communes eliminated
Mandatory quotas eliminated 1985 379.1 350.5 0.112
Use of IOU's for payments for grain (see Ch. 5)
Mandatory quotas re-instated for rice & wheat 1986 391.5 356.2 0.110
1987 404.7 362.2 0.109
Use of IOU's expands 1988 394.1 346.8 0.108
1989 407.6 353.0 0.107
1990 446.2 380.9 0.106
Grain bureaus and ration shops converted to self-supporting 1991 435.3 366.6 0.105
1992 442.7 368.2 0.103
1993 456.5 375.4 0.100
Total grain production up 45% from 1978 1994 445.1 362.2 0.099
Population increased by 25% from 1978  
Sources:   
Population:  FAO Statistics  
Total grain production:  State Statistical Bureau 2001  
Arable land:  FAO Statistics
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Agriculture still needed to be a net contributor to FX reserves to finance at least 
part of the modernization.  After an initial negative balance, the agriculture balance of 
payments turned positive and throughout Deng’s rule exports exceeded imports by nearly 
40% as shown in Table 4.3.  The positive trend was established by increased exports of 
primarily labor-intensive crops as well as increased grain production.  From an agricul-
tural balance of trade point of view, once it turned positive in 1984 the PRC was self-suf-
ficient in total while being only self-reliant in some foodstuffs, including wheat.   
 
From a food security point of view, the reforms were a success, yet incomplete.  
The use of subsidies for agricultural inputs, procurement prices from farmers, and subsi-
dies for urban food consumption required ongoing adjustments.  Each constituency 
Table 4.2                                        Indicators of Food Security /  Insecurity
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
% change in total grain output (1) 7.8% 8.9% -3.3% 1.2% 8.6% 9.6% 5.2% -6.9% 3.4%
% change in population 1.38% 1.34% 1.36% 1.38% 1.40% 1.44% 1.49% 1.55% 1.62%
K/cal availability per capita per day (2) 2062 2077 2146 2164 2328 2399 2433 2429 2424
1978-1994
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Average
% change in total grain output (1) 3.3% -2.7% 3.6% 9.3% -2.5% 1.6% 3.1% -2.5% 2.80%
% change in population 1.68% 1.68% 1.61% 1.49% 1.35% 1.24% 1.14% 1.08% 1.43%
K/cal availability per capita per day (2) 2439 2416 2404 2504 2431 2456 2538 2604 2367
Sources: 1) Production 1977-1992, PRC State Statistical Bureau, various years
2) FAO Statistics Division
Shaded areas indicate years in which population growth exceeded grain output increases.
Table 4.3
                    Agriculture Balance of Trade (millions USD) 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Balance (671) (1,300) (2,354) (2,235) (1,950) (136) 1,639 3,006 3,688
Total
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1978-1994
Balance 3,203 2,878 984 2,849 4,656 4,932 6,383 5,460 31,032
Source:  FAO Statistics
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needed to be kept content and the government had to be able to afford the subsidies it 
granted.  This was made more difficult by the annual and natural fluctuation of crop pro-
duction regionally and nationwide.   
From an industrial point of view, the TVEs provided employment in rural areas 
and absorbed some excess farm labor into light industry.  The creation of SEZs brought 
the outside world into the PRC to take advantage of its natural endowment, inexpensive 
labor, while beginning the process of transferring technology and management tech-
niques, a process which would gain steam after 1992.  This was a trade of labor for 
knowledge.  If successful, it is an example of an absolute gain from a realist point of view 
and rapid advancement towards development.  If it failed to achieve knowledge transfer, 
it might have created a dependency on labor exports and a much longer path to develop-
ment. 
 
Foreign Policy under Deng 
 
Just as the food paradigm changed significantly under Deng’s leadership so did 
foreign policy.  In this section, the major changes in foreign policy will be addressed.  
The overall foreign policy of “peace and development” (Wang: 1997, 485-6) commenced 
in the early 1980’s.116  As many have stated, PRC foreign policy flowed from domestic 
                                                 
116 Kim delineates PRC foreign policy during this time into smaller time blocks: 1) Mid-1978 to mid-1981, 
anti-Soviet policy on a parallel track with the US.  2) Mid-1981 to mid-1984, an independent foreign pol-
icy.  3) Mid-1984 to mid-1989, the peace and development policy.  4)  The post-Tiananmen period when 
the “notion of sovereignty-bound international order coupled with the rhetoric of economic interdepend-
ence became the lingua franca of Chinese international relations in a frantic quest for international legitima-
tion” (Kim: 1984, 130).  
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concerns.  Deng’s primary concern was the development and modernization of the PRC 
and for that to occur he needed peace. Peace, including the absence of threats against or 
by the PRC, would provide the time and funds for development.117  Peace would also en-
able Deng to use foreign assistance in economic development so that the PRC could 
speed development rather than relying on Mao’s self-reliance model.   
The PRC had joined the UN in 1971.  It continued and then deepened participa-
tion in both IGO and international non-governmental organizations.  This represented a 
distinct increase in IGO participation, especially in securing IGO financing for economic 
development.  Under Mao, the PRC was a revisionist state.  Now it was becoming a sta-
tus quo state interested in using the developed world to meet its modernization goals.   
 
The International System 
When Deng assumed the leadership at the top of CCP hierarchy, the international 
system was still embroiled in the Cold War, a bi-polar domination by the US and USSR.  
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 resulted in a uni-polar international system dominated 
by the US, a significant event in international politics. The PRC had played a role in that 
system aligning itself with whichever super-power was the least threatening and that 
could assist the PRC with its development.   
The PRC maneuvered within the international system during this time.  Detente 
with the Soviets removed its threat and allowed the PRC to follow an independent foreign 
                                                 
117 Note that the four modernizations included military modernization.  However, this was fourth in order of 
priority, giving credence to the desire for peace. 
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policy.  This followed the thaw in relations between the US and USSR following Gorba-
chev’s rise to power in the USSR.  Contrary to other periods of détente between the two 
super-powers, this was a benefit to the PRC as it lessened the risk of war and would con-
tribute to the peace that the PRC needed for development (Shambaugh: 1997, 204).  
Bringing Taiwan back into the PRC was an ongoing effort that caused friction with the 
US if the threat of force was used.  The US contributed to that friction whenever it sold 
arms to Taiwan or did anything that made the PRC think that the One China Policy was 
being violated.  Finally, Deng used IGO’s and his opening policy to finance and acquire 
technology needed for domestic development. 
There were other aspects to PRC foreign policy that did not fit with peace and de-
velopment.  In the early period of Deng’s rule and in some cases continuing into the 
1990’s, the PRC transferred nuclear technology for weapons production to Algeria and 
Pakistan, missile technology and launchers to Pakistan, and sold advanced missiles to 
Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The West, at least, thought to be a bad idea.118 These actions 
were justified by the PRC based on its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty occurred 
just after the shipment to Algeria.  The Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the 
PRC has not joined, applied to missiles with a range of 300 kilometers or more; the PRC 
claimed that the missiles sold had only a range of 290 kilometers (Robinson: 1997, 588-
9). 
                                                 
118 The US had intended to sell Pakistan missiles and lost the contract to the PRC. 
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We will look in detail at three major aspects of PRC foreign policy: détente with 
the USSR, relations with the US, and the use of IGOs to finance development.  The inter-
actions with the USSR and the US allowed the PRC to follow an independent foreign 
policy.   
 
Détente with the Soviets 
When Deng rose to power, the PRC had already achieved a tacit defense arrange-
ment with the US.119  The PRC could not compete militarily with the US or USSR, it was 
not a great power, nor could it be said that it was even a regional power.  Yet its geo-
graphical spread and population made it a threat to any country with whom it shared bor-
ders.  Geography allowed the Soviets to increase pressure on the PRC by entering into an 
alliance with Vietnam, which included Soviet naval access to Cam Ranh Bay and 
Danang, both on the South China Sea.  This put Soviet military forces on the PRC border 
from the North Pacific to Afghanistan, a weak Soviet ally, India, on the southwest border, 
and Vietnam on the southeast border along with its allies in Southeast Asia.  This was 
nearly complete encirclement of the PRC.  As in ancient times, the PRC security was 
most concerned with what Gao refers to as an inner vassal state (see Chapter II) and Na-
than and Scobell refer to as the “second ring” of states.120  
                                                 
119 There was no formal defense agreement, yet the principle threat to each country was the USSR.  There-
fore it would be expected that either the PRC or US would react negatively towards the USSR should either 
become involved militarily with it.   
 
120 The first ring of concern is the PRC state itself and its internal security, the second is adjacent states, the 
third is the six multi-state regional security systems, and the fourth would become the rest of the world 
once the PRC became a power with international interests (Nathan and Scobell:2012, 3-7). 
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Deng reacted to this situation with a short-lived invasion of northern Vietnam to 
“punish” the Vietnamese, both for the engagement with the Soviets and for its ousting of 
the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge government of Cambodia (Nathan and Scobell, 2012, 
150).  The invasion has not been viewed as a success for Deng. 
In early 1979, the PRC refused to extend its 30 year old Treaty of Friendship with 
the USSR set to expire in 1980 (Hook et al: 1979, 677).  By late 1979, the PRC and 
USSR began meetings, without preconditions, to normalize relations.  For normalization 
to occur, the Soviets would need to unilaterally reduce forces on the PRC border, remove 
all forces from Mongolia, end all support of Vietnam, and settle existing border disputes 
with the PRC.  Each of these conditions for normalization addressed Soviet encirclement 
and the second ring of security.  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put a quick end to these talks for several 
years, and withdrawal from Afghanistan was added as a requirement for normalization 
(Zagoria:1983, 855).  By 1982, both sides were talking again and the Soviets engaged in 
confidence-building measures to signal the desire for normalized relations.121  They cul-
minated with a Gorbachev – Deng summit in 1989 just prior to the Tiananmen crack-
down and only two years prior to the dissolution of the USSR.122 These discussions took 
place against a background of increasing US support for Taiwan: the passing of the 1979 
                                                 
121 The Reagan military buildup, directed at the USSR, provided additional inducement for the Soviets to 
engage with the PRC.  
 
122 Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and reacted to PRC concerns faster than might otherwise have been 
expected (Nathan and Scobell: 2013, 83). 
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Taiwan Relations Act, and arms sales to Taiwan.  These two aspects of US-PRC relations 
greatly infuriated Deng, especially the Taiwan Relations Act (Vogel: 2013, 480).   
Détente with the USSR, while maintaining friendly relations with the US, im-
proved the PRC’s military security.  Preceding this, Deng made substantial moves to fa-
cilitate modernization through the use of international organizations without which such 
rapid advancement would have been improbable.  
 
International Government Organizations 
From 1966 to 1989, the PRC increased its membership in NGOs and IGO’s to 37 
and 677, respectively, from practically zero.  The most notable membership was admis-
sion to the UN and to the Security Council.  With that came admission to the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP) in 1972, the WB and its subsidiary organizations 
and the IMF in 1980, and application for WTO status in 1986.  These Bretton Woods or-
ganizations, formed by the West, were the principal international economic regimes af-
fecting states that chose to join, and naturally ones that ran contrary to what the PRC had 
stood for but simultaneously, if it so desired, provided an opportunity to use these institu-
tions and/or add its input to shaping the rules.  Kim also makes the point that the PRC 
follows a “maxi/mini” strategy when dealing with IGOs.  It maximizes security while 
minimizing the normative costs that are part and parcel of IGOs (Kim: 1992, 155).  
With the rise of Deng, the use of the UNDP, WB, and IMF suddenly changed.  
Previously the PRC had been a minor contributor to the UNDP and uninvolved with the 
other two.  Kim refers to the PRC at this time as the Group of One (G-1) for its refusal to 
join the G-77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, the two principal developing world 
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groups of which it considered itself one and where its international behavior was more 
symbolic than substantive (Kim:1997, 407).  This all changed when Deng declared that 
the PRC was a developing country, not a provider of aid, and by 1992 had received over 
$270 million in funding from UNDP.  From the IMF, it received $2.1 billion to facilitate 
balance of payment issues.  The WB and its subsidiaries funded $13.3 billion in loans and 
credits for 109 projects (Feeney: 1994, 226-33).  Total funds distributed, less repayments, 
by the WB from 1980 through 1994 totaled $23.5 billion in current USD (World Bank In-
dicators: 1994).123  Once the PRC decided to pursue the development route with earnest, 
its foreign policy of using IGO’s provided the funds it needed; its endowment was labor, 
not capital.  The downside of these actions was to reduce the amount of funds available 
for other developing states, yet the PRC was the only developing country that had con-
tributed funds for development without receiving any, until this point (Kim: 1997, 409).  
In turning to the outside world to finance development, the PRC abandoned its 
self-reliance stance on development and its support of the new international economic or-
der in practice.  Under Mao, self-reliant development was achieved by “… each [country] 
doing the utmost for itself as a means toward self-reliance for new growth, working inde-
pendently to the greatest possible extent, making a principle out of not relying on others, 
and not doing something only when it really and truly cannot be done.... Reliance on 
other countries . . .is most dangerous” (Qouted in Wu: 1981, 456).   Deng would not have 
                                                 
123 Joining these institutions, whether from a realist perspective for relative gains or from a liberal perspec-
tive seeking only absolute gains, the PRC was successful in acquiring development funds, and its interests 
were met from both points of view.  Its success in securing funds is attributable to development organiza-
tions wanting to do the most good for the most people.  Therefore, with 20% of the world population, it 
represented an opportunity to move a great deal of people out of poverty that would eventually happen.    
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been able to achieve the Four Modernizations rapidly under such a definition.  So self-
reliance was reinterpreted to be "socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics" 
(Kim: 1984, 615).  This included the use of foreign capital, foreign learning, and foreign 
technology which together signaled a move towards an interdependent PRC. 
 
Foreign Policy and Food Security 
As seen above, the issue of food security improved dramatically from 1978 
through 1994 as measured by available calories per day per capita based on domestic pro-
duction.  Concentration on labor-intensive crop production (fruit and vegetables) was a 
major reason in turning the agricultural balance of trade from negative to positive.  But so 
was grain.  As shown in Figure 4.1, the PRC continued as an importer of wheat, an ex-
porter of rice, and became a net exporter of maize and soybeans in 1984 and 1983, re-
spectively.  Though the imports of wheat reached large numbers, on a per 
 
 capita basis they averaged just under 2% of domestic output.  Interdependence continued 
and dependency on the rest of the world to supply grain did not occur.  The level of do-
mestic grain production was sufficient on a national basis, according to generally ac-
cepted measures of food security; it made up for the lack of transportation infrastructure 
Figure 4.1
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to move grain from growing areas to population centers.124  More ever, the surge in do-
mestic grain and other foodstuffs output permitted a window of opportunity for the PRC 
to use grain exports as a tool to improve relations with the USSR and its allies.      
Because of its large population, the PRC was a major factor in the world grain 
markets and therefore had the ability to use grain / food purchases to influence its suppli-
ers or its customers, a tool of foreign policy.  In this period, we will see both positive and 
negative uses of the trade in grain in rewarding and punishing suppliers or customers as a 
method to influence the behavior of other states.  Simply using the grain trade to reward 
or punish states is not that simple in a world where the grain exporters are concentrated 
(wheat, maize, and soybeans).  A number of other factors must be considered.  First, the 
price paid is a major consideration and is affected by the vagaries of the weather, carryo-
ver stocks, and producer country subsidies.  Even the availability of ships affects the sup-
ply and demand.  A state does not wish to pay too much in any case.   Second, given the 
limited number of supplying states, a diversified source of supply is needed but difficult 
to achieve.125  This can cause a buyer to be unable to use failure to purchase as punish-
ment.  Rewarding another state’s behavior can come from altering the purchase amounts 
among the major suppliers to the favor of good behavior from the PRC point of view.   
 
 
                                                 
124 In the late 1990’s the PRC ranked 73rd in the world in paved roads per million people.  India was ranked 
66th, Russia 27th and the US 7th.  For rail transport, the PRC had 0.16 km/km2 while Russia had 0.3, the US 
0.65 and India 0.73 (Pittman: 2004, 310).  The inability to move grain around the country also led to major 
regional price discrepancies. 
 
125 In 1979, 90% of wheat imports were from the US, Australia, Canada, and Argentina (Maidenberg: 1979, 
6/22, D1). 
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Improved Relations with USSR 
The re-opening of talks with the Soviets in 1982 paved the way for resumption of 
agricultural trade with the USSR in 1984.  The Soviets first purchased soybeans in 1984, 
added maize to the mix in 1985, and in 1986 a five-year USSR-PRC trade deal was 
signed covering maize and soybeans with annual volumes of 1.5 and .5 million tons re-
spectively.  Similar agreements were signed with East European countries (China Situa-
tion: 1986, 6).  The grain trade with the USSR should be viewed as a confidence-building 
measure on the part of the PRC along the road to normalization of relations.  Soviet satel-
lite countries of Eastern Europe began importing grain from the PRC.  Rice and maize 
exports started in 1985 and soybeans exports in 1986.   Between 1984 and 1990, exports 
of soybeans to the East Bloc represented between 50% and 32% of total soybean exports.  
For maize, between 1985 and 1991 exports to the East Bloc represented between 49% 
and 14% of total maize exports. In both cases, the USSR was by far the biggest pur-
chaser.  The percentage of exports to the USSR dropped after the first few years due to 
increased PRC exports and lower purchase volumes by the Soviets.  
Given this sharp increase in exports to the USSR, the question must be asked as to 
whether this forced the PRC to reduce exports to other countries.  The short answer is no.  
From the banner production year of 1984, the PRC became a net exporter of maize and 
soybeans.  As seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the switch from net importer to net exporter 
was dramatic.  This came about through a combination of increased harvested area, yield 
improvements, material incentives and most likely, inventory levels.126   The East Bloc 
                                                 
126 Area harvested is the number of ha. actually harvested disregarding the area sown.   
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was not the only area to benefit from PRC soybean and maize exports nor were these the 
only “new” agricultural exports to the USSR.  South Korea emerged as a principal maize 
buyer. 
  
 These exports served as a confidence-boosting measure that Deng could use to 
demonstrate intentions to the Russians that the PRC was interested in pursuing normal-
ized relations.  There was no risk to Deng if the Soviets opted not to pursue better rela-
tions or failed to meet PRC conditions for normalization.  The Soviets were a frequent 
user of the world grain markets and the PRC would simply be another supplier for a pe-
riod of time.  The falloff in grain trade with East Bloc states is coincident with the disso-
lution of the Soviet Bloc and subsequently the USSR itself.   
 
Arms Sales to Taiwan 
Arms shipments to Taiwan were and are a considerable source of concern for the 
PRC.  The PRC considers Taiwan as part of the mainland, a territory to be reclaimed by 
the PRC to complete the revolution.  Therefore, it is considered part of the PRC’s internal 
affairs, one that other nations should steer clear of as the PRC would do according to the 
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most important tenet of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: a state should not 
become involved in the internal affairs of another state.  The Netherlands, France, and the 
US have been involved with arms shipments to Taiwan and therefore exposing them-
selves to retaliation by the PRC and possibly in the sales or purchases of agricultural 
products. 
The Netherlands agreed to sell Taiwan two submarines in 1981 with the encour-
agement of the US (Sterba, 1/19/1981, A14).  In 1982, the US sold military aircraft to 
Taiwan, though not the most advanced, to the dismay of Beijing that maintained that the 
US would suffer a sharp PRC reaction and possibly a downgrading of diplomatic rela-
tions (Wren: 1/13/1982, A1).  The US repeated the sale in 1992 with more advanced air-
craft.  That sale was immediately followed by the sale of advanced aircraft and arms to 
Taiwan by France.  In retaliation for the submarine sale, the Dutch ambassador was ex-
pelled and official relations were downgraded to the charge d’affairs level.127  France 
was forced to close its consulate in Guangzhou in retaliation, an area where there was 
much French FDI, and the PRC ceased participation in international arms reduction talks 
(WuDunn: 11/19/1992, A12).128  Further, no new imports of French wheat occurred until 
both sides decided to mend fences in 1994 at which time wheat purchases re-started after 
a two-year absence.  In contrast to the Dutch and French punishments, the US was spared 
                                                 
127 This remained in place until 1984 when the Dutch government denied a Taiwanese request for four ad-
ditional  four additional subs  (New York Times, 2/2/1984, A4). 
 
128 The Germans were also rumored to be considering arms sales to Taiwan at the time.  The PRC indicated 
that it might cancel orders for Airbus planes if German sales proceeded.  The Germans did not make the 
sale but it demonstrates that with a multi-country manufacturing firm in Europe, like Airbus, the actions of 
one country could impact other countries thereby increasing the leverage of, in this case, the PRC.  
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any major issues by Beijing due to arms sales to Taiwan.129  In fact, it appears that the 
PRC went out of its way to maintain normal trade relations.  In 1982, the Sino-US agree-
ments let the sales to Taiwan occur without issue so long as negotiations on ending arms 
sales continued.  That said, the US did suffer.  From 1985 through 1987, the US provided 
only 10% of PRC wheat imports and from 1986 through 1988 only 67% of maize im-
ports.  Both were far below its historical share. 
In the 1992 case, the decision to sell the F-16s was primarily a domestic US polit-
ical gambit to maintain employment to assist G. H. W. Bush’s re-election possibilities.  
The PRC considered this sale to be a breach of the agreement reached in 1982 (Cheung: 
2001, 76).  Yet, right after Bush’s defeat, the PRC placed an order for two million tons of 
wheat as a “present” for the victorious Clinton (Kristoff: 11/29/1992, 4).  The absence of 
retaliation against the US can be explained by its economic and military capabilities rela-
tive to the Dutch and French.  From the military point of view, in 1982 the PRC was still 
dependent on the US to keep the Soviets at bay.  By 1992, the USSR had ceased to exist.  
From an economic development point of view, the PRC needed the combined economic 
power of all three to invest in 1982 and most importantly in 1992, in the aftermath of 
Tiananmen and coincident with Deng’s southern tour.  Finally, in agriculture the US was 
the leading grain exporter to the PRC, France was a player but fourth or fifth ranked, and 
the Dutch were non-participants.  It is only natural that the PRC would do as little as pos-
sible to antagonize the US while simultaneously punishing the behavior of other states 
                                                 
129 A Dutch journalist was quoted asking a PRC spokesman “Why is the American ambassador still here?” 
following the sale of F-16s in 1992 (Kristoff: 11/29/1992, 4) 
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with fewer capabilities.  The US did not suffer as it had following the 1982 arms sale.  
The US share of the import market remained relatively constant in the following years. 
Or is there a different explanation for part of the punishments handed out by the 
PRC at differing times?  During the 1982 arms sale, there was another trade dispute oc-
curring between the US and PRC.  PRC textile manufacturers were having textiles “fin-
ished” in Hong Kong and claiming them as products of Hong Kong, thereby evading US 
tariffs for PRC goods.  The US demanded compensation to resolve the issue.  Prior to res-
olution in 1983, the PRC retaliated by reducing agricultural imports from the US purchas-
ing only 2/3 of the contract amounts for wheat and maize and was expected to be unable 
to make up the difference in its 1984 purchases.  The textile issue was the reason for the 
1983 shortfall and other excuses, either real or delaying tactics, were the cause of the 
shortfall in 1984 (Wren: 9/29/84, 29).  The answer to the question is an absence of need.  
First, the PRC had record harvests of wheat and maize in 1983 with growth of nearly 
19% and 13%, respectively.  Thus need was lessened.  This increase in output was not a 
one-off event but was maintained and later grew even more.  Second, the value of the 
USD was quite high and it behooved the PRC to buy from other countries with room to 
negotiate with regard to FX rates.  Third, the PRC was running a trade deficit with the US 
and un-needed grain imports would exacerbate the issue.  Fourth, if it did fulfill its con-
tract obligations, in USD, it would have sold the excess in the world market almost surely 
at a loss, and anger other exporters.   
The situation in 1992 was similar.  The PRC was a net exporter of soybeans, 
maize, and rice in 1992-4 and had substantial reductions in wheat imports.  Punishing 
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France with suspension of imports was a simple decision that would probably have oc-
curred anyway.  The most likely explanation is a combination of both explanations.  First, 
the absence of need was the starting point.  Second, the PRC was able to make two politi-
cal statements: first, to France and the world, as a matter of principle, for interfering in 
the internal affairs of the PRC; and second, to recognize the distribution of capabilities 
the US had and the need that the PRC would have for those capabilities. 
 
The Second Ring 
It would also be appropriate to examine the Second Ring, the ASEAN countries, 
plus Japan, South Korea, and North Korea after 1991.  The expansion of agricultural out-
put triggered by the Deng reforms led to an expansion of grain trade between the PRC 
and these countries.  Both maize (Figure 4.4) and soybeans (Figure 4.5) followed a simi-
lar pattern for total exports of the crops under consideration as shown in Figure 4.1.  As 
the Deng era commenced imports of both continued but nearly ceased as Deng’s reforms 
drove production up.  
Figure 4.4      
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Thailand was a sometimes client state of the PRC.  Harding maintains that the use 
of Thailand, in this case, was as a counterweight against Vietnam from 1975 and into the 
mid-1980’s, a continuation of a long-term rivalry.  Thailand was also useful to the PRC 
as a conduit to ship aid to Cambodian factions opposed to Vietnam (Harding: 1997, 386-
7).  Though Thailand is a major agricultural state in Asia, trade in maize with the PRC 
was not normal.  However, from 1978 through 1987, the PRC bought 1.4 million tons of 
maize from Thailand, an action that does not appear to be needed from a PRC-wide food 
security viewpoint.  One can speculate that the un-needed maize purchases were a type of 
repayment to Thailand for whatever assistance they provided to the PRC interests in 
Cambodia.  One logical explanation is that the maize went directly to Cambodia as aid 
from the PRC for which the PRC paid Thailand.  
 
We also see the importance of Japan as a destination of PRC grain exports.  Klein 
maintains that “Japan is vastly more important to China than any European nation.  Ex-
cept for the United States and perhaps the former Soviet Union, China’s most important 
bilateral relationship is with Japan” (Klein: 1997, 120).  When the PRC was unable to 
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fulfill its committed purchase of a steel complex from Japan, partially due to reduced oil 
output, Deng was left to explain to Japanese business and government officials that the 
PRC’s lack of experience had led to mistakes (Vogel: 2011, 432-3).130 Japan was a source 
of technology, and an important source of chemical fertilizers and fertilizer production 
facilities for agricultural use.  At this time the PRC also ran a trade deficit with Japan.  As 
previously mentioned, the PRC tried to keep bilateral trade balanced; consistent maize 
and soybean sales to Japan were part of the trade that helped to keep the deficit with Ja-
pan from getting worse.  
With maize, we see the arrival of a new major customer for PRC maize, South 
Korea.  Figure 4.4 shows exports to South Korea starting in 1990.  However, an article by 
Chung, citing non-public information, states that South Korea started importing PRC 
maize following the 1984 harvest.  This was conducted through Hong Kong to avoid the 
source and destination from becoming public.  This trade was not made public due to 
PRC concerns over its relations with North Korea.  Trade with South Korea was deemed 
to be beneficial for the PRC for mid-range technology products but the risk it ran was 
having North Korea turn to the Soviets permanently should commercial activities be for-
malized with the South (Chung: 1988, 1039-40).  In 1990, South Korea and the USSR es-
tablished diplomatic relations, eliminating the PRC’s North Korean concerns; trade of-
fices opened shortly thereafter to PRC-South Korean trade.  In 1991, South Korea sur-
passed Japan as the major maize customer. 
                                                 
130 Vogel goes on to say that Deng was too impatient and failed to listen enough to Chen Yun. 
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In a somewhat similar situation, Vietnam and the PRC became engaged in agri-
cultural trade.  As USSR / PRC relations warmed, Gorbachev urged its ally, Vietnam, to 
mend fences with its northern neighbor.  In 1991, the USSR ceased to exist but Vietnam 
had started discussions with the PRC.  Following resolution of the Cambodian situation 
where each backed opposing factions, normal relations were restored between Vietnam 
and the PRC in 1991.  Though border disputes, on land and in the South China Sea, con-
tinued--trade began again between the two (Thayer: 1994, 352-7), including grain.  The 
PRC imported in excess of 700 thousand tons of rice from Vietnam from 1992 through 
1996 and exported 53 thousand tons of maize to Vietnam in 1993. 
Following the collapse of the USSR, its client state, Mongolia, began importing 
rice from its southern neighbor, the PRC; a further indication of changing trade patterns 
resulting from the Soviet demise.   
   Expanding grain trade with all countries within the second ring continued to 
take more maize and soybean exports from the PRC.  Both were readily available on 
world markets but the proximity to the PRC reduced transport costs and delivery times.  
It served to help create a pattern of trust between the PRC and its closest neighbors. 
Given the suspicions of many of its neighbors concerning the PRC’s rise and its ultimate 
intentions, the liberal view that trade reduces the possibility of conflict is appropriate at 
this juncture.   
 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa  
Rice was an export product to the second ring (prime rice growing areas) and to 
other regions of the world.  Rice exports to Sub-Saharan Africa continued to grow during 
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Deng’s time.  African countries as well as small island states were a source of competi-
tion between the PRC and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, a competition that often in-
volved sufficient aid to effect the change.131  Rice exports to Africa followed the diplo-
matic recognition patterns. Not all states that recognized the PRC bought PRC rice.  Only 
one that bought PRC rice recognized Taiwan, Cote d’Ivoire, and did so in relatively high 
volumes prior to switching recognition in 1983.  Recall that diplomatic recognition was 
not a prerequisite for trade with the PRC.   
During the 1980’s, the PRC increased rice exports to the Middle East, primarily to 
Libya, Iran and Bahrain.  All are oil producers, an issue that concerns the PRC as its 
Daqing oil field has less reserves that anticipated.  Libya and Iran are arms customers of 
the PRC, and Iran received nuclear development assistance from the PRC from 1985 
through 1990132 (Kim: 1994, 146-9).  Buying rice from the PRC is most likely not a quid 
pro quo arrangement for arms and nuclear technology.  It should be considered as estab-
lishing trade links that could facilitate trade in oil in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The international situation that Deng initially faced was a continuation of the Cold 
War.  Mao had started as an affiliate of the Soviets and an enemy of the West but left 
Deng with the West as a partner and the Soviets as a threat.  Deng’s initial domestic re-
forms in agriculture, implementation of the HRS and the incentives that it contained and 
                                                 
131 In addition to recognition of Taiwan, whether a state opposed PRC UN admission prior to 1971 could 
influence the PRC’s behavior towards that state (Harding: 1997, 387).  
132 As did Iraq in 1989-90. 
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would create increased agricultural output and rural incomes.  The additional agricultural 
production was available to feed labor in the urban areas and for export as well. The crea-
tion of SEZs took advantage of low cost and excess agricultural labor formed the back-
bone of export-led economic development in urban eastern coastal areas.  It was in the 
SEZs where the use of the West’s technology, knowledge, and capital was first applied 
and where the exports originated. Together, the agriculture reforms and the export-led de-
velopment model began moving the PRC towards a market economy.   
The CCP remained quite capable to compel citizens to act as it determined was 
best.  The one-child policy was implemented to reduce population growth and decrease 
future food demand by diminishing demand.  Student protests were crushed at Tianan-
men late in Deng’s rule when they refused to disperse.    
The question now is whether grain was a strategic good during Deng’s term of of-
fice.  Whether it was strategic or non-strategic depends on the issues of sensitivity or vul-
nerability resulting from internal limitations or by the potential actions of other states.  As 
noted, food security is always a concern.  The increase in export businesses using agricul-
tural products, i.e. cotton, on a decreasing quantity of arable land offered the population 
and the CCP additional worries concerning long term food security. 
There are three reasons why grain might not be considered a strategic good.  First 
is the increasing grain production.  For our four major grains, production had increased 
annually, excepting normal crop output variations, throughout Deng’s time.  Between 
1978 and 1984 and between 1987 and 1990, the PRC was a net importer of these grains.  
From 1991 through 1994, it was a net exporter of soybeans and maize and a minor ex-
porter of rice.  (Figure 4.1).  This demonstrates that the HRS and subsequent adjustments 
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were working as exports and increases in k/cal per capita consumption were increasing.  
However, the improvement in output is not sufficient to remove grain as a strategic good, 
especially as imports of wheat continued. 
Second, the total balance of payments turned positive for good in 1994.  Except 
for one year, it had been positive since 1990.  This put the PRC in a position to purchase 
whatever food they did not raise domestically in the world markets.  It would no longer 
need to be self-reliant; the foundation had been laid by the earnings of export-led devel-
opment to be self-sufficient in grain.  
Third, suspension of food exports was no longer considered a legitimate punish-
ment tool in the absence of war.133  Despite the Tiananmen crackdown and the interna-
tional reaction to it, grain shipments were not suspended from the main suppliers, the US, 
Canada, France, and Australia.   It could be assumed that imported grain would continue 
to be available to the PRC regardless of international distaste of its domestic politics.  
Yet, the PRC was susceptible to international pressures.  The execution of the develop-
ment plans, at least in the speed of attainment, led to the PRC having to accept US arms 
sales to Taiwan.  Any non-verbal rebuke ran the risk of alienating the US government, 
which could have slowed US business investment in the PRC or limited access to the US 
market.   
                                                 
133 The embargo of Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War was constructed so that domestically unavailable 
products for infant nutrition and medicines could be imported by Iraq and paid for by oil exports.  This was 
recognition that the innocent should not suffer due to the government.  While well-meaning, it appears not 
to have happened as planned as those needed products were re-exported to earn FX for non-essential goods.  
However, the failure of N. Korea to meet its nuclear commitments did lead to a cutoff of grain shipments 
from the US and others.  
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We must now consider whether grain is a strategic good.  One that is essential for 
state survival or defense (Keohane and Nye) or if insufficient grain availability (domestic 
or imported) would produce “rapid and negative effects on a wide range of economic and 
military activities” (Ripsman and Blanchard: 2000, 60).   
The increase in production was a step forward in food security.  However, it was a 
step made in a longer journey.  Two variables keep grain as a strategic good: the ability to 
keep the output growing and the loss of arable land.  Output growth has occurred due to 
increasing use of chemical fertilizers, better seeds, better farming practices, incentives for 
farmers and partial reform of purchasing practices.  An unanswered question is the 
whether the rate of production growth keep up with demand.  According to some statis-
tics the arable land per capita had increased during Deng’s time.  That increase had been 
the conversion of ponds to farmland.  This helped but was limited and would not offset 
the conversion of arable land to other uses brought on by modernization.  These two fac-
tors are critical.  Continued production growth will not go on indefinitely and the rate of 
loss of arable land will increase for at least a while.  The uncertainty surrounding these 
issues combine to keep grain a strategic good. 
As a balance of payments issue, agriculture was a net contributor to exports de-
spite large wheat imports, a condition of agriculture interconnectedness.  The export 
driven economy was just starting to generate net positive FX.  It was too soon to rely on 
manufacturing alone for FX.  The PRC needed to repay loans and re-accumulate FX re-
serves. Agriculture was a proven method to do so, though its contribution will decrease in 
proportion to manufacturing.  Other reason for maintaining grain as a strategic good are 
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the domestic ramifications of importing grain in times of shortage and the impact on in-
flation.  Paying for imports at a higher than domestic price necessitated the use of subsi-
dies to control inflation; a costly, but necessary, exercise for Beijing.   
The Tiananmen incident reaction from much of the world was decidedly negative. 
Despite the decidedly negative response to Tiananmen, grain shipments from primarily 
Western countries continued.  Similar responses to rash domestic PRC policies might not 
stop grain shipments but could cause a slowdown in investment and exports thereby re-
tarding the PRC’s ability to generate FX.  Such a situation would return the onus of FX 
generation back to agriculture, a situation that would delay modernization.  Until FX re-
serves are sufficient and consistent grain will remain a strategic good.     
The overwhelming policy action that designated grain as a strategic good was the 
one-child policy; fears of the ability of self-reliance to feed the population. Such an intru-
sion into the normal cycle of life and culture is the securitization of the rate of growth of 
the population.  Once such drastic measures are taken, it must follow that all other as-
pects of preserving food security through domestic means, self-reliance, must be taken.  
Imports will be part of this but only as a backstop to a robust domestic effort.  Grain con-
tinues to be a strategic good and one that remains interdependent sensitive.   
The improvement in grain output provided Deng with the opportunity to use grain 
exports for FX as well as for influence.  The five year soy and maize contract with the 
USSR is a case in point: an opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviets that the PRC was 
interested in restoring normal relations.  Other than the five year contract with the Sovi-
ets, the vast majority of PRC grain exports went to the 2nd Ring countries.  Trade with the 
neighborhood is always a good idea, especially as the memories of many neighboring 
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states were negative concerning the PRC.  Grain trade with oil producers such as Libya, 
Iran, and Bahrain created influence that could lead to oil purchases from those countries.  
Similarly, Deng was able to send negative messages to the US and France by ceasing or 
reducing grain purchases following arms sales to Taiwan.  The success of the HRS, in ad-
dition to the domestic benefits, provided the opportunity to punish each by reducing grain 
purchases.   
At the conclusion of Deng’s rule, progress had been made agricultural production 
in grains and other labor intensive agricultural activities.  Grain continued to be a strate-
gic good despite improvements.  Yet, Deng’s peace and development strategy limited his 
foreign policy options.  Development required peace, and development required the co-
operation of the international community.  As the PRC chose to join additional IGOs he 
became constrained by the regime rules, the price of admittance.  Any egregious interna-
tional action triggered by the PRC that ran contrary to Western normative behavior, as 
Tiananmen did, ran the risk of long-term suspension of technology transfer, FDI, and ex-
ports, and ran the risk of retarding development for an extended period of time.134 In ef-
fect, Deng’s development strategy made the PRC vulnerable to the rest of the world and 
primarily on the West for its development / modernization.  It could not insulate itself 
from events that took place in the West.135  Failure in the development policy would cre-
ate more pressure on agriculture, forcing it to re-emerge as the source of modernization.  
                                                 
134 Western normative behavior is important as a significant portion of technology transfer and FDI were of 
Western origin and the West was the primary export markets. 
 
135 Deng risked his development strategy through military technology transfers and missile sales to coun-
tries that were considered unsuitable according to the US and contrary to international law intentions, 
though the PRC was yet to sign those agreements.   
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Chapter V - FOOD and the LEADERSHIP of the THIRD GENERATION 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the rule of Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the 
CCP from 1989 to 2002, President from 1993 to 2003, and Chairman of the CMC from 
1989 to 2004.  This was an important period in the PRC.  Domestically, the urban – rural 
and the coastal –western split separated income and opportunity in favor of urban eastern 
coastal areas.  The development of the eastern coast first had been the plan, but the rural 
and western areas were getting restless.  Attempts by Beijing to delegate management of 
provincial and local matters to the respective levels led many officials to abuse their posi-
tions.  This corruption was felt most harshly by the peasants.  Still, Beijing could force 
change in rural areas as it did to fight food inflation, an administrative action that would 
lead to a level of grain security for the nation not enjoyed for quite some time. 
Internationally, the PRC would have to learn to live in a uni-polar world even as it 
spoke the language of a multi-polar one.  The PRC would join the WTO near the end of 
Jiang’s time in office and become a participant in regional organizations involving Russia 
and Central Asia as well as joining regional groupings focusing on ASEAN.  The in-
crease in grain output provided confidence-building trade opportunities with each of 
these organizations for a period of time, though horticulture products were the best and 
most sustainable opportunities.  Building confidence with ASEAN countries was im-
portant given the increasing tensions in the South China Sea.    
As has been done previously, we will first examine the food paradigm of the PRC, 
the domestic aspects of food security.  We will then examine the foreign policy of the 
PRC to see its impact on achieving and / or maintaining food security as well as using 
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grain as a foreign policy tool.  The degree that the PRC can be self-reliant or sufficiently 
self-sufficient in grain will increase its foreign policy options.   
 
The Food Paradigm 
 
This chapter on the food paradigm will examine the domestic politics of the time 
and proceed through the state-society relationship, economic development, and popula-
tion issues.  The last section will examine the food paradigm and its effect on food secu-
rity. 
  
 Domestic Politics 
Jiang assumed his position at the top of the CCP hierarchy during a time of great 
change.  First, he assumed the position of General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC 
following the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and subsequent shootings.  The previous 
General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, was dismissed by Deng and other party elders for his 
objection to the use of force to end the demonstrations.  Jiang was previously Mayor of 
Shanghai and was a surprise choice for the position.136  He was the first CCP leader not to 
have his communist roots in the revolutionary phase of the Party.  Nor did he possess the 
prestige and charisma of Mao and Deng, but he did enjoy the support of Deng, who none-
theless “listened from behind the curtain.”   
                                                 
136 Dittmer maintains that Jiang was not Deng’s personal choice (Dittmer: 2002, 233). 
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Second, there was the transition from a “traditional agrarian society to a modern 
society, from a state-socialist economy to a market economy, and from a Leninist politi-
cal system to something else.” (Teiwes: 2002, 255).  While Mao had centralized political 
leadership and Deng had decentralized it in order to enliven the economy, Jiang “had the 
more technically difficult task of separating the political system from the economy in 
ways that maintain a sufficiently strong state without stifling the economy” (Fewsmith: 
2002, 265).  Decentralizing control was a necessary tool in revitalizing the economy, but 
it was also an invitation to corruption by provincial and local cadres who now had at their 
disposal significant funds that were not always used as Beijing intended. 
For Jiang, these formidable transitions and tasks were to be undertaken under the 
cloud of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and suppression.  His marching orders 
were to bring tranquility to the PRC by avoiding drama and extremes and focusing on 
management before politics.  His guiding principles were to preserve the party’s monop-
oly of power, which was in the PRC’s best interest as well as his own (Pye: 2002, 209).    
To maintain its position, the CCP needed to demonstrate its legitimacy, something 
that was increasingly in question following Tiananmen.  “…the fragility of the regime’s 
legitimacy - a fragility due to an official ideology few believe in, the inability of leader-
ship to curb rampant corruption, and the fact that a legitimacy based on economic perfor-
mance is inherently vulnerable” (Teiwes: 2002, 255).  Just as the CCP suffered a legiti-
macy gap, so did Jiang himself, given the circumstances of his rapid rise and the relative 
obscurity from which he came.  Further, Jiang took the responsibility of negotiating 
GATT (soon to be WTO) membership, one that potentially could damage the gains that 
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the peasants had made during the era of agricultural reform by exposing them to competi-
tion from world markets. 
State-Society Relationship  
The state-society relationship during Jiang’s rule was a continuation of the poli-
cies set forth by Deng.  There was no dramatic change at the highest levels of govern-
ment as there was between Mao and Deng.  One area of change in the state-society rela-
tionship was the delegation of responsibilities to provincial and local levels; it was diffi-
cult to manage a country the size and scope of the PRC exclusively from the top down.  
A second area of change was Jiang’s “three represents” policy; the CCP represented the 
broad mass of the population, the advanced culture, and the most advanced forces of pro-
duction.  The broad mass of the population also included capitalists, and a year after he 
articulated the “three represents” Jiang expanded CCP membership to include private en-
trepreneurs, a controversial decision among CCP conservatives (Fewsmith: 2002, 265).  
This section will focus on three issues.  First was the issue of state-owned enter-
prises (SOE) and the “iron rice bowl”, the cradle-to-grave care the state provided to SOE 
employees.  The inability of many SOEs to cope with the need to make profits and meet 
their obligations to the iron rice bowl disrupted the state-society relationship.  Second is 
the rural situation that developed and led to farmers being paid in IOU’s when the cash to 
pay them was used for other purposes in the early to mid-1990s.  A common element of 
both was triangular debt.  Third, the food price inflation of the late 1980s and mid 1990s 
presented challenges to the central government, provincial budgets, and urban incomes.  
Yet, it provided income opportunities for peasants.  A return to more government control, 
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dictated from the top but implemented and managed at the provincial level, was the auto-
matic response to a problematic situation with these three issues. 
 
State Owned Enterprises 
From the time of the takeover of private enterprise by the CCP following the 1949 
victory, the government had assumed responsibility for urban employment.  The danwei, 
or social organization of the employees and their families, took responsibility for educa-
tion, housing, medical care, and proper communist thinking for all during employment 
and retirement.  This high level of “benefits” precluded the need for high salaries and 
therefore minimized the amount of money that could be saved by individuals.  It was the 
“iron rice bowl,” cradle-to- grave security administrated via the state’s agent, the SOE.  
In 1978, the large SOEs produced 77.6% of total industrial output.  By 1996, output had 
declined to 28.8% of total industrial output yet the SOEs still employed 57.4% of the ur-
ban workforce (Lin et al: 1998, 422).   
Lin notes that most SOEs were profitable at the start of reforms and provided 
much of the government tax revenue.137  Recall that Deng raised urban wages as well as 
raising the price of grain paid to farmers; wages rose at an annual rate of 16% from 1978 
to 1996 while productivity increased at only 7.6% annually (Lin et al: 1998, 425), a sure 
sign of decreasing profitability.  As profits fell, debt increased.  Manufacturers would sell 
their goods and their customers would pay part of the bill, in turn the manufacturer would 
pay part of the bill to its supplier.  The shortages would be made up by bank loans which 
                                                 
137 Hughes states that the tax receipts of industrial SOEs accounted for 65% of total industrial tax revenues 
(Hughes: 1988, 71). 
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would only be partially repaid.  This triangular debt was estimated to be $24 billion in 
1994 (Hughes: 1998, 74). 
To solve the inefficient state-owned enterprise problem, firms were sold to the 
workers and management, sold to the public, merged into more profitable firms, entered 
into joint ventures with foreign investors, or forced out of business. A common thread in 
all of these solutions was workforce rationalization; those laid off continued to be paid 
but at lower rates.  The retired were transferred to local government supported pension 
plans, increasing the burden on those government entities.  Unemployment was becoming 
a problem in the workers’ paradise.138  The unemployment problem was worst in the 
northeast, the PRC’s “rust belt”, where there was a concentration of state-owned heavy 
industry.  The iron rice bowl was broken and for all practical purposes so was Marxism.  
The engine of economic growth was no longer the SOE; it was replaced by the export-led 
model that will be discussed under Economic Development. 
 
Crops for IOU’s 
Not all was good in rural areas either.  Peasants were more and more becoming 
subject to arbitrary and excessive taxes and fees.  Most were not sanctioned by Beijing or 
the province.  The intended use of these extra funds was to provide public goods at the 
local level that higher level authorities were unwilling to fund.  These extra funds were 
                                                 
138 Hughes points out that a method of avoiding a cut in benefits was to have one family member work as a 
civil servant where benefits were not being cut (Hughes: 1998, 72).  In a similar fashion, a family could be 
better off with one person working for a foreign joint venture where wages were the highest and another 
within the state system where benefits were not being cut or were provided by the JV. Management level 
JV employees might be provided housing that generally reverted to the employee after a certain number of 
years of employment.   
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sometimes used to purchase land from peasants.  Compensation for voluntary or forced 
sales was often inadequate.   The acquirers, oftentimes local officials and developers, 
could make significant monetary gains from developing that land.  Rural unrest, and 
sometimes violence, was the result as peasants attempted to maintain the gains made pre-
viously under the reform agenda (Bernstein: 2004, 1-3). 
Another rural issue arose as early as the mid-1980s as counties did not have suffi-
cient funds to pay farmers for their grain.  This peaked in the post-1992 investment 
boom.  Rather, they were paid in IOUs.139  The grain bureaus that purchased grain for the 
state had become responsible for their own financial affairs.  Given the normal lag time 
between a purchase (at harvest time) and a sale of grain (over time to the next harvest), 
there was the need for loans.  They came from the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) that 
was created for such purposes.  If the ABC did not have the funds to make the loans they 
could call on the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) for funds, the lender of last resort.  The 
lag times between the purchases and sales created overdue loans and left the grain bu-
reaus short of funds, so, they started issuing IOUs to farmers.  This was the rural version 
of triangular debt.  The problem was exacerbated by a recession in 1989-90 and by good 
harvests in 1990 through 1992.  The recession slowed payments for raw materials and the 
good harvests increased the amounts of grain that had to be purchased by the grain bu-
reaus.  As sales were subsidized (lower sales price than purchase cost), higher purchases, 
lower sales, and delayed payments increased the burden on provincial and lower levels of 
                                                 
139 Unless indicated, the information of IOU’s comes from Wedeman: 1997, 810-824. 
206 
 
government that were already strapped for cash.  So, IOUs took the place of cash pay-
ments. 
The IOU problem worsened further after what would be called Deng’s southern 
tour of SEZs that re-ignited the economic boom.  Deng bypassed the Central Committee 
in conducting the tour (Teiwes: 2002, 240); it was his method of telling the world that the 
PRC was open for business and it worked.140  In effect, this ended the period of post-
Tiananmen austerity and increased the demand for capital.  This sent interest rates and in-
flation higher and presented banks and grain bureaus at provincial and local levels with 
opportunities to misappropriate funds and transfer them to the capital-starved eastern 
coastal provinces in search of greater returns, either for the local entity or for personal 
gain, or both.  The rush for development also occurred in rural areas, prompting further 
misallocation of funds to finance those activities, further compounding the lack of cash in 
rural area.  To solve the immediate problem, more IOU’s were issued.  IOU’s were used 
not only for crop purchases but also for remittances from those working in urban areas, 
for pay, and for company bonds coming due that employees had been forced to purchase 
(Chu: 7/4/92, 1). There was no surety as to when the IOUs would be repaid nor were they 
interest-bearing which worsened the impact in a high-interest, high-inflation rate environ-
ment.  The situation was partially caused by and continued to be ripe for fraud. 
Getting rich might be glorious but getting rich quickly by circumventing rules and 
regulations created unintended problems.  As would be expected, there was peasant un-
rest.  Protests were common with some devolving into violence.  To correct the problem, 
                                                 
140 The southern tour was a rebuke of Jiang but not a challenge to his position (Teiwes: 2002, 244).   
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the PRC government ordered all IOUs to be repaid by mid-January 1993, and banks were 
reorganized.141  Over the following year, nearly all senior government and CCP leaders 
made comments concerning the need for peasant welfare and stability within agriculture.   
The peasant response to the IOU issue can be seen in the change in crops planted.  
As seen in Figure 5.1, the total grain areas sown decreased and the sown ar- 
eas of cash crops-- vegetables, orchards, tobacco, cotton, and oil bearing crops (excluding 
soybeans) increased--thus avoid-
ing having to sell a portion of 
production to the state.142                
Wedeman acknowledges 
that there was individual corrup-
tion but calls the IOU issue one 
of institutional corruption.  One 
where “the problem is not simply degenerate agents, but rather a breakdown in the insti-
tutional mechanisms putatively designed to prevent agents from engaging in illegal 
acts… Despite regulations prohibiting the use of procurement funds to make commercial 
loans, banks, procurement agencies and local governments colluded together, ignored 
their fiduciary responsibilities, and systematically misappropriated vast sums in the hope 
of reaping windfall profits…” (Wedeman: 1997, 830).143  
                                                 
141 Repaying debts at Chinese New Year is a common practice which usually falls during this time of year. 
 
142 The areas sown include multiple cropping, more than one crop per piece of land in a year. 
143 Wedeman assumes that the IOU problem led to an increase in migration from rural areas to urban areas.  
“Because data on the extent of rural out-migration and farmers' precise motives for abandoning farming and 
joining the ranks of the "floating population" are difficult to obtain, it is hard to tell with any certainty to 
what extent the IOU crisis directly contributed to the flow of rural residents into the cities. Nevertheless, 
Figure 5.1
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Food Inflation  
We have seen that the steps that the PRC had taken to improve grain production--
the HRS, increasing farmer decision making abilities, material incentives, and expanding 
market opportunities--first led to an increase in output of grain.  The steady increase in 
state purchase prices of grain moved grain prices towards and then above world levels by 
1994 (Findley: 1998, 15).  With those increases also came inflation, a scourge that had 
visited China during the first half of the 20th century.  Maintaining low-to-reasonably 
priced grain for the urban population was considered an imperative for economic growth 
and to promote urban tranquility.144 
As it did when inflation occurred in 1988-9, Beijing intervened in the grain trade 
in 1994-5 following the decontrol of the procurement and retail price of grain (Lin and 
Zhang: 1998, 16).  The interventions in both cases involved: control over grain produc-
tion that had decreased in favor of cash crops; procurement policies; and the use of urban 
price controls.  The first reaction to inflation came from local governments that imple-
mented inter and intra-provincial trade barriers (Park et al: 2002, 68).  In late 1994, Bei-
jing implemented the Provincial Governor’s Grain Responsibility System (PGRS) that 
put the provincial governors in charge of balancing the supply and demand for grain in 
                                                 
there is evidence that out-migration increased in the wake of the 1992 IOU crisis (Wedeman: 1997, 825-6).  
The NBSC only began reporting the “floating population” statistics in 2013.  
 
144 In urban areas about 50% of household income was spent on food, so the impact of food inflation was 
important.   
209 
 
their provinces.145  The objective was to increase output and therefore reduce prices via 
administrative controls that included governing sown areas, local stocks, and managing 
inter-provincial grain transfers.146  The inefficient and inadequate transport system, cou-
pled with PGRS created market distortions and led to further impediments that reduced 
the opportunity to use comparative advantage in increasing output.  This was consistent 
with the past use of regional self-reliance147, a continuing misallocation of resources.148   
The market distortions were caused by policy changes in both grain deficit and 
surplus provinces.  In grain deficient Guangdong province, where there were many other 
profitable uses for land, incentives were raised and farmer taxes were reduced to encour-
age grain production.  Grain surplus areas had incentives reduced and taxes increased as 
the grain was not needed, thereby reducing output.  Therefore, in grain rich but economi-
cally poor Jiangxi, a province without the extent of non-agricultural opportunities that 
bordering Guangdong enjoyed, prices were lowered and taxes raised and income opportu-
nities reduced.  Trade was reduced by grain exporting provinces through the use of ad-
ministrative controls or export taxes or even blockades as in Qing times.  Importing prov-
inces could subsidize imports but then had to use blockades to prevent re-exports in 
                                                 
145 A similar program, the Mayor’s Responsibility System was used to assure a sufficient supply of fruits 
and vegetables, had been put in place earlier.  This was less onerous than the PGRS as fruit and vegetable 
crops tended to be produced and consumed locally. 
 
146 The PGRS also served to provincialize / localize grain production and pricing, an activity that Beijing 
had realized was better performed at those levels rather than centrally.  
 
147 Recall that the definitional differences between self-reliance, reliance on using the means available 
within the PRC or a region thereof to meet its needs without outside assistance, and self-sufficiency; the 
state can provide food from domestic sources and have the financial ability to purchase the balance. 
 
148 The PRC acted as if it were a customs union, a country with common exterior tariffs and regulations but 
with inter-provincial trade retarded by administrative controls and differing price and tax regimes. 
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search of higher prices (Findley: 1998, 23-4).  These actions hurt farmers that had just be-
gun to enjoy the higher grain prices. 
Despite the market distortions that the PGRS created, it fulfilled its objective of 
increasing output.  This had an impact on the PRC grain trade (see Figure 5.2) and it will 
be seen repeatedly in trade patterns.  
For example, high imports and low 
exports in 1995-6 addressed the 
shortfalls in grain production and 
high inflation.  This was followed by 
five years of exports exceeding im-
ports of the four grains we focus on.  If soybeans are excluded, the PRC was a net ex-
porter of grain through the end of Jiang’s term of office.149   
However, there was an upside to domestic prices catching up with world prices.150  
It opened up the PRC to imports that would have otherwise been inflationary when do-
mestic prices were lower than world prices.  If not, additional subsidies would have been 
necessary to bring higher import prices in line with lower domestic prices, a further de-
mand on government funds.  Should domestic prices exceed international prices, imports 
could be used to lower inflation. However, this would be the case only if PRC use of in-
ternational markets was marginal and did not drive world prices higher.     
 
 
                                                 
149 Increasing soybean imports made the balance of payments of these four products increasingly negative. 
 
150 PRC prices exceeded world prices in the last half of the decade. 
Figure 5.2
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State-Society Summary 
The reforms ushered in by Deng introduced a “socialist market economy”, one 
that in 1993 meant that the economy was “market-oriented and market-driven for growth, 
just as in capitalist economies, but it is for a socialist purpose; ‘socialism’ is intended to 
mean above all a mixed state and private economy that comes with social equity, 
summed up by the expression ‘getting rich together’” (Huang: 2012, 620).151 
The change from a communist or state-directed economy to a market-based econ-
omy, whether a “socialist market” one or a completely laissez-faire one, creates winners 
and losers.  Peasants were initial winners with the HRS and higher crop prices.  SOE 
workers were losers as their employment ended due to firm inefficiencies.  Peasants be-
came temporary losers when paid with IOU’s or permanent losers if not receiving fair 
value for their land.  Many in the western regions were neither winners nor losers but 
were simply ignored as state policy was to focus economic development in the coastal re-
gions before expanding westward. 
Whenever the economic transition issues became serious, the government re-
sponse was to temporarily retreat from marketization and/or institute government-man-
dated controls or create new institutions to alleviate the issues at hand.  This was a con-
stant theme within the agricultural realm that continued under Jiang’s administration as it 
had under Deng.  The intentions of the interventions were to make what had been created 
work better, and to keep all segments of society happy or on the path to happiness and 
                                                 
151 For a good discussion on various aspects of the definition of “socialist market economy” see Huang 
(2012) and  Wang Shaoguang “The Compatibility of Public Ownership and the Market Economy: A Great 
Debate in China,” World Affairs, Vol. 157, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 38-49. 
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prosperity.  This was key for the CCP.  Without that, the ability of the CCP to survive 
would be brought into question.   
Economic Development 
While employment opportunities were decreasing in the SOEs, a new source of 
employment opportunities was emerging, the foreign invested enterprise (FIE), initially 
located in Deng’s SEZs.152  Initially, most FIEs came in search of low cost PRC labor for 
export purposes rather than domestic sales; therefore the employment created by export-
oriented FIEs was nearly all incremental.  The explosion in FDI began in 1984, re-ignited 
after Deng’s post-Tiananmen southern tour, paused after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
and then resumed its strong upward pace as shown in Figure 5.3.153 
 
 
                                                 
152 Joint ventures gradually expanded from foreign ownership being limited to less than 50% prior to ex-
panding.  A wholly owned foreign enterprise (WOFE) involved 100% foreign capital. 
 
153 Starting after Deng’s southern tour, a number of FIEs were established to penetrate the PRC market ra-
ther than just for export.  Exports were required to balance FX needs but the business opportunity was first 
and foremost the PRC market. These operations were also a source of employment in the PRC and one that 
employed a wide range of skills rather than just assembly labor. 
Figure 5.3
Source: UNCTAD
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In 1993, FIEs employed 1.65 million PRC citizens.  By 2002, employment in 
FIEs reached just under 7.6 million, more than 1% of total PRC employment.  Employ-
ment in FIEs could not offset the employment losses from SOEs, but it helped.  The vast 
majority of FIE employment was manual assembly type labor that employed primarily 
females for their manual dexterity.  Many were from rural areas, excess agricultural labor 
that contributed to rural income via remittances to their home towns. 
As shown below in Figure 5.4, the surge in FDI for purposes of export was the 
key factor in establishing the export-led development of the PRC.  In 2001, FIE exports 
(primarily manufactured goods) comprised 50% of total PRC exports from all sectors of 
the economy.154  The creation of the SEZs and the subsequent investment had created an 
export juggernaut that relieved the pressure on agriculture as a source of foreign funds to 
finance modernization. However, as will be seen later the growth of industrial production 
created a need for more manufacturing facilities, more infrastructure, and more and better 
housing. All of these would place greater demand on the decreasing supply of arable 
land. 
                                                 
154 The government maintained strict control over scarce FX so that among other reasons, FX earned by 
FIEs ended up in the coffers of the government.  However, foreign investors received tax breaks that PRC 
companies did not receive.  To obtain these tax breaks, domestic companies would begin taking profits 
overseas, mainly in Hong Kong initially.  A Hong Kong registered PRC business could create FIE’s in the 
PRC to get the tax advantage.  
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Population  
The impact of the one-child policy continued.  Between 1993 and 2002, the rate 
of population increase fell to 0.58% from 1.14% annually.  Yet, this was an increase of 
just under 100 million people. 
The hukou system that was put in place to restrict rural-to-urban migration de-
volved to local-based control.  The need for labor in the SEZs and for urban construction 
had grown immensely.  To fill the demand for labor, migrants could now obtain tempo-
rary residency in urban areas but receive none of the benefits that permanent residents 
were entitled to, including health care and education.  As a result, temporary migrants 
seldom brought their families with them (Willmore et al: 2009, 162). 
 
Analysis of the Food Paradigm under Jiang 
 
Overall, the food security situation during Jiang’s rule was mixed as can be seen 
in Table 5.1.  Available calories per day rose each year and in total by 14.8% from 1992 
Figure 5.4
Source: China Statistical Yearbook , various issues 
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through 2003.  However, most of the gain came before 2001.  Yet, total grain output and 
the population growth remained practically constant, some of which was attributable to 
the decreasing population growth rate brought on by the one-child policy.  This is indica-
tive of grain playing a relatively lesser role in calorie consumption, though still the major 
source of calories.  Grain availability in kg per capita during the reform era peaked in 
1996.  Additional and increasing calories more and more came from meat and non-grain 
plants (FAO Food Balance Sheets).  Increasing meat consumption is consistent with in-
creasing societal wealth.  As can be seen in Table 5.2, the output of grain that had been 
growing since the reforms of Deng levelled off in the 1992-4 era, recovered and in-
creased with the implementation of the PGRS before falling again beginning in 2000.  On 
a per capita basis, grain production also fell starting in 2000.   
 
 
Table 5.1                                        Indicators of Food Security /  Insecurity
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% change in total grain output (1) 1.6% 3.1% -2.5% 4.8% 8.1% -2.1% 3.7%
% change in population 1.23% 1.14% 1.08% 1.04% 1.00% 0.96% 0.91%
K/cal availability per capita per day (2) 2465 2538 2604 2691 2694 2725 2769
1992-2003
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
% change in total grain output (1) -1.4% -8.6% -2.1% 1.0% -5.7% 1.0%
% change in population 0.84% 0.77% 0.69% 0.63% 0.58% 0.94%
K/cal availability per capita per day (2) 2763 2806 2814 2830 2831 2711
Sources: 1) Production 1977-1992, PRC State Statistical Bureau, various years
2) FAO Statistics Division
Shaded areas indicate years in which population growth exceeded grain output increases.
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Three aspects have not been mentioned.  First is the publication of the Lester 
Brown book, Who Will Feed China?  Second is the declared level of food self-reliance 
that the PRC should maintain.  Third, the application to join the WTO.  The WTO will be 
covered in the foreign policy section below. 
Brown’s book was published in 1995 and raised the possibility of a food supply 
crisis given the continuing population growth of the PRC.  In the time since it was pub-
lished, many of the assumptions and claims made have been shown to be improper or ex-
cessive, but it was a wakeup call for the PRC that the supply of foodstuffs was more than 
a method of financing economic development.  Brown’s book not only looked at the abil-
ity of the PRC to feed itself but also at its impact on the world food situation.  This served 
to focus the world on food security, not just the PRC.   
Table 5.2
Total Grain Total Grain Arable Self-
Production Production Land Reliance
Year Mil. of tons Kg./capita/ year Ha./capita Ratio*
Payment by IOU peaks 1992 442.7 368.2 0.1035 102.2
IOU's to be repaid, ABC reorganized 1993 456.5 375.4 0.1003 102.3
PGRS Implemented 1994 445.1 362.2 0.0991 101.4
1995 466.6 375.8 0.0983 97.0
95% self-sufficiency policy 1996 504.5 402.3 0.0967 98.4
Arable land conversion ban 1997 494.2 390.3 0.0949 99.8
Land tenure extended to 30 yrs. 1998 512.3 401.0 0.0952 99.3
Arable land conversion ban  ends 1999 505.4 392.3 0.0939 98.7
2000 462.2 356.0 0.0932 98.1
2001 452.6 346.2 0.0918 95.5
2002 457.1 347.4 0.0904 97.6
2003 430.7 325.5 0.0882 96.3
* for rice, wheat, soybeans and maize
Sources:  
Population:  FAO Statistics
Total grain production:  State Statistical Bureau 
Arable land:  FAO Statistics
Self-Reliance ratio: calculated from FAO statistics
      Grain Production and Arable Land and Self-Reliance
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Second, there were two troubling aspects of food security that began to be ad-
dressed during Jiang’s time, the previously mentioned decrease in arable land and the re-
duction in grain self-reliance.  The decrease in arable land was attributable to economic 
development.  Increasing urbanization required additional housing estates for new arri-
vals as well as schools, parks and retail outlets.  Increasing manufacturing required more 
industrial parks.  Increasing economic activity required additional transportation in the 
form of roads, railroads, and airports.  Increasing TVEs required land on which to oper-
ate.  Land formerly used for grain crops was converted to pasture land to raise livestock 
to support the increasing demand for meat brought on by higher income levels.  All of 
these land-using activities decreased the amount of arable land available for crops.  Using 
FAO arable land statistics, arable land increased to 116.7 million ha. in 2003 from 103.4 
million in 1961.  But, during the same time the population nearly doubled.  And, between 
1992 and 2003, arable land decreased by 7.7 million ha.155  
This decrease of arable land was dealt with by increasing the number of harvests 
that a single piece of land could achieve (multiple cropping), a common practice in China 
(Ash and Edmonds: 1998, 855-7).  Also instrumental was the continuing adaptation and 
use of chemical fertilizers, better seed, and increased irrigation to drive yields higher.  
                                                 
155 FAO arable land calculations exclude permanent crops such as orchards, an important source of fruit. 
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Beijing wanted to keep sufficient arable land for grain production.  Provincial and local 
interests could conflict with 
Beijing’s when it came to us-
ing land for more lucrative 
purposes.  Often local land 
acquisition would occur via 
abuse of power or extra-legal 
means as previously men-
tioned that served to enrich local officials.  To combat this practice and preserve arable 
land for agriculture, the State Council and Central Committee banned arable land conver-
sion to non-agriculture land use from 1997 through 1999 (Lin and Ho: 2005, 411).  How-
ever, there remained a number of ways to transfer arable land to non-arable, both legally 
and illegally.156  
The idea of PRC of a self-reliance target for grain was first made public in the 
“White Paper on Grain Production” in 1996 and called for the PRC to maintain a mini-
mum of 95% self-reliance in grain.  As with the PGRS, this target was most likely 
brought about by the decrease in output in 1994 and in reaction to Brown’s book.  As can 
be seen in the Figure 5.5, wheat and rice and the total of the four crops being followed re-
                                                 
156 For a detailed discussion on land transfer issues in the PRC, see Lin and Ho, “The State, Land System, 
and Land Development Processes in Contemporary China” in  Annals of the Association of American Ge-
ography, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jun., 2005), pp. 411- 436.   
 
Figure 5.5
Source: FAO Statistics
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main close to self-reliance while maize increases over time and soybeans fall dramati-
cally.157  The reduction in soybean output was maintained as a choice. Relative compara-
tive advantage favored substituting rice and wheat for soybeans that could be produced 
more efficiently abroad, according to South China Agriculture University President Wen 
Simei (referenced in Wong and Huang: 2012, 122).  A more in-depth explanation comes 
from Rozelle and Huang.  They attribute the decline in soybean production to a systemic 
reduction in tariffs and trade barriers and relaxed trade restrictions related to soybeans 
starting in 1997 as a “sure sign that China has committed during the past decade to import 
crops that they do not have an advantage in producing” and one that was beneficial to 
both the urban consumer and the rural consumer, to a lesser degree (Huang & Rozelle: 
2004, 18-21, 36-7).158   
If the impact of soybeans is removed from the self-reliance calculations, the PRC 
was more than self-reliant in wheat, maize, and rice, in total, from 1997 through 2003.  In 
excess of 70 million tons were exported over that time period.  The decrease in soybean 
production was accompanied by an increase in maize production; they share the same cli-
mate conditions.  The PGRS ignored domestic competitive advantage but the re-emphasis 
on grain production did increase grain output.  In doing so and in conjunction with loos-
ening trade restrictions on soybeans, this led to opportunities to export rice and maize, 
which the PRC did extensively.    
  
                                                 
157 Self-reliance is calculated as follows:  Production divided by production plus imports minus exports.   
158 The self-reliance rate would be even lower if soybean oil was included.  Though not rising consistently, 
the soybean equivalent of soy oil imported in 1997 was 4.4 million tons and increased to 9.1 million tons in 
2003.   
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Foreign Policy and Food Security 
 
The objective of this section is to identify the impact that foreign policy has had 
on food security and the impact that food security has had on foreign policy.  To accom-
plish this, we will first examine the PRC foreign policy for this time period and the inter-
national system in which it operated.  Second, we will look at five specific foreign policy 
situations where food security can or does play a role.  Finally, we will identify the im-
pact on food security arising out of those situations or the impact on foreign policy aris-
ing from food security issues. 
 
Foreign Policy 
Jiang’s foreign policies of came in two parts.  First, while Deng was still alive 
Jiang followed Deng’s policies that facilitated maintaining peace so that economic devel-
opment could continue, continued integration into the world political and economic or-
ders, and pursuit of an independent foreign policy that Deng had started following recon-
ciliation with the USSR.  Following Deng’s death, Jiang began referring to the PRC as a 
great power (within a relatively wide list of great powers) and with that staking a claim 
that the PRC would be a responsible shaper of the international order, promote globaliza-
tion, and further military modernization (Miller & Liu: 2001, 139-45).159 
                                                 
159 Two occurrences during Jiang’s time created a degree of uncertainty as to whether the PRC military 
could cope with modern warfare and necessitated the modernization of forces.  The first incident was the 
1991 (Jiang was formally in office then) US led coalition attack against Iraq following the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.  The use of precision weapons, long-range air strikes, mobility and all the technology those en-
tailed was witnessed on TV by Beijing.  Second, the ill-fated attack in Belgrade that hit the PRC embassy 
was delivered by stealth bombers flying from Missouri.  
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The domestic aspect of foreign policy manifested through “nationalism or patriot-
ism became the only means of generating a sense of national unity” as socialism could no 
longer accomplish such (Yahuda: 2007, 342).  This was the “official” CCP top-down ver-
sion of nationalism that focused on continued economic development, national unity and 
interdependence, plus international status that could be obtained through IGOs.  It com-
peted with the bottom-up nationalism inspired by the incidents with Taiwan and the US, 
the bombing of the  PRC’s Belgrade by the US, and mild government responses to other 
real or perceived provocations by Japan and the West (Chen: 2005, 51-2).160  
Internationally, Rozman, identifying the PRC as a great power, suggests that even 
after the end of the PRC-USSR-USA strategic triangle the PRC continued to visualize the 
world in strategic, yet regional, triangles: the PRC-USA-Japan triangle and the PRC-
USA-Russia triangle.  
[The] Chinese have gravitated to the triangle as the building block to 
link existing unipolarity and eventual multipolarity. In a triangle, 
each side exerts its energy to block the other two sides from coincid-
ing, hence a triangle places a limit on unipolarity. However, the 
multipolarity that is emerging over the long term will make triangles 
less stable than they were during the Cold War, because fourth and 
fifth parties can more easily intrude (Gou & Niu quoted in Rozman: 
1999, 400).   
 
                                                 
160 The “bottom-up” nationalism was most likely encouraged by CCP inspired or facilitated public demon-
strations in response to these incidences. 
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An overriding PRC desire for a multi-polar world is demonstrated above.  Inter-
estingly, these triangles focus on Northeast Asia, an indicator that the PRC, while main-
taining that it is a great power, still prioritizes the regional view over a world view.  
There is also the recognition, from a neorealist point of view, that with multi-polarity 
comes the increased possibility of conflict as opposed to bi-polarity (Waltz: 2004, 168-
70).161  The inclusion of Japan indicates that its economic power, especially at that time, 
was a material capability that could not be ignored.  Japan could also be used by the US 
as a forward base in the event of armed conflict with the PRC.  The inclusion of Russia, 
an economic basket case at the time, reflected its military power and the long border that 
the PRC and Russia shared.   
At the beginning of the Hundred Flowers campaign, Mao called for “a hundred 
schools of thought to contend.”  This was a ruse to smoke out those not fully committed 
to Mao’s revolution, the only school of thought.  Since Mao’s death, the number of con-
tending schools of thought has grown.162  David Shambaugh examines the spectrum of 
identities and interests that influence foreign policy found in the PRC.  These identities or 
schools of thought range from Nativists at one extreme to Globalist at the other.  Briefly, 
these identities are: 1) Nativists, a collection of populists, nationalists, and Marxists that 
distrust the outside world and are extreme nationalists.  2) Realists, the dominant identity, 
                                                 
161 Waltz reasons that a uni-polar world will not last long.  Uni-polar states tend to “take on too many tasks 
beyond their own borders” and “…international politics abhors unbalanced power…some states try to in-
crease their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into bal-
ance” (Waltz: 2000, 28).  
 
162 A contributing factor to the rise of differing schools of thought was the use of think tanks and universi-
ties to provide leaders with points of view outside of the central government.  Zhao Ziyang was an early 
user of think tanks (Shambaugh: 1984, 82) 
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take the nation-state as the principal level of analysis, pursue PRC power, either hard or 
soft, and view the outside world, especially the US, pessimistically to the extent that they 
can foresee conflict with the US in the future.  3) The Major Powers school which holds 
that the major powers, the US, EU, and Russia should be the focus of attention to the det-
riment of the developing world and multilateralism.  4)  The Asia Firsters, those that wish 
to improve national security through being good neighbors, making them prosperous so 
both feel secure.  5)  The Global South School that emphasizes China’s past relationship 
with imperialism and colonialism and thus should emphasize its relations with those that 
have suffered the same.  6) The Selective Multilateralists, those that advocate expanding 
the PRC’s international involvements only to the point where national interests are in-
volved. 7) The Globalists who wish to see greater involvement in global governance but 
are limited by the PRC’s power and influence.  This group is similar to liberal institution-
alists in the West (Shambaugh: 2013, 26-43).   
The realists are the predominant school of thought, but as will be seen deviations 
from realism do appear in the PRC’s foreign policies.  What is consistent is that circum-
stances or opportunities presented by the international system, either planned or reactive, 
tactical but probably not strategic, can pull the foreign policy prescription of another 
school of thought to the forefront for the benefit of the state’s interests.  This will be seen 
in the following section. 
 
The International System 
Shortly after Jiang’s appointment, the international system underwent the most 
profound change since WWII: the USSR collapsed and in late 1991 ceased to exist.  It 
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was replaced by 15 different countries, the principal one being Russia.  Nearly overnight 
the bi-polar world that had existed since 1945 was over and replaced by a uni-polar world 
led by the US, a country with the world’s largest economy, the world’s leading military 
power, and the country that had led the creation of the West’s “world” following WWII. 
At nearly the same time the first Gulf War took place, an American-led coalition 
set up to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.  This action was approved by the UN.  The PRC ab-
stained in voting on this measure in the Security Council.163  Disregarding the capabilities 
of the Iraq military, the initial thrust had a profound effect on the world’s view of US ca-
pabilities.  It served to awaken the PRC military that it was severely lacking the ability to 
compete with the US militarily.  Such a realization served to reinforce the existence of a 
unipolar world from the PRC point of view. 
  The spread of liberalism via IGOs also influenced the international system dur-
ing Jiang’s leadership.  The WTO was created from the GATT agreement, strengthening 
the world trade regime.  Regional trade agreements expanded with the North America 
Free Trade Zone and Mercosur in South America among Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay; 
the EU took in several former East Bloc countries, and trade agreements would also 
spread in Asia.164  The liberal economic trading regime was boosted by WTO member-
ship, the success of regional trade agreements, and the PRC’s export-oriented develop-
                                                 
163 Wu points out that the PRC objected to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and objected to the use of force 
to remove Iraq.  Abstaining did not hurt relations with the US and did not violate PRC principles.  A prag-
matic solution to a difficult problem (Wu: 2001, 297-8). 
  
164 Regional trade agreements are easier to conclude as there are fewer participants to satisfy as opposed to 
worldwide agreements such as the WTO. 
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ment model.  In this section, we will examine the PRC’s foreign relations with interna-
tional organizations and the PRC’s relationship with Taiwan, its “breakaway” province.  
Regarding international organizations, we will examine three areas:  First is the PRC’s 
long march to join the WTO.  This was a key aspect of foreign policy as it further incor-
porated the PRC into the global community established by the US-led Bretton Woods 
agreements, yet was viewed by many as a threat to PRC agriculture.  Second, we will 
look at regional organizations including the post-USSR breakup and the creation of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), dominated by the PRC and Russia.  It is a re-
alist-based organization aimed at mutual security needs (anti-terror and energy) and ulti-
mately intent on keeping the US out of the area.  Third will be the PRC’s interactions 
with the ASEAN countries.  This focuses on ASEAN methods of engaging the PRC eco-
nomically and constraining it militarily, both elements of ASEAN security.   The SCO 
and ASEAN hold the potential of using agricultural trade as being a confidence builder, 
consistent trading partner, or alternative supply source for the PRC.  Shambaugh identi-
fies the time frame of the 1980s and ‘90s as one where the PRC learned and participated 
with respect to IGOs, thereby setting the stage for a more confident and outspoken IGO 
participation in the 2000s (Shambaugh: 2013, 125).        
Relations with the US are involved in each aforementioned multi-lateral and bi-
lateral relationships.  The US became the world’s only superpower, and its relationship 
with the PRC became the world’s primary bi-lateral relationship.  
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The PRC and GATT / WTO Negotiations  
GATT was initially approved by 23 countries in 1947.165  The objective was to 
achieve “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce.”166 This agreement did include agricultural prod-
ucts, but there were insufficient constraints to prevent trade-distorting activities.  The 
WTO agreement addressed those constraints by reducing distortions such as non-tariff 
barriers, eliminating types of export subsidies, and types of domestic support programs.  
The WTO also dealt with capital transfers, intellectual property, and trade in services. 
Most states are WTO members.   
After 15 years of arduous negotiations were completed, the PRC officially joined 
in December, 2001.167  Accession was a major step in the integration of the PRC into the 
                                                 
165 GATT was the tariff agreement incorporated into the International Trade Organization (ITO).  It was 
one of the Bretton Woods agreements.  The US Congress refused to ratify this agreement.  GATT substi-
tuted for the ITO by managing international trade in goods but was a generally ineffectual way of doing so 
as there was no dispute settlement aspect that could be enforced.    
 
166 GATT agreement preamble pg iii 
 
167 From the US point of view, negotiations were a two-level game.  There were the US – PRC government 
negotiations and those between the US President and the US Congress (Sen: 2003, 131) representing vari-
ous constituencies.  The PRC side could also be considered to be playing a two level game.  Below the gov-
ernment-to-government discussions, the PRC had to gain agreements from a variety of governmental con-
stituencies.  The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MOFTEC) led the negotiations with 
the US Trade Representative.  Domestically, their negotiations occurred with the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MFA) and the Bank of China as well as with various Leading Small Groups representing various 
groupings at the Politboro level as well as various industry and regional groups and those factions repre-
senting conservative and reform-minded economic points of view.  The objective of which was to gain the 
agreement of Zhu Rongji at the vice-premiere level and ultimately at the Standing Committee of the Polit-
boro (Pearson: 2001, 346-50).  The length of the negotiations obviously led to a non-uniform approach, due 
to changing personnel and the prevailing world situation, on both sides of the negotiation.       
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world economy and continuation of engagement in multilateral organizations.  This is re-
flective of the identities of Selective Multilateralists and the Globalists that Shambaugh 
identified. 
Feeney lists several benefits the PRC expected from WTO membership: 1) in-
creased trade; 2) avoiding the annual domestic US political battle over extending Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) status to the PRC; 3) ensuring gains by achieving MFN from all 
WTO signatories; 4) belonging to an institution that makes the rules, and 5) assisting in 
the economic development of the PRC as a source of information to help with its policy 
agenda and promoting and legitimate reform agenda.  The desire to obtain permanent 
MFN status is indicative of the needs of industry superseding those of agriculture.  The 
success of the manufacturing export-led development strategy made agricultural-led de-
velopment obsolete.  
The cost of joining was to require the PRC to adhere to WTO norms regarding 
trade. This necessitated lower tariffs, decentralized trading entities (allow private trade 
and allocate trade activities to private entities), limiting import substitution, phasing out 
import licensing, improving foreign market access via competitive bidding, eliminating 
export subsidies, loosening FX accessibility, and to assuring that FIEs were treated 
equally with SOEs.168  Transparency had to be increased, including full and timely dis-
closure of all trade policies, rules and regulations, pricing policies, and data releases 
(Feeney: 1994, 242).   
                                                 
168 Diminution of the role of the state in trading is the political motive favoring capitalism.   
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Entry was on “commercial terms” rather than as a developing country.  That cre-
ated obligations such as tariff reductions and internal policies that a developing country 
would not be required to meet for a longer period of time.  The costs of joining, given 
above, also included a provision that allowed other WTO members to implement emer-
gency safeguard provisions against PRC exports for 12 years should exports damage their 
economies (Lawrence: 2006, 7-8).  This was in recognition of the PRC’s abilities to dis-
rupt foreign markets with large amounts of inexpensive goods.169  Despite objections by 
the PRC, it was deemed to be a non-market economy for 15 years.  This designation per-
mitted more onerous rules to be applied in anti-dumping investigations (Halverson: 2004, 
330).  
With respect to agriculture, entry into the WTO and the agreements that required 
implementation were already trending in that direction.  The general movement towards 
marketization of agriculture was underway but with fits and starts and applicable mainly 
to non-strategic items such as horticulture products.  But with the WTO came the com-
mitment (and legal responsibility) of the PRC to abide by those commitments.  The com-
mitments fell into three general categories: market access, export subsidies, and domestic 
support programs. 
Market access came from tariff reductions, the use of tariff rate quotas (TRQ), 
and the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTB).  TRQs provide a low tariff for a specific 
amount of imports after which a higher tariff rate will apply.  A principal NTB aspect ad-
dressed was elimination of the monopoly state import and export of grains by inclusion of 
                                                 
169 A major reason for the more onerous terms of accession was the trade surplus that the PRC was running 
with the US (and would get bigger).  It was not politically acceptable to the US domestically for the PRC to 
enter the WTO as a developing country.  
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private trading companies along with a quota of trading reserved for the private compa-
nies (Huang et al: 2007, 250).  Export subsidies involve government rebates to exporters 
after each transaction.  These would no longer be allowed under the WTO.  Such rebates 
might have been advantageous in accumulating FX in the past; they were no longer 
needed in 2001.170   
Domestic support programs, common in the EU, US, and Canada are permitted 
under the WTO so long as they are not price distorting.  Generally these are either incen-
tives for non-planting of specific crops or they are related to the acreage planted, but 
never output.  The number of possible subsidies also applies to agricultural inputs, either 
direct or non-direct.  In total, these may not exceed 8.5% of the total value of a “basic ag-
ricultural product” (Huang et al: 2007, 252-3).  For developing countries, the limit is 
10%.  As with all countries, the transparency of such subsidies is not great and not neces-
sarily accurate. 
Jiang maintained: "Joining the WTO is a strategic policy decision by the Chinese 
government under the situation of economic globalization; it is identical with China's ob-
jective of reform, opening up, and establishing a socialist market economic structure.”  
Not convinced, Kim asks “why take some unprecedented sovereignty-diluting steps to 
gain WTO entry?” (Kim: 2009, 63).  The principal reason was to assure foreign market 
access for manufactured exports in order to maintain the drive towards modernization.  
                                                 
170 However, there are examples of export subsidies in corn and rice (Fuller et al: 2003, 406).  An explana-
tion for these comes from the self-reliance policies that require a large inventory to protect against poor 
harvests or other threats.  Deterioration of the grain quality over time drives down the value.  So the ques-
tion becomes are these subsidies or are they simply a realistic price for the poorer quality of the grain being 
exported? 
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Fewsmith suggests an answer to the question, citing the need for fundamental domestic 
reforms. WTO accession would permit “competitive foreign pressures to force restructur-
ing” of the SOEs and financial system (Fewsmith: 2001, 574).  Put another way, reform-
ers could not accomplish all they wanted due to conservative opposition.  Compliance 
with the rules and regulations of an IGO would force domestic changes that otherwise 
might take years to accomplish.  In rural areas, this would include facilitating labor mo-
bility and the implementation of social safety nets, both of which would assist peasants 
hurt by increased grain imports. 
 
The WTO and Food Security 
Within agriculture, the challenges and opportunities of joining the WTO are best 
summed up by Minister of Agriculture Du Qinglin:   
“We are fully aware that accession to the WTO also imposes 
great challenges to agriculture in China.  Generally speaking, major 
land-intensive agricultural products will be greatly affected.  How-
ever, due to the fact that labor-intensive products, in which the coun-
try has a comparative advantage, lack the strength to penetrate new 
markets, it is difficult to imagine that they will witness major devel-
opments in the near future.  These factors will make it more difficult 
to raise farmers’ income levels and to provide more employment op-
portunities…[via] restructuring agriculture and rural economy, in-
creasing farm income, & improving competitiveness of agricultural 
products…[to] promote quality over quantity, farmer income and 
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depredations, shift from extensive growth to methods that focus on 
sustainability and economic benefits, & shift from emphasizing do-
mestic production towards more active participation, co-operation, 
and specialization at the international level”  (OECD: 2002, 16). 
 
To an observer of the PRC agricultural system, particularly as it applied to grain, 
a comparison with the world grain-producing powers would lead the rational observer to 
suspect that the PRC farmer would be unable to compete.  After all, given the average 
farm size of about 0.6 ha. and operated by a family with little if any machinery compared 
to multi-hundred acre farms (or more) using advanced equipment, the comparison was 
either comical or sad.  Accession to the WTO would seem to doom the PRC grain farmer.    
Agriculture based on comparative advantage did flourish.  Labor-intensive crops 
such as fruits and vegetables had a comparative advantage that land-intensive crops did 
not.  The WTO served this type of agriculture well just as it did for manufactured prod-
ucts. 
Membership in the WTO did not remove the use of trade as a political tool.  The 
PRC still could buy and sell grain to whatever country with which they could success-
fully conclude an agreement.  The combination of the TRQs, in-quota tariffs, and the 
amount and direction of private trading quotas serve as an indication of the PRC’s rela-
tive need to control strategic grains and comparative advantage (see Table 5.3).  The 
more dependent on imports, the more the state controlled trading.  With wheat, a major 
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import, the state controls 90% of the trading.  There is comparative advantage with spe-
cific types of rice, and therefore non-state traders control half of the trade.171  Soybeans 
and soy oil reflect the absence of comparative advantage and dependence on the market 
to secure domestic needs.  Maize was becoming increasingly competitive and therefore 
had export potential.  Private trading was a method of decreasing state involvement, but 
private traders could also be influenced to follow the desires of the state.172  The TRQ 
served to limit imports as out-of-TRQ rates are too high.173  Further, the 2002 TRQ  
 
amounts, measured as a percentage of 2001 imports are, 1.1% for wheat, 12.0% for maize 
and 1.0% for rice.  The impact of private trading is limited at best as of the time of acces-
sion to the WTO. 
                                                 
171 It should be noted that the percentage of rice production that enters world trade is only 5%, much less 
than many grains. 
 
172 This is especially true with grain as the state trading company, COFCO, often served private traders as 
procurers of domestic grain for export. 
 
173 The out of quota tariff rate was the highest that could be charged (the “bound” rate according to PRC / 
WTO regulations.)  In the event that imports in excess of the TRQ were needed, the bound rate could be 
lowered as the PRC saw fit. 
Table 5.3
       Post-WTO TRQ's and Trade Quotas
    Quota for non-State
TRQ (millions of tons) Tariff Rate % Enterprises %
2002 2005 In-Quota Above Quota 2000 to 2005
Wheat 7.3 9.6 1 65 10
Maize 4.5 7.2 1 65   25 - 40
Rice 2.6 5.3 1 65 50
Soybean Oil 1.7 3.2 9 121   50 - 90
Note: Soybean import tariff was 3% beginning in 2000, down from 114%
Source: Huang et al: 2007, 251
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While WTO accession occurred during Jiang’s time in office, there was no dis-
cernible change in agricultural trade in grains in the two years following.  Fruit and vege-
table exports increased 39% and imports by 71% in value terms from 2002 through 2004, 
an indication of the WTO membership increasing trade.  The positive balance of trade in 
fruit and vegetables increased to $5 billion from $3.6 billion, an indication of the PRC’s 
comparative advantage in labor intensive agricultural products (FAO Statistical Data 
Base). 
 
The Breakup of the USSR 
The breakup of the USSR created three new countries on the PRC’s western bor-
der, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  The PRC organized the Shanghai Five, the 
new bordering states and Russia, for purposes of confidence-building and disarmament 
along their borders in 1996.  In addition to border disputes that were promptly settled, 
these five countries plus Uzbekistan, which joined in 2001, formed the SCO.174  The PRC 
and Russia are the principal parties in the SCO, a realist reaction to a uni-polar world.  
Tang views the SCO as the result of NATO pushing eastward into the former USSR, the 
strengthening of the US – Japan alliance, and a newly uni-polar world where both felt a 
sense of unease.  While Moscow and Beijing had reason to move closer together, there 
were also reasons not to move too close.  First, there were historical differences that were 
not too far in the past.  Second there was the sparsely inhabited Russian Far East sitting 
next to an over-populated PRC and where PRC traders were making significant inroads.  
                                                 
174 Blank writes that since the borders were established there has been “repeated instances of China ‘rectify-
ing’ these border treaties, primarily, but not exclusively, with Central Asian states, to reclaim previously 
conceded territory.”  It has been successful with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.   
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Third, Russia was a Eurasian-based state but one that faced west first and was unsure of 
where its future would be.  Russia supplied advanced arms to the PRC (that could be used 
against Russia) but also did the same with India, an historical antagonist of Beijing 
(Tang: 2000, 361-4).    
All had common interests in Central Asia. The PRC was in need of energy 
sources that Russia and Central Asia could provide.175  All wanted to control radical Is-
lam.  Russia and the PRC were concerned over separatist movements of domestic minori-
ties.  In the case of the PRC, it is the Uighers, ethnic Turkic inhabitants of Xinjiang.  An 
unknown number have separatist leanings that have the potential to coincide with those 
Uighers residing in new SCO states.  Following the 9/11 attacks, interests included coun-
ter-terrorism.  The US move into Afghanistan and the leasing of bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan provided both Beijing and Moscow with the common goal of getting rid of 
those bases and US influence as soon as possible.  Without those bases and with a US 
pullout from Afghanistan, geography would keep the US out of landlocked Central Asia.  
Both also acted to offer economic incentives to counter US influence so as to defuse the 
potential of “color revolutions” that had occurred in some former USSR states and was a 
possibility in Kyrgyzstan (Goldsmith: 2006, 4).176   The principles of the SCO bear a 
striking resemblance to the PRC’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.  
                                                 
175 The PRC started to purchase natural gas from Central Asia in 2008 and to construct a gas pipeline from 
Russia in 2015.  For Russia, this was a step towards Asia following European concerns over energy de-
pendencies from Russia and backlash over Russian activities in Ukraine.   
 
176 The US requested “observer status” with the SCO and was rebuffed.  However, other countries within 
the region have been granted the same.  Such a position against the US keeps the US at bay in the back-
yards of the PRC and Russia.  India and Pakistan were granted admittance to the SCO in 2015 and are ex-
pected to join in 2016. 
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Russia, Central Asia, and Food Security 
The demise of the USSR in 1991 and the creation of the SCO in 1996 presented 
the PRC with an opportunity to use agricultural trade to create goodwill with its new 
neighbors.  The former East Bloc diminished into a minor market for rice, maize, and 
soybeans.  There were two reasons for this reduction.  First, was the reduction in grain 
output that led to the PGRS.  Second, the USSR (its successor states / regions) and other 
East Bloc countries had established trading arrangements and suffered financially as they 
tried to reorient their economies.  There was a slight recovery beginning in 1996 but only 
to about 20% of the pre-breakup volumes.  
The USSR had been a major buyer of maize since 1985.  Following the breakup, 
Russia continued to purchase until 1995 when PRC exports to all states fell close to zero.  
(Figure 5.6) Subsequent purchases were inconsistent and small volumes.  From 1992 to 
1995, the new Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan bought 
maize but that ended also due to a decrease in PRC output.  Following the implementa-
tion of PGRS, shipments of rice became a potential means of confidence-building with 
SCO states but primarily with Russia. There are several reasons that the grain trade has 
not flourished between the PRC and the new Central Asian states and with Russia.  First, 
there is the issue of geography.  Central Asia and the PRC are divided by mountainous 
terrain.  Interstate transportation is underdeveloped.  Central Asia and the populous areas 
of Russia are a long way from the prime growing areas for grain in the PRC.  This brings 
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other possible suppliers into competition even though the PRC is a bordering state.177  
Second, PRC concerns over radical Islam entering the PRC from Central Asia and con-
cerns over independence-minded local Uighurs may dampen any government desire to 
facilitate trade.  Third, competition from Vietnam, Thailand, India, and the former USSR 
republic of Kazakhstan for the rice Russian market.  However, agricultural exports to 
SCO states did continue for non-grain items.  Fruit and vegetable exports to Russia, espe-
cially, and the other SCO states jumped beginning in 2001.178 
On the import side, wheat imports plummeted starting in 1997 following the in-
crease in output brought on by the PGRS.  By 1994, Russia had become a major exporter 
as had Ukraine, a former part on the USSR.  Interestingly, neither became a supplier to 
                                                 
177 Within the PRC, comparative advantage by crop and region affects trade possibilities.  Maize and soy-
beans are produced least efficiently in the western PRC, which would logically reduce its export potential 
(Fang & Beghin: 2003, 192).  However, transport costs also must be taken into consideration, which could 
offset inefficient production and allow export to land-locked Central Asia states. 
 
178 During the last three years of the USSR, annual apple imports from the PRC averaged 42 thousand tons 
per year.  The first 4 years of the Russian Federation, the average was 71 thousand tons per year.  Starting 
in 1996, the start date of the SCO, Russian imports have averaged 123 thousand tons per year.  Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan have averaged purchasing 58 million tons, annually, since 1996.  Previously, they were very 
minor purchasers of apples. 
Figure 5.6 Figure 5.7
Source: FAO Statistics Source: FAO Statistics
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the PRC.  Most likely this was a function of transportation costs, either by rail or ship.  
Russian wheat markets tended to run from Central Asia to the Mediterranean. 
The breakup of the USSR led to major changes in international politics.  It neither 
offered the PRC a serious opportunity to gain influence through the sale or purchase of 
grains nor to improve domestic food security nor to earn FX from the former USSR.  In 
any case, it was the SCO agreement that would carry much more influence than the grain 
trade could provide.  However, it was during this time that rice exports to Africa allowed 
the PRC to earn political points with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through selling rice ra-
ther than fighting proxy wars with the Soviets.  Between 1993 and 2003, rice exports to 
SSA were second only, in volume, to the 2nd Ring.  (See Figure 5.7) Most likely, this was 
a result of the “going out” strategy in combination with the PRC’s traditional interest in 
the Global South. Agricultural investment in Africa will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter.  
 
ASEAN Agreements and Trade 
The PRC had been a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
since 1991.  This regional group, that includes nations from both sides of the Pacific 
Ocean, has been marginally successful in discussing economic issues, ecological issues, 
and in promoting, with minor success, a reduction in tariffs.   
In 1992 the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) was created with the goal of 
increasing trade within ASEAN and in creating a larger economic entity “to meet the eco-
nomic challenge of China’s attractiveness to foreign investments…Without this, the 
ASEAN countries will be left out by international investors” (Lee Kwan Yew quoted in 
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Lincoln: 2004, 169).  ASEAN was concerned that its economic success, based on an ex-
port-led development strategy, was seriously being threatened not only by the PRC’s own 
export-led development but also by the size of its domestic market - 20% of the world’s 
population.  The combination of export opportunities from the PRC and the opportunity 
to enter the domestic market made the PRC very enticing for foreign investors, often-
times at the expense of ASEAN states.   
Lurking in the background was the PRC claim of sovereignty over the vast major-
ity of the South China Sea (SCS) and the islands therein.179  The claim, based on histori-
cal occupation of the islands, is dubious at best.  The area contains rich fishing grounds 
and potential oil and natural gas reserves, two resources that the PRC needs.  To maxim-
ize the potential for the PRC, the claims of sovereignty over various islands, shoals, and 
reefs would permit each marine structure to have a territorial sea of 12 miles and, in the 
case of islands, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 miles.  The disputes centered 
mainly over the ownership of the Spratly Islands in the SCS between ASEAN states, pri-
marily Vietnam and the Philippines, and the PRC.  
The Asian Regional Forum (ARF), initiated by ASEAN in 1994, was designed as 
a security dialogue among all major powers in the Asia Pacific region.  While none of the 
ASEAN countries could be considered major powers, as a whole they did carry weight, 
especially in economic matters.  It was in this time period that the US was perceived to be 
                                                 
179 This claim was originally made by Taiwan and then taken up by the PRC.  In 1974 the PRC took the 
Paracel Islands from South Vietnam a year prior to PRC ally North Vietnam taking over South Vietnam.   
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in decline and losing interest in East Asia.180  At the same time, the PRC was rapidly ex-
panding economically as well as militarily, including at the expense of ASEAN states in 
the SCS.  As a result, a power vacuum was being created, and the PRC would most likely 
fill it.  The economic asymmetry advantage the PRC held over ASEAN also applied mili-
tarily. 
He Kai suggests that the ARF was a deliberate attempt by ASEAN at institutional 
balancing in order to maintain the economic advantages that engagement with the PRC 
could bring while keeping PRC military power at bay.  Institutional balancing is a combi-
nation of neorealist balancing, hard power, and neoliberal interdependence.  By using the 
ASEAN framework, ASEAN members were able to create a grouping, ARF, and create 
and utilize the agenda of the new grouping to achieve its ends through soft power balanc-
ing within the institution that included the both US and PRC so that its security concerns 
were addressed as were its economic interests.  He Kai maintains that institutional bal-
ancing is a realist strategy that reacts to the distribution of capabilities and strong eco-
nomic interdependence.  In this case, the objectives of ASEAN were achieved through 
inclusion of the problematic parties, the US and PRC, binding them to institutional norms 
and rules.  With both the US and PRC as members of the ARF, the US was kept involved 
in the region and ASEAN was able to negotiate with the PRC over the SCS islands.  The 
                                                 
180 The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo led to the closure of the US air base located in the immediate vicinity and 
the subsequent closure of the navy base at Subic Bay at the request of the Philippine government.  The dis-
missal of the US “big brother” from the immediate area removed a constraint for the PRC.  Years later, 
Philippines President Macapagal-Arroyo stated “we are glad to have China as our big brother in the region” 
(Greene: 2007, A21).  This statement did nothing to stop the PRC activities within the Philippine SCS 
claim and could be interpreted as a statement of subordination as a tributary state.     
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Treaty of Amity between ASEAN and the PRC established the need for peaceful settle-
ment of SCS issues and provided ASEAN with legal and moral principle on which to 
stand (He Kai: 2008, 500-4).181  
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led to a steep decline in the currencies of a num-
ber of Asian states, many of which were competitors of the PRC for exports.  There was a 
natural temptation for the PRC to devalue its currency to maintain a competitive balance 
with other Asian exporters.  The decision was made not to do so.  The PRC had devalued 
its currency to 8.28 / USD in 1994.182  1997 was a time of high inflation in the PRC.  A 
devaluation would have increased the cost of imports, offsetting part of the export bene-
fits derived from any devaluation.  Finally, the PRC was enjoying a strong balance of 
payments; any increase resulting from devaluation would have been less than acceptable 
with trading partners and competitors.   
The decision not to devalue was received quite well by the Asian countries suffer-
ing from the crisis.  If devaluation of the RMB did occur, it might have led to another 
round of competitive devaluations.  The PRC also contributed to the IMF backed bail-out 
funds for Indonesia and Thailand and avoided the debates over the IMF proposals on how 
to address the issues.  Further, it accepted IMF oversight of regional (SE Asia) macroeco-
nomic policies, a departure from a strictly independent foreign policy (Zha: 2002, 65-6).  
The PRC was not acting as the only member of G-1. 
                                                 
181 The Treaty has not stopped the PRC from exercising its will in the SCS but it may have slowed it down. 
 
182 The PRC had maintained two currencies for a number of years; Foreign Exchange Certificates (FEC) 
were used for foreign transactions and for purchases of foreigners in the PRC at a rate of about 5.3 / USD.  
The rate for the RMB, used for domestic transactions by PRC citizens and organizations, was 8.28 / USD.  
When the FEC was eliminated, the unified rate became 8.28 / USD. 
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Meanwhile, the US took a hands-off approach to the Asian financial crisis and 
backed IMF prescriptions to address the crisis.  The harsh remedies proposed by the IMF 
were not well received by suffering countries, Malaysia in particular.  “…the crisis re-
vealed the vulnerability of Asian economies caused by their over-dependence on the US 
and US-led international financial institutions” (He Kai: 2008, 508).  This led to the crea-
tion of the “ASEAN+3, a regional grouping of ASEAN states plus the PRC, South Korea, 
and Japan.  Each had been hurt to some extent by the Asian financial crisis.  The first 
near-term achievement was a currency swap arrangement among members that would 
hopefully stop or reduce another currency crisis.183  He Kai looks at the ASEAN+3 as an 
example of exclusion in institutional balancing.  “…ASEAN states intend to use the 
ASEAN+3 to emphasize their relevance in the region and hopefully to increase their bar-
gaining power with the US and the West [through exclusion…and] China plays an indis-
pensable role in strengthening ASEAN+3 cooperation. For China, ASEAN+3 is not only 
an exclusive institutional balancing strategy to undermine US influence in the region, but 
also an inclusive institutional balancing policy to further engage ASEAN” (He Kai: 2008, 
508-9).  
Increasing ties with SE Asia, reminiscent of the tributary system, would meet the 
needs of the Asia First, Realists, Selective Multilateralists, and Global South foreign pol-
icy advocates.  The SCS claims made would increase the resources of the PRC in fish and 
potentially energy.  Securing these resources has taken place through using military 
                                                 
183 The ASEAN+3 would evolve into the East Asia Summit in 2005. 
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power to take and fortify shoals and reefs in the SCS at the expense of states unable to 
compete with the PRC economically or militarily, an example of realist power.  
  
The Second Ring 
The Second Ring was becoming more and more important as a trading partner for 
PRC grains.  This is consistent with the gravity theory of trade that maintains states trade 
most frequently with their neighbors and particularly with those of relative economic 
size.  The PRC was much larger than its neighbors when the entire economies are com-
pared but they are much closer together when measured on a per capita basis.  In terms of 
the grain trade, trade with neighbors would be expected as the diets would not vary to a 
great extent, especially with regard to basic grains. 
The soybean decision cut PRC exports of soybeans from a high of nearly 1.1 mil-
lion tons to about 20% of that amount after 1996.  Indonesia and Malaysia, former big 
buyers, essentially disappeared.  North Korea continued with about the same amount per 
year while South Korea began buying an amount similar to the North.  Japan continued to 
be a major buyer but on a decreasing scale.  Sales to Japan, denominated in yen, would be 
attractive to the PRC due to its appreciation potential. 
A major contributor to PRC grain trade has been South Korea.  Since the initial 
shipments via Hong Kong, South Korea became the largest Second Ring buyer of PRC 
maize, surpassing Japan.  The post-1996 boom in exports was taken up primarily by the 
Second Ring states.  By 2003, exports of maize to the Second Ring were just under 14 
million tons.  This increase in exports hurt other suppliers.  Thailand, Argentina, and the 
US were the victims losing shipments to Malaysia.  The US lost volume on shipments to 
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South Korea in the years 1992-4 and 1998-2003.  There is no need to cry for Argentina or 
the US as both would reassume their favored positions in Malaysia and Korea, respec-
tively, in 2004.  Thailand did not recover. 
It is worth noting that according to FAO statistics, the PRC sold a total of 5.78 
million tons of foodstuffs including four million tons of rice, soybeans, maize and wheat 
to North Korea during the period of 1994 through 2004, the period of its famine.  In con-
trast, during the same period for the same products, South Korea bought in excess of 39 
million tons.184  However, the PRC shipped 1.44 million tons of declared food aid to the 
DPRK between 1996 and 2004 plus an additional 510 thousand tons in 2005 (Choo: 
2008, 352).185  The food aid was made in the self-interest of the PRC.  Worsening famine 
and economic conditions in the DPRK potentially threatened the PRC for two main rea-
sons.  First, there were the same reasons that they entered the Korean War; the DPRK 
continued to serve as a buffer state between the PRC and South Korea. Now, as then, the 
collapse of the DPRK would certainly lead to a takeover of the North by the South and its 
contingent of US troops.  Second, it could cause an exodus of DPRK refugees into the 
PRC.  The PRC wanted neither.   
In 1994, the PRC occupied Mischief Reef in the SCS, a natural marine structure 
also claimed by the Philippines.  The SCS dispute seems to have had no effect on the 
                                                 
184 While the PRC was a wheat importer in all years since 1960, there were times when they had an excess, 
and it would be sold on the international market.  The excess was caused by over-importing, more than ex-
pected production, too much inventory, or a combination of thereof. 
 
185 As the PRC was a net importer of wheat and soybeans during this time, the aid in these products was 
essentially bought from third countries and then donated to the DPRK.  Food aid does not have to be from 
food surplus countries only (Uvin: 1992, 298). 
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grain trade between the Philippines and the PRC.  In preparation for poor harvests due to 
an El Nino weather effect in 1997, the Philippines began importing rice and maize from 
the PRC.186  From 1997 to 2000, it imported 1.8 million tons of rice and 667 thousand 
tons of maize.187  For maize, this reflects a decrease in Philippine domestic production 
from 1995-98 and a dramatic falloff in rice production in 1998.  The trade in anticipation 
of severe weather and the subsequent shipments gave the PRC an opportunity to lend a 
“helping hand” to a state in need and potentially reduce animosity resulting from the Mis-
chief Reef issue, an Asia First response to the Nativist and Realist schools of thought.  A 
crude measure of the prices paid by Manila for PRC maize puts them at the high end of 
prices paid by other 2nd Ring countries, though less than the US prices for some years.188   
The SCS was also a point of contention with Vietnam.  In 1994-6, both Thailand 
and Vietnam were sources of rice for the PRC.  Thailand is the world’s leading exporter 
of rice, and Vietnam is a major exporter.  The decision to purchase 700 thousand tons of 
rice from Vietnam can be seen as a reflection of improved relations between the two.  Vi-
etnam had unilaterally withdrawn troops from Cambodia in 1989.  Relations were nor-
malized between the two in 1991 (Womack: 1996, 80).  It therefore follows that when 
rice imports were needed two years later, purchasing from Vietnam was a method of re-
                                                 
186 The Philippines also bought rice from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand (The Filipino Express, 
11/23/1996, pp. 33). 
 
187 FAO import figures from the Philippines are inconsistent with the export figures of the PRC.  I have 
opted to use the PRC figures. 
 
188 Prices are determined by dividing value by quantity (FOB PRC) based on FAO statistics.  There is no 
indication of grain quality in these prices. 
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ward for the Cambodian withdrawal, the normalization of relations, as well as to keep Vi-
etnam from drifting too close to the US.  In the cases of the Philippines and Vietnam and 
the SCS, we see a realist application of relative PRC power to continue slicing away the 
SCS for its own use.  Simultaneously, the PRC extended help to the Philippines and sent 
positive signals to Vietnam.  This was an indication that the Asia First and Global South 
schools of thought also had influence.    
 
The PRC and Taiwan 
Jiang Zemin added his stamp to Deng’s Taiwan policy of reunification through 
the “one country two systems” approach by way of his Eight Points Initiative to draw 
Taiwan into the PRC, an overriding goal of the CCP.  Yet, issues continued with the US 
over Taiwan.  Jiang’s initiative followed US President Clinton’s decision to “upgrade” 
unofficial relations with Taiwan in September 1994 that had followed the sale of F-16’s 
to Taiwan in 1992 (Tylers: 9/11/1994, 14).  Further, the election of Lee Teng-hui in 1993, 
the first directly elected and non-KMT president of Taiwan, increased the independence 
rhetoric in Taiwan.  This was manifested by Taiwan’s interest in joining or rejoining vari-
ous international organizations the PRC had forced it to leave, including the WTO.  The 
PRC thought the idea of one China was devolving into a one China one Taiwan policy.  
Jiang’s initiative was rather mild suggesting the start of a dialogue to iron out differences 
(Swaine: 2001, 313-9). 
 In early 1995, the Clinton administration gave President Lee permission to visit 
Lee’s university alma mater in the US.  As Lee was the current Republic of China (ROC) 
president, this was viewed in Beijing as another ROC – US action designed to counteract 
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the one China policy of the US.  The PRC reacted swiftly with diplomacy and with mili-
tary threats.  First was a propaganda campaign attacking the Taiwan independence move-
ment and a cancellation of the second round of talks between the PRC and ROC that 
grew out of the Eight Points.  Second, the PRC ambassador was recalled from the US, 
and high-level military talks between the US and PRC were cancelled.  Third, a diplo-
matic campaign directed at Asia, Europe, and Russia was initiated to reduce US diplo-
matic leverage in this matter and to reassure Taiwanese businessmen that their invest-
ments in the PRC, of which there were many, were safe. 
The military threats, coming between the first and second diplomatic initiatives, 
featured war games simulating an amphibious landing on Taiwan and missile tests.  The 
missile tests were quite provocative.  Missiles were fired that overflew Taiwan or landed 
close to the island (Swaine: 2001, 320-1), and that prompted PRC warnings to commer-
cial aircraft to avoid the area.  The US responded to the PRC intimidations by stationing 
naval forces at either end of the Taiwan Straits, a counter intimidation. 
No physical blows were struck by the PRC against Taiwan nor between the US 
and the PRC.  However, Swaine maintains that the results of this crisis demonstrated to 
all that the PRC would use force against Taiwan if necessary, that Taiwan was vulnerable 
to PRC political and / or military pressure, and that Taiwan was vulnerable economically 
to PRC threats as indicated by the degree of capital flight.  Yet, it failed to reduce Tai-
wanese domestic support for Lee, though it produced verbal rebukes of Lee by some of 
his party associates. It led to a vigorous US response and gave additional strength to pro-
Taiwan members of the US Congress, and disturbed or angered other Asian countries.  
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Subsequently, the PRC attempted to encourage the US to bring Taiwan to the negotiating 
table under a one-China umbrella (Swaine: 2001, 326-9).189   
From the PRC point of view, the issues with Taiwan were not international; Tai-
wan was a breakaway province and therefore an internal affair.  The PRC foreign policy 
guidelines (the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) preclude interference in the in-
ternal affairs of another state. From its perspective, the US was interfering in PRC do-
mestic affairs.  Yet, as mentioned, this is not the first time that the US had interfered; sell-
ing arms to a breakaway province could be nothing more than internal interference, there-
fore strengthening the PRC’s realist view of the world and its relations with Russia.   
 
Taiwan and Repercussions with the US 
If the PRC had wanted to deliberately punish the US for its actions during the Lee 
saga and the Taiwan Straits intimidation, the grain trade was not going to be an effective 
method.  At first blush, it appears that wheat imports from the US were cut back substan-
tially (See Figure 5.8).  In 1995 and 1996 the US shipped just over six million tons of 
wheat to the PRC; for the next seven years only 1.4 million tons were shipped.  While 
this appears to be penalizing the US for its actions it was not.  Total PRC wheat imports 
for those seven years (1997-2003) only amounted to 6.3 million tons.  The US market 
share fell, but all suppliers lost business.  Canada, the principal supplier, lost about half of 
                                                 
189 Swaine also points out that Beijing could not count on the US for a consistent one China policy or not to 
sell additional arms to Taiwan due to the unpredictability of US policy.  This concern is evidenced by the 
March, 1986,  invitation by US Senator Jesse Helms to Lee Teng-hui, at the height of the crisis, to visit 
Washington and meet other Republican Congressmen who had kicked off the Lee issue by “forcing” Clin-
ton to approve the visa (South China Morning Post, 3/28/1996, 20) 
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its average shipments in 1995 and 1996 over the following seven years.  The same oc-
curred with maize.  The US shipped five million tons to the PRC in 1995 but only 600 
thousand tons over the next eight years.  The reduction of maize and wheat imports was a 
function of increased PRC output following the implementation of the PGRS.  Maize be-
came a major grain export for the PRC through 2003.   
With regard to wheat, the need to import was significantly reduced from 1997 
through 2003.  There were no other sources that could supply what might be needed in 
the future but the US and its major allies.  So again, the reduction in imports was not a 
deliberate attempt to punish the US, but simply a function of improved domestic out-
put.190   
Soybeans were a different story. (See Figure 5.9)  From 1994 to 2004, annual im-
ports grew to more than 20 million tons from 50,000 tons.  The US market share fell but 
it steadily shipped more each year, reaching 10 million tons in 2004, hardly a punish-
ment.  The biggest change in the share of the PRC soybean market was enjoyed by Ar-
gentina and Brazil.  Both previously had been intermittent suppliers.  By 2004, each had 
shipped for ten consecutive years, with roughly equal market shares, reaching a combined 
12 million tons in 2003.   
 
                                                 
190 Russia was an obvious possibility to supply wheat to the PRC but it had its own customer base as men-
tioned.  Its customers would not appreciate having to obtain wheat from the US or Canada given the in-
creased transport cost versus nearby Russia. 
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The cases of soybeans and wheat are very similar in regard to how the PRC dealt 
with soybeans, a situation with anticipated inadequate domestic production, and wheat 
where there was a sharp increase in domestic production.  With soybeans, the PRC in-
creased its purchases from the US while upgrading relations with Brazil and Argentina 
through increased and consistent purchases.  In addition to expanding the supply base, 
this action also diversified growing regions and gave the importing country additional ar-
bitrage opportunities for a fungible product.   
With wheat, the PRC already had a diversified supply base geographically but one 
that was by and large of the same foreign policy interests.  The downturn in import needs 
was met by reducing imports from the three major and consistent suppliers, Canada, US, 
and Australia, and ceasing imports from minor suppliers such as France.  While the per-
centage of the three major suppliers volume varied to an extent, the rank order remained 
constant, as given above.  Each major supplier suffered equally; thereby, the PRC showed 
no favoritism in anticipation of maintaining the relationship with all three. 
Figure 5.8                       Figure 5.9
Source: FAO Statistics                     Source: FAO Statistics
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There was no political decision to punish the US over its behavior regarding the 
Taiwan issues of the time in a way that involved the grain trade.  The increase in domes-
tic output removed that as a method of punishment with respect to wheat and maize.  For 
soybeans, imports from the US increased as they would have to, given the decisions al-
ready made by the PRC plus the US role in the international soybean market.  The in-
creased participation by the other two major suppliers was a rational diversification of the 
source of supply. 
It should be noted that Taiwan agreed to purchase maize from the PRC beginning 
in 2002.  Subsequent purchases were made in 2003-4 and 2008-9.  Taiwan had refused to 
purchase maize from the PRC for 50 years (China Daily: 11/12/2002).  The decision to 
do so was the result of labor unrest in US west coast ports.  The choice of the PRC (as a 
lower price supplier than the US) may have been a positive outgrowth of Jiang’s Eight 
Points. 
 
Expanding Horizons? 
In 1996, Jiang made his first public pronouncement that PRC firms should “go 
out”.  Going out meant that “We should grant to enterprises and to science and technol-
ogy research institutes the power to engage in foreign trade, and we should encourage en-
terprises to expand their investments abroad and their transnational operations” (Jiang 
quoted in Shambaugh: 2013, 175).  This statement was directed at the SOE sector and it 
was hoped that by increasing the foreign exposure they would be able to become stronger 
international companies in more modern industries rather than simply companies pur-
chasing natural resources to make up for the PRC’s absence of certain endowments.  In 
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the “going out” strategy, there is something for each of the identities that Shambaugh 
noted.  Even the nativists could support it as it would eventually lead to a stronger state.  
“Going out” will weigh heavily in the next chapter and involve purchases of foreign food 
and seed companies, investments in foreign agricultural lands, and agricultural assistance 
to Africa.   
The PRC had had a strong interest in Africa since the days of Bandung.  In 1995 it 
had trade with Africa totaling about 5 million USD, mostly in oil.  Rice also played a 
role.  Between 1994 and 2004, the PRC shipped nearly 6 million tons to SSA.  From 
2000 through 2009, SSA imported more rice from the PRC than any other region.  As in 
Deng’s time, the vast majority went to Cote d’Ivoire, a country where the PRC had num-
ber of type projects.  The next chapter will look closer at the PRC’s efforts in Africa to 
improve food security, directly for Africa and indirectly for the PRC.  After all, any im-
provement in food output increases the world supply, and, as Brown’s book pointed out, 
the world supply is ultimately what matters most. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this section, we wanted to determine whether food security was achieved for 
the PRC during Jiang’s time as CCP General Secretary.  Success can be via self-reliance, 
a situation where all grain is supplied domestically, or through self-sufficiency, a combi-
nation of self-reliance and available FX to purchase what cannot be produced domesti-
cally.  Self-sufficiency requires trade with the rest of the world, and therefore requires a 
foreign policy that facilitates the state’s interest in achieving it.  Self-sufficiency brings 
with it measures of interconnectedness or interdependency, and whether the absence of 
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self-reliance presents an existential threat.  But first, it needs to be determined whether 
the international system presents a situation as to when food should be considered a stra-
tegic good.  
Grain had been a strategic good from the beginning of the PRC.  It was the bottle-
neck in increasing industrialization.  Grain production increases have come through a 
combination of incentives (land redistribution and HRS) and coercion (PGRS).  Together 
they brought forth significant increases in output.  Fear of the inability to feed its own cit-
izens has continued, even with the one-child policy.  The PGRS served to limit peasant 
choices on what crop to plant and how much to plant in order to address food inflation.  
This policy led to an increase in grain output beginning in 1996 (but at the deliberate ex-
pense of soybeans) and to an explicit statement by the PRC that it could not be 100% 
self-reliant in wheat, rice, maize, and soybeans, only 95%.  The combination of the HRS 
and the Jiang-inspired PGRS put the PRC in a food security position unseen since the on-
set of collectivization.   
Starting in 1996, the case can be made that grain was not a strategic good.  The 
rationale for this is as follows:  First, the success of the PGRS, through Jiang’s term, 
demonstrated that the PRC was capable of compelling a change in what and how much 
grain to plant to offset production shortfalls and inflation, and that it could be accom-
plished rather quickly.  Wheat imports declined from an average of nearly 6.9 million 
tons annually from 1994 through 1998 to less than a tenth of that amount annually from 
1999 through 2003.  Maize again became the leading grain export. This decreased sensi-
tivity and vulnerability of other states to affect food security in the PRC.  Second, the 
success of the export-led development strategy provided sufficient FX to allow, without 
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sacrificing other spending options, a move to self-sufficiency from self-reliance as was 
done in the case of soybeans.  By 2004, the PRC was running nearly a $24 billion trade 
surplus with the rest of the world, seven times that of 1994, and it would continue to 
grow.  This was more than enough to become self-sufficient in soybeans.191 
Third, the decision to rely on soybean imports converted the PRC from a minor 
exporter into one relying on 20 million tons of imports by 2003, a quantity that would tri-
ple by 2012.  To avoid PRC dependence on a single supplier of soybeans, the US, Brazil 
and Argentina each accounted for about a 50%, 25%, 25% ratio, respectively, of total 
soybean imports.192  Fourth, rice and wheat, the primary grains for human consumption, 
increased in output making the PRC essentially independent of the rest of the world for 
these key products.193  Finally, while the international system was described as relatively 
benign, there were still areas of disagreement between the PRC and the US, still the uni-
polar power.  In the event that military conflict were to arise in East Asia, it would most 
likely be a conflict of choice for the PRC and involve the US.  Therefore, they should be 
able to prepare for all potential shortages in goods that would become strategic in the 
                                                 
191 Though not part of this study, barley imports followed a path similar to soybeans. 
 
192 This can also be seen as part of South-South Cooperation (SSC), an FAO-facilitated organization to re-
duce food insecurity and poverty in developing countries.  In South America, all countries other than Bra-
zil, Uruguay, Chile, and French Guiana are host countries (receiving assistance) while Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Chile are providers of assistance.  The PRC is active in Africa as a provider state.  Trading activities be-
tween Southern Hemisphere states are generally referred to as south – south cooperation whether the FAO 
is involved or not. 
     
193 For rice, exports were greater than imports from 1997 to 2003.  Wheat imports from 1997 to 2003 were 
only 0.88% of production and that dropped to 0.63% from 1999 to 2003.  In total, from 1997 to 2003, rice 
exports exceeded wheat imports by about 1.4 million tons per year. 
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event of conflict.194  However, any conflict that would potentially involve the US was un-
likely as it would require Jiang to abandon Deng’s strategy of peace and development, 
nearly an unthinkable turn of events.  
Is grain still a strategic good or was the 1996-2004 time frame simply a respite 
from a never-ending task to assure food security, especially in grain?  In a world with a 
benign international system, it is reasonable to sustain food security through international 
trade.  Sensitivity remains but is generally in the areas of the impact of poor harvests 
overseas on domestic inflation.  What is not addressed in declaring that grain is not a stra-
tegic good is what will happen in the future.  The competition for arable land is a battle 
that will continue and intensify.  The number of mouths to feed continues to rise despite 
the one-child policy.  Environmental degradation is an ever-increasing issue.  All of 
which will further strain domestic output per capita.  At the highest levels of government, 
the overall increase in grain output cannot be considered as anything but a temporary 
condition.  After all, the one-child policy was the securitization of the population increase 
that occurred to improve the long-term viability of the domestic food supply from vulner-
ability.  Diversification of the soybean supply by supplier and geography was a supply 
strategy (or tactic in food security strategy) of common sense and comparative advantage.  
The increased emphasis on human food, wheat and rice, as opposed to animal feed, corn 
and soybeans, improved human food security.195 When looking forward, grain remains a 
                                                 
194 As seen during Mao’s time, Canada, Australia, and France would serve their own best interests by ex-
porting wheat to the PRC when the US would not.  Nevertheless, a PRC military attack on Taiwan very 
possibly could lead to an embargo where all Western states participate.   
195 It is worth noting that at this point in time, the PRC was generating a net surplus in wheat and rice, those 
grains used primarily for human consumption.  In the event of the suspension of the grain trade, for what-
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strategic good for the PRC regardless of the domestic improvements seen during this 
time.  The future remains filled with uncertainty, especially in a non-benign international 
system.       
Foreign policy initiatives by the PRC during this time focused on accession to the 
WTO and increasingly on 2nd Ring states, particularly ASEAN.  The WTO created the 
path for increased foreign access to the PRC market for all items as well as grain.  At the 
same time, we see increased grain trade with South Korea and the DPRK as part of fam-
ine relief to that country, a strategic necessity for the PRC.   
Following the closure of US bases in the Philippines, PRC military activity in-
creased in the SCS and was aimed at the Philippines.  Yet, they arranged to buy grain 
from the PRC nearly simultaneously.  Vietnam, another country with SCS problems and 
long periods of enmity with the PRC, arranged to sell large quantities of rice to their for-
mer foe.  ASEAN countries were well aware of the “China threat” (too many, too strong, 
too rich, too near) and sought continued US involvement in SE Asia to counter the PRC 
in regional forums.  Japan and India were also welcomed by ASEAN.  The PRC-ASEAN 
problem over the conflicting SCS claims continues.196   
Taiwan continued to be an issue with PRC-US foreign policies.  Grain imports 
from the US had declined due to domestic output.  When they started to pick up in 2000, 
                                                 
ever reason, the PRC would be able to convert maize and soybean production to wheat and rice.  An ab-
sence of sufficient animal feed would lead to a reduction in meat consumption following an initial mass 
slaughter of farm animals.  Protein consumption would have to revert to plant-based products.  
 
196 “The much-awaited rulings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague—in response to the 
Philippines’ 2013 submission over the maritime entitlements and status of features encompassed in China’s 
expansive South China Sea claims—were released this morning [7/12/16]. Taken together, the rulings were 
clear, crisp, comprehensive, and nothing short of a categorical rejection of Chinese claims.” (Liow: 2016). 
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South American countries were increasing their share of PRC business at the expense of 
the US.  The PRC even took Taiwanese maize business from the US for a short period of 
time.   
SSA had reappeared on the PRC foreign policy radar in the rice trade.  From 2000 
to 2004, it was the main market for rice exports.  This will be covered in the next chapter. 
While still strategic, the grain trade during the PGRS led to a period of intercon-
nectedness / interdependency for all of grain as well as the four specific types we focus 
on.  (Though soybeans are the primary imports, they are a trade-off that could change to 
another grain.)  Perhaps the one group that was dependent on PRC wheat imports was the 
wheat farmers of its major suppliers.  Wheat prices peaked in May, 1996, and were $70 
to $150 per ton less costly for the following seven years.  Would the same occur with 
South American soybean farmers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
257 
 
Chapter VI - LAND GRABS:  MAKING LAND MOBILE? 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will explore the new and different methods and approaches that 
the PRC has taken to achieve food security.  In the last chapter it was shown that it was 
no longer self-reliant in grains, but through the export-led development model and the FX 
it generated, the PRC was easily self-sufficient in food.  However, it is maintained that 
the PRC was not only food secure, but from 1997 through 2003 grain did not have to be 
considered a strategic good as it had demonstrated the ability to compel quick and effec-
tive changes to agriculture to move towards self-reliance if needed. 
The new and different potential solutions to food security were necessitated by the 
continuing growth of the population and the continuing economic growth that encroached 
on arable land.  Pollution, water shortages, food safety concerns, and the decreasing effi-
cacy of the PGRS mandates served to exacerbate the situation. 
 
The Food Paradigm 
 
The food paradigm under Hu Jintao begins to change in a number of areas ranging 
from food safety concerns to dietary changes that alter food consumption habits.  De-
creasing arable land continues to be an issue as do water availability and purity.  In effect, 
the food paradigm is changing due to the continued economic growth, rising incomes, 
and the unfortunate aspects of trying to “get rich quick” by cutting corners.   
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Domestic Politics 
Hu Jintao, elected by the CCP National Congress, succeeded Jiang Zemin as Gen-
eral Secretary of the CCP (2002-2012), President (2003-2013), and Chairman of the 
CMC (2004-2012).  Hu was designated by Deng to succeed Jiang.  Hu was succeeded by 
Xi Jinping in all of the positions Hu held.  Both Hu and Xi grew up during the rule of the 
CCP but were not of the revolutionary cohort and are referred to as the fourth and fifth 
generation of leaders, respectively.197  This chapter will focus on Hu and add relevant in-
formation germane to food security and foreign policy in the early years of Xi’s time in 
office.  
The success of economic development had moved the PRC from an underdevel-
oped state to a middle-income state in 24 years, positively impacting the lives and oppor-
tunities for many citizens.  To improve the lives of the rest, there continued to be chal-
lenges, primarily creating employment for new entrants to the workforce each year and 
for the excess agricultural labor that continued to exist.  Still, the development had been 
uneven geographically and by this time vast fortunes were being accumulated by a small 
segment of society, especially by those connected to high level CCP cadres or through 
corruption.  Further, the economic success had been accomplished at the expense of the 
environment where degradation continued.   
Hu approached the above problems with two policies (sometimes referred to as 
slogans): Scientific Development Concept, and the Harmonious Society.  Scientific De-
velopment was a “catchphrase for developing the economy in a more balanced manner, 
                                                 
197 Xi is the son of a high ranking party official under Mao.   
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paying less attention to gross domestic product (GDP) growth and more attention to such 
things as the ecological costs of the headlong rush for development” (Fewsmith: 2008, 
88).  The Harmonious Society, a goal, “should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, 
justice, sincerity, amity, vitality, and orderliness as well as the harmonious coexistence of 
people and nature” (Hu Jintao quoted in Yu: 2009, 169-70).  It should be noted that de-
mocracy, in this case, is applicable only to the Central Committee where there is electoral 
democracy, yet there is “signaling” that occurs to let prospective candidates know if they 
should proceed (Fewsmith: 2008, 94).198  Despite the claims of the policies above, Saich 
maintains that “Hu made it clear that he was not interested in significant political restruc-
turing but rather an improvement in the quality of public administration” (Saich: 2006, 
37) .  
Domestic politics were influenced by Beijing’s reliance on provincial and lower 
government levels to enforce the laws and regulations that came from the center.  By 
2004, lower levels of government received 45% of tax revenues, but were responsible for 
72% of the spending.  Generating more and more tax revenue through more and more 
growth (Bergsten: 2008, 77-8) worked at cross-purposes with Hu’s declared objective of 
balancing development and the environment.   
 
 
 
                                                 
198 The PRC is a supporter of democracy in IGOs.  Part of the reason for this is that many IGOs are crea-
tions of the Bretton Woods agreements, and other post-WWII organizations are dominated by the founding 
states or by the funding contributions that determine voting weights; one country one vote in these institu-
tions would increase the power of the PRC and others at the expense of the current dominant power(s). 
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State-Society Relationship 
In this section we will focus on three aspects of the state-society relationship that 
are interrelated: the environment, food safety, and corruption as related to food security.  
The discussion of the environment will focus on two elements: the actual and potential of 
climate change to effect arable land, and the availability and quality of water.  Modern 
food safety has become a concern due to adulteration to increase profits or through igno-
rance. As we have seen, corruption has played a role in the decrease of arable land, pri-
marily through cheating peasants via the purchase price of their land. It also plays a role 
in polluting land and water through illegal or improper disposal of toxic materials.  As 
mentioned above, Hu’s statements on the environment and actions by local officials can 
work at cross-purposes.  One way to bring these two into line is via the press.  The local 
press, under local control, can be dissuaded from reporting on abuses.  The press from 
outside a local area can shed light on abuses.  That is no longer possible as Beijing 
“banned the practice of reporters traveling to other areas to report on illegal or corrupt 
practices of local officials” (Saich: 2006, 40).199   
The PRC has become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) while 
the US continues to be the largest emitter on a per capita basis.  Greenhouse gases, in-
cluding CO2, are considered the leading causes of global warming, a situation that will 
cause sea level rises, temperature increases, and changes in precipitation patterns world-
                                                 
199 This ban was implemented to reduce the publicity of large-scale demonstrations that were becoming 
more common and were generally targeted at local officials.  Media reporting on environmental pollution 
and public health issues caused by environmental disasters is permitted (Saich: 2006, 40). 
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wide.  Wang et al surveyed the literature on the effects of global warming on PRC agri-
culture.  First of all, agriculture is a contributor to global warming; 15.4% of the PRC’s 
total emissions came from agriculture as did 88.6% of nitrous oxide and 59.4% of me-
thane in 2005.  Both nitrous oxide and methane contribute much more to global warming 
than does carbon dioxide, 296 and 23 times more, respectively.  In general, climate 
change will produce the following effects in the PRC: 1) Non-irrigated land will see a de-
crease in yields (but cotton yields would increase); 2) a longer growing season in north-
ern areas will increase the opportunity for multiple cropping as well as in the Yangtze 
River valley; 3) the CO2 fertilization effect will increase grain output; 4) increasing tem-
peratures and the likelihood of more droughts in the North China Plain where there is a 
shortage of water already will decrease crop yields; 5) weather events will be more severe 
than normal; and, 6) livestock production will decrease.  This is predicated on the farmer 
adjusting to the climatic changes appropriately, continued seed development, and effi-
cient use of fertilizers and pesticides.  The net result is little change in the PRC output of 
rice, wheat and maize when projected to 2030, but the population continues to grow 
(Wang, Huang, Rozelle: 2010). 
China, as other geographically large countries, suffers from unequal distribution 
of rainfall across the country.  The northwest is dry, and most water resources are in the 
south of the country.  About 45% of agricultural land in the PRC is irrigated, and the wa-
ter table is falling in some areas as a result.  This is the case in the North China Plain, 
China’s traditional breadbasket.  Extensive use of water, for agriculture and non-agricul-
ture use, has even caused the Yellow River to cease flowing to the sea during part of the 
year.  The long-term solution is the South to North Water Transfer Project from the 
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Yangtze via two routes to the North China Plain.  Whether this is a long-term solution is 
questionable (You et al: 2011, 6). 
Clean water is the number one environmental problem; “300 million rural resi-
dents drink polluted water, and 90 percent of the water passing through cities is polluted.  
There is one ‘sudden environmental accident’ every other day on average in China, and 
most of these accidents involve water pollution” (Pan Yue quoted in Craig: 2007, 114).  
Sudden environmental accidents can also cause international issues; the Songhua River 
chemical spill flowed downstream into Russia.  Within the PRC, most chemical plants 
are located on rivers that flow through densely populated areas, a potential hazard of 
great proportion (Craig: 2007, 114).  Polluted water was also a cause of land pollution.  
Though not necessarily related to water-borne pollution, heavy metals contaminate 12 
million tons of grain each year (Ash: 2007, 803).  
Food safety has become a major concern.  While an industrial chemical spill may 
be accidental, most food contamination is premeditated and is referred to as “poisonous 
food”, as opposed to food poisoning, an unintended contamination (Yan: 2012: 710).  
Yan differentiates between four types of poisonous foods: adulterated, toxic food addi-
tives, pesticides used as preservatives, and fake foods.  Probably the most well-known in-
cident was the addition of the chemical melamine (used to make plastic and tan leather) 
to increase the protein levels of Sanlu baby formula and other dairy products in 2008.   
Deliberate production and sale of poisonous food has created an element of dis-
trust within society that “contribute[s] to the crisis of social trust: namely, distrust of the 
market due to faulty goods and bad service, distrust of service providers and strangers, 
distrust of friends and even relatives, distrust of law enforcement officers, distrust of the 
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law and legal institutions, and distrust of basic moral values” (Peng Siqing quoted in 
Yan: 2012: 719).  Following the Sanlu episode, the public reaction served to “expand dis-
trust in strangers, to distrust in food experts, regulatory agencies, and modern society in 
general” (Yan: 2012: 719).   
Within the state-society relationship, the issues that are most important are those 
related to water safety and availability and food safety.  Public distrust of a widening por-
tion of society reflects the inability of Beijing’s intents to be executed at the local level 
related to food and water, among other concerns.  The insufficient attention of the state to 
the public good of safe food and water provided by the state is negatively affecting the 
population as a whole.  Hu’s inconsistent actions to influence local officials to follow the 
laws and regulations set forth by the center increased the distrust.200  Publishing infor-
mation on environmental disasters is a very indirect method of correcting existing issues 
and preventing new ones.201   
 
Economic Development 
The domestic economy continued to grow.  Between 2002 and 2012 the annual 
balance of trade surplus grew by 6.5 times to $230 billion in current currency values.  
During Xi’s first two years in office, the surplus grew by another 66% (United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development data base).  The structure of the PRC economy 
                                                 
200 The inability of Beijing to control the periphery is consistent with Chinese dynasties of the past where 
the comment similar to “the mountains are high and the emperor is far away” served to permit the periph-
ery to do as they pleased. 
 
201 In his first two years in charge, Hu’s successor Xi Jinping cracked down on corruption within the CCP.  
However it remains unclear as to whether the crackdown is politically motivated or aimed at improving the 
efficacy of local government.  
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was changing also.  The tertiary sector grew to 46.1% of GDP in 2013 from only 41.5% 
in 2002 (National Bureau of Customs Statistics).  Much of the economic growth since 
1978 had been driven by investment.  During Hu’s term, efforts were made to drive 
growth via domestic consumption, an effort that has yet to produce the intended results. 
The “going out” strategy was quite evident in natural resources.  In agriculture, 
the most controversial aspect is what is referred to as “land grabs”.  (This will be taken up 
in detail later in this chapter.)  Foreign corporations based on agriculture were purchased 
by SOEs.  For example,   in 2008 COFCO took a 4.95% interest in Smithfield Foods, a 
US based meat processor, mainly pork.  In 2013, Shuanghui International, a conglomer-
ate, purchased all of Smithfield.  Also in 2013, Tully Sugar of Australia was purchased 
by COFCO.  COFCO purchased the remainder of Noble Agri Ltd, that it did not own in 
December 2015.  Noble Agri is a grain merchandising operation (Kane and Watts, 
1/8/2016).202  Syngenta, a Swiss seed development and agri-chemical company, agreed to 
be purchased by an SOE in 2016.  Taken together, these acquisitions can be characterized 
as “food security mercantilism” (Keulertz and Woertz: 2015, 13). 
For non-renewable resources such as oil, copper, and iron ore, the race was on to 
acquire these from states where they are a natural endowment.  Though these commodi-
ties are not part of the focus, they will play a role in the foreign policy discussions.   
                                                 
202 The Agricultural Cultivation Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture Director, Wang Shoucong, wrote 
that Xi Jinping is in favor of the PRC creating a grain merchandising company to rival the largest US and 
European ones (Zuo: 2014, 3).  The acquisition of Noble Agri is a step in that direction. 
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Going out presented another issue that affected trade relations with developing 
countries. The PRC continued to need export markets to utilize domestic production ca-
pacity.  Countries that provided raw materials, ores, and agricultural commodities pro-
vided an opportunity to do so.  Through new trade arrangements or through the Chinese 
diaspora communities, PRC SOEs found markets for low-end goods that could be sup-
plied to low-income countries priced very attractively.  So much so that imports nega-
tively impacted domestic business (Sutter: 2008, 280, 385. Congressional Research Ser-
vice: 2008, 127-8).  
 
Population 
There are several policy decisions and milestones that affected the population as a 
whole during Hu’s reign and in the early years of Xi’s.  These occurred against the inter-
minable increase in population by about by 71 million. 
In 2011, the urban population exceeded the rural population for the first time dur-
ing the rule of the CCP and probably for the first time ever in China.  This is indicative of 
the continuing industrialization.    
In 2015, the one-child policy was changed to allow for two children.  A second 
child required government approval and penalties for more than two children were en-
forced as before (SCMP: 10/31/15, A4).  While the increase in population was slowed by 
the one-child policy, it had negative demographic impacts.  The gender ratio was abnor-
mally skewed to males.  The reduced birth rate created a ‘hole’ in the population, a situa-
tion where there is a potential shortage of labor to maintain PRC economic growth.  Fur-
ther, while there were two parents and four grandparents to coddle each “little emperor,” 
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that little emperor is faced with the potential of having to support a spouse, child, four 
parents and surviving grandparents in a country where the social safety net is poor.203   
 
Analysis of the Food Paradigm under Hu 
 
During the time of Hu and into the term of office of his successor, Xi Jinping, the 
PRC continued to improve its food security position.  In this section, we will examine the 
statistics that confirm the improvement, answer the questions as to why the successes oc-
curred, identify the challenges that still exist, and the methods that can be used to meet 
those challenges. 
Hu’s domestic policies, emphasizing equity and balanced growth, were particu-
larly relevant to the income and opportunity disparities between urban and rural areas.  
Efforts to improve rural income opportunities were renewed starting in 2003.  A pilot 
program was implemented in two provinces that reduced agriculture taxes to zero, while 
other provinces had those taxes cut to 5% from 7%.  For 2006, the policy of zero agricul-
ture taxes was expanded nationwide.204  This raised per capita rural incomes by 150 RMB 
and total rural income by 125 billion RMB.   In addition to tax relief, agricultural subsi-
dies were added.  This started in 2004 with direct grain, seed, and machinery subsidies in 
some areas only.  In 2007, livestock production subsidies began.  These subsidies put an 
                                                 
203 This situation helps to explain the continued high savings rate in the PRC and the slowness of develop-
ing a consumer-led economy. 
204 The taxes involved were the agriculture tax, local agriculture tax, and livestock farming tax.  All other 
taxes, such as income taxes, continued. 
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additional 80 billion RMB in the hands of the rural PRC.205  The third leg of these plans 
was the development of rural infrastructure that covered transportation, electrification 
and water quality, among others (Chen, X: 2009, 125-6).  This program must be consid-
ered a success as rural household incomes rose at a compounded rate of greater than 12% 
from 2005 through 2013.206   
As can be seen in Table 6.1, the available k/cal per capita continued to rise annu-
ally and in total increased 9.8% from 2002 through 2013.  Facilitating this was the con-
tinuing diminution in the rate of population growth.  Food security as measured for the 
                                                 
205 The removal of the agriculture tax and the addition of subsidies were good for farmers and rural society 
as a whole.  This decreased tax revenue at local and provincial levels as well as adding subsidies that had to 
be paid.  As Zha and Zhang point out: “The conflicts of interests between central and local governments 
means that China’s food security system is very fragile, and it is an uphill task to maintain the high grain 
production level” Zha and Zhang: 2013, 463). 
 
206 The increase in incomes reflects not only the tax cuts and subsidy increases, but also price levels and 
output. 
 
Table 6.1
             Indicators of Food Security / Insecurity
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% change in total grain output (1) 0.4% -6.3% 8% 2.5% 2.3% 0.2%
% change in population 0.561% 0.556% 0.549% 0.541% 0.536% 0.535%
K/cal availability per capita per day (2) 2830 2831 2857 2879 2883 2919
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
% change in total grain output (1) 4.8% -0.1% 2.4% 4.0% 2.7% 1.6%
% change in population 0.535% 0.536% 0.537% 0.537% 0.535% 0.526%
K/cal availability per capita per day (2) 2977 2994 3044 3081 3100 3108
Sources: 1) Production 2002-2013, PRC State Statistical Bureau, various years
2) FAO Statistics Division
Shaded areas indicate years in which population growth exceeded grain output increases.
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whole of the PRC increased well beyond average minimums determined by UN agen-
cies.207  It does not take into account the urban – rural differentials.  Income disparities 
and physical distribution bottlenecks account for part of the differentials.  
The decrease in arable land per capita (Table 6.2) continued due to urbanization, 
pollution, and desertification - an increasing problem.  Despite that, grain production sur-
passed 600 million tons in 2013 and averaged 517 million tons from 2002 through 2013.  
The interesting aspect of Table 6.2 is in the self-reliance aspect of the crops we focus on.  
In total, maize, rice, soybeans and wheat see the self-reliance decrease to 86.8% in 2013, 
far below the 95% target.  However, if we look at human food, rice and wheat, the self-
reliance rate remains well above 95%.  Animal feed, the primary use for maize, fell from 
being a net export to a marginal import by 2013.  The PRC became the largest importer 
of soybeans in the world during this time.   
Why would the PRC decide to import soybeans rather than another grain?  Rice 
and wheat are the primary human food grains. Maintaining self-reliance in these grains 
serves to underwrite the priority of food security in the public’s mind and allows greater 
control of domestic prices.  Maize, primarily animal feed, was growing in demand as 
consumption of animal protein increased.  Maize production is concentrated in the US, a 
potential international political issue for the PRC.  Finally, soybean production was in-
creasing in South America, presenting an opportunity to benefit South-South relations 
and decrease dependence on the US.  As mentioned previously, the decrease in soybean 
production came from a reduction in import tariffs and price increases between maize and 
                                                 
207 The PRC was a recipient of food aid from the World Food Program from 1980 to 2006. 
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soybeans.  In 1996 the per ton price for maize moved above that for soybeans and maize 
already produced more to tons per ha. than soybeans, quite a disincentive.       
 
    
Arable land, the ultimate limiting constraint for self-reliance in grain production, 
has become the PRC’s “red line” that cannot be crossed.  The 11th Five-Year Plan of 
2006 stated that arable land should not drop below 120 million ha.  Should that line be 
breached, it is said that self-reliance (at the 95% level) will become impossible and possi-
bly threaten the “economic miracle” (Cui and Kattumuri: 2010, 10).  However, as arable 
land per capita is decreasing, the demand for agricultural products is increasing.  In-
creased meat consumption and the use of plant materials to produce ethanol or biofuels 
were two reasons for this increase in demand.  In these two cases, there are direct trade-
offs between grain self-reliance and other areas of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. 
Table 6.2
   Grain Production and Arable Land and Self-Reliance
Total Grain Self-Reliance Self-Reliance Self-Reliance Self-
Total Grain Production Arable Ratio - Maize, Ratio Ratio Reliance 
Production Kg./capita/ Land Rice, Wheat, Human Food Animal Feed Ratio  
Year Mil. of tons Year Ha./capita Soybeans Rice, Wheat Maize Soybeans
2002 457.1 355.9 0.0926 100.6% 100.7% 109.6% 33%
Agriculture tax policy trial 2003 430.7 333.5 0.0903 100.0% 101.7% 114.2% -33%
Some subsidies implemented 2004 469.5 361.5 0.0941 94.3% 97.7% 101.8% -14%
2005 484.0 370.7 0.0906 95.2% 98.9% 106.2% -60%
Agirculture tax eliminated nationwide 2006 498.0 379.4 0.0900 94.8% 100.4% 102.0% -80%
Livestock subsidies implemented 2007 501.6 380.1 0.0829 95.1% 101.0% 103.2% -139%
Worldwide rice price increases 2008 528.7 398.5 0.0819 92.6% 100.2% 100.1% -138%
2009 530.8 398.0 0.0825 91.3% 99.9% 100.0% -182%
2010 546.5 407.5 0.0830 88.7% 99.7% 99.2% -262%
Urban population exceeds rural 2011 571.2 423.7 0.0828 89.5% 99.6% 99.2% -261%
2012 589.6 435.0 0.0781 87.4% 98.2% 97.6% -346%
2013 601.9 441.8 0.0776 86.7% 97.8% 98.5% -429%
Sources:  
Population:  FAO Statistics
Total grain production:  State Statistical Bureau 
Arable land:  FAO Statistics
Self-Reliance ratio: calculated from FAO statistics
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Will the red line be an example of a failed securitization?  The referent object was 
sufficient arable land to maintain 95% self-reliance, a PRC definition of food security.  
The idea may have been good, originating from Hu with the Standing Committee as the 
audience.  The functional actor is the Ministry of Land and Resources.  However, imple-
mentation is scattered among national actors such as those responsible for agriculture, 
transportation, urban and industrial development, and housing to mention a few and in-
cludes authorities at state, provincial, and local levels, all with differing objectives 
(Schwoob: 2012  1-2).  As seen before in the history of the PRC, actual results may be 
manipulated for political reasons and what Beijing desires can be ignored by local offi-
cials.  The statistics on arable land are being questioned as to whether or not they adjust 
land for quality, not just quantity (Zhang: 2011, 2).  That said, efforts are underway to ad-
just for land quality in determining the actual production capabilities of the land (Liu et 
al: 2014, 9).  
PRC reported cultivated land (which includes multiple cropping) at 130 million 
ha in 2006, which fell to 121 million two years later before leveling out.  The FAO esti-
mates PRC arable land, which excludes multiple cropping, at 106 million ha and that it 
has been below 120 million ha since 1998 (FAO Statistics).  Regardless of which figures 
are correct and how they are determined, the relentless urbanization seems intent on 
crossing the red line.    
As income rises, the consumption of animal protein also increases.  This phenom-
enon puts additional pressure on agriculture to provide the grain, primarily corn, to feed 
the livestock.  In 2013, the PRC produced approximately 218 million tons of maize.  The 
combined weight of meat harvested of cattle, chicken, and hogs amounted to 81.4 million 
271 
 
tons.  To achieve that meat output would require almost 246 million tons of maize, and 
75% of that would be fed to hogs.208  Obviously this cannot be sustained.  In the past, and 
less nowadays, hogs and chickens would forage for food.  However, the increasing use of 
feed lots for cattle and hogs will increase the demand for feed grains such as maize.  The 
same will be true with chickens as “industrial” style concentrated production evolves.  
Grain self-reliance is at odds with meat self-reliance.   
In order to reduce petroleum imports (minimally at best), plant-based ethanol and 
biofuels have become an alternative.  The PRC initiated such programs in 2003 to pro-
duce ethanol from corn and wheat, a step towards meeting the State Council’s goal of 
15% of energy usage to be from non-fossil sources by 2020. 
Recall that the PRC has large reserves of grain and those reserves deteriorate over 
time if not properly managed.  Using aged stocks for ethanol production seemed to be a 
good way to utilize those stocks.  However, there were insufficient supplies to fully oper-
ate the production facilities; therefore some usage of fresh maize and wheat was required.  
This presented authorities with a grain self-reliance issue.  The solution to this issue was 
to limit maize and wheat-based conversion plants to the five existing ones.  Additional 
capacity was to come from other agricultural feedstock such as cassava, jatropha, and 
waste edible oils.  These would make biofuels for diesel engines (Chang et al, 2012, 4-6).  
The interesting aspect of this decision is that the feedstocks still had to be grown, a poten-
tial use of scarce arable land.  There were 23 million ha. of land, deemed as “marginal”, 
                                                 
208 This assumes that beef requires 6 lbs. of grain to produce 1 lb. of beef, for hogs the requirement is 3.5 
lbs. and for chicken it is 1.8 lbs.  The maize requirement stated above refers only to “meat”, not to total ani-
mal weight, therefore the feed requirements are understated. 
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available to grow biofuel feedstocks.  No water or fertilizer was allowed to be used on 
these crops.  But are these lands really marginal?  Chang notes that “marginal lands do 
need water resources, fertilizers and so on. If these resources are provided, one might argue 
that the land can be used for production of food instead of biofuels, if food security is the pri-
mary concern of the country” (Chang et al: 2012, 6).   
Ethanol and biofuel production is heavily subsidized.  It takes a large volume of feed-
stock to make a small amount of fuel, and more energy is used making it than the fuel pro-
duces.  In 2006, 20% of the US maize crop was used for ethanol and provided only 1% of na-
tional petroleum use (Pimentel: 2010, 186).  Agriculture-based fuel does not appear to be an 
energy solution. 
Increased meat consumption and ethanol / biofuel production present a challenge to 
arable land and sustaining the red line.  As time goes by, this challenge will be more and 
more difficult to meet; the two-child policy is starting and urbanization continues.  Authori-
ties will need to determine the optimum use of arable land within the sphere of PRC agricul-
ture in light of the perceived risks.  So far, Hansen et al maintain that domestic policy levers 
have been used to address imports and exports of agricultural commodities despite the liber-
alization mandated by WTO accession.  These include the allocation of TRQ import licenses 
between state and private trading companies, changes in value added taxes for imports and 
exports, and minimum domestic purchase prices (Hansen et al: 2011, 9-10).   More substan-
tive issues will have to be faced.  For example: Should the PRC grow crops for ethanol / bio-
fuels?  What is the minimum production quantity of grains for human consumption?  Is im-
porting beef better than raising cattle domestically?  What actions taken will relieve the pres-
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sure on arable land and not create a situation where food security can be compromised by ge-
opolitical security?  In the foreign policy section to follow, we will see how the PRC is going 
about answering these types of questions. 
While grain was not a strategic good from 1996 to 2003, in 2004 the situation began 
to change.  Net exports of rice, maize, and wheat edged towards zero through 2010 while 
soybean imports increased rapidly (see Figure 6.1).  Though imports and exports continued, 
by 2011 all of the major grains were net imported products and would continue as such into 
Xi’s administration.  The agricultural balance of payments fell from a US$ 2.8 billion surplus 
in 2002 to a US$ 68.9 billion 
deficit in 2013.  Net soybean 
imports over that period of time 
exceeded US$ 207 billion and 
accounted for 32% of all agri-
cultural imports. 
Self-reliance in the four 
major grains was no longer pos-
sible, but self-sufficiency for all agriculture continued given the total FX that the country’s 
export-led economy generated.  So, has grain become a strategic good, one that presents an 
existential threat from a lack of supply, domestically or internationally or in combina-
tion?  That question cannot be answered unless a strategy involving food and non-food 
crops is devised and done so considering water availability, climate, pollution, etc.  De-
ciding on importing the vast majority of soybean needs, assuming the decision was made 
on relative water usage, is an implemented aspect of such a strategy.  Another example is 
cotton.  If cotton, a raw material for industrial use, was imported and the land converted 
Figure 6.1
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to wheat production, would the PRC be in better or worse shape food-wise, industrially, 
and economically?  These questions are easily answered as “we want the food” as it fuels 
all.  But what are the ramifications of such a decision domestically and with the presumed 
supplier of cotton?209  In effect, the question that needs to be addressed is how to use the 
red line of 120,000 ha. of arable land.  The following sections look at how the PRC and 
other states are approaching similar predicaments.    
 
Foreign Policy 
 
The foreign policy of Hu Jintao grew out of his domestic policy of creating a Har-
monious Society and was appropriately called the Harmonious World, one “where all 
civilizations coexist and accommodate each other.”  In 2005, he described the Harmoni-
ous World as one that: 1) embraced multilateralism and rejected the Cold War mentality; 
2) embraced multilateral trade that was fair, open, and non-discriminatory; 3) preserved 
international diversity, made the world more democratic, and allowed states to follow 
their own paths; and, 4) reform the UN according to the three previous points when nec-
essary (Blanchard: 2008, 2-3).210  A year earlier in a speech at the Boao Conference, Hu 
                                                 
209 It would be difficult for the CCP to suggest opting for cotton rather than wheat given the history of star-
vation in China and Mao’s decisions regarding the GLF.  
210 The Harmonious World concept grew out of two previous slogans, Peaceful Rise and Peaceful Develop-
ment.  The basic premise was to assure the world that the advancement of the PRC was not to be similar to 
the rises of Japan and Germany that resulted in WWI & II, but peaceful.  The term “rise” was removed for 
a variety of reasons including the possible need to use force in the case of Taiwan or to defend itself.  So, 
Peaceful Development was adopted.  It was meant to assure the world that it would not be a revisionist 
state, though the concept between Rise and Development had not changed (Glaser and Medeiros: 2007).   
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stated “’China always practices what it preaches,’ namely, ‘We pursue a policy of bring-
ing harmony, security, and prosperity to neighbors and dedicate ourselves to strengthen-
ing mutual trust and cooperation and cooperation with fellow Asian countries, easing up 
hot-spot tensions, and striving to maintain peace and tranquility in Asia’” (Quoted in 
Shirk: 2008, 109). 
Nathan and Scobell maintain that the PRC’s strategic objectives continue to be: 1) 
territorial integrity, including the SCS and East China Sea; 2) preventing domination of 
Asia by an outside power while expanding PRC influence; 3) maintaining conditions for 
economic growth; and, 4) having a voice in shaping the international order (Nathan and 
Scobell: 2012, 33-4).  One would suspect that the first two strategic objectives are diffi-
cult to achieve without contradicting the essence of the Boao speech and “allowing states 
to pursue their own paths” as mentioned in the Harmonious World.  The inclusion of con-
tinuing “fair, open, and non-discriminatory trade” in the Harmonious World and “striving 
to maintain peace and tranquility in Asia” in the Boao speech are consistent with Deng’s 
peace and stability policy to provide the PRC with the space to continue its economic de-
velopment and the third objective.   
The going out strategy introduced by Jiang was continued under Hu and Xi.  
There are three aspects of this strategy that concern us.  First is the explicit inclusion of 
foreign sources of food as a method of meeting food security concerns.  The National 
Food Security and Long-term Planning Framework (2008-2020) called for “Active use of 
international supply and demand of domestic market regulation.  Under the premise of 
protecting domestic food self-sufficiency (self-reliance) involves the rational use of the 
import and export market swap.  Continue to play the role of state trading enterprises in 
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the import and export of food.  Strengthening inter-governmental cooperation, establish 
long-term stable, agricultural (grain and oil) partnership[s] with some important grain–
producing countries…Implementation of agriculture ‘going out’ strategy to encourage 
domestic enterprises to ‘go out’ to establish a stable and reliable import…security sys-
tem, [and to] improve the ability to protect the domestic food security…” (State Admin-
istration of Grain: 2008, 13).  Similar statements continue to be found in the recent No. 1 
Central Documents issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the State Council.  While there has been trade in grain for nearly the entire history of 
the PRC, this is an official document that includes food security as part of foreign pol-
icy.211  This will be the focus of the next section of this chapter. 
Second, Xi, in 2016, has made non-traditional security part of his “Overall Secu-
rity Concept,” and especially food security as a potential threat to PRC security. Xi’s con-
cept brings together a full range of issues, both traditional (foreign policy and military se-
curity) and economic (such as food security). Domestic economic realities will increas-
ingly affect Chinese external security decision-making (Wood: 2017,1).  Additionally, a 
                                                 
211 At this point, the question as to whether the “red line” or the fact that the highest levels of CCP have in-
cluded in the foreign policy going out strategy the need to actively search for consistent sources of food 
from foreign sources, are either of these an act of securitization against an existential threat?  Given the de-
gree of high-level attention to food security, one would be tempted to say that there had been a speech act 
(securitized by the Central Committee) securitizing food security as an existential threat.  Yet, has an ap-
propriate referent object been identified that would threaten survival?  Arable land would seem to be the 
appropriate referent object, the domestic land to produce the food for the PRC-- to securitize.  But that fails 
as there is insufficient policing of land use policies at all levels of government, thereby undercutting the ex-
tent of the threat, making it politicization rather than securitization.  The inclusion of food security via self-
sufficiency as the foreign policy calls for, also puts food security in the realm of the political.  Cui and Kat-
tumuri suggest that the ultimate threat would be the “economic miracle,” a more likely referent object 
would be the continued rule of the CCP. 
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Xinhua article indicates that the Xi is concerned about over-reliance on foreign sources of 
raw materials and the potential disruption of supply (Xinhua: April 19,2016).   
Third, there is also another aspect of going out that is the development and expan-
sion of soft power.  Hard power is the ability to get others to do what they would not oth-
erwise do.  Soft power, a concept introduced by Nye, attempts to get others to want what 
you want.  “If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If 
it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to 
change. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their 
activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coer-
cive or hard power” (Nye: 1990, 167).    
One can see that achievement of the Harmonious World foreign objectives and 
those in the Boao speech can be interpreted as being consistent with the soft power con-
cept. Both Li and Shambaugh discuss differing points of view among PRC scholars and 
officials on what soft power actually is and how it is to be achieved.  Shambaugh sug-
gests that culture is the key to PRC soft power, yet there are differing interpretations of 
what aspects of culture are important.  Those range from values culture to ideological 
culture to political culture to developmental culture.  But proponents of each agree that 
there is a lack of PRC soft power (Shambaugh: 2013, 211-15).  Li adds to the discussion 
the defensive nature of soft power.  It can be used to counter the “China threat” aspect of 
the PRC’s rise as well as to “fend off excessive influence and penetration of foreign cul-
tures in China, particularly ideologies or beliefs that might harm the legitimacy of the rul-
ing party” (Li: 2008, 300).   
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There is a consensus that the PRC lacks sufficient soft power.  Improvement ef-
forts are being made through several means.  First is the cultural approach, which has in-
cluded Confucius Institutes that have been built in many areas of the world and radio sta-
tions in several African countries as well as university scholarships for African students.  
The successful Beijing Olympics and various cultural touring events are others.  In the 
economic realm, there are several notable activities: 1) the so-called Beijing Consensus, 
the terms under which loans are made to developing countries that do not include the 
structural adjustments that the so-called Washington Consensus requires;212 2) interest-
free and low-interest loans as well as write-offs of existing debts of developing countries.  
When such loans are given for construction projects, the construction is often done by 
PRC labor.  While this may keep PRC labor employed, it does not assist the receiving 
country in local employment or skill development; 3) there has been a concerted effort by 
the PRC to develop agriculture in Africa.  This has been aided by demonstration farms to 
improve farming techniques in many Sub-Saharan countries and is considered to be suc-
cessful (Sheng: 2010, 110-2); and 4) particularly germane to the subject, between 2012 
and 2016 the PRC contributed USD 32.6 million to the general funding of the World 
Food Program (this figure excludes bilateral aid, aid that comes with conditions).  This 
ranks 32nd in the world for contributions; Malawi ranked 30th and Ethiopia 27th (World 
Food Program).     
                                                 
212 A criticism of the Beijing Consensus is that loans may be disbursed but there is insufficient follow-up to 
assure that funds are not taken by corrupt local officials in the receiving country. 
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While going out refers to economic and political issues, it can be said that the 
PRC is going out in terms of military power also.  The PRC has embarked on the con-
struction of a “blue water” navy, one that has the ability to operate in deep-water seas and 
across oceans.  This is a natural activity for a great power with an extensive coast line.  In 
the Western Pacific the objective is one of access-denial aimed at the US, the naval 
power of the Pacific.  “…the United States regards sea control as essential to its eco-
nomic and security interests in East Asia, and China is no less adamant that U.S. sea con-
trol threatens Chinese interests and even Chinese territory” (Gompert: 2013, 24).  Access-
denial is not a war winning capability but rather a capability that keeps US ships farther 
from any potential hot-spot and thereby decreases its capability or increases its vulnera-
bility (Gompert: 2013, 59).  An immediate area of concern where naval forces might 
come into contact is the SCS.  While the PRC promotes a Harmonious World, it actively 
seeks to lessen or prevent domination of Asia by an outside power while expanding PRC 
influence. 
The blue water navy will also be a method, if needed, to protect PRC shipping, an 
aspect of security that the PRC implicitly depends on the US Navy to provide now.213  
Again this is important to safeguard imports of grain and oil.  
 
 
 
    
                                                 
213 The PRC participated in anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, its first naval activity away from its 
coastal areas.   
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Making Land Mobile 
Since the 2008 overall increase in commodity prices, including grain and particu-
larly rice, the term “land grab” has become popular.214  It refers to FDI in agricultural 
land in a pejorative sense.  “Whether FDI in agriculture is perceived as a “land-grab,” de-
pends largely upon pre-existing local conditions. In countries with large uncultivated land 
reserves, foreign ownership is muted” can be considered FDI “… whereas countries with 
limited or densely-populated farmland will find foreign involvement hard to stomach and 
investments will be resisted by the population” can be considered land grabs.  Agriculture 
FDI is generally considered a development opportunity while land grabs are “an institu-
tion where people lose their access to and control over production lands or its resource” 
(FSN Forum: 2009, 1).  Land grabs tend to be associated with less-developed states 
where there are insufficient legal protections for land rights.  Africa is such an area as 
well as parts of SE Asia.  FDI is associated with developed countries with unused land.  
A major example is Australia.  Brazil, most likely, qualifies for both. 
Those investing in overseas agriculture, that is raising crops or livestock, do so for 
a variety of reasons.  First, it can be a financial investment to raise crops and sell them.  
                                                 
214 The “rice crisis” of 2008 occurred during a year when worldwide rice production increased by 32 mil-
lion tons over the previous year.  It was the result of poor policies in India and Vietnam (export restrictions 
despite higher production than in 2007), panic buying in the Philippines, a weaker USD, higher fuel prices 
and a belief that prices would go higher.  Eventually, Africa endured food riots and export bans, and Carib-
bean and Asian countries encountered hoarding and purchase limits.  The PRC also suspended rice exports 
for a period of time (Slayton: 2009).  Paarlberg holds that domestic policy changes are the single biggest 
factor in prices increases.  He cites restrictions on exports to maintain domestic prices.  In addition to those 
countries mentioned, the PRC, Argentina, Russia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, and, Cambodia increased 
export taxes or banned exports during this time for products ranging from grain to palm oil (Paarlberg: 
2010, 24). 
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Second, for states with high population-to-land constraints or those with inhospitable cli-
mates they may invest to assure their home countries a supply of food controlled by itself.  
For example, Japan, Korea, and the PRC are states with population-to-land constraints 
and the Gulf States have an inhospitable climate.  Third, a state that is reliant on imports 
may seek to insulate itself from market prices in times of short supply.  Finally, if a state 
raises its own food overseas, or buys directly from growers, it can bypass paying grain 
merchandisers a commission on its purchases. 
The actual investors in FDI or land grabs range from foreign private investors to 
local private investors to states.  States provide the largest pool of investors through 
SOEs and sovereign wealth funds (SWF).  Private investors sometimes invest with 
SWFs.  
There are issues with both FDI and land grabs.  In developing countries the con-
cern is that corrupt government officials will inappropriately sell or lease land to foreign-
ers that deprive traditional “owners” of their livelihoods while gaining personally.  Prom-
ises by the acquirers for housing and jobs for the dispossessed are frequently not met in 
developing countries (Borras et al: 2011, 210-11).  As crops are raised for export, both 
groups fear that in times of poor harvests at home or in the country of destination the 
food they grew would go somewhere else leaving them with too little.215  In the case of 
                                                 
215 Sovereign states can embargo exports of foodstuffs should it be in their best interest as happened during 
the 2008 rice crisis, regardless of whether another state has purchased the land and grown the crop.  Under 
Part VI, Article 12 of the WTO Agreements on Agriculture, 2003, the exporting country must take into ac-
count the impact on the importers food security as well as notifying all interested parties as to the expected 
length of the suspension.  Sovereignty is not lost due to foreign purchase of domestic lands.  However, this 
does not stop the originator of the FDI from pursuing any means possible to export its crop through extra-
legal means.  The possibility of using extra-legal means increases in weak states subject to corruption, a 
situation that exists in many states with agricultural FDI for land purchases.  During the Indian famines of 
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PRC involvement, especially in FDI areas, there is the fear of the “China threat.”  The 
PRC has so many people and so much money that they will be able to purchase an entire 
province and consume what should naturally be that of the fruits of the host country.  Put 
another way, the PRC is making land, like labor and capital, mobile.  The land may stay 
in place but what the land produces will move to the PRC. 
   It is suggested that the PRC prefers investments to trade as they “are less fluid 
than trading ties, providing the basis for a longer-term – and, hence, more stable – eco-
nomic relationship” (Thomas: 2013, 551).216  Yet, there are drawbacks to such an out-
look:  First, land “grabbed” by the PRC with the help of local officials provides a perma-
nent source of grievance directed at the PRC.  In the minds of the local dispossessed, it is 
the “occupying” entity that remains behind as a permanent reminder of what was lost as 
opposed to the local facilitator of the acquisition.  This is an example of hard power, the 
“China threat,” as opposed to the soft power that the PRC aspires to.  As will be seen in 
the case of Brazil, trade, facilitated by purchasing crops from local farmers and building 
local processing plants that employ locals presents a “win-win” situation the PRC at-
tempts to create with the local population.  Second, programs can be enhanced or created 
by financing skill improvements of local farmers to increase output or to expand produc-
tion onto unused land.  In these cases, the total world supply of grain in increased that can 
                                                 
the 1890’s, the British exported wheat to the UK while locals starved (Late Victorian Holocausts).  This 
was not a case of extra-legal actions but one of power, in this case colonial power.  
   
216 A current rationale for such fears, not relating to food but to the absence of natural resources, can be 
seen in the PRC’s decision to cut off or delay shipments of rare-earth metals to Japan following a collision 
between PRC and Japanese military vessels in the East China Sea near islands claimed by both. 
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be purchased to help feed the PRC, as will be seen in the case of Africa.  Finally, whether 
or not the PRC can be protected from world price swings in grain is immaterial.  Price 
differentials will always exist.  Given its size, the issue exists within the PRC itself when-
ever grain must be moved from one area to another when harvests vary.  When world-
wide grain is plentiful and harvests are poor in the PRC, imports lower overall costs.  
When the opposite occurs, export opportunities may increase profits.  When harvests are 
low in the PRC and in the world, grain costs will be a national hardship but one that we 
can expect to be relieved via domestic grain subsidies or tariff reductions and the next 
harvest.  Regardless of the relative strength of the PRC, it is not practical to assume that 
foreign-grown crops on PRC owned land in another sovereign state that is also suffering 
will be permitted to feed the PRC at the expense of its own population’s food supply.  In 
other words, trade works and if it does not, the problem is one of a temporary cost.        
     
Food Security and Foreign Policy 
 
This section will explore the interface of foreign policy and food security to deter-
mine how they interact to increase or decrease PRC food security.  It will focus on re-
gions and individual countries where appropriate and emphasize the specific activities in 
which the PRC engaged to deepen its involvement in local grain production through land 
acquisition or other less controversial activities.217 
                                                 
217 The question as to the extent of international “land grabs,” by all countries, is suspect.  There are a num-
ber of groups that claim to collect statistics on this issue but all are suspect.  Many rely on press reports that 
relate to intentions but not necessarily signed contracts, the amount of land is always suspect, and the terms 
are not necessarily known.  This is especially true in lesser developed countries.  I have opted to use the 
Land Matrix data as my source.  It includes more complete information and more detail than others.  
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South America 
As we have seen, South American countries, primarily Argentina and Brazil, have 
been grain suppliers to the PRC since the early 1960’s when Argentine corn shipments 
helped the PRC recover from the GLF.  However, real agricultural cooperation began 
around 1995 when Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay became consistent suppliers of soy-
beans to the PRC.  Roughly coincident with the increase in soybean imports were the in-
creasing imports of iron ore (Brazil, Peru), copper (Chile, Peru, Mexico), and other ores. 
These raw materials were needed to feed industries to meet local and world demand for 
PRC finished products. 
Prior to these times, PRC diplomacy with South America was minor.  There was 
the competition between the PRC and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, the South-
South cooperation, and PRC and Brazilian desires for a multi-polar world (Shambaugh: 
2013, 113).  Choo maintains that South America and the PRC share several goals: anti-
colonialism, anti-hegemonism, and the desire to follow independent foreign policies, all 
dating from the Cold War (Choo: 2009, 74).  The developing world became important to 
the PRC as it searched for friends following the Tiananmen incident (Choo: 2009, 78).  
South America is an area it turned to.  Deng’s southern tour restarted the rapid economic 
boom, and South America gained further importance to the PRC; it needed markets for its 
goods, natural resources to supply its industrial base, and more and more raw materials 
such as grain (Choo: 2009, 75).  South America had oil, iron ore, copper, forests, grain, 
and market potential.  
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For South America, Choo suggests that the PRC’s “policy priority lies in political 
relationship that is based on mutual respect and equal treatment” (Choo: 2009, 80).  Once 
a sound political bond is formed, mutually beneficial economic cooperation can start and 
both can be backed up by the application of soft power (Choo: 2009, 80-1).   
Additional issues complicated the Brazil – PRC relationship: international politics 
and dependent development. Politically, Brazil had supported the PRC in the UN, expect-
ing in return a seat on the permanent Security Council.  When that opportunity arose, the 
PRC vetoed changes to the Security Council as Japan would have also become a perma-
nent member (de Souza: 2006, 11).  The specter of dependent development, trading raw 
materials for finished goods, potentially a situation that retards economic domestic devel-
opment, is one that Brazil claims to have endured.   In 2004, as part of a bilateral trade 
agreement Brazil recognized the PRC as having a market economy, as opposed to the 
WTO designation of three years earlier.  Brazil agreed without obtaining any concessions 
from the PRC.  The result was a flood of manufactured goods from the PRC that undercut 
Brazilian manufacturers at home and in their foreign markets.  Brazil began filing dump-
ing complaints with the WTO in 2005 (Horta, 2015, 24).  A Brazilian high-tech invest-
ment in the PRC was made by aircraft manufacturer Embraer to build aircraft there.  Re-
sults are not what was expected and Embraer believes that the PRC used Embraer tech-
nology to produce and sell its own planes at Embraer’s expense (Horta: 2015,22).   Ulti-
mately, Brazilians would question whether the trade was mutually beneficial or simply a 
new phase of dependencia, Brazilian raw materials and grains for PRC manufactured 
goods. 
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The PRC quest for grain supplies focused on Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.  In 
contrast to the PRC, open lands and a concentration of wealth resulted in a combination 
of massive farming operations and smaller peasant farms.  The Land Matrix lists 152 ag-
riculture-related foreign investments in all of South America.  This excludes-forestry re-
lated investments, but does include crops intended for biofuels.  Only three have an area 
exceeding 200,000 ha.  Investors come from all over the world, but the one that is notice-
ably small is the PRC.  There is one PRC owned farming operation of 13,000 ha. in Ar-
gentina and one in Bolivia of the same size.  Both grow soybeans.   In effect, the PRC has 
been locked out of Brazil and Argentina, and other countries, by new or re-applied laws 
relating to foreign ownership.  The Argentine law limits foreign ownership to 1000 ha. 
and the Brazilian law applies to foreign investments in domestic firms also (Valente: 
5/11/2011).  Brazil began restricting foreign land ownership in 1971, relaxed the rules 
when foreign capital was needed, and the law was re-interpreted to its original intent in 
2011.  The trigger for re-applying existing law came from negotiations to purchase large 
tracts of land, 200,000 ha. in Brazil by Chongqing Grain Group (Bao: 11/24/2011), 
800,000 acres in Argentina by Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken Group, and a 500,000 
acre sale/lease to Saudi Arabia (Moffett: 9/1/2011, A3).  Chongqing and Beidahuang pro-
jects were scaled back and the Saudi one, already signed, continued as the re-application 
of foreign land ownership was not applied retroactively. 
Also important in controlling PRC investments in Brazil was a statement from 
former minister Antonio Delfim Netto who “recommends caution with selling of lands to 
Chinese State-controlled companies, or to companies with a State participation…‘busi-
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nesses’ undergo a change of meaning when the investments are subordinated to the stra-
tegic reasons of a foreign State. In the cases of natural resources and agriculture-land, a 
proper evaluation of such strategy becomes a security-issue participation” (O Estado de 
Sao Paulo 2010, A3).   
To an extent, Netto’s concerns were addressed by Chen Xiwen, the director of the 
Office of the Central Rural Work Leading Group: “Buying or leasing lands in foreign 
countries to produce agricultural products is only one of the ways China can expand over-
seas….We can also go to some grain exporting to set up processing facilities, help ex-
pand local employment and provide technical and economic assistance” (Yap: 2/2/2012). 
In fact, that is what happened to the Chongqing project in Brazil; it secured sufficient 
land to build a processing plant and chose to purchase soybeans from local farmers 
(Xinhuanet: 9/28/2012).  The PRC wants to avoid paying the grain merchandizers to pur-
chase and ship grain to the PRC.  With the change in the scope of the Chongqing opera-
tions, that is what they have become in this instance, and they will be in direct competi-
tion with grain merchandizers. 
In the case of soybeans in South America, we have seen that when there is de-
mand the market will fulfill the need.  This raises the question as to whether FDI in agri-
cultural land will increase world output.  For Brazil and Argentina, that is the case.  Both 
countries received extensive FDI and output increased rapidly.  In the case of Brazil, it 
suffered a lack of capital that resulted in an increase in FDI.  The market met the in-
creased demand for exports to the PRC but did so without meaningful PRC FDI. Netto’s 
concerns about foreign-state involvement must raise questions about land purchases or 
long-term leases in the minds of PRC officials.  Such concerns can lead to a strategy 
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modification, as Chen suggested, that in Brazil led to local soybean purchasing and pro-
cessing; a less capital intensive method to achieve the desired results. 
 
ASEAN 
The overall economic and political relations between the PRC and ASEAN, both 
as a group and as individual states, are mixed.  The ASEAN China Free Trade Associa-
tion went into effect in 2010 for the original six members and in 2015 for the new, and 
much poorer members (Cambodia, Lao DR, Vietnam, and Myanmar).  ASEAN prefers to 
negotiate as a whole while the PRC prefers bilateral negotiations.  The PRC is the largest 
trading partner of each ASEAN state, and ASEAN as a whole is the third largest trading 
partner for the PRC (Thomas: 2013, 537).  The disputes in the SCS continue with the 
PRC building islands and militarizing them.  The PRC has used its “client” state, Cambo-
dia, to fracture ASEAN consensus decision-making norms. 
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong asks whether the PRC “’is going to 
be benign and not only play by the rules but leave space for other countries that are not as 
powerful to prosper.’ In this context, America is welcome in the region precisely because 
it ‘wants the region to prosper. . . countries to do well’ and importantly is ‘prepared to 
help them.’” (Lee: 2015, 4). This sentiment is reflected in the actions of some ASEAN 
states.  External balancing in reaction to PRC activities is occurring the Philippines, invit-
ing US forces back into the country as part of its defense treaty with the US, and Singa-
pore has opened its ports to US naval ships.  Internal balancing is occurring in the Philip-
pines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore as they increase the military capabil-
ities.  Other than the Philippines, the remaining four countries are also soft balancing 
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through strengthening security ties.  Vietnam is considering hosting US naval ships with-
out basing rights.  India and Japan are also states with which these countries are pursuing 
soft balancing strategies.  None of the four is considering is formal treaty ties (Lee: 2015, 
5).   
PRC land acquisitions in ASEAN are concentrated in Cambodia and Laos and are 
used primarily for rubber, timber, and palm oil and cassava for biofuels.  Additionally 
there are a few mixed-use crops, maize and sugar cane, that can be used for either etha-
nol, biofuel, feed, or human consumption.  Investors from the PRC include SOEs218 and 
private companies.  Many countries are investors including ASEAN states, Japan and Ko-
rea.  In most cases, there is a local partner involved.  However, the local partner may be a 
foreign invested entity.  All investments serve to meet growing PRC demand and/or the 
lack of domestic resources.  Rubber provides tires to feed the burgeoning auto business.  
Fast-growing timber meets the need for pulp for domestic manufacturing or harvesting of 
tropical hardwoods.  Palm oil and cassava meet the need for non-petroleum-based energy 
for transportation.  The benefit for the PRC is freeing domestic land to produce grain 
crops while Cambodia and Laos produce primarily non-grain agricultural products for in-
dustry.219 
                                                 
218 Investors may be SOEs or provincial owned enterprises; all will be referred to as SOEs. 
 
219 The “Golden Triangle”, the opium-growing region encompassing the parts of Myanmar and Laos that 
border Yunnan Province in the PRC, supplied much of the heroin consumed in the PRC.  To halt those im-
ports, the Opium Replacement Plan was developed:  Economic investment in the border regions of Myan-
mar would offer peasants alternative methods to earn a living while, in the case of rubber, provide the PRC 
with a commodity it needed.  Incentives were offered to PRC firms, subsidies, tax waivers, and import quo-
tas.  Rubber plantations were constructed by PRC companies on the lands of the dispossessed peasants 
when their incomes severely declined.  The subsidies offered by the PRC were to be used to develop alter-
native livelihoods for the dispossessed (former poppy growers), but were kept by the companies.  The net 
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Objections to PRC, or any entity or state, come from several concerns: 1) forcing 
peasants from their land, legally or not; 2) deforestation of natural plant growth that is re-
placed by tree plantations; 3) disruption of normal food production that runs the risk of 
creating local food insecurity; and 4) increasing ownership by foreign entities and the in-
security of not knowing the ramifications of such.  This is an important point.  The PRC 
has significant influence over the Cambodia and Laos governments.   The going out strat-
egy relating to agriculture is a national priority and PRC SOEs or privately owned firms 
can bring the influence of the state to bear.  The Cambodian and Lao governments have 
significant power and influence over their populations, and many government officials 
may be serving their own interests, aided by a lack of transparency.  The least powerful is 
the peasant who may be at the mercy, ultimately, of the PRC government, an example of 
extreme asymmetry for two sides with differing objectives (Luo et al: 2011, 291).     
The Philippines present a more interesting situation.  While the People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy (PLAN) was gradually slicing off SCS islands, claimed by both the Phil-
ippines and the PRC, other PRC companies were attempting to lease / buy large chunks 
of Philippine farmland.   
President Arroyo’s plan, The Medium Term Philippines Development Plan 2004-
2010, called for the development of two million ha. of underdeveloped farm land and 
marginal or idle lands to provide jobs and to make food plentiful and competitively 
priced (The Medium Term Philippines Development Plan 2004-2010: 2004, 29).  A large 
                                                 
result was an increase in opium planting and heroin processing by the peasants that had lost their land (Kra-
mer and Woods: 2012, 2-9). 
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portion of that objective was achieved in early 2007 with an agreement between Philip-
pine government entities and PRC provinces and companies for 18 farming and aquacul-
ture projects.  One of these was with Jilin Fuhua and Jilin Province for one million ha. to 
grow rice, maize, and sorghum. Another with Guangxi covered 40 thousand ha. for bio-
fuel crops (de la Cruz: 2011, 6).  Under negotiation at the time was an investment cover-
ing 200 thousand ha. for unspecified crops (Freeman: 2010, 18).  Shortly afterwards, the 
PRC company ZTE was accused of bribery in a non-related investment that eventually 
led to the suspension of two of the land deals included in the 18 PRC invested projects 
(Thomas: 2013, 540).  This led to civil society groups, Congressional inquiries, and the 
Supreme Court looking at the land deals and terminating the larger ha. projects and sus-
pension of talks on the smaller.  The legal aspect was directed at the use of public lands 
with respect to size (1000 ha. maximum) and minimum ownership of such lands by Fili-
pinos, 60%. A closer look at the Jilin project determined that the investor was not invest-
ing slightly less than four million USD into the Philippine economy, but rather was going 
to pay out that amount from profits of the venture over 25 years (de La Cruz: 2011, 1, 9-
10).220 
Land Matrix holds that there are only four agriculture projects, totaling 56,350 
ha., with PRC investment in the Philippines.  One of those is a 40 thousand ha. project 
mentioned above.  GRAIN, a non-profit NGO, maintains that all of the 18 projects were 
“suspended.”   
The interesting aspect of the intended PRC investments is that they were predomi-
nantly for palm oil for biofuels or for mixed-use crops in the Philippines.  In Indonesia, 
                                                 
220 Indicative of the factual or non-factual information regarding “land grabs.” 
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the investments are in rubber and rice.  In Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines, the PRC investments are not for grain, but rather for crops the PRC does not have 
in much quantity, rubber, and for biofuels that can reduce carbon emissions and reduce 
oil imports to a minor extent.  This allows the PRC to keep its floor level of arable land, 
120 million ha, producing rice and wheat for human consumption and meeting its 95% 
self-reliance target.  The countries supplying these products see their respective food se-
curity threatened in areas of investment and perhaps overall (the Philippines and Indone-
sia are both net importers of rice). 
Vietnam has not been a destination for agricultural FDI from the PRC to any great 
extent.  There have been rubber investments by bordering provinces and leasing of land 
to grow sweet potatoes where land rentals earn peasants more than they could earn grow-
ing them.221  Vietnam is a major supplier of rice to the PRC but on a trading basis.  
Thomas points out that there is a reservoir of ill feelings in Vietnam directed at the PRC, 
and that would increase should trade be curtailed and be replaced by extractive invest-
ment (Thomas: 2013, 549).  
ASEAN+3 cooperation has included a regional rice reserve to strengthen food se-
curity in the region, supplementing the ASEAN agreement with the same purpose.222  
The initial PRC contribution was 300,000 tons of rice (Arase: 2010, 828).  At present, 
                                                 
221 The PRC farmer raises high quality sweet potatoes for export to the Japanese market.  Few Vietnamese 
farmers are sophisticated enough to export on their own.  
 
222 The ASEAN reserve did not function during the 2008 rice crisis due to policy decisions that reduced or 
eliminated exports, despite the original intentions of the agreement. 
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member countries have commitments to supply stated quantities of rice in times of emer-
gency, including natural disasters.  Commitments are for specific amounts, not a “set-
aside” of stocks for emergency purposes.  This reduces / eliminates the need for desig-
nated supplies and the resulting storage cost and risk of degradation.223  It also raises the 
question, in off-shore farming for export and in emergency situations, as to whether a 
country experiencing a rice shortage would export to another country in a similar or 
worse situation. 
 
Africa 
As in other areas, the extent of “land grabs” in SSA is not fully known and most 
likely exaggerated.224  The fact that many governments have poor governance related to 
land tenure, government corruption is not uncommon, and there is an ongoing search for 
oil and minerals, all add to a conclusion that foreign land grabbing must be excessive.  In 
a continent that suffers from food insecurity, land grabbing for export of agriculture crops 
is not well received by civil societies at home nor by NGOs abroad.   
                                                 
223 Such a scheme may work in the event of a localized natural disaster.  However, in the case of a regional 
drought, for example, such a scheme will only further increase higher than normal prices if the contributing 
states only supply funds, not rice.  To avoid raising prices for everyone, emergency rice would have to 
come from out-of-area suppliers or state specific emergency supplies. 
224 For a good summary of the issues concerning the reliability of reported land grabs, see Marc Edelman 
“Messy Hectares: Questions about the Epistemology of Land Grabbing Data” Journal of Peasant Studies, 
40:3, 485-501. 
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In the case of the PRC, the initial reports of large-scale purchases were false.  
However, there is extensive PRC-backed agricultural activity.225  The political aspects of 
PRC involvement in Africa come from the Bandung Conference that attempted to unite 
the developing world, from the PRC’s attempt to obtain and keep diplomatic recognition 
of African states for itself rather than allow it to go to Taiwan, and from the Soviet – PRC 
competition of the 1970’s and ‘80’s.      
Starting in the 1960’s, the PRC constructed large-scale farms in Guinea, Benin, 
Togo, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Sierra Leone.  Crops included rice, tea, and sugar and 
were considered as aid by the PRC.  The success of these operations was largely depend-
ent on PRC management remaining in control of operations.226  For example, the scale of 
operation in Tanzania rose to 3200 ha. of irrigated rice fields in 1967.  Tanzanian Presi-
dent Nyerere, a socialist admirer of the PRC, eventually resorted to forced collectiviza-
tion in 1973 to assure participation by local farmers.  Within two years, output plum-
meted and food grain imports rose (Brautigam: 2011, 39).  The PRC projects, like those 
of Western countries, tended to fail when management was passed on to local officials 
(Easterly, 2006, 189-90).   Prior to the GLF, Zhou Enlai had urged Africans “that China 
was a model not ‘to emulate’ but a kind of ‘reference point’” (Brautigam: 2011, 38).  In 
the case of Tanzania, Nyerere could not be dissuaded from emulating the collective 
model, and suffering the consequences. 
                                                 
225 There have been and are substantial PRC investments in other resources in Africa, the prime examples 
being copper and cobalt in Zambia and oil in Angola. 
 
226 See Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, for details.   
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These projects were considered aid by the PRC.  Oftentimes, as with resource ex-
traction projects, infrastructure development was included.  This facilitated both the 
growing of crops as well as roads for access and ports for export.  
Taiwan followed a different path.  It built demonstration farms aimed at improv-
ing the efficacy of traditional small landowners in African countries rather than large-
scale farms (Brautigam: 2009, 688).  Following PRC admission to the UN, the PRC took 
over Taiwanese demonstration farms in states that had switched diplomatic recognition to 
the PRC.  The PRC built more of these demonstration farms as its trial-and-error ap-
proach to African aid developed.   
The second phase of PRC involvement in African agriculture involved the recon-
struction of previous projects that had fallen into disrepair following PRC exits from 
those projects.  According to a PRC official: “almost all of them without exception have 
gone through the odd cycle of ‘quick starting, quick results and quick decline’” 
(Brautigam: 2009, 692).  The PRC turned to SOEs to reverse that trend by including a 
profit motive that paved the way for continued SOE involvement following the start-up 
phase (Brautigam: 2009, 691-2).  This included the use of feasibility studies, rationalizing 
existing projects, management decentralization, and an opening to African countries to 
partially fund projects (Xu et al: 2016, 83).227     
From 1987 through 1995 exports from SSA to the PRC tended to be in cash crops 
-- cotton and tobacco--sourced from individual farms, and an increasing amount of tree 
                                                 
227 In 2007 the PRC agreed to provide irrigation for 250,000 ha. of maize in Zimbabwe.  The project was 
cancelled when Zimbabwe failed to make its financial contribution to the project.  This is indicative of the 
revised approach both in terms of project rationalization, host country funding, and the profit motive. 
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nuts and cocoa, as well as periodic shipments of grains from the major grain producers, 
Zimbabwe (at the time) and South Africa. There were shipments of sugar from states 
with PRC-financed sugar operations as well as shipments to Europe that could be im-
ported duty free from Africa.  
The current agricultural activities in Africa are centered around the Agricultural 
Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDC), and reflect the cumulative learning of the 
PRC experience in Africa to date.  This program was announced in 2006 in conjunction 
with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).  The creation of the demonstra-
tion center involves three stages: 1) Infrastructure development for the center for two 
years. 2)  Technical cooperation for three years, the key to the plan.  This involves 
demonstrating methods and techniques superior to the existing practice that will improve 
output and that will be spread beyond the immediate area to other parts of the country. 3) 
A program on sound financial footing that will allow ongoing operation.  This involves 
the sale of superior seeds and farm implements to local farmers (Xu et al: 2106, 84, 88).  
Ultimately, there is mixture of aid and sustainable business.  The ADTCs are representa-
tive of PRC soft power even though they are ultimately a money-making operation run by 
SOEs.   
However, problems continue to exist with ADTCs.  Xu et al examine four, one 
each in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique and find among other things:  
1) Satisfying the expected results of PRC state organizations, PRC provincial organiza-
tions, and host government organizations is difficult.  2) The PRC believes that its exper-
tise lies in rice and not maize; therefore an emphasis on rice where an emphasis on maize 
is needed results in a mismatch between expertise and needs.  3) Extension activities are 
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expected from the host government and are inconsistent.  4) Locals prefer local rice that 
is “better” than hybrid rice; therefore, the better yield of the hybrid does not matter.  5) 
Who can/will buy advanced (relatively) technology? (Xu et al: 2016, 87-8).  In summary: 
“As a platform for a whole array of activities, the Centres provide an important symbol of 
Chinese development experience and perceptions. As a future model for agricultural de-
velopment, these first phases of the ATDCs have been an important learning experience, 
but there will be challenges to achieve full commercialization and a business platform 
that can fund aid activities” (Xu et al: 2016, 89).  
The PRC has not made land mobile for food products in Africa. According to the 
Land Matrix, the PRC (state or provincial owned enterprises) has 24 agricultural projects 
(excluding ADTCs) in SSA covering just over 150,000 ha.228  Two are for biofuels, two 
produce mixed food/biofuel crops, and the remaining 20 produce food crops.229  FAO im-
port and export data show no meaningful or sustained exports from SSA to the PRC for 
wheat, rice, soybeans, or maize.  Cotton continues to be a major export to the PRC as 
well as sesame seeds and cocoa230. 
                                                 
228 This excludes private investment by PRC individuals, many of whom were laborers for PRC aid projects 
who decided to stay in Africa. 
 
229 There is one PRC logging operation according to the Land Matrix, in Liberia covering 10,000 ha. 
 
230 It should be noted that Brautigam mentions that the PRC uses resource-secured loans to finance aid pro-
jects in some instances.  In the case of a dam built in Ghana, the compensation for the construction included 
the export of 40,000 tons of cocoa beans, annually over the course of the 20 year loan (Brautigam: 2011a, 
212).  This compensatory trade, development goods and services for local products also involved oil from 
Angola, minerals from Congo, and copper from Zambia, among others (Brautigam: 2011,55).  Local prod-
ucts could also be used to repay loans. 
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Brautigam offers four conclusions concerning the PRC in SSA.  First, there is a 
small but growing involvement of public and private investment in SSA agriculture.  Sec-
ond, the use of contract growing (outgrowing) has been occurring and is increasing but is 
not a possible source of food security for the PRC. Third, SSA issues with infrastructure 
and inefficient governance will keep investment down. Finally, SSA governments and 
private citizens are increasingly involved in JVs with and learning from the PRC 
(Bratigam: 2013, 1690-1).  
A fitting example of the complicated issue of “land grabs” and/or development 
opportunities in SSA can be seen in the example of rice production in Mozambique.  
Horta and Brautigam have engaged in a running dispute over PRC involvement in agri-
culture in Mozambique.231  The question boils down to whether the PRC is investing in 
the Zambesi Valley of Mozambique to increase rice production to 500,000 from 100,000 
tons annually in order to export the increment to the PRC as local demand is only 
100,000 tons, the position Horta takes.  Brautigam maintains that the PRC objective is to 
provide rice domestically so that imports can be reduced as domestic demand is 500,000 
tons.  Based on FAO Statistics, production, import, and export data from Mozambique, 
there has been an improvement in rice production in Mozambique to 149,000 (2012-13) 
with a peak of 264,000 (2010-11) from 107,000 tons (a two-year average of 1994-5).  Im-
ports have increased to 453,000 tons in 2013 from 51,000 tons in 1994.  Imports have 
come primarily from Thailand and Pakistan, some has come from the PRC.  Exports, 3% 
                                                 
231 Horta’s initial article and his response to Brautigam’s critique are at http://csis.org/publication/zambezi-
valley-chinas-first-agricultural-colony.  Brautigam’s article is at http://www.chinaafricare-
alstory.com/2012/01/zambezivalleychinasfirst.html 
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of total imports, have all gone to SSA countries plus Bangladesh.  There are none to the 
PRC.  Brautigam was correct. 
Whatever incremental agricultural production occurs in Africa increases the world 
output and therefore indirectly helps with PRC food self-sufficiency.  If Mozambique can 
become self-reliant in rice, that is 400,000 tons more than the world has today. 
 
Russia – No Need to Grab 
In the Russian Far East (RFE), there is no reason to grab land; there is lots of it, 
there are few people, and the Russian government is fairly agreeable to permitting PRC 
investments and labor to work in its far backyard.  The total RFE population (of Russian 
citizens) is somewhere around 7 million.  The population of Heilongjiang, the PRC prov-
ince bordering the eastern-most area of RFE has a population of nearly 40 million.  The 
three provinces closest to the RFE, including Heilongjiang, have a population in excess 
of 100 million.  This presents an opportunity to use abundant PRC assets, labor and capi-
tal, on abundant RFE land to increase the food supply for the PRC and Northeast Asia; an 
opportunity that would benefit both countries. 
Following the breakup of the USSR, there was a flood of Russians that departed 
the RFE for more hospitable parts of Russia.  The state farms were broken up and land 
was given to the occupants of those farms.  The RFE was an exception as redistribution 
did not occur.  The PRC had, since the 1980s, provided labor support to RFE farms.  This 
accelerated in the 1990s due to the outmigration as Russians sought better living condi-
tions.  The RFE government had no problem with leasing the land that was not redistrib-
uted, but did so with an extreme bias in favor or large-scale operations.  However, this 
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did not prevent leases to individuals, generally of PRC origin but from other parts of the 
world as well.232 
Consistent with “going out” larger PRC companies, private and province owned, 
started operations through purchase of existing Russian operations or leasing land.  This 
included Beidahuang, a company also involved in South America.  However, much of the 
produce was used to feed the existing population of RFE due to transportation costs 
(Zhou: 2015, 9-15). 
FAO export data from Russia to PRC and PRC import data from Russia, through 
2013, is consistent with the RFE consumption thesis.  PRC vegetable imports from Rus-
sia are small, perhaps representing the degree of small acreage farming operations or lo-
cal consumption.  Large-scale farming requires development time which may be the rea-
son that they fail to register in PRC imports to any great extent.  Noticeably absent is the 
lack of pig meat imports. A PRC company began operating a hog farm, in Russia, close 
to the border in 2001 (Stanway: 2013), yet there are essentially no pig meat imports from 
Russia. 
While this situation may be a perfect pairing of resources, there is a lingering fear 
of “sino-zation” of RFE.  Nonetheless, it also fits into Russia plans to create a “Far East 
Grain Corridor” capable of producing, for export, 10 million tons of grain per year by 
2020 (Zhou: 2015, 13).  Provided there are sufficient export facilities, Korea and Japan 
could be beneficiaries of such a plan in addition to the PRC. 
 
                                                 
232 As with other agricultural FDI in other parts of the world, specific information on foreign investment 
tends to be anecdotal and should not be used to identify the quantity of lands used by the PRC in Russia.      
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Australia and the “China Threat” 
As a developed country with a functioning legal system, Australia is an FDI desti-
nation country.  Following the 2008 grain price increases, it became a destination for 
SWFs, private investment, and public investment from Brazil, USA, Canada, Dubai, Ja-
pan, UK, Singapore, Switzerland, Qatar, South Korea, Spain, and the PRC, among others.  
Australian companies were actively involved also. The investment targets ranged from 
existing agri-business companies to farms to vacant land.  “Australia offered these inves-
tors high quality production assets, relaxed government regulations, significant export 
surplus, favourable fundamentals and proximity to growing Asian demand." This was ev-
idenced by $12 billion (Australian) in agriculture investments over the previous four 
years (Lamont and Manning: 2011, 4).  
The Australian Foreign Investment Review Board was responsible for approving 
foreign investments that exceeded A$231 million.  Lesser amounts were reviewed by 
mid-level Treasury officials (Cai: 2013, 6).233  As with Brazil, Australia was concerned 
about SOE investment. They were major investors in Australian resources and ultimately 
reported to the CCP, thus creating the question of normal commercial transactions vs. 
PRC strategic interests.  This issue was addressed by a “national interest test,” a set of 
criteria that, it appears, can be weighted differently for differing investments.  It could 
                                                 
233 In contrast, New Zealand officials must approve all foreign land purchases exceeding five ha. 
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also be used to resolve issues with creative solutions.  By 2008, the Board was required to 
approve all SOE and SWF investment applications (Cai: 2013, 6).234 
PRC acquisitions include land for organic dairy farms, the largest farm in Aus-
tralia--Cubbie Station--and 13,000 ha. along the Ord River in Western Australia.  This is 
a fifty-year lease arrangement that includes the construction of a sugar mill.  It is in an 
area that Australia hopes to develop into a prime agricultural “food bowl” (Clarke: 2012).  
Approval is not always granted to PRC companies. Shanghai Pengxin, a private com-
pany, was rejected on national security grounds from purchasing Australia’s largest pri-
vately owned tract of 101,000 sq. kilometers.  Part of the purchase included military test-
ing grounds (Elliot: 2015, 28).   
Perhaps the most interesting question is why the Australians themselves had not 
invested in food production for export rather than deferring to non-Australians.  “Aus-
tralia is a capital-hungry country that is in desperate need of foreign investment, espe-
cially in the agricultural sector” (Cai: 2013,6).  It was the lack of domestic capital that led 
to the sale of Cubbie Station. If it had not been sold, it would have closed (Cai: 2013,6).  
Capital may be the ultimate answer.  Another might be that like their counterparts in the 
PRC, the farmer might wish to live in a city rather than the countryside. 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 When the Australia-PRC FTA went into effect in 2015, Australia raised the FIRB approval level to 
A$1094 million for non-sensitive investments.  Agri-business and agricultural land investments will all be 
reviewed at a lower threshold level, and all SOE investments will be reviewed (China-Australia FTA).  
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Conclusion 
 
The going out strategy started out under Jiang and was focused on non-agricul-
tural firms to go out and be involved in the world economy.  Under the export-led devel-
opment model, foreign firms came to the PRC to manufacture and/or to sell in the PRC 
market.  The emphasis under Hu was expanded to include agriculture and included in-
vestment in foreign agri-businesses and to obtain crops from overseas for domestic con-
sumption, either through farming or through increased involvement in the agri-business 
supply chains.  Success in the agriculture ventures can be measured in several ways:  1) 
Growing crops and bringing them back to the PRC for consumption; 2) Improving the ag-
ricultural output of countries so that the world supply is increased, thereby making more 
crops available to be purchased in the world markets; 3) Growing non-grain crops over-
seas so that domestic land can be used for grain; and, 4) By inserting PRC companies into 
grain supply chains.  This allows needed grains to be purchased directly from the growers 
or by purchasing companies that can alter their sales patterns to include exports to the 
PRC.  
In the cases that we have examined, the results are mixed.  In the cases of Russia 
and Africa, PRC farmers in Russia are improving food output for consumption in the 
RFE.  In SSA, it is PRC aid that is attempting to do the same.  In Australia, we see exam-
ples of green-field investment for products that will be shipped back to the PRC as well 
as the “food bowl” concept of the Australian government to create food from land that 
only the PRC has contracted to develop.  Russia’s “Far Eastern Grain Corridor” is similar 
in concept but not past the talking stage.  In the case of Cambodia, and probably under 
development in Laos, is growing mixed-use crops on foreign lands for biofuels so that 
304 
 
food crops can be grown in the PRC for food security.  Cambodia exported 22 million 
and 51 million tons of cassava to the PRC in 2012 and 2013, respectively.  That number 
will increase and the plantation organization is expected to have a negative impact on lo-
cal food security. 
The case in South America is one based on demand and not supply.  When the de-
mand is there, the supply will follow.  Prohibition of large-scale land purchases led the 
PRC to focus on less capital intensive soybean collection from local farms, then pro-
cessing, and shipping to the PRC.  In response to growing PRC imports, the ha. of soy-
beans harvested increased by 5.9 million between 2006 and 2013.  This increase did not 
displace other crops as the total ha. harvested for all of Brazil increased by 10 million.  
The same occurred in Argentina where soybean ha. harvested increased by 4.3 million 
while total ha. harvested increased by 5.9 million.  Given the increase in total ha. har-
vested, it can safely be assumed that this was new output on previously unused land. 
The case of Brazil and Argentina has been successful for the soybean supply for 
the PRC.  There, as in Australia and the Philippines, these countries reacted to the invest-
ment attempts of the PRC, as well as other countries and SWFs, by more strictly control-
ling foreign investment in agricultural lands.  Japan, Korea, and private companies had 
been engaging in similar activities long before 2008.  The China threat seems to be the 
factor that led to more control over domestic agricultural lands.  However, in the case of 
the Philippines, Australia, and for a while, Brazil, all suffered from a lack of capital to in-
vest in agricultural projects.  Such situations need creative solutions that play a role in 
improving Philippine food security (a demonstrable need) and Australian agricultural 
305 
 
projects, both of which increase world food security and therefore PRC food security in-
directly.   
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Chapter VII - CONCLUSION 
 
There are several themes that run through the story of achieving and maintaining 
food security in the PRC and its interaction with foreign policy.  First, agriculture needed 
to fill three distinct roles in the PRC: food for the population, raw materials for industry, 
and a source of FX.  Second, the overall view of the CCP was that food security was to 
be generated by domestic actions: land redistribution, the HRS, and the PGRS.  However, 
recent trends indicate that further domestic supply may be insufficient.  Third, since Mao, 
there has been a loosening of state control of some aspects of life and the use of incen-
tives rather than coercion to improve grain outputs.  Finally, PRC foreign policy is a re-
flection of domestic conditions and interests.  That brought the international system into 
play, a system where the PRC is a major player, and served to limit trading partners and 
the items that could or would be traded.  In keeping with the format already in use, we 
will draw conclusions on food security from the constituent parts of the food paradigm; 
domestic politics, the state-society relationship, and economic development.  We will 
then look at the foreign policy aspects of achieving food security and how these two, food 
security and foreign policy, interacted in achieving and maintaining food security.  
 
Domestic Politics 
 
Overall, domestic politics began as a totalitarian state (complete subservience to 
the state) in 1949 and has moved to an authoritarian state (strict obedience to authority), 
beginning with Deng’s rule.  Food security has improved whenever incentives were cre-
ated.  The land redistribution under Mao and the HRS system under Deng are the two 
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prime examples.  Deng’s adjustments included price incentives and multiple market 
channels.  Coercion had the opposite effect.  The move to collectivization caused falling 
output and famine.  Under Jiang’s time at the top of the PRC, the PGRS employed com-
pellance but it was modified through the use of price incentives.    
   The nature of the totalitarian state made matters worse when coercion was used 
to force change.  Under Mao, top-down planning put central bureaucrats in charge of ag-
riculture decisions best made by farmers who knew what and when to plant.  The GLF 
famine was worse than it might have been as officials exaggerated production results for 
fear of retribution, thereby leading to decisions not based on reality.  The compellance as-
pect of the PGRS (in an authoritarian state) was executed at the provincial level and that 
at least put decision-making closer to farmer than was the case under Mao. 
As the state transitioned to an authoritative one, we see a movement away from 
Marxism to an ideology with a more liberal bent, albeit within an overall realist approach.  
The dividing line was Deng’s ascent to power.  Mao’s first move was redistribution of 
farmland, a very Marxist attempt at equalizing society by allocating the holdings of the 
wealthy to the poor.  It was successful in increasing grain output as the peasant was able 
to fully enjoy the fruits of his labor after taxes, an incentive to which the peasant re-
sponded.  Collectivization, the epitome of Marxism, led to a decrease in output as the in-
centive for increased production led to a free-rider issue, among other things. 
Deng stepped away from Marxism with the dissolution of the commune and the 
implementation of the HRS, a decidedly non-egalitarian approach.  To get rich was now 
the mantra and the peasant was the first to enjoy this.  Choice of what to plant was intro-
duced along with financial incentives.  This was consistent with liberalism, relying on a 
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bottom-up approach to generate incremental output.  This situation worked well but ran 
into problems when peasants began to choose to plant cash crops at the expense of grain.  
The result was a reduction in choice of what to plant and was implemented via the PGRS.  
Financial incentives were retained but were limited in grain surplus provinces and ad-
justed as necessary to encourage planting of what the Provincial Governors thought was 
best.     
The total output of wheat, rice, maize, and soybeans grew to 563 million tons in 
2014 from 80 million in 1952, a seven-fold increase.235  The organization of agricultural 
society has been a trial-and-error evolution.  Science, the development of better seeds, 
and incentives have been major sources of increased output.  Yet, the increase was not 
enough.  The population had grown 2.5 times.  The PRC imported these grains annually 
from 1960.  It was not self-reliant but self-sufficient.  In 1996, it officially lowered its 
self-reliance factor to 95%.  A major reason for this was decreasing arable land.  Arable 
land in 2013 was only 42% of the amount in 1950.  By 2006, maintaining arable land at 
an absolute minimum of 120 million ha was a national priority. 
   
State-Society Relationship 
 
The state-society relationship ebbed and flowed just as domestic politics did.  The 
government took over responsibility for the cradle-to-grave needs of urban citizens via 
the danwei.  Personal choice was limited.  Urban rationing of foodstuffs controlled de-
mand, and citizens were watched lest someone exhibit anti-CCP behavior. For the urban 
                                                 
235 Soybean production was not reported until 1961. 
309 
 
population, the state provided all it considered necessary.  Rural residents, the majority of 
the population, were left on their own, prior to collectivization.  The hukou system of reg-
istration prevented unwanted movement to urban areas from rural ones.  The rural popu-
lation was needed to remain in agriculture to produce food for urbanites, raw materials 
for industry, and food for export.  
Deng both imposed and removed the state from daily life.  The state involvement 
reached its height with the implementation of the one-child policy, aimed primarily at ur-
ban residents.  The implementation of this draconian policy was the fear of the state that 
it would be unable to feed the population should the rate of growth continue.  It was a 
possibility from the earliest times of the PRC but not used until the spurt of growth dur-
ing the GPCR.  Nearly coincident with the one-child policy was the dissolution of the 
collectives and the redistribution of commune land.  The state may have entered the bed-
rooms of society, but it also provided choice in economic endeavors that had been miss-
ing since 1957-8, a continuation of the totalitarian state.  
The pursuit of modernization provided citizens with more choices and opportuni-
ties as well as fears.  Modernization demanded skills that required more education, much 
of which was to be obtained overseas with only minimal caveats.  More labor was needed 
for the SEZs, and that led to migration opportunities for rural residents despite the exist-
ence of hukou.  Wages increased, but so did the cost of living.  The hukou was part of the 
totalitarian state, and as time passed it became more of an authoritarian tool that was used 
only to keep the floating population under control in the major cities.  It still is in use, but 
is less stringent than it was originally.    
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Among the improvements, there were setbacks.  Farmers lost land and were paid 
in IOUs due to mishandling of monetary resources and greed by those in charge or out-
right corruption.  Employees of bankrupt SOEs lost their pensions or pensions were re-
duced as were the benefits provided by the danwei.  Pollution--land, air, and water--has 
become a major health concern with little hope in sight.  Poisonous foods have created 
scandals and reduced societal trust.  It is in the lack of trust in the authorities to follow 
through on the social contract with SOE employees and the expansion of corruption and 
deceit that has caused the major loss of trust and increasing demonstrations against this 
behavior in rural areas throughout the country (The Economist: 9/29/2005 and 
1/28/2012).  The absence of civil society organizations, beyond what the government per-
mits, prevents grievances to be heard and addressed until the demonstrations develop…or 
not at all. 
Finally, in 2015 the one-child policy was relaxed and increased to two, albeit with 
penalties should that limit be exceeded.  Whether or not this relaxation will help alleviate 
the issues the one-child policy caused is questionable.  The demographic transition is in 
full swing in the PRC.  One-child may be the choice of child-bearing women today. 
 
Economic Development 
The original emphasis on economic development was on heavy industry.  Steel 
production became a measure of development rather than what was made from that steel.  
The failure of the GLF made agriculture the priority.  This led to seed development and 
increased fertilizer use but not to economic development.  If development was to be done 
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domestically, the choice Mao made in backing away from the Soviets, the road to mod-
ernization would be quite long. 
Deng’s adoption of the export-led development model was a fortuitous and neces-
sary change of development strategy.236  It paved the way for FX earnings from PRC as-
sembled and manufactured goods far beyond what agricultural commodities could earn.  
Once these foreign investments started exporting, the fiscal need for the PRC to be self-
reliant in grain was obsolete as it was then able to purchase what it needed without run-
ning an FX deficit.  It could be self-sufficient, if desired. 
It is with the change of development strategies that we see a shift towards capital-
ism and liberalism in the PRC.  Capitalism was invited into the country to take advantage 
of low wages and a population that was, on the whole, non-productive economically.  
Teaming up with PRC companies (SOEs) FX was generated, employment and wages in-
creased, new skills and technologies were introduced for future use, and possibly best of 
all, it was done with other people’s money.  All-in-all, it was a major success and one that 
has created unprecedented growth in moving people out of poverty in a short period of 
time.  Eventually, this led to domestic entrepreneurs emerging to create new economic 
opportunities.  There became a viable bottom-up aspect of economic growth based on in-
dividual incentive, completely consistent with liberalism.  However, this has not solved 
the problem of inefficient SOEs, something the government is reluctant to tackle due to 
the social benefits they continue to provide. 
                                                 
236 The case can be made that this was the most important decision in China in the 20th century.  
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Under Jiang, the PRC joined the WTO, a necessity for export-led economic devel-
opment. This further ingrained liberal ideas of free trade as well as requiring adherence to 
the rules and norms of the trade regime it joined.      
The downside to economic development, as far as it relates to agriculture, is the 
loss of arable land to grow crops.  Transportation, housing, and recreation, among other 
land needs, have dramatically cut into arable land.  This is complicated by the fact that 
prime agricultural land is located where much of the population and competing demands 
are located. 
Even with self-sufficiency, there is concern over domestic grain production as ev-
idenced by the continuing emphasis on agriculture in the annual No. 1 Document.  Secu-
ritization of arable land at a minimum of 120 million ha. is the amount the government 
believes is necessary, not to be self-reliant, but to maintain a reasonable level of self-reli-
ance in a world of self-sufficiency.  Maintaining this level is a challenge. 
A key policy decision by Jiang was for PRC businesses to “go out” and expand 
their exports to the rest of the world and to expand their investments abroad and opera-
tions abroad.  The export-led economy that started under Deng needed to be expanded 
into more advanced products that could be found overseas at the source of marketing, 
manufacturing, and technological innovation.  This is an explicit statement by Jiang that 
further economic advancement would need to rely more directly on what was being done 
abroad rather than depending on the portion done abroad and brought to the PRC.   
Hu took going out a step further and emphasized agriculture. After all, economic 
development was decreasing arable land, and there was more overseas than at home. The 
PRC was generally unable to acquire land overseas to plant crops for consumption at 
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home.  It has managed, to an extent, to use the going out strategy to improve total agricul-
ture production.  It is not an increment for the PRC but for the world.  It is an absolute 
improvement but not a relative one.  “Going out” is another example of creeping eco-
nomic liberalism.  
 
Foreign Policy 
 
The PRC’s approach to foreign policy is “diplomacy is an extension of internal 
affairs.” It follows that we can see elements of its food security in its foreign policies.   
Foreign policy can be divided into two different planes, international politics or high poli-
tics, and low politics or trade.  In the post-WWII era, until the dissolution of the USSR, 
high politics revolved around the Soviet-sponsored East Bloc and the US-led West Bloc.  
The PRC was a player in this game.  It was aligned with the Soviets, then in opposition to 
both Blocs, followed by a tacit alignment with the US for defensive purposes, all under 
Mao.  Several years into Deng’s rule, the USSR and PRC began mending fences, and the 
PRC pursued an independent foreign policy.  Alignment with either Blocs served to limit 
trading opportunities.  There was little trade between the US and USSR and trade rela-
tions between members of opposing Blocs were limited, but greater than US – USSR 
trade.  Low politics was restrained by high politics.  But low politics was a tool that could 
be used to influence or signal (dis)satisfaction with high politics as the PRC pursued its 
own interests.  
For the PRC, food security and international trade created issues based either on 
need or on opportunity.  Need refers to either short-term real needs or long-term per-
ceived needs.  Opportunity refers to its choice of states to trade with, and that can be used 
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to influence or signal PRC intentions and/or (dis)satisfaction with other states’ policies.  
These can take place within the normal interdependent trade relations or when special sit-
uations arise.  
There are three cases of need where the international community contributed or is 
contributing to PRC food security.  First, of course, are the West’s and Argentina’s ship-
ments of wheat and maize to reduce the impact of collectivization and GLF-caused fam-
ine, a short-term real need.  Second is the developing situation of sourcing grain from 
overseas via investment in other countries, primarily done by Hu extending the “going 
out” strategy to agriculture.  The purpose is to satisfy long-term perceived needs for a sta-
ble food supply that included foreign-sourced grains, to meet increasing demand.  We 
have seen that the PRC is not generally involved in land grabs, other than in Laos and 
Cambodia.  It was legislated out of land acquisitions in Brazil and Argentina and has 
changed its approach to act as a grain merchandizer, buying direct from farmers and ship-
ping soybeans back to the PRC.  In Australia, it has bought and leased land to grow crops 
and transport them back to home.  In the case of leased land, they are bringing unculti-
vated land into cultivation and thereby increasing world output, a positive situation in any 
case.  In the RFE, mainly individual PRC citizens have been growing crops in Russia for 
consumption in Russia.  This is another case of increasing production, this time in an area 
where production had declined following the fall of the USSR.  In Africa, after various 
attempts to involve itself in African agriculture, the use of small-scale demonstration 
farms is now the chosen method to increase output.  These activities are all efforts to pro-
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duce more crops worldwide, in some cases for the PRC itself and in some cases to in-
crease world supply that will be an indirect benefit to the PRC.  Both types of efforts ad-
dress the long-term concerns the PRC has for its own food security.   
The third area where need comes into play, at least indirectly, resulted from rap-
prochement with the US.  This gave the PRC access to the US breadbasket.  A grain-inse-
cure state would want access to the leading grain trading state.  This would have benefits 
economically as the greater competition for sales to the PRC held out the possibility 
oflower prices.237  For the PRC, it reduced the possibility of the US influencing members 
of the West Bloc to abstain from selling grain to the PRC for international political rea-
sons. 
Normal interdependent trade was important to the PRC in order to generate FX, 
and agriculture products were needed to accomplish this until the development strategy 
changed.  It was limited by the international political situation.  As an East Bloc member, 
trade within the Bloc was generally on a barter basis, and did not generate needed FX.  
The soybean exports to Western Europe generated scarce FX.  Trade with Japan was ini-
tially on a barter basis, but the exchange terms were better than those within the East 
Bloc.  The role of Hong Kong as a transshipment port for PRC grain crops grew steadily 
over time and contributed FX.    
As long as there was grain to ship or grain to purchase, there were opportunities to 
influence, signal, reward, or punish other states when it benefitted PRC interests.  In 
                                                 
237  The actual amount of grain would only be increased when new acreage was planted in grain-producing 
countries.  Though the US was not selling to the PRC, its production was already part of the world supply 
and therefore included in the international prices.  Only competition for sales to the PRC could lower 
prices.  
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Mao’s case, there is also another reason; Mao used grain as an instrument of spite.  When 
faced with criticism by Khrushchev on his collectivization plans, his general dislike of 
the Soviet leader, and his own ego, caused Mao to leave the Soviet orbit.  In the midst of 
his collectivization and falling grain output, he repaid Soviet loans with his scarce com-
modity, grain.  Subsequently, some grain purchased from abroad was transferred to Alba-
nia since Albania was quarreling with Moscow.  Mao punished his own people.   
Mao also used the grain to further punish (or irritate) the Soviets and influence 
members of its Bloc.  The PRC sold rice to the Cubans between 1961 and 1969 and 
bought sugar from them.  It is reasonable to conclude that Mao was attempting to demon-
strate that PRC communism was superior to the Soviet version and to lure Castro into al-
lying with the PRC rather than the Soviets.238  Other than with Cuba, and a bit with Alba-
nia, all trade with the East Bloc stopped after 1962, a signal to the East Bloc that the PRC 
did not need them. 
To make up for the loss of East Bloc markets, the PRC began to focus more on 2nd 
Ring states, particularly on Japan and Malaysia, and Sri Lanka (as Ceylon was known af-
ter 1972).  The latter two were sources of rubber as well as buyers of PRC grain.  Rela-
tions with SE Asia were negatively influenced by Mao’s pursuit / support of communist 
revolts in several of those countries.  
On the import side, Argentina continued as a maize supplier and a sometime 
wheat supplier.  This, of course, presented an opportunity, as opposed to need, to con-
tinue trade with all of the suppliers that helped to relieve the GLF famine.  Argentina was 
                                                 
238 It can also be explained by normal interdependent trade, rice for sugar; trading of which you have in ex-
cess for that that you need.  This trade stopped in 1969 when the Sino-Soviet disputes turned hot. 
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a politically less sensitive state than any other states from the West.  While Canada and 
Australia continued as consistent wheat suppliers, following rapprochement the PRC 
made large purchases of maize and wheat from the US between 1972 and 1974, a reward 
for political progress between the two.  Purchases from the US then stopped for three 
years.  This was the time of intense internal PRC conflict between the Gang of Four and 
the less radical forces that eventually toppled the Gang.  Australia, Canada, and France 
were less politically sensitive than the US, a reflection of domestic policy influencing for-
eign policy.  Similarly, Brazil, a developing country, was more politically tolerable than 
the US for soybeans and consistent with the south-south orientation of the PRC.  Ship-
ments from the US restarted under Deng in 1978.   
      Deng followed a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policy, and he used the 
opportunity to influence other states with trade in a pragmatic manner.  The HRS pro-
duced more grain that enabled it to be used in trade and potentially as influence.  The ex-
port-oriented economy told the world that the PRC was open for business and that eco-
nomic development, not revolutionary fervor, was to be the way forward.    This removed 
the political threat that existed under Mao and allowed the 2nd Ring to become a major 
importer of PRC soybeans and maize.  South Korea, which would become a major trad-
ing partner, initially received grain imports via Hong Kong, a surreptitious transaction 
that would delight the South Koreans as it would be behind the back of the North.   
We have seen how Deng punished the US, France, and the Netherlands for arms 
sales to Taiwan.  The US suffered less than the others; it was a superpower militarily, 
economically, and agriculturally.  Deng also demonstrated good intentions by renewing 
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grain trade relations with the Soviets. That included an element of influence that eventu-
ally led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, a necessity for Deng’s independ-
ent foreign policy.  Trade re-started with Vietnam late in Deng’s tenure.  New grain cus-
tomers included Iran and Libya.  The PRC was getting more and more dependent on for-
eign oil, so being a supplier of grains to these countries was a method of strengthening 
the trade relationship. 
The expansion of grain exports began in 1995 and continued under Jiang.  The 
HRS output improvement increased the opportunities to use grain sales for influence.  
Jiang’s PGRS spurred output after several less-than-acceptable harvests, and by 1997 the 
PRC was again a net grain exporter, due in large part to a substantial decrease in wheat 
imports.  Despite exports to the Soviets and MENA, the real strength in exports was to 
the 2nd Ring.  During Jiang’s term of office, 1994-2003, of the PRC’s exports, approxi-
mately 100% of maize, 61% of rice, and 85% of soybean went to 2nd Ring countries.  
More than 99% of rice imports came from SE Asia (FAO Statistics Data Base).   
Second Ring countries were the natural trading partner of the PRC.  Yet, there 
were political issues developing with the Philippines and other SE Asian states over the 
SCS, and they continue today.   Under Jiang’s watch, this did not affect PRC food secu-
rity or affect the grain trade in the area.  However, it cannot be said that it helped PRC re-
lations with SE Asia.  Rather, it served to prod ASEAN states bordering the SCS into 
searching for outside powers to remain involved in the area. 
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The PRC was an active participant in the “rice crisis” of 2008, following the rest 
of the rice producing countries in banning exports in fear of inadequate supplies and do-
mestic inflationary pressures.239  This prompted Hu’s going out strategy for agriculture 
that started in the land grab direction and ended up with a less intrusive, and less contro-
versial solution that benefitted both the supplying country and the PRC.  Not all foreign 
efforts turned out to raise total worldwide production.  PRC attempts in the Philippines 
created a backlash against the PRC, no doubt a Philippine reaction to the SCS crisis.  An 
alternative solution, as happened in South America, was not pursued.  
 
The Future 
 
For a country with 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of its arable land, 
the challenge of food security for the PRC will continue, as the world population is ex-
pected to rise 50% by 2050.  Activities that increase world output are welcomed by all.  
In this section we address three interrelated issues concerning the present and de-
veloping challenges facing the world and its food security.  Second we will look at how 
these problems will affect the combination of PRC foreign policy and its trade, primarily 
agricultural trade.  Finally, we will look at issues that may be the solution, or at least miti-
gate food security issues. 
 
 
                                                 
239This was not an issue in the PRC.  The output of the four grains in question was the highest of all times.  
Rice output increase by five million tons from 2007, but was 5% below the highest level of rice output at 
the time, in 1997. 
320 
 
Food Security Challenges 
Of the challenges the world faces, three prominent issues will have an effect on 
food security.  These issues will impact various countries and regions differently but will 
be felt worldwide.  First, is the issue of climate change, the warming of the planet, an is-
sue that affects worldwide agriculture.  Climate change, caused by the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, of which the burning of fossil fuels for power is con-
sidered the major source, presents a number of problems that will affect agriculture 
around the world.  Cropping patterns will have to adjust to a warming climate, the grow-
ing seasons will change as will precipitation patterns.  Extreme weather events are ex-
pected to increase in frequency and intensity.  On the other hand, the use of grain and 
other plant types can be used to replace the use of fossil fuels for some types of energy.  
This presents an interesting tradeoff; is climate change to be reduced or delayed by using 
arable land to grow raw materials for “green” fuels or should that land be used to grow 
crops for human consumption in a world where the total population is expected to grow 
by 50% in a little more than 35 years?  This is a decision that individual countries will 
probably make given their commitments to reducing fossil fuel emissions, the state of 
their food security, and the condition of their economy. The decision will be heavily in-
fluenced by the market prices of crops, energy, and the alternative uses of land.  President 
Hu’s policy of balanced growth has made the environmental considerations part of in-
vestment decision making process in the PRC.  Subsequently, Xi’s recognition that food 
security must be an integral part of PRC non-traditional security concerns, acknowledges 
that if not adequately addressed it could threaten the legitimacy of the CCP, if not its ex-
istence.   
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Second, just as the PRC has lost arable land to economic development, the same 
can be expected in other developing countries.  South Asia (India, Pakistan, and Bangla-
desh) accounts for approximately 23% of the world population and in total only about 
34% in urbanized (CIA FactBook).  Increasing urbanization in South Asia and Africa will 
reduce arable land as it did in the PRC, though the extent remains uncertain.  Economic 
development will probably result in less food output. 
Third, as mentioned above, there is the continued growth in population.  The PRC 
used the one-child policy to slow the rate of population growth.  Most likely, this will not 
be possible in a democracy such as India, soon to be the most populous country.  How-
ever, increased urbanization, according to Demographic Transition Theory, should reduce 
the birth rate and the rate of population growth over the long term. 
 
PRC Foreign Policy and Meeting Food Security Challenges 
With the challenges mentioned above, how does PRC foreign policy interact with 
its food security?  The PRC has committed to being a continuing importer of grain to 
meet its food security needs.  Other countries have done the same, but not with the scale 
of demand that the PRC has.  In 2012 and 2013 it was a net importer of all four of the 
grains we are discussing.  The PRC has decreased its dependency on the US for soybeans 
by diversifying its sources, politically and geographically, but is increasing its total de-
pendency by planting and producing substantially less than demand.  It has decreased its 
dependence on the West for wheat by increasing yields.  Its dependence on countries near 
and far for maize has been reduced by planting and producing more.  It has increased its 
dependency on rice in the ASEAN countries.  Most ASEAN countries are wary of PRC 
322 
 
power and intentions.  Yet, it is some of these countries that may become the most im-
portant grain suppliers to the PRC as Vietnam and Thailand, are major rice producers.  
The use of soft power may be a method that maintains sources of imports and increases 
the availability of grains, especially in SE Asia.   
While grain imports grow and exports decrease, this limits, but does not mean that 
the PRC’s grain trade cannot be used to reward, punish, or influence other countries.  Re-
wards and influence still continue via imports to a greater extent than before and poten-
tially have greater influence potential as they contribute to the national income of the ex-
porting country.  The only limiting aspect is the number of countries than can provide the 
quantities the PRC will need.  In 2013, the PRC imported 20.7% of the world’s soybean 
production and that accounted for 59.7% of the world’s exports.  Outside of the top four 
soybean producing countries, PRC imports exceeded the production of all other countries 
by 34% (FAO Data Base).  For rice, the PRC both imports and exports providing the op-
portunity for its trade to reward, punish, and influence other states.  Most imports and ex-
ports are with 2nd Ring states but in 2012-13 the PRC imported nearly one million tons of 
rice from Pakistan.  It was an attempt to influence the Pakistanis, a long-time US ally, as 
US relations with India, Pakistan’s enemy, improved.  
The PRC has used soft power most dramatically by entering into business ar-
rangements with Brazil and Argentina to purchase and process soybeans.  This was a 
backup plan for land acquisition in both countries that ended up as a commercial en-
deavor -- thus avoiding land grabs, a political and sovereignty issue, and a large initial 
outlay of capital, an economic benefit.  The success of this project serves as a demonstra-
tion to other states with unused arable land that PRC companies can provide the demand 
323 
 
that local farmers can meet.  One could say that this is an example of soft power via com-
merce.   
The PRC will run into criticism if it engages in further land grabbing in states 
where property rights are ill defined.  In states with defined property rights, it should be 
allowed to invest, even if the crops are normally shipped back to the PRC.  SOEs invest-
ments would be less welcomed than purely private investment as SOE “investments [can 
be] subordinated to the strategic reasons of a foreign state,” as Netto suggests. 
There are other areas closer to home, in SE Asia, where soft power can also in-
crease agricultural output.  PRC rice production per ha. ranges between approximately 
50% and 100% greater than its ASEAN neighbors (Yu & Fan: 2009, 5).  Sharing the 
PRC’s expertise in achieving higher yields through better farming practices and better 
seeds holds the possibility of a dramatic improvement of output in the 2nd Ring.  Such as-
sistance would increase the total rice supply, as well as reducing Philippine and Indone-
sian imports.  It would be beneficial to the PRC as its import of rice now comes exclu-
sively from SE Asia and rice imports are growing.  
The use of soft power in SE Asia by the PRC is not new.  It is questionable 
whether its potential can be maximized or if the PRC’s military activities, an application 
of “hard power,” in the SCS are offsetting the benefits of successful use of soft power.  
The PRC has yet to define its controversial “9-dash line” in the SCS other than to say “it” 
is sovereign PRC territory based on historical claims that pre-date the claims of any other 
littoral state.  This not only concerns those states with claims but also any state whose 
ships, commercial or military, transit the SCS under freedom of navigation laws. 
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As the population grows and the arable land diminishes, the question must be 
asked as to whether scarce resources are allocated to maximize grain output.  Riccardo 
demonstrated comparative advantage using numbers of people to do a specific task.  To-
day, the world has come to allocate resources based on price and the income that a re-
source will generate.  The question is whether this method of resource allocation, suffi-
cient to keep the necessary amounts of arable land and water in an area with a suitable 
climate that is free of pollution, can provide food security for all at reasonable prices.   
PRC soybean imports from Brazil and Argentina provide an example of how re-
source allocations might apply to where crops are grown.  The decision to rely on soy-
bean imports was an economic / political decision.  A subsequent explanation -- not a ra-
tionale for the change, but a post-change analysis -- comes from Liu et al.  They suggest 
that it is the intensity of water usage for the soybeans that makes it the crop of import 
preference as opposed to the other three we are discussing.  It takes 3203 cubic meters of 
water per ton of output for soybeans versus 844 for wheat, 975 for maize, and 1190 for 
rice (Liu et al: 2007, 80-90).  Liu et al maintain that this was not a deliberate water-sav-
ing decision to arbitrage water usage among various crops.  It does demonstrate that 
when water availability is an issue, soybeans should not be grown when rice, wheat, and 
maize can be. 
Similarly, a PRC company’s acquisition of Smithfield Foods, a meat concern in 
the US, offers the PRC a source of pork products that can be exported to the PRC.  As 
mentioned in Chapter VI, this is an opportunity to transfer the raising and feeding of pigs 
to an area where arable land and grain are not issues.   
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Multi-Lateral Action or Every State for Itself 
Should a world that is concerned about the ability of the world resources to feed 
ever- growing populations, would it be possible to allocate crops to specific areas and as-
sure they would be distributed as planned and needed?  One answer to this question is 
yes.  In places where there is a choice of what to plant and a transportation system that 
gets the crop to market efficiently, farmers will generally plant the crops that provide the 
greatest yield.  In the case of the PRC, the answer to that question is no.  The PRC does 
not allocate grain production by natural resource availability.240  The PGRS requires 
provinces to produce the grain it needs within each province, a situation that ignores 
comparative advantage.  Grain output would increase if comparative advantage was used 
and if the transportation systems could move the grain to where it was needed when it 
was needed.  If it only works in limited areas, it cannot be expected to work worldwide.   
ASEAN+3 established a regional rice reserve to minimize the impact of crop fail-
ures.  However, the cost of maintaining a reserve in rice was too expensive and rather 
than storing rice, a fund was established that could purchase rice in times of such an 
event.  This does not increase the rice available but serves only to have the funds availa-
ble to purchase rice when there is insufficient supply -- if there are sufficient funds, oth-
ers will suffer, not us.  The US maintained large amounts of grain in storage that could be 
used in the event of shortages in the world (though, it was not established for that reason).  
It, too, was suspended due to costs. 
                                                 
240 Nature does allocate by climate and soil conditions as evidenced by the grains primarily consumed in 
various climates.  Traditionally, wheat is prevalent in drier climates, North China, and rice in wetter cli-
mates, South China. 
326 
 
Allocating crop production around the world to maximize output based on com-
parative advantage, including natural resource optimization, would require an extreme 
degree of global governance and a loss of sovereignty.  The possibility of the countries of 
the world attempting such a feat is incomprehensible at this time.  At the country level, 
PRC does not allocate crop production by comparative advantage domestically.  At the 
regional level, ASEAN+3 will not maintain a reserve of rice.  No aspect of global gov-
ernance is in place to compel or to persuade participation in such a scheme.  There are in-
ternational food regimes; the FAO monitors crop production in an attempt to provide 
early warnings in the event of production shortfalls.  The World Food Program focuses 
on capacity building and relief and views the PRC as a major success in reducing hunger.  
Such programs focus on improving local conditions so that local communities can be 
self-reliant or self-sufficient.  The WTO establishes trading norms, including foodstuffs, 
and a dispute settlement mechanism.  World food security remains an issue addressed by 
individual countries.  Worldwide improvements, focused on maximizing world output 
and resource optimization, will only come about when individual countries do so.  Once 
that is successful, it can be expanded regionally and further if necessary.  Most likely, it 
will take an extreme disaster for sufficient impetus to occur.   
The practical ways to assure food security until other solutions are found remains:  
1) Trade surpluses for shortages; 2) subsidize basic foodstuffs when prices are high; 3) 
maintain arable land; 4) utilize science to improve crop yields; 5) maintain reserve 
stocks; 6) improve physical distribution capabilities; and, 7) take advantage of one coun-
try’s unused agricultural assets so that the trading partner can pursue other agricultural 
opportunities.  Otherwise, a state that does not have an ongoing positive balance of trade 
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will need to be self-reliant in grain or receive aid to cover their needs.  A state can have 
an ongoing positive balance of trade, as the PRC does, then self-sufficiency in grain is 
not an issue…at least for now. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I 
Data Sources and Issues 
Compiling trade statistics on a bilateral basis for maize, rice, soybeans, and wheat 
produces only an estimate of what actually was traded by the PRC, both in terms of quan-
tity and trade partners. There are several reasons why obtaining this information is diffi-
cult. First, the statistics from the PRC are incomplete. Following a long civil war and a 
world war, one can easily imagine that it would take some time before statistics for pro-
duction, let alone trade, could be considered reliable. This situation was aggravated by 
domestic political turmoil, principally during the GLF and the famine it caused. During 
the initial stages of the GPCR, 1966-69, and at its conclusion, following Mao’s death and 
the rise and fall of the Gang of Four, statistics were unavailable or unreliable. Second, the 
use of transshipments obscured the source or destination of shipments. In the case of 
North Korea, the PRC did exactly this. The extent to which other similar trades took 
place is unknown. The PRC has frequently shipped grain to Hong Kong and Singapore in 
excess of what could possibly be consumed locally. In the case of Hong Kong, its trade 
statistics do not indicate an ultimate destination, other than returns to the PRC and trans-
shipments to Macao. A third issue is that states may produce agricultural statistics, in-
cluding trade, on a calendar year basis or a crop year basis. When they were presented in 
both ways, the calendar base was used, if presented in only one way, it is assumed to be 
on a calendar basis. Third, cross-checking shipments by a supplier to a destination to ver-
ify both parties are claiming the same volumes does not always work as the comparisons 
are on an FOB basis for shippers and a CIF basis for receivers.  That carries with it an  
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error unless one has access to bills of lading. Also, shipments in transit at the close of an 
accounting period will be shown as a shipment by the shipper and omitted by the receiver 
as the shipment is yet to be received.  
For purposes of this dissertation, the first objective is to determine the total 
amount of imports and exports for the four agriculture products being examined. Export 
quantities for rice and soybeans were obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (MOFERT) as published by the USDA (Colby: 1992, 282). They en-
compassed the years 1950-1989. Exports of wheat and maize were sourced from the 
USDA for the years 1950-1969 (Kirby: 1992, 33). Kirby also had export statistics for rice 
and soybeans that were quite different from Colby’s but differences became smaller over 
time. For imports, Colby provides statistics for wheat only, the principal grain import by 
the PRC (Colby: 1992, 285). Kirby provides import quantities for all four of the products 
under study using FAO yearbooks for his information. Beginning for the year 1961, the 
FAO began publishing online the total imports and exports by commodity. For purposes 
of this study, annual export totals for rice and soybeans provided by Colby were used for 
the period 1950-1960. Kirby’s figures were used for wheat and maize for the same pe-
riod. The annual import totals for wheat came from Colby’s statistics and rice and maize 
from Kirby. From 1961 on, the FAO reported numbers were used. Both Kirby’s and 
Colby’s figures converged with those published by the FAO and in some cases were 
identical.  The FAO updates its records as needed. The FAO statistics used for this study 
are those available in December 2015.  
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The most important issue is determining the bilateral trade in these products be-
tween the PRC and its trading partners. For the period 1950-1969, Kirby used the PRC’s 
trade partners to determine what was exported by what the other countries imported from 
or exported to the PRC, an issue identified above. The method that Kirby used could only 
include those countries that published trade information; that eliminated intra-East Bloc 
trade as those countries did not publish trade information. However, there are references 
of specific shipments to specific countries that appear in the literature (i.e., Eckstein, 
Chen, and Chao) and in newspapers that add to the quantities reported by Kirby. These 
are extremely important for the period of the GLF when significant quantities of grain 
were shipped to the USSR during the famine, statistics unavailable to Kirby and his 
method of data collection.  
The period from 1970 through 1986 comes from a variety of sources including 
USDA – Economic Research Service, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
China Customs Statistics, and United Nations World Trade Annual. None of these 
sources was sufficiently complete (including availability), nor were they necessarily pre-
sented the same way. For example, the NBER trade statistics were presented at various 
degrees of milling that necessitated conversion to a common unit of measure. The USDA 
information was for major import and export countries. The NBER data, in some cases, 
had large export or import volumes for the PRC that did not identify the source or origin. 
China Customs Statistics were not uniformly available nor was the UN World Trade An-
nual, which was extremely difficult to work with. As a general rule, shipments to major 
customers and shipments from major suppliers were relatively close from different  
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sources. They could be very different for customers or suppliers where trade was incon-
sistent. Sometimes the quantities were similar but for two years but one data source, for 
example, had the shipments in one year and the other in the next year. In cases where a 
trading partner was not in the statistics of one source but was in another, the source re-
porting trade was used. From 1987 to the present the primary source of trade data, by 
source for imports and by origin for imports, comes from the FAOSTAT - Detailed Trade 
Matrix.  
The question must be answered as to whether the sum of the bilateral trade be-
tween the PRC and its partners matches with the total imports and exports, by product, on 
an annual basis. The closer those numbers are increases the level of confidence that bilat-
eral trade has been accounted for. As seen in Table A1.1, as time passed, bilateral trade as 
a percentage of total import or export, as would be expected.  
The difficulty in compiling statistics for the PRC, regardless of the source, pre-
sented issues in the early years for the PRC.  Following the successful CCP revolution, 
domestic data collection and reporting mechanisms needed to be established and could 
not happen overnight.  The situation is further aggravated by the nearly continuous politi-
cal campaigns during Mao’s time that led to statistics not being collected or not being 
published or were falsified.  It is safe to say that reliable statistics did not become availa-
ble until Deng had been in office for several years.  However, that did not solve the prob-
lem completely as Hong Kong and Singapore were used as transshipment points to ob-
scure the destination or source of exports and imports. 
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The same problem exists with grain production statistics, especially during Mao’s 
rule.  In fact, there seems to have been a cottage industry seeking to determine the actual 
production of major grain crops throughout most 1950s.  I have opted to use Chen’s sta-
tistics for 1952-57 (Chen: 1967, 338-9), Piazza for 1950-1 and 1958-60 (Piazza: 1986, 
183), and FAOSTAT for 1961 on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
334 
 
 
 
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 2
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
Ex
po
rt
s 
an
d 
Im
po
rt
s 
by
 R
eg
io
n 
an
d 
by
 P
ro
du
ct
Fi
gu
re
 A
2.
1
Th
e 
2n
d  
Ri
ng
 a
pp
li
es
 to
 a
ll
 S
E 
As
ia
n 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
pl
us
 S
ou
th
 K
or
ea
 th
ro
ug
h 
19
91
.  
Be
gi
nn
in
g 
in
 1
99
2,
 V
ie
tn
am
, N
or
th
 K
or
ea
 a
nd
 M
on
go
li
a 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
2
nd
 R
in
g.
  
Ja
pa
n 
is
 li
st
ed
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y,
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
.
H
on
g 
Ko
ng
 a
nd
 M
ac
au
 a
re
 li
st
ed
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y.
Fr
om
 1
95
0 
th
ro
ug
h 
19
91
, t
he
 E
as
t B
lo
c 
in
cl
ud
es
 a
ll
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 a
li
gn
ed
 w
it
h 
th
e 
U
SS
R.
  
Ea
st
er
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 c
on
si
st
s 
of
 fo
rm
er
 E
as
t B
lo
c 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
in
 E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e 
an
d 
Cu
ba
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 R
us
si
a 
   
 w
hi
ch
 is
 r
ep
or
te
d 
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
.
 (5
0,
00
0,
00
0) -
 5
0,
00
0,
00
0
 1
00
,0
00
,0
00
 1
50
,0
00
,0
00
 2
00
,0
00
,0
00
N
et
 Im
po
rt
s (
+)
 a
nd
 E
xp
or
ts
 (-
) b
y 
Re
gi
on
 1
95
0-
20
13
 (t
on
s)
Ru
ss
ia
Ce
nt
ra
l A
sia
Ea
st
er
n 
Eu
ro
pe
M
EN
A
SS
A
Ho
ng
 K
on
g
So
ut
h 
As
ia
Ja
pa
n
2n
d 
Ri
ng
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a
Ea
st
 B
lo
c
W
es
t B
lo
c
335 
 
   
   
  F
igu
re
 A
2.
2
 (4
0,0
00
,00
0)
 (2
0,0
00
,00
0) -
 20
,00
0,0
00
 40
,00
0,0
00
 60
,00
0,0
00
 80
,00
0,0
00
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
 19
78
 19
80
 19
82
 19
84
 19
86
 19
88
 19
90
 19
92
 19
94
 19
96
 19
98
 20
00
 20
02
 20
04
 20
06
 20
08
 20
10
 20
12
Ne
t Im
po
rts
 (+
) a
nd
 Ex
po
rts
 (-)
by
 Cr
op
 19
50
-20
13
 (to
ns
)
W
he
at
So
yb
ea
ns
Ric
e
Ma
ize
336 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Arase, D., “Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: The Institutionaliza-
tion of Regional Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism”, 
Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July/August 2010), pp. 808-833. 
 
Ash, R.F., “The Evolution of Agricultural Policy”, The China Quarterly, No. 116 (Dec., 
1988), pp. 529-555. 
 
Ash, R., “The Grain Issue in China: Domestic and International Perspectives” China Re-
view, (1997), pp. 135-160. 
 
Ash, R.,  2007 “China's Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 191,  (Sep., 2007), pp. 796-821. 
 
Ash, R., & Edmonds, R., “China's Land Resources, Environment and Agricultural Pro-
duction,”The China Quarterly, No. 156, Special Issue: China's Environment (Dec., 
1998), pp. 836-87. 
 
Ba, A., “Reflections on Analytic Eclecticism and the Field,” Qualitative & Multi-Method 
Research, Fall 2010, 14-17. 
 
Bao C., “CGG Is Setting Up a Soybean Base in Brazil,” China Daily, 11/24/2011. 
 
Becker, J., Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret Famine, John Murray, London, 1999. 
   
Bergsten, C.F., Freeman, C., Lardy, N., Mitchell, D., China’s Rise, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 
D.C., USA, 2008 
 
Blanchard and Guo, “Introduction” in ‘Harmonious World’ and China’s New Foreign 
Policy, Guo S. and Blanchard, J-M F. (eds), Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 
2010. 
 
Blank, S., “Revising the Border: China's Inroads into Tajikistan”, China Brief , Volume: 
11 Issue: 14 July 29, 2011. 
 
Borras Jr., S., Hall, R.,  Scoones, I., White, B.,  & Wolford, W., “Towards a Better Un-
derstanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction,, The Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 38:2, 209-216, 2011. 
 
Brautrigam, D. and Tang, X., “China’s Engagement in African Agriculture: ‘Down to the 
Countryside’” The China Quarterly, 2009, pp. 696-706. 
 
337 
 
Brautigam, D., The Dragon’s Gift, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Brautigam, D., “Chinese Development Aid in Africa What, where, why, and how much?” 
in Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, (eds) Golley, J., Song, L., ANU 
Press, 2011. 
 
Bräutigam, D. & Zhang, H., “Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China’s Agricultural 
Investment in Africa”, Third World Quarterly, 2013, 34:9, 1676-1696. 
 
Buzan, B., “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Teory Meet the English School”, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, 
1993, pp 327-352. 
 
Burns, J., “Australia assured by Peking” The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current 
file); Jul 12, 1971; pg. 1, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
  
Bennett, A., & George, A., “Process Tracing in Case Study Research”, MacAurther 
Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, October 17-19, 1997, 
uers.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teachings/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm Accessed 4/17/2012. 
Breslin, T.A., Beyond Pain, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, USA, 2002. 
 
Cai, P., “Delicate balancing act for the foreign investment board”, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, (Australia) - October 26, 2013, Business, p.6. 
 
CIA Intelligence Report, 4/4/68, released 5/2007, “Ten Years of Chinese Communist 
Foreign Policy: South and Southeast Asia”.  
 
CIA “The World FactBook”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ 
 
Chan, H.K., “The ‘Chinese Barbarian Officials’ in the Foreign Tributary Missions to 
China during the Ming Dynasty” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 88, No. 
3 (Jul. - Sep., 1968), pp. 411-418. 
 
Chan, H.L., “The Chien-wen, Yung’Lo, and Hsuan-te reigns, 1399-1435”, Mote and 
Twitchett (eds) in Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Chan, K.W., “The Chinese Hukou System at 50”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 
2009, 50, No.2, pp. 197-221. 
 
338 
 
Chen, Z., “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy”, Journal of Con-
temporary China, (2005), 14(42), February, 35–53. 
 
China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, “Fact Sheet: Investment”, 1/5/2016.   
 
Clarke, T., “WA opens the Ord to China”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11/21/2012, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/waopenstheordtochina2012112029o1k.html  
 
Chang, K.C., “Introduction” in Food in Chinese Culture, K.C. Chang, ed., Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1977.American Geographers, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Jun., 1981), pp.202-21. 
 
Chang, S., Zhao, L., Timilsina, R., Zhang, X., “Development of Biofuels in China Tech-
nologies, Economics and Policies” WPS6243, The World Bank Development Research 
Group Environment and Energy Team, October 2012  
 
Chao, K., Agricultural Production in Communist China 1949-1965, The University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1970. 
 
Chen, N.R., Chinese Economic Statistics, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1967. 
 
Chen, L.Y., & Buckwell, A., Chinese Grain Economy and Policy, : C.A.B. International, 
Wallingford, Oxon, UK, 1991. 
 
Chen, X., "Review of China's Agricultural and Rural Development: Policy Changes and 
Current Issues", China Agricultural Economic Review, Vol. 1: 2, 2009, pp. 121 – 135. 
 
Chen, Y.X., “Cold War Competition and Food Production in China, 1957-1962”, Agri-
cultural History, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Winter, 2009), pp. 51-78. 
 
Cheng, T. and Selden, M., “The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou Sys-
tem”,  The China Quarterly, No. 139 (Sep., 1994), pp. 644-668. 
 
The China Quarterly, No. 13, “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation” pp. 258-262. 
 
The China Quarterly, No. 59, “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation” pp. 625-661. 
The China Quarterly, No. 26, “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, pp. 206-224. 
China Situation and Outlook Report, USDA, Economic Research Service, July, 1986, 
p.6. 
 
Cho Y.N., & Jeong, J.H., “China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects”, 
Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 3 (May/June 2008), pp. 453-472. 
 
Choo, J., “Mirroring North Korea's Growing Economic Dependence on China: Political 
Ramifications”, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2008, pp. 343-372. 
339 
 
 
Choo, J., “China's Relations with Latin America: Issues, Policy, Strategies, and Implica-
tions”, Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2,  2009, pp. 71-90. 
 
Clark, D.N., “Sino-Korean tributary relations under the Ming”, Mote and Twitchett (eds) 
in Cambridge History of China, Vol. 8, The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998. 
 
Cheung, T..M., “The Influence of the Gun: China’s Central Military Commission and Its 
Relationship with the Military, Party, and State Decision-Making Systems” in The Mak-
ing of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Reform Era, D.M. Lampton (ed), Stan-
ford University Press, 2001. 
 
Chinn, D.L., “Basic Commodity Distribution in the People's Republic of China”, The 
China Quarterly, No. 84 (Dec., 1980), pp. 744-754. 
 
Chu, K., “Peasants More than Just in the Red”, South China Morning Post, 
7/4/1993, p. 1. 
 
Chung, J.H., “South Korea-China Economic Relations: The Current Situation and Its Im-
plications”, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 10 (Oct., 1988), pp. 1031-1048. 
 
Collier, D., “Understanding Process Tracing”, Political Science and Politics, 44, No. 4, 
2011, pp 823-830. 
 
Congressional Research Service, “China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’in South 
America, Asia, and Africa”, April 2008. 
 
Cooley, J.K.,  “Peking exploits opening: How Red China's political forays in North Af-
rica have Multiplied”, The Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current file); Apr 9, 1970; 
 
Craig,S.,  “Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats”,  
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5244 
 
Crook, F.W., Langley, S.,Tuan, F.,“An Analysis of PRC Government Involvement in Do-
mestic and Foreign Trade of Wheat, Rice, Corn and Soybean Products,” "China’s Role in 
World Food Markets: A Workshop," Proceedings of the fifth symposium of the Western 
Coordinating Committee "Assessing the Chinese Agricultural Market," February 8-9, 
1999, in San Diego, CA. 
 
Cui, Z., “Introduction to Tang Tsou's ‘Interpreting the Revolution in China’", Modern 
China, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 194-204. 
 
Cui, S. and Kattumuri, R., “Cultivated Land Conversion in China and the Potential for 
Food Security and Sustainability”, LSE Asia Research Centre Working Paper 35, 2010 
340 
 
 
De Bary, W.T, & Bloom, I., Sources of Chinese Tradition Vol. One, 2nd Edition, Colum-
bia University Press, New York, 1999. 
 
Dernberger, R.F., “Prices, the Exchange Rate, and Economic Efficiency in the Foreign 
Trade of Communist China”, in Brown and Neuberger (eds), International Trade and 
Central Planning, University of California Press, Berkeley CA, 1968. 
 
Dittmer, L., “The Changing Form of Dynamics of Power Politics”, in The Natural of Chi-
nese Politics, J.Unger (ed). M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 2002. 
 
Dosch, J., “China and Southeast Asia: A New Regional Order in the Making?”, in China 
and the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, (ed) Dittmer, L. and Yu, G.T., 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2010. 
 
Duliusin, L.,“The Influence of China's Domestic Policy on Its Foreign Policy”, Proceed-
ings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, The China Challenge: American 
Policies in East Asia (1991), pp. 53-62. 
 
Easterly, W., The White Man’s Burden, Penguin Press, 2007. 
 
Eckstein, A., Communist China’s Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, Council on For-
eign Relations, NY, 1966. 
 
The Economist, “A Dangerous Year”, 1/28/2012. 
 
The Economist, “The Cauldron Boils”, 9/29/2005. 
 
Elliot, T., “Kidman's kingdom”,Sydney Morning Herald, The (Australia) - November 21, 
2015 News Review Page: 28. 
 
Elvin, M., The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 
1973. 
 
Fairbank, J.K., and Teng, S.Y.,”On The Ch'ing Tributary System”, Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jun., 1941), pp. 135-246. 
 
Fairbank, J.K. “The Reunification of China”, Cambridge History of China, Volume 14 
The People’s Republic Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965, , 
MacFarquahar & Fairbank (eds)  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
 
Fang, C. & Beghin, J., “Pretection and Comparative Advantage of Chinese Agriculture: 
Implications for Regional and National Specialization”, in Agricultural Trade and Policy 
in China, Rozelle & Sumner (eds), Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, England, 2003. 
 
341 
 
FAO Statistics Data Base, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/   
Feeney, W.R., “China and the Multilateral Economic Institutions” in China and the 
World, Kim S., (ed), Westview Press, 1984. 
 
Feenstra, R. C.,  Lipsey, R.E.,  Deng, H.,  Ma, A.C., & Mo, H., “World Trade Flows: 
1962-2000,” NBER Working Paper no. 11040, 2004.  Accessed from UC –Davis and 
www.nber.org/data 
 
Feuerwerker, A.“Relating to the International Community”, Proceedings of the Academy 
of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 1, China's Developmental Experience, Mar., 1973, pp. 
42-54. 
 
Feuerwerker, A.“ Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China”,: 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 402, China in the 
World Today (Jul., 1972), pp. 1-14. 
 
Fewsmith, J., “The Political and Social Implications of China’s Accession to the WTO”, 
The China Quarterly, No. 167, Sept., 2001, pp 573-91. 
 
Fewsmith, J., “The Evolving Shape of Elite Politics”, in The Natural of Chinese Politics, 
J. Unger (ed). M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 2002. 
 
Fewsmith, J., “China in 2007: The Politics of Leadership Transition”, Asian Survey, Vol. 
48, No. 1, 2008, pp. 82-96. 
 
The Filipino Express, “Preparing for El Nino: Philippines Anticipates Rice Shortage, Or-
ders from Asian Neighbors”, 11/23.1996, pp. 33). 
Findley, C., (eds) “Grain Market Reform in China: Global Implications”, Australian Cen-
tre for International Agricultural Research, June, 1998.  
 
Freeman, M., “Sung” in  Food in Chinese Culture, K.C. Chang, ed., Yale University 
Press, 1978. 
 
Freemen, D., Holslag, J., & Weil, S., “China’s foreign farming policy: can land 
provide security?” BICCS Asia Paper Vol. 3 (9) 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “The State of Food Insecurity 
in the World”, Rome, 2010, www.fao.org/publications/sofi3 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Statistics Database 
  
Førland, T.E., “Economic Warfare' and 'Strategic Goods': A Conceptual Framework for 
Analyzing COCOM”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1991, pp. 191-204. 
 
342 
 
Fuller, F., Beghin, J., DeCara, S., Fabiosa, J., Fang, C., Holger, M., “China's Accession to 
the World Trade Organization: What Is at Stake for Agricultural Markets?”, Review of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn - Winter, 2003), pp. 399-414 
 
FSN Forum Discussion No. 44, Summary of “Land Grab or Development Opportunity”, 
http://km.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/fsn/docs/SUMMARY_land_grab_or_devel-
opment_opportunity.doc 
   
Glaser, B., and Medeiros, E., “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in 
China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise”’, The China Quar-
terly, No. 190, 2007, pp. 291-310. 
 
Global Hunger Index 2012, IFPRI, Washington D.C., 2012 
Goldman, M., “China Rethinks the Soviet Model”, International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 
(Autumn, 1980), pp. 49-65. 
 
Goldsmith, B., “Here There Be Dragons:  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Cen-
ter for Defense Information, September 2005. 
 
Gompert, D., “Theory and Lessons of History” in Sea Power and American Interests in 
the Western Pacific, Gompert, D., RAND Corporation, (2013. 
 
Green, M., “America’s Quiet Victories in Asia”, The Washington Post, 2/13/2007, p. 
A21. 
 
Gurtov, M., “Changing Perspectives and Policies”, in China and the Developing World, 
and the New Global Dynamic, (ed) Dittmer, L. and Yu, G.T., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder, CO, 2010. 
 
Halverson, K., “China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications”, 
Boston College Int'l & Comparative Law Review, 2004, pp. 330. 
 
 
Hao and Wang, “Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations 1840-1895”,  Fairbank 
(ed) in Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, Late Ch’ing 1800-1911, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1995. 
 
Harding, H., “China’s Co-operative Behavior”, in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds), Chi-
nese Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1997. 
 
Harsch, J.C., “State of the Nations: The Communist Food Crisis”, The Christian Science 
Monitor; Jan 30, 1962; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Christian Science Monitor 
(1908-2000) pg. 1. 
 
343 
 
Hansen, J., Tuan, F., Somwaru, A.,  (2011),"Do China's Agricultural Policies Matter For 
World Commodity Markets?", China Agricultural Economic Review, Vol. 3:1, 2011, pp. 
6 – 25. 
 
He Kai, “A Strategic Functional Theory of Institutions and Rethinking Asian Regional-
ism: When Do Institutions Matter?” Asian Survey Vol. 54, No. 6 (November/December 
2014), pp. 1184-1208. 
 
He Kai, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interde-
pendence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of In-
ternational Relations, Vol. 14(3): 489–518. 
 
Hinton, H.C., “China as an Asian Power”, in Robinson and Shambaugh (eds), Chinese 
Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1997. 
 
Hofman, I. & Ho, P., “China's ‘Developmental Outsourcing’: A Critical Examination of 
Chinese global ‘land grabs’ Discourse,” The Journal of Peasant Studies,39:1, 1-48, 2012. 
 
Hook, B., Yahuda, M., Wilson, D., “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 60 (Dec., 1974), pp. 823-853. 
 
 Hook, B., Yahuda, M., Wilson, D., “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The 
China Quarterly, No. 70 (Jun., 1977), pp. 446-470. 
 
Hopf, T., “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), pp. 171-200. 
 
Hopkins, R., Puchala, D., “Perspectives on the International Relations of Food”, Interna-
tional Organization, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Summer, 1978), pp. 581-616 
 
Horta, L., “Brazil-China Relations”, RSIS Working Paper 287, S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Singapore, 10 March 2015. 
 
Hsiao, G.T., The Foreign Trade of China, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 
1977. 
 
Huang, J., Rozelle, S., “Trade Liberalization, Rising Imports and China’s Food Economy: 
The Case of Soybeans”, Report Submitted to the American Soybean Association 2004. 
 
Huang, J., Jun, Y., Xu, Z., Rozelle, S., Li, N., “Agricultural Trade Liberalization and 
Poverty in China”, China Economic Review vol.18 (2007), pp. 244–265. 
 
Huang, P.C.C., “Profit Making State Firms and China’s Development Experience: ‘State 
Capitalism’ or ‘Socialist Market Economy’”, Modern China, 38(6) 591–629. 
 
344 
 
Hudson, V., Foreign Policy Analysis, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD, 
2007. 
 
Hook, B., Wilson,D., Yahuda, M., “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 79 (Sep., 1979), pp. 644-687. 
 
Hopper, B.C., “Narkomindel and Comintern”, Foreign Affairs, 7/1/1941, pp 737-50. 
 
Hsu, Robert C., Food for one Billion, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1982. 
 
Hu, S. “Central Government Must Take the Lead on Hukuo Reform”, South China Morn-
ing Post, 8/13/2013, www.scmp/comment/insight-opinion/article/1295108/central-gov-
ernment-must-take-lead-chinas-hukuo-reform/ 
 
Huang, J., Otsuka, K., Rozelle, S., “Agriculture in China’s Development”, Brandt and 
Rawski (eds) China’s Great Transformation, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Huang,J., Wang, X., & Qui,H., “Small-Scale Farmers in China in the Face of Moderrni-
zation and Globalization”, International Institute for Environment and Development, 
London, 2012. 
 
Huang, R., “”Lung-Ch’ing and Wan-Li Reigns”,  Mote and Twitchett (eds) in Cambridge 
History of China, Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
 
Hughes, N.C., “Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Jul. - 
Aug., 1998), pp. 67-77.  
 
Jackson, P., The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, Routledge, NY, 2010. 
 
Johnson, D.G., “China’s Grain Trade: Some Policy Considerations”, ”, in Agricultural 
Trade and Policy in China, Rozelle & Sumner (eds), Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, Eng-
land, 2003. 
 
Johnson-Hanks, J., “Demographic Transitions and Modernity” Annual Review of Anthro-
pology, Vol. 37 (2008), pp. 301-315. 
 
Wu, K, and Watts, J. “Noble Group 's Bonds Plunge as Creditors Turn Pessimistic”,  Wall 
Street Journal (Online) [New York, N.Y] 08 Jan 2016. 
 
Kam W. C. and Buckingham, W., “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” The China 
Quarterly, No. 195 (Sep., 2008), pp. 582-606. 
 
Kang, D.C., East Asia Before the West, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010. 
 
345 
 
Kang, X. and Han, H. “Graduated Controls: The State-Society Relationship in Contem-
porary China”, Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 2008), pp. 36-55. 
 
Karns, P. & Mingst, K., International Organizations, Lynn Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 
CO. 2010. 
 
Kerr, D. “Has China abandoned self-reliance?”99933, Review of International Political 
Economy, 2007, 14:1, 77-104.  
 
Keohane, R., and Nye, J., Power and Independence, Longman, NY, 2nd ed., 1989. 
 
Keuh, Y.Y., “Mao and Agriculture in China's Industrialization: Three Antitheses in a 50-
Year Perspective” The China Quarterly, No. 187 (Sep., 2006), pp. 700-723. 
 
Keulertz, M., and Woertz, E., “States as Actors in International AgroInvestments” The 
Graduate Institute, Geneva 6,1, 2015, http://poldev.revues.orgbcrfj.revues.org/2023 
 
Kim, S.S., China and the World, (3rd ed.), Westview Press, Inc., Boulder Co., USA, 1994.  
 
Kim, S.S., “International Organizations in Chinese Foreign Policy”,  Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 519, China's Foreign Relations (Jan., 
1992), pp. 140-157. 
 
Kim, S.S. “China’s International Organization Behavior” in Chinese Foreign Policy: The-
ory and Practice. Robinson, T.W. & Shambaugh, D., (eds), Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1997 in Robinson and Shambaugh, pp. 603-633. 
 
Kim, S.S., “China and Globalization: Confronting Myriad Challenges and Opportuni-
ties”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2009), pp. 41-80 
 
Kirby, R.H.,  “Agricultural Trade of the People’s Republic of China 1935~69”, Foreign 
Agricultural, Economic Report, Economic Research Service, Washington, DC, Aug., -
1972. 
 
Kissinger, H., On China, Penguin Books, N.Y., 2012. 
 
Klein, D.W., “Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations”, in Robinson and Sham-
baugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1997. 
 
Kramer, T., Woods, K., “Financing Dispossession - China’s Opium Substitution Pro-
gramme in Northern Burma”, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 2012. 
 
Kridtalina, G., & Pop, V., “EU Official Says Neglect Pushed China to Set Up Develop-
ment Bank; U.S., Europe haven't been active enough in reforming World Bank, IMF,” 
Wall Street Journal (Online), New York, N.Y 21 Mar 2015. 
346 
 
 
Kristoff, N., “It’s China Against the World with a Great Deal at Stake”, New York Times, 
11/29/1992, p 4. 
 
Kuhn, P.A., “The Taiping Rebellion”, in J.K. Fairbank (ed) The Cambridge History of 
China, Volume 10, Part One, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Lamont, L., Manning, P., “Shut the gate: why cash-strapped landowners are selling the 
farm - Agribusiness - Who Owns NSW?”, Sydney Morning Herald, The (Australia) - Au-
gust 1, 2011, Business, p4. 
 
Lardy, N., Agriculture in China’s Modern Economic Development, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1983. 
 
Lardy, N., “Chinese Foreign Trade,” The China Quarterly, No. 131, Special Issue: The 
Chinese Economy in the 1990s (Sep., 1992), pp. 691-720. 
 
Lardy, N, “Economic Recovery and the 1st Five Year Plan” MacFarquahar & Fairbank 
(eds) Volume 14 The People’s Republic Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 
1949-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
 
Lardy, N, “The Chinese Economy Under stress, 1958-1965” MacFarquahar & Fairbank 
(eds) Volume 14 The People’s Republic Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 
1949-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
 
Lawrence, R.Z., “China and the Multilateral Trading System”, Working Paper 12759, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 
 
Lee, J., “China's Economic Leverage in Southeast Asia”, The Journal of East Asian Af-
fairs, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2015), pp. 1-21. 
 
Lee, Seung-joon, Gourmets in the Land of Famine, Stanford University Press, 2011. 
 
Lee, J., “China's Economic Leverage in Southeast Asia”, The Journal of East Asian Af-
fairs, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2015), pp. 1-21. 
 
Li, Lillian M., Fighting Famine in North China, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 
2007. 
 
Li, Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 
Vol. 2, 2008, 287–308. 
 
Li, Ninghui, “China’s Food Economy and the Implications for the Rest of the World”, in 
Critical Issues in China’s Growth and Development, Kwan, Y.K. and Yu, Eden S.H., 
(eds), Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, England, 2005. 
 
347 
 
Lieberthal, K.  “The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership” MacFar-
quahar & Fairbank (eds) Volume 14 The People’s Republic Part I: The Emergence of 
Revolutionary China 1949-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
  
Lieberthal, K., Governing China, W.W. Norton, NY, 1995. 
 
Lin, J.Y., “Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961”, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6 (Dec., 1990), pp. 1228-1252. 
 
Lin, J.Y., “The Needham Puzzle:  While the Industrial Revolution Did Not Originate in 
China” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3 No. 2, (Jan. 1995) pp.269-
292. 
 
Lin, J.Y., Cai, F., Li, Z., “Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise Re-
form”, The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and 
Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, 1998, pp. 422-427. 
 
Lin, J.Y., Fan, Z., “The Effects of China's Rural Policies on the Sustainability” 
http://idrinfo.idre.ca/archive/corpdocs/118115/  Effects Agriculture in China Paper pre-
pared for the 11th Biannual Workshop on Economy and Environment in SE Asia in Sin-
gapore on November 10-13, 1998 . 
 
Lin, G.C.S., & Ho, S.P.S., “The State, Land System, and Land Development Processes in 
Contemporary China,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 95, No. 
2 (Jun., 2005), pp. 411-436.  
 
Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of Confucius, (Ed. and translated with notes by Lin Yutang), 
Random House, New York, 1966. 
 
Liu, J., Zehnder, A., & Yang, H., “Historical Trends in China's Virtual Water Trade,” 
Water International, 32:1, 78-90, 2007. 
 
Liu,Y, Fang, F., Li, Y., “Key Iissues of Land use in China and Implications for Policy 
Making”  Land Use Policy,  40 (2014) 6–12. 
 
Lobell, S., Ripsman, N., Taliaferro, J., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Pol-
icy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2009. 
 
Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China, Second Edition, 
Westview Press, Boulder , Colorado, USA, 2000. 
 
Ma, S.Y., “Recent Changes in China's Pure Trade Theory”, The China Quarterly, No. 
106 (Jun., 1986), pp. 291-305. 
 
348 
 
Maidenberg, H.J., “Soviet Buying Lifts Grain Price: Soviet Buying Raises World Grain 
Price”, New York Times, Jun 22, 1979, p. D1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New 
York Times. 
 
“Medium Term Philippine Development Plan”, National Economic Development Au-
thority, Manila, 2004. 
 
Mearscheimer, J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton, New York, 2001 
Miller, L.& Liu, X., “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s ‘Third Generation’ Elite”, 
in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Reform Era, D.M. Lampton 
(ed), Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Moffett, M., “World News: Argentina Debates Foreign Land Buys”, Wall Street Journal, 
Eastern edition [New York, N.Y] 01 Sep 2011: A.13. 
http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/886565560/fulltext/2EFCB1C81EA840F7PQ/5
?accountid=10901 
 
Momargi, http://www.momagri.org/UK/focus-on-issues/The-East-Asia-Emergency-Rice-
Reserve-Gradually-building-a-tool-to-regulate-the-rice-market-in-East-Asia_990.html 
 
Morgenthau, H.J., Politics Among Nations, Knopf, New York, 1978. 
 
Myers, R. and Wang Y.C., “Economic Developments, 1644-1800”, Peterson, W.J., (ed), 
The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part One: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Nakajima, M., “Foreign Relations from the Korean War to the Bandung Line”, MacFar-
quahar & Fairbank (eds) Volume 14 The People’s Republic Part I: The Emergence of 
Revolutionary China 1949-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
  
Nau, H.R.,“The Diplomacy of World Food:  Goals, Capabilities, Issues and Arenas”, In-
ternational Organization, Volume 32, No 3, Summer 1978, pp775-809. 
 
Naughton, B., “The Foreign Policy Implications of China’s Economic Strategy”, in Chi-
nese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Robinson, T.W. & Shambaugh, D., (eds), Ox-
ford University Press, New York, 1997. 
  
New York Times, “Peking Heals Rift with the Dutch”, Feb 2, 1984, p A-6; ProQuest His-
torical Newspapers. 
 
New York Times, “Problem of Asia”, Jan 8, 1950, p 127; ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
 
New York Times, Jun 3, 1952; “Chinese Reds List Trade 'Pact' Items: Disclose Details of 
Unofficial ...”, p 3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
349 
 
Norman, A.E., “Australians Warned On Wheat to Peking: Resale Warning Aired”, The 
Christian Science Monitor, Jun 23, 1961, p 12. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Nye Jr., J.S., “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Autumn 1990, pp 153-71. 
  
Paarlberg, R., “Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Power,” International Security, Vol. 3, 
No. 2 (Fall, 1978), pp. 3-19. 
 
Park, A., Jin, H., Rozelle, S., Huang, J., “Market Emergence and Transition: Arbitrage, 
Transaction Costs, and Autarky in China's Grain Markets”, American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Feb., 2002), pp. 67-8. 
 
Park, A., and Wang, S., “China’s Poverty Statistics”, China Economic Review 12, 2001, 
pp. 384–398. 
 
Pearson, M., “Accession to GATT/WTO”, in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy in the Reform Era, D.M. Lampton (ed), Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Perisse, J., “Energy and Protein Requirements”, WHO/FAO, Geneva: WHO, 1973 
PRC State Grain Administration of Grain, “The National Food Security and Long-term 
Planning Framework (2008-2020), 2008. 
 
Perkins, D., Agricultural Development in China, Aldine Publishing, Chicago, 1969. 
Pettman, R., “Human Security as Global Security:  Reconceptualising Strategic Studies”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, April, 2005. 
 
Piazza, A., Food Consumption and Nutritional Status in the PRC, Westview Press, Boul-
der, CO., 1986. 
 
Pimentel, D., “Biofuels versus Food Resources and the Environment”, Review (Fernand 
Braudel Center) Vol. 33, No. 2/3, 2010, pp. 177-201. 
 
Pittman, R., “Chinese Railway Reform and Competition: Lessons from the Experience in 
Other Countries” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 
2004), pp.309-332. 
 
Pollack, J.D., “The Opening to America”, Cambridge History of China, Volume 15 The 
People’s Republic Part 2: Revolution Within the Chinese Revolution, , MacFarquahar & 
Fairbank (eds)  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
 
Pye, L., “Jiang Zemin’s Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolize Power and Settle for 
Limited Effectiveness”, in The Natural of Chinese Politics, J.Unger (ed). M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc., Armonk, NY, 2002. 
 
350 
 
Rada, E.L., “Food Policy in China: Recent Efforts to Balance Supplies and Consumption 
Requirements” Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Apr., 1983), pp. 518-535. 
 
Reuveny, R., & Kang, H., “Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation: Do Goods 
Matter?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 5 (Sep., 1998), pp. 581-602. 
 
Ripsman N, & Blanchard, J., “”Contextual Information and the Study of Trade and Con-
flict”, (eds) Sil & Doherty in Beyond Boundaries?, SUNY Press, Albany, 2000, pp 57-85. 
 
Robinson, T. W., “Interdependence in China’s Foreign Relations”, in China and the 
World, Kim S., (ed), Westview Press, 1984. 
Rose, G., “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics 51 (Oc-
tober 1998), 144-72. 
Rosecrance, R., The Rise of the Trading State, Basic Books, Inc., NY, 1986. 
 
Rowe, W.T., “Social Stability and Social Change”, Peterson, W.J., (ed), The Cambridge 
History of China, Volume 9, Part One: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2002. 
 
Rozman, G., “China’s Quest for Great Power Identity”, Orbis, Summer 1999, pp.383-
402. 
 
Russet, B. & Oneal, J., Triangulating Peace, W.W. Norton, New York, 2001  
 
Shinn, D.H., “Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World” 
in China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Rotberg, R.T., (ed) World Peace Founda-
tion, Brookings Institution Press. (2008). 
 
Shih, C.Y., “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psycho-cul-
tural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy,” Political Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 
599-63. 
 
Shirk, S. L., “The Delayed Institutionalization of Leadership Politics”; in The Natural of 
Chinese Politics, J.Unger (ed). M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 2002. 
 
Slayton, T., “Rice Crisis Forensics: How Asian Governments Carelessly Set the World 
Rice Market on Fire”, Working Paper Number 163, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development. Washington D.C., March 2009. 
 
Spence, J., The Search for Modern China, W.W. Norton, New York, 1991. 
 
Sil, R.. & Katzenstein, P., Beyond Paradigms, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2010. 
 
351 
 
Sil, R., “The Questionable Status of Boundaries: The Need for Integration” (eds) Sil & 
Doherty in Beyond Boundaries?, SUNY Press, Albany, 2000 
Smil, V., “Food Production and Quality of Diet in China”, Population and Development 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 25-45 
 
Snow, P., “China and Africa”, ”, in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Robin-
son, T.W. & Shambaugh, D., (eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 1997. 
 
Stanway, D., “Insight: For Chinese farmers, a rare welcome in Russia's Far East”, Reu-
ters, 12/23/2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/uschinarussiaagriculturein-
sightidUSBRE9BL00X20131222  
 
Sterba, J., “China Attacks U.S. on Dutch-Taiwan Deal: Explanation Called 'Untenable'”, 
New York Times, Jan 19, 1981, p A-14. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.  
 
South China Morning Post, “First one child, now two – but China’s birth policy is here to 
stay - Changing the number of children from one to two might lessen need for harsh en-
forcement, but it won’t disappear altogether, experts say”, (Hong Kong) - October 31, 
2015Page: A4. 
 
Sun, E.Z., “The Pattern of Railway Development in China”, The Far Eastern Quarterly, 
Vol. 14, No. 2 (Feb., 1955), pp. 179-199. 
 
Sun, L., “Societal Transition: New Issues in the Field of the Sociology of Development”, 
Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 1, (Jan., 2008), pp. 88-113. 
 
Swaine, M., “The Policy Analyst and Historical Perspectives”, in Wills Jr. (ed), Past and 
Present in China’s Foreign Policy, Merwin Asia, Portland, Maine, 2010. 
 
Swaine, M., “Decision Making Regarding Taiwan: 1979-2000”, in The Making of Chi-
nese Foreign and Security Policy in the Reform Era, D. Lampton (ed), Stanford Univer-
sity Press, Stanford, CA, 2001. 
 
Tang, S.P., “Economic Integration in Central Asia: The Russian and Chinese Relation-
ship”, Asia Survey, Vol. XL, No. 2, March/April, 2000. 
 
Teiwes, F.C., “Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime”, Fairbank, J.K. 
“The Reunification of China”, Cambridge History of China, Volume 14 The People’s Re-
public Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965, , MacFarquahar & 
Fairbank (eds)  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. 
 
Teiwes, F.C., “The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition”, in The Natural of Chinese Politics, 
J.Unger (ed). M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 2002. 
Terrill, Ross. Mao: A Biography, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993.  
352 
 
  
Thayer, C., “VIETNAM: Coping with China”, Southeast Asian Affairs, (1994), pp. 351-
367. 
 
Tow, W.T., “China and the International Strategic System”,  in Chinese Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice. Robinson, T.W. & Shambaugh, D., (eds), Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1997. 
Tuan, F.C., Ke, B., “A Review of China’s Agricultural Policy: Past and Present Develop-
ments” in Agriculture in China and OECD Countries, OECD, 1999. 
 
Tweeten, L., “The Economics of Global Food Security”, Review of Agricultural Econom-
ics, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp 473-88. 
 
Tylers, P. “China Warns U.S. on Relations With Taiwan,” New York Times11 Sep 1994, 
A14. 
 
Uvin, P., “Regime, Surplus, and Self-Interest: The International Politics of Food Aid” In-
ternational Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 293-312. 
 
Valnete, M., “South America: Curbing Land Purchases by Foreign Investors” 
Marcela Valente*. IPS - Inter Press Service [Montevideo] 11 May 2011. 
http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/866094320/fulltext/2EFCB1C81EA840F7PQ/7
?accountid=10901 
 
VietNamNet. (2011) ‘Chinese lease Vietnamese land to grow sweet potatoes’, 
11 July, accessed at http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18927, April 4, 2016. 
 
Vogel, Ezra F., “Chen Yun: His Life” Journal of Contemporary China (2005), 14(45), 
November, 741–759. 
 
Vogel, Ezra F., Deng Xiao Ping and the Transformation of China, The Belknap Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., USA, 2011. 
 
Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, Mass. Belk-
nap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.  
 
Wallensteen, P.,“Scarce Goods as Political Weapons:  The Case of Food”, Journal of 
Peace Research, No. 4, Vol XIII/1976, pp. 277-98. 
 
Waltz, K.N., Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill Education (Asia) Co. and Pe-
king University Press, Beijing, 2004. 
 
Waltz, K.N., “Structural Realism After the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 25, 
No. 1, 2000, pp.5-41. 
353 
 
 
Wan, G.H., Chen. E.J., “A Micro-empirical Analysis of Land Fragmentation and Scale 
Economies in Rural China”, Yang, Y.Z., Tian, W.M., (eds) in China’s Agriculture at the 
Crossroads, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, 2000. 
  
Wang, G., “Ming foreign relations: Southeast Asia”, Mote and Twitchett (eds) in Cam-
bridge History of China, Vol. 8, The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Wang. J., “International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A 
Chinese Perspective”, in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Robinson, T.W. & 
Shambaugh, D., (eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 1997. 
 
Wang, J., Huang, J., Rozelle, S.,  Climate Change and China’s Agricultural Sector: An 
Overview of Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation, ICTSD–IPC Platform on Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Trade, Issue Brief No.5, International Centre for Trade and Sus-
tainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland and International Food & Agricultural Trade 
Policy Council, Washington DC, USA. 
 
Wang, Qingxin, “Cultural Norms and the Conduct of Chinese Foreign Policy”, in China’s 
International Relations in the 21st Century, Hu, Chan, & Zha (eds), University Press of 
America, New York, 2000. 
 
Wang Yuan-kang, “Managing Regional Hegemony in Historical Asia: The Case of Early 
Ming China,”  The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 129–153. 
 
Wang, Z., “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical 
Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China”, International Studies Quarterly, 2008, 
52, 783-806. 
 
Wedeman, A., “Stealing from the Farmers: Institutional Corruption and the 1992 IOU 
Crisis” The China Quarterly, No. 152 (Dec., 1997), pp. 805-831. 
 
Wen, S.C, Yu, Side, “China’s Agricultural Export and Import Behavior”, in Agriculture 
Trade and Policy in China, Rozelle & Sumner (eds), Ashgate Publishing, Burlington VT, 
2003. 
 
White, T., China’s Longest Campaign, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2006. 
 
Whiting, A.S., “Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis,” Annals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, Jan., 1959, pp. 100-111.  
 
Whiting, A.S., “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension”, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, 
No. 4 (Apr., 1997), pp. 299-322. 
 
354 
 
Wilber, C.K., “The Role of Agriculture in Soviet Economic Development”, Land Eco-
nomics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Feb., 1969), pp. 87-96 
 
Willmore, L., Cao, G.Y., Xin, L.J., “Determinants of Off-Farm Work and Temporary Mi-
gration in China”, Population and Environment, Vol 33, 2012, pp. 161-85. 
 
Wines, M., “Majority of Chinese Now Live in Cities”, New York Tim,es, 1/20/2012, 
www.nytimes/2012/01/18/world/asia/majority-of-chinese-now-live-in-cities.html  
 
Wittfogel, K.A., “Agrarian Problems and the Moscow-Peking Axis”, Slavic Review, Vol. 
21, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 678-698 
 
Womack, B., “Vietnam in 1995: Successes in Peace”, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 1, Jan., 
1996, pp. 73-82. 
 
Womack, B., “Recognition, Deference, and Respect:  Generalizing the Lessons of an 
Asymmetric Asian Order”, in Past and Present in China’s Foreign Policy, Wills, J. E. Jr. 
(ed), Merwin Asia, Portland, Maine, 2010. 
 
Womack, B., “Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System”, The Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 37–54. 
 
Womack, B., “Recognition, Deference, and Respect:  Generalizing the Lessons of an 
Asymmetric Asian Order”  in Willis Jr., J.E., (ed), Past and Present in China’s Foreign 
Policy, MerwinAsia, Portland Me., USA, 2010. 
 
Wong, J., Huang, Y., “China’s Food Security and its International Implications” 
China: An International Journal, Volume 10, Number 1, March 2012, 
pp. 113-124. 
 
Wong, J., “Chinese Demand for South-East Asian Rubber, 1949-72” The China Quar-
terly, No. 63 (Sep., 1975), pp. 490-514. 
 
Wong, R.B., China Transformed, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997. 
 
Wood, P., “Food Security and Chinese ‘Comprehensive National Security”, China Brief, 
March 2, 2017 
 
World Bank Development Indicators 1994 
 
World Food Program, “Contributions to WPF: Comparative Figures and Five-Year Ag-
gregate Ranking”, (as of April 17, 2016).  
 
355 
 
World Trade Organization, “Agreements on Agriculture”, 2003 Wrens, C., “Peking Pro-
tests Sale of U.S. Planes to Taiwan: China Issues Strong ...”, New York Times,  Jan 13, 
1982, p A1 ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Wrens, C., “China Lags on Buying U.S. Grain: China Fails to Meet U.S. Grain-Buying 
Quota”, New York Times, Sep 29, 1984, p 29. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 
 
Wu, Friedrich W. Y., “From Self-Reliance to Interdependence?: Developmental Strategy 
and Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao China”,  Modern China, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Oct., 
1981), pp. 445-482. 
 
Wu Xinbo, “Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior,” Journal 
of Contemporary China, 2001, 10:27, 293-301. 
 
WuDunn, S., “Chinese Angered by French Arms Sale to Taiwan”, New York Times,  Nov 
20, 1992, p. A12 ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
 
Xinhua Insight: “Twists and turns for Chinese SOEs abroad”, English.news.cn | 
20120928 
Xinhua, “China to Guarantee 120 mln ha Arable Land”, August 14, 2008.  Accessed Au-
gust 12, 2013. 
 
Xinhua, “Comment on the Chinese Implication of Overall Security View of Xi”, April, 4, 
2016. 
  
Yahuda, M.H., “China and Europe”, in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. 
Robinson, T.W. & Shambaugh, D., (eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 1997. 
 
Yahuda, M.H., “Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 36 (Oct. - Dec., 1968), pp. 93-113. 
 
Yahuda, M., “China’s Foreign Policy Comes of Age”, The International Spectator, Vol. 
42, No. 3, September 2007, 337–350. 
 
Yan, Y.,”Food Safety and Social Risk in Contemporary China”, The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 71, No. 3 (August 2012), pp. 705-729. 
 
You, J., Gan, H., Tang, K., Jia, L., & Niu, C., “Analysis of impact of South-to-North Wa-
ter Transfer Project on groundwater exploitation in north China.” Proceedings of the 
2011 World Environmental and Water Resources Congress; May 22. 26, 2011, American 
Society of Civil Engineers. 
 
Yu, B. & Fan, S., “Rice Production Responses in Cambodia,”  IFPRI Discussion Paper 
00939 December 2009. 
356 
 
 
Zagoria, D. S., “The Sino-Soviet conflict and the West”, Foreign Affairs ; Oct 1962; 41, 
pg. 171. 
 
Zagoria, D.S., “The Moscow-Beijing Détente”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Spring, 
1983), pp. 853-873. 
 
Zelin, M., “The Yung-Cheng Reign”, Peterson (ed) in Cambridge History of China, Vol. 
9, The Ch’ing Dynasty to 1800, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Zha, D., “The Politics of China-ASEAN Economic Relations: Assessing the Move to-
ward a Free Trade Area”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 26, No. 4, (2002), pp. 53- 82. 
 
Zha, D. and Zhang, H., “Food in China’s International Relations’, The Pacific Review, 
26:5, pp 455-479, 2013. 
 
Zhang Feng “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’:Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of 
Historical East Asian Politics”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, 2009, 
545–574 
Zhang Hongzhou, “China’s Food Security: Questioning the Numbers,”RSIS / Commen-
taries / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Non-Traditional Security 04 MAY 2011, CO11071 |  
 
Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan, “The Tributary System as International Society in The-
ory and Practice”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 3–36. 
 
Zhou, J., “Chinese Agrarian Capitalism in the Russian Far East”, Working Paper 13, 
BRICS Initiative for Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS), May, 2015 
 
Zuo, M., “China turning state-owned farms into agri-corporations to take on world play-
ers”, South China Morning Post, August, 4, 2014 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/arti-
cle/1573077/china uringstateownedfarmsagricorporationstakeworldplayers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
357 
 
VITA 
                                                        
   PAUL D. RITTENHOUSE 
 
   Born, Chicago Heights, Illinois 
 
1972   B.S. Business Administration 
University of Missouri 
Columbia, Missouri 
 
1973-1979                                      
 
 The Quaker Oats Company 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
1978   MBA Degree 
DePaul University 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
1979-1980   United Technologies 
Des Plaines, Illinois 
 
1980-1998   The Quaker Oats Company 
Chicago, Illinois / Hong Kong 
 
1999   Independent Consultant 
Hong Kong 
 
1999-2003   Avon Products Inc. 
Hong Kong 
 
2003-Present   Independent Investment Manager 
Pembroke Pines, Florida 
 
2008-2016   Ph.D. Candidate 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2012-Present   Adjunct Professor (part time) 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
